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INTRODUCTION
Acts perpetrated during the course of warfare have, through the ages, led to 
signifi cant environmental destruction. Th ese have included situations where 
the natural environment has intentionally been targeted as a ‘victim’, or has 
somehow been manipulated to serve as a ‘weapon’ of warfare. Until recently, 
such acts were generally regarded as an unfortunate but unavoidable element 
of armed confl ict, despite their potentially disastrous impacts. Th e existing 
legislative rules that purport to regulate such acts have largely been ineff ective 
and inappropriate, and have in practical terms done little to deter deliberate 
environmental destruction, particularly when measured against perceived 
military advantages. However, as the signifi cance of the environment has come 
to be more widely understood and recognised, such intentional destruction 
of the environment is no longer acceptable, particularly given the ongoing 
development of weapons capable of widespread and signifi cant damage.
Th is book, which is a revised and updated version of my PhD Dissertation 
submitted to the Faculty of Law at the University of Maastricht, represents the 
culmination of many years of contemplation of, and increasing concern for the 
state of the global environment. In 2003, I was invited to present a key note 
lecture on ‘Armed Confl ict and the Environment’ at the University of Stetson, 
Florida, when I was there as a Faculty Advisor of my own University’s moot 
court team participating in the world fi nals of the International Environmental 
Law Moot Court Competition. Th is talk sparked my desire to delve further 
into this topic. Given my research interests also in the areas of international 
criminal law and international humanitarian law, it seemed to me that the issue 
of intentional destruction of the environment during warfare was an area on 
which I should focus, particularly since it represents a point of intersection of 
all of these fi elds.
Several years later I approached my close friend and colleague, Professor Dr 
Andre Klip, who graciously agreed to take on the role of Principal Supervisor 
for my PhD dissertation on this topic. I enrolled as a part-time PhD candidate 
at the University of Maastricht, and thus began a lengthy period of research and 
writing, unfortunately punctuated by several lengthy periods of inactivity as a 
result of my responsibilities as Professor of International Law at the University 
of Western Sydney, as well as other research related activities at a number of 
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institutions and international associations. Yet, eventually, this project was 
completed although, in my view, it only represents a ‘work in progress’ and a 
small stepping stone towards the broader goal of enhancing and incorporating 
more appropriate international regulatory frameworks designed to prevent all 
forms of deliberate destruction of the natural environment.
Th is book therefore examines the current international legal regime relevant to 
the intentional destruction of the environment during warfare, and argues that 
such acts should, in appropriate circumstances, be recognised as an international 
crime and be subject to more eff ective rules giving rise to international criminal 
responsibility. It also suggests a framework as to how this might be achieved.
In essence, this book focuses on the following issues:
(a) To what extent do treaty and customary principles of international law 
currently address the intentional destruction of the environment during 
warfare?
(b) Is the current position suffi  cient to allow for criminal accountability for such 
acts in appropriate circumstances?
(c) What function should the mechanisms of justice under international 
criminal law, in particular the International Criminal Court, play in 
addressing this issue?
(d) Is it therefore necessary to amend the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court in order to more appropriately deal with what might be 
referred to as ‘crimes against the environment’?
As one would expect, there are a number of people to whom I owe sincere 
thanks. Professor Dr Andre Klip and Dr David Roef were the most challenging 
and stimulating supervisors one could possibly hope for. Whilst there were times 
when I thought that they were too demanding, I eventually came to understand 
how incredibly insightful and helpful their comments and criticisms were. I have 
learnt a lot from them, not only with respect to legal expertise and research, but 
also in terms of research supervision. Th ese are lessons that I now try to emulate 
when I myself supervise PhD candidates. Th ank you Andre and David for your 
support, patience and friendship – I am most grateful.
I also acknowledge and thank the members of the Assessment Committee for 
my PhD Dissertation, and for their valuable and challenging comments and 
suggestions.
Th ere are two people who, over the years, have guided me and provided me with 
the inspiration to continue and expand upon my research and teaching activities 
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– H.E. Judge Errki Kourula at the International Criminal Court and H.E. Judge 
Abdul Koroma, for many years a judge at the International Court of Justice. 
Both of these Judges have encouraged me to pursue this research and I am very 
honoured to regard them as close friends. Th ey continue to provide perfect role 
models for all persons concerned with making the world a better and more just 
place.
I am also grateful to the many people and organizations I have met along the way 
who share a common concern with me as regards the need for greater protection 
of the environment, and who off ered me the opportunity to present my views 
on this topic publicly. I should mention in particular Werner Wouter and his 
colleagues at the Institute for Environmental Security in Th e Hague, the T.M.C. 
Asser Institute, and a broad range of colleagues involved in the ‘End Ecocide’ 
campaign. Th e feedback I have received from my various discussions with these 
and many other institutions has been invaluable.
I would also like to thank my colleagues at the School of Law at University of 
Western Sydney, and my Dean, Professor Michael Adams, for their support 
in enabling me to fi t the time in to complete this project alongside my other 
activities at that institution.
I also acknowledge the generous fi nancial support I received from the 
European Commission as a Marie Curie International Fellow (2013–2014), 
and the stimulating research environments made available to me as a Visiting 
Professor at both the iCourts Centre of Excellence for International Courts at the 
University of Copenhagen, and at the University of Vienna.
I owe thanks also to my publishers, Intersentia, and in particular Hans Kluwer 
and Tom Scheirs, for their support with regard not only to the publication of 
this book, but also to an ongoing book series, Annotated Leading Cases of 
International Criminal Tribunals, of which I have the privilege of being a 
Co-Editor along with Andre Klip.
Of course, thanks also go to my family. My dear 93-year old father Lou, my 
brother Michael and his family, and my in-laws John and Charlotte, have always 
been so supportive and understanding of the travel-related and other demands 
I have placed upon myself, and have been there for me whenever possible. Th is 
book is also dedicated to my mother Blanka, who passed away in 2010.
Research projects such as this are heavily time-consuming and require the writer 
to be selfi sh and utilise whatever time is available for overly-indulgent purposes 
– time that should instead be spent with loved ones and friends. I am so lucky 
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to be married to the kindest, most loving and wonderful person, Donna, and 
to share with her the joy and love of Becky and my own daughter Michaela. 
My greatest thanks and love are reserved for these three amazing people. Th ey 
represent everything that is good in the world.
Steven Freeland
Sydney, January 2015
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CHAPTER ONE
THE IMPERATIVE TO REGULATE 
THE INTENTIONAL DESTRUCTION 
OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
DURING WARFARE UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
1.1. INTRODUCTION – INTENTIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION 
AS A PART OF WARFARE
History has been witness to many deliberate acts  aimed at destroying the natural 
environment in order to achieve strategic goals and safeguard State sovereignty 
during the course of a military confl ict. Herodotus described how, in the fi ft h 
century BC, the retreating Scythians scorched the earth and poisoned the water 
wells in an eff ort to slow the advancing Persian army led by Darius. In 146 BC, 
Roman troops razed the city of Carthage and poisoned the surrounding soil 
with salt to prevent its future fertilisation.
In August 1945, we witnessed the overwhelmingly destructive capability of 
weapons technology when the United States detonated two atomic bombs 
over the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, resulting in massive loss of life 
and environmental destruction.1 During the Vietnam War, the United States 
implemented ‘Operation Ranch Hand’ to devastating eff ect to destroy vegetation 
used by the enemy for cover and sustenance, through the use of chemicals such 
as Agent Orange.2
1 Th e bombing of Nagasaki was described as a ‘war crime’ by one of Japan’s most senior 
politicians, Shoichi Nakagawa, the then policy chief of the ruling Liberal Democratic 
Party: Chris Hogg, ‘Nagasaki bombing labeled a crime’ (18  December 2006) BBC News 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacifi c/6189489.stm> at 18 January 2015.
2 It has been estimated that Operation Ranch Hand destroyed 8 per cent of Vietnam’s 
croplands, 14 per cent of its forests, and 50 per cent of its swamp areas: Ensign Florencio 
J. Yuzon, ‘Deliberate Environmental Modifi cation Th rough the Use of Chemical and 
Biological Weapons: “Greening” the Environmental Laws of Armed Confl ict to Establish an 
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More recently still, few can forget the haunting images of over 700 burning 
Kuwaiti oil well heads, which had been deliberately ignited by retreating Iraqi 
forces towards the end of the Gulf War in 1991 – a scene that was likened to 
‘Dante’s Inferno’.3 Th ese actions galvanized the international community to 
address deliberate attacks on the environment during armed confl ict,4 and 
gave rise to almost universal condemnation.5 Th e then German Chancellor, 
Helmut Kohl, for example, asserted that this constituted a ‘crime against the 
environment’.6
Following the conclusion of the Gulf War, the Saddam Hussein regime, in 
retaliation for what it saw as the support by the Ma’dan, or Marsh Arabs, for 
an uprising against his government, built barriers and levees to drain the 
al-Hawizeh and al-Hammar marshes in southern Iraq, an area some believe 
to be the site of the biblical Garden of Eden.7 Th is eff ectively destroyed the 
livelihood of the 500,000  Marsh Arabs who had inhabited the area of this 
unique ecosystem.8 Saddam Hussein and eleven other members of his former 
regime were subsequently indicted by the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal 
(Iraqi Special Tribunal) to face charges that, in part, related to these acts of 
environmental destruction.9 However, they did not include specifi c reference to 
environmental ‘crimes’, even though the Iraqi Special Tribunal Statute includes 
an express reference to damage to the natural environment.10
Environmentally Protective Regime’ (1996) 11 American University Journal of International 
Law and Policy 793, 795–6.
3 Phillip Elmer-Dewitt, ‘A Man-Made Hell on Earth’, Time (London), 18 March 1999, 36.
4 Jessica E. Seacor, ‘Environmental Terrorism: Lessons from the Oil Fires of Kuwait’ (1994) 10 
American University Journal of International Law and Policy 481, 488.
5 For example, shortly aft erwards, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
called for the establishment of a war crimes tribunal to prosecute those responsible for ‘this 
disgraceful attack on the environment’: Anthony Leibler, ‘Deliberate Wartime Environmental 
Damage: New Challenges for International Law’ (1992) 23 California Western International 
Law Journal 67, 68.
6 Helmut Kohl, Statement by the German Chancellor, Bulletin (Bonn), 9 April 1991, 255.
7 David Blair, ‘Toll of Infamy: Regime Killed 2 Million’, Th e Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 
16 December 2003, 8.
8 Perhaps as few as 20,000 of the Ma’dan were left  in what remained of the wetlands on the eve of 
the March 2003 invasion of Iraq by United States-led forces: Heather Sharp, ‘Iran’s ‘devastated’ 
Marsh Arabs’, BBC News, 3 March, 2003 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2807821.stm> 
at 18 January 2015. For a discussion of the possible prosecution of those responsible for this act, 
see Tara Weinstein, ‘Prosecuting Attacks that Destroy the Environment: Environmental Crimes 
or Humanitarian Atrocities?’ (2005) 17 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 
697, 714–22.
9 On 30 December 2006, Saddam Hussein was executed, following the death sentence imposed 
by the Iraqi Special Tribunal, for crimes against humanity in the Shia town of Dujail, where 
148 Shia villagers were tortured and killed in reprisal for an assassination attempt against 
Saddam in 1982.
10 Th e Iraqi Special Tribunal had jurisdiction over ‘any Iraqi national or resident’ accused of 
committing the crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or violations of 
certain Iraqi laws between 17 July 1968 and 1 May 2003: Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal 
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It has been estimated by Human Rights Watch that, during the course of the 
2003 invasion of Iraq, United States and British forces used almost 13,000 
cluster bombs11 – containing almost two million munitions – and over 
1.9 tonnes of depleted uranium,12 causing very signifi cant environmental 
damage, the extent of which may still not be known for a considerable period 
of time.13
Even now the world is still witnessing a continuing humanitarian and 
environmental catastrophe in the western region of Darfur in Sudan,14 which 
has seen the poisoning of vital water wells and drinking water installations,15 
as part of a deliberate government-supported strategy by the Arab Janjaweed 
Militia to eliminate or displace the ethnic black Africans living in that region. 
Th ere had been calls for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to charge 
2003, article 10 (English version reproduced in Al-Waqai Al-Iraqiya, Offi  cial Gazette of Iraq, 
Volume 44 <www.loc.gov/law/help/hussein/docs/CoalitionProvisionalAuthorityOrder48en.
pdf> at 18  January 2015). Th e respective defi nitions of the crimes of genocide, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity in the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal (articles  11–13) 
are based on those that appear in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3; 37 ILM 999 (entered into force 1 July 2002)) 
(Rome Statute). Article 13(b)(5) of the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal is identical with 
article  8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute, which relates to ‘widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment’, and is discussed in chapter 4.
11 On 30 May 2008, at a conference in Dublin, 107 States adopted the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions, opened for signature 3 December 2008, 48 ILM 357 (entered into force 1 August 
2010), which imposes restrictions on the use, development and stockpiling of certain types of 
cluster bombs.
12 Pekka Haavisto, in Symposium, ‘Th e International Responses to the Environmental Impacts 
of War’ (2005) 17 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 565, 581.
13 Depleted uranium is a by-product of the process of ‘uranium enrichment’, which involves 
the separation of the three diff erent uranium isotopes (uranium-238, uranium-235 and 
uranium-234) as a preliminary step towards the use of nuclear fi ssion as a source of energy 
(uranium-235 is the most suitable for nuclear fi ssion): Erik V. Koppe, Th e Use of Nuclear 
Weapons and the Protection of the Environment During International Armed Confl ict (2006), 
18.
14 In early 2013, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees estimated that there 
were approximately 2.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), 140,000 refugees, 
7,000 asylum-seekers, and hundreds of thousands persons at risk of statelessness in 
Sudan, much of it due to the ongoing confl ict in the Darfur region: United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees, ‘2013 UNHCR country operations profi le – Sudan’ 
(2013) <www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483b76.html> at 22  June 2013. See also ‘U.S. 
Warns Sudan Death Toll Could Reach 300,000 To 1 Million’ (3  June 2004) UN Wire 
<http://medilinkz.org/news/news2.asp?NewsID=6776> at 27 March 2007.
15 See United Nations Commission on Human Rights, ‘Report of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and Follow-Up to the World Conference on Human Rights: 
Situation of Human Rights in Darfur Region of the Sudan’ (7 May 2004) E/CN.4/2005/3, para 
50 and 73.
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Sudanese offi  cials with ‘environmental crimes’,16 but this has not happened, 
although other charges have been laid.17
1.2. IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION 
ON HUMAN SECURITY AND CONFLICT
Th e examples referred to above indicate how the intentional destruction of the 
environment has already been a part of many warfare situations, even though 
such destruction can have widespread and long lasting impacts. Th is section 
discusses a number of these impacts, thus highlighting the signifi cance of having 
access to appropriate regulatory measures to restrict and prosecute such acts.
Th e intentional destruction of the environment can have catastrophic eff ects, not 
only in human, but also in ecological terms. For example, nuclear, biological and 
chemical weapons, as well as potentially killing many thousands of people, have 
eff ects that may persist for the environment, in some cases indefi nitely.18 Such 
acts may also represent a breach of the fundamental human rights of the targeted 
individuals.19 Th e relationship between human security and a safe and habitable 
environment is vital, particularly in relation to access to natural resources.
Another equally signifi cant, but perhaps not yet fully understood, link between 
the environment and human confl ict is that access to natural resources – or 
the lack of access – can itself be the trigger for confl ict. In both the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Haiti, the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) has reported that environmental damage has been a major cause of 
16 Katy Glassborow, ‘Court urged to consider environmental crimes’, Institute for War and Peace 
Reporting (United Kingdom), 30 August 2007 <http://iwpr.net/?p=acr&s=f&o= 338199& apc_
state=henh#> at 25 March 2013.
17 In March 2005, the United Nations Security Council referred the situation in Darfur to 
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court pursuant to article  13(b) of the Rome 
Statute: see United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593 (31  March 2005) UN Doc S/
RES/1593/2005 (Algeria, Brazil, China, United States abstaining). Th ere are currently fi ve 
cases at the Court relating to the situation in Darfur. However, the current ICC Prosecutor, 
Fatou Bensouda, has recently announced that she is ‘suspending’ the investigation into the 
matter: David Smith, ‘ICC Chief Prosecutor shelves Darfur war crime probe’, Th e Guardian 
(UK), 14  December 2014, <www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/14/icc-darfur-war-
crimes-fatou-bensouda-sudan> at 18 January 2015.
18 Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, 
Biological and Chemical Arms (2006), 22.
19 For example, Principle 1 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment (16 June 1972) UN Doc A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (Stockholm Declaration) provides 
that ‘[m]an has the fundamental right to freedom, equality, and adequate conditions of life, in 
an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being’.
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political unrest and confl ict.20 It has been estimated that, during the 1990s, 
approximately fi ve million people were killed in armed confl icts that related 
to the exploitation of natural resources,21 and that one quarter of the 50 active 
armed confl icts in 2001 were largely ‘motivated’ by resources.22
In 1990, a research team at the University of Toronto concluded that, in 
countries as diverse as Haiti, Pakistan, the Philippines and South Africa, 
‘severe environmental stress multiplied the pain caused by such problems 
as ethnic strife and poverty’.23 A water expert has predicted that, in regions 
initially experiencing low-level confl ict, the risk of escalation to full-scale civil 
war approximately doubled immediately following a year of abnormally low 
rainfall.24 In similar vein, in 2004, the United Nations High-Level Panel on 
Th reats, Challenges, and Change concluded that:25
[p]overty, infectious diseases, environmental degradation and war feed one another 
in a deadly cycle … Environmental stress … can contribute to civil violence.
In addition, environmental degradation results in increasing numbers of 
refugees. Th e United Nations High Commission for Refugees estimated 
that, at the end of 2011, 42.5 million people worldwide were considered as 
forcibly displaced as a result of confl ict or persecution, including 15.2 million 
refugees.26 In an interview following the release of an earlier (2008) report, the 
High Commissioner, António Guterres, stated that climate change led to the 
dislocation of people ‘by provoking confl icts over increasingly scarce resources, 
20 Alister Doyle, ‘UN Aims to Study Link Between Environment, Wars’, reproduced in United 
Nations Environment Programme, ‘Th e Environment in the News’, 14 January 2004.
21 Rudy S. Salo, ‘When the Logs Roll Over: Th e Need for an International Convention 
Criminalizing Involvement in the Global Illegal Timber Trade’ (2003) 16 Georgetown 
International Environmental Law Review 127, 142.
22 David R. Francis, ‘Fuelling the Fire: “Resource Wars” Spurred by Assets of Developing 
Nations’, Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 6 December 2002, A3.
23 Th omas Homer-Dixon, ‘Terror in the Weather Forecast’, Th e New York Times (New 
York), 24  April 2007, <www.nytimes.com/2007/04/24/opinion/24homer-dixon.html?_
r=1&th&emc=th&oref=s login> at 18 January 2015. Th e author of that article led the research 
team.
24 Professor Charles Vörösmarty, ‘Drought as a Contributor to Civil War: Results from a Global 
Spatial Analysis’, speech delivered at seminar entitled ‘Climate-Security Connections: An 
Empirical Approach to Risk Assessment’, Washington DC, USA, 6 March 2007.
25 Report of the High-Level Panel on Th reats, Challenges, and Change, ‘A More Secure World: 
Our Shared Responsibility’ (1 December 2004), para 22, UN Doc A/59/565 (2004).
26 United Nations High Commission for Refugees, ‘2011 Global Trends: A Year of Crisis’ (2012) 
<www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=4fd6f87f9&query=
Global%20Trends> at 25 March 2013.
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such as water’ and that its impact on the environment ‘was a trigger of extreme 
poverty and confl ict’.27
Th e Iran-Iraq War, the events in Kuwait at the end of the 1991 Gulf War, and the 
confl icts in African countries such as Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Liberia, all serve to illustrate how armed confl ict that is (partially) 
driven by disputes over natural resources can subsequently result in signifi cant 
destruction to the natural environment.28 In the latter cases, not only were 
the confl icts fought over natural resources, but the resources themselves (for 
example, timber and diamonds) became sources of funding for the combating 
parties, to be used to acquire weapons for the confl ict. In 2002, a panel of experts 
appointed by the United Nations Security Council concluded that many of the 
serious crimes committed in the Democratic Republic of Congo were both in aid 
of, and fi nanced by, the profi ts of the illegal appropriation of natural resources in 
that country.29
Th ese examples illustrate a phenomena sometimes referred to as ‘asset wars’, 
where the economic value of natural resources serves to fuel or trigger confl ict. 
Exploitation of these resources represents a source of funding for military 
activities, giving rise to an unvirtuous circle.30 Th e misuse of natural resources 
such as diamonds, or the scarcity of resources like water, may facilitate potential 
confl ict, a situation which then becomes self-perpetuating and protracted.31 
Environmental degradation can thus be both a cause and a consequence of 
armed confl ict. In addition, during the course of confl ict there are further 
‘knock-on’ eff ects fl owing from environmental destruction arising from the 
actions of the combatants.32
27 Julian Borger, ‘Confl icts fuelled by climate change causing new refugee crisis, warns UN’, Th e 
Guardian (London), 17 June 2008, 15.
28 Betsy Baker, ‘Legal Protections for the Environment in Times of Armed Confl ict’ (1993) 33 
Virginia Journal of International Law 351, 351.
29 United Nations Security Council, ‘Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal 
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo’ (16 October 2002) UN Doc: S/2002/1146.
30 Aaron Ezekiel, ‘Th e Application of International Criminal Law to Resource Exploitation: 
Ituri, Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (2007) 47 Natural Resources Journal 225, 234.
31 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed 
Confl ict, UN Doc A/62/228, 13 August 2007, para 12. See also the section entitled ‘Diamonds’ 
in the Trial Chamber decision of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, Judgment, Prosecutor v. 
Charles Gankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03–01-T, Trial Chamber II, 18 May 2012, para 2046–
2173.
32 See Stephanie Nebehay, ‘Dirty Water Provokes Hepatitis Outbreak in Darfur’, Reliefweb, 
9  August 2004 <http://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-dirty-water-provokes-hepatitis-
outbreak-darfur> at 18 January 2015, who describes how the refugee camps that were set up 
in Darfur as a result of the confl ict in that region are struggling with additional problems 
from the lack of safe drinking water.
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Moreover, the very nature of armed confl ict and its adverse eff ects on the 
livelihood of communities and destruction of the natural environment fuel 
a spiralling vicious cycle of poverty and further violence, leaving desperate 
individuals, who are oft en children, with no choice but to themselves become 
active participants in the confl icts and to off er their services to a ‘cause’.33 Th is 
contributes to the tragically high number of ‘child soldiers’ now engaged in 
armed confl ict.34
While there is, of course, much more work to be done to accurately determine 
the nature and extent of the link between environmental degradation, poverty 
and political and social confl ict, the logic of some form of connection appears 
undeniable. In 1992, the United Nations Security Council concluded that:35
[t]he absence of war and military confl icts amongst States does not in itself 
ensure international peace and security. Th e non-military sources of instability 
in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fi elds have become threats to 
international peace and security. Th e United Nations membership as a whole needs 
to give the highest priority to the solution of these matters.
Th is also indicates how environmental degradation can lead to social upheaval 
and tensions, thus representing a threat to national security.36 Th is is one reason 
why combatants in a confl ict may seek to intentionally ‘target’ the environment. 
Many States now view environmental concerns ‘in strategic terms’.37 It has 
even been suggested that the world is ‘only one international environmental 
disaster that implicates environmental security away from’ the development of 
customary rules that may permit the legal use of ‘environmental armed force’ as 
33 Steven Freeland, ‘Mere Children or Weapons of War – Child Soldiers and International Law’ 
(2008) 29 University of La Verne Law Review 19, 27–8.
34 In a 2004 report, the NGO Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers found that children 
were ‘fi ghting in almost every major confl ict, in both government and opposition forces’. In 
addition to an estimated 300,000 children who engage in actual military confl ict, another 
500,000 are ‘conscripted’ into paramilitary organisations, guerrilla groups and civil militias 
in over 85 countries: see also Steven Freeland, ‘Child Soldiers and International Crimes 
– How Should International Law be Applied?’ (2005) 3 New Zealand Journal of Public and 
International Law 303, 304.
35 United Nations Security Council, ‘Note by the President of the Security Council’ (31 January 
1992) Presidential Statement S/23500, quoted in Catherine Tinker, ‘Environmental Security’ 
in Th e United Nations: Not a Matter for the Security Council’ (1992) 59 Tennessee Law Revue 
787, 787 (emphasis added).
36 Jutta Brunneé, ‘Environmental Security in the Twenty-First Century: New Momentum for 
the Development of International Environmental Law’ (1995) 18 Fordham International Law 
Journal 1742, 1742.
37 Rymn James Parsons, ‘Th e Fight to Save the Planet: U.S. Armed Forces, “Greenkeeping,” and 
Enforcement of the Law Pertaining to Environmental Protection During Armed Confl ict’ 
(1998) 10 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 441, 444.
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a legitimate exercise of the right of self-defence, in order to avert environmental 
destruction.38
Th e United Nations plays an increasing role in addressing deliberate 
environmental degradation. On 5  November 2001, the General Assembly 
declared 6 November of each year as the ‘International Day for Preventing the 
Exploitation of the Environment in War and Armed Confl ict’.39 As indicated, 
the increasing threats posed by a lack of environmental security adds support to 
the view that the Security Council might more frequently act under its Chapter 
VII powers within the United Nations Charter40 to address environmental 
issues.41 Th ese might extend to coercive measures under article 41, and perhaps 
even the use of military force under article 42, to counter environmental threats, 
although such action may itself give rise to environmental destruction.42 In 
a 2002 report on the ‘Prevention of Armed Confl ict’, the then United Nations 
Secretary-General Kofi  Annan highlighted the role that the General Assembly 
could also play in addressing the ‘confl ict prevention dimension’ of a number of 
concerns, including ‘environmental degradation’.43
In the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project Case, the International Court of Justice 
acknowledged that Hungary’s concerns relating to damage to its environment 
constituted an ‘essential interest’ of that country, within the context of the 
international law defence of necessity.44 Moreover, the eff ects of environmental 
destruction can have transboundary consequences, thus undermining the 
security of neighbouring countries, regions, and even the broader international 
community.
Of course, it must be noted that, even where man-made environmental damage 
is not caused within a confl ict situation, the impacts may still resonate in terms 
of future warfare. In April 2007, the Security Council held its fi rst ever debate on 
the impact of climate change on international peace and security.45 Th at same 
38 Michael K. Murphy, ‘Note: Achieving Economic Security with Swords as Ploughshares: Th e 
Modern Use of Force to Combat Environmental Degradation’ (1999) 39 Virginia Journal of 
International Law Association 1181, 1214 and 1219.
39 See Steven Freeland, ‘Destroying the environment is also a war crime’, Th e Canberra Times 
(Canberra), 6 November 2008, 23.
40 See United Nations Charter, articles 39–51.
41 Murphy, supra note 38, 1198.
42 Alexandra Knight, ‘Global Environmental Th reats: Can the Security Council Protect Our 
Earth?’ (2005) 80:5 New York University Law Review 1549, 1553.
43 Report of the Secretary-General, Kofi  A. Annan, ‘Prevention of Armed Confl ict’ (2002), para 
29.
44 Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 53.
45 See United Nations Security Council, ‘Security Council Hold First-Ever Debate on Impact 
of Climate Change on Peace, Security, Hearing Over 50 Speakers’ (17 April 2007) UN Doc 
SC/9000 <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9000.doc.htm> at 18 January 2015.
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month, 11 retired United States generals and admirals released a report,46 in 
which they argued that the environmental impacts of climate change constituted 
a ‘threat multiplier’ in fragile parts of the world, which would ‘exacerbat[e] 
conditions that lead to failed states – the breeding grounds for extremism and 
terrorism’.47 Th ey highlighted the examples of Darfur and Somalia as confl icts 
arising from scarce natural resources.48 Th ese sentiments were supported by 
the Military Advisory Council of the Institute for Environmental Security 
(comprising a group of serving and retired military offi  cers from Africa, 
Asia, Europe, Latin America and the United States), which, in October 2009, 
highlighted the ‘confl ict and instability implications of climate change’.49
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has said that the eff ects of 
climate change were partly to blame for the ongoing confl ict in Darfur.50 
Shortly aft er his inauguration as President of the United States in January 2009, 
Barack Obama spoke of the risk of ‘violent confl ict’ stemming from unchecked 
global warming.51 Th e NGO Christian Aid has predicted that up to one billion 
people could be forced to leave their homes over the next 50 years as a result of 
widespread environmental degradation caused by climate change.52
Th e importance of these factors was affi  rmed as early as 1972 in the Stockholm 
Declaration – a landmark instrument described as representing ‘the birth of 
international environmental law’53 – which provided that:54
[t]o defend and improve the human environment for present and future generations 
has become an imperative goal for mankind – a goal to be pursued together with, and 
in harmony with, the established and fundamental goals of peace and of world-wide 
economic and social development
46 Th e CNA Corporation, ‘National Security and the Th reat of Climate Change’ (April 2007) 
<www.cna.org/sites/default/fi les/news/FlipBooks/Climate%20Change%20web/fl ipviewerxpress.
html> at 18 January 2015.
47 ‘Warming and Global Security’, Th e New York Times (Editorial), 20  April 2007 <www.
nytimes.com/2007/04/20/opinion/20fri2.html> at 18 January 2015.
48 Ed Pilkington, ‘UK to raise climate talks as security council issue’, Th e Guardian (London), 
16 April 2007, 8.
49 Institute for Environmental Security, Military Advisory Council, ‘Climate Change and the 
Military – First Statement of the Military Advisory Council’ (29 October 2009), para 6.
50 ‘U.N chief: Darfur a victim of climate change’ (16  June 2007) NBC News <www.nbcnews.
com/id/19268452/#.UU8qVFf-jdc> at 18 January 2015.
51 Andrew C. Revkin, ‘Bush’s environmental legacy in play: Obama reshaping some policies and 
building on others: Climate Change’, Th e International Herald Tribune (Paris), 7–8 February 
2009, 5.
52 John Vidal, ‘Climate may force 1 billion from their homes’, Th e Sydney Morning Herald 
(Sydney), 15  May 2007 <www.smh.com.au/news/environment/climate-may-force-1-billion-
from-their-homes/2007/05/14/1178995077364.html> at 18 January 2015.
53 Yuzon, supra note 2, 97.
54 Stockholm Declaration, preamble para 6.
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Th e general discussion above highlights the signifi cance of the state of the 
natural environment and its potential relationship to armed confl ict in many 
circumstances. In some respects, the intentional destruction of the environment 
may be a precursor or trigger point for confl ict. In other circumstances, however, 
such intentional environmental damage may be perpetrated as a part of the 
conduct of warfare. Whilst we must, naturally, remain cognizant of the impacts 
of the former, it is the latter that this book is primarily concerned with, and 
which it seeks to address by way of more appropriate international regulation.
1.3. INTENTIONAL TARGETING OF THE 
ENVIRONMENT DURING WARFARE AND 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Notwithstanding (or perhaps because of) its signifi cance to human populations, 
the targeting of the environment has increasingly become a part of the conduct 
of armed confl ict. Such acts represent not only a feature of confl ict strategy, but 
also, as noted, a root cause for the further escalation of the confl ict itself.55 Given 
the increasingly diverse ways in which armed confl ict might be conducted, 
particularly in light of the development of weapons technology, there is even 
greater scope for environmental damage in future warfare, perhaps even in ways 
that we cannot at this time completely fathom.
As a consequence, for the purposes of considering what might represent 
appropriate regulation of such acts under international criminal law, the 
discussion that follows in this book assumes an expansive perspective of what is 
encompassed by ‘the environment’. When it comes to draft ing the specifi cs of a 
crime relating to intentional destruction of the environment during warfare (see 
chapter 5), a defi nition of the environment for the purposes of that crime will be 
proposed.
Actions taken during previous armed confl icts illustrate that the environment 
has been targeted as a ‘victim’ of armed confl ict – in the sense that it is 
deliberately damaged. It has also sometimes been utilized as a ‘weapon’ of 
warfare to secure a military advantage.
For example, the intentional setting alight of the Kuwaiti oil wells in 1991 
highlighted vividly how the environment can become a victim of warfare. Th is 
55 Myron N. Nordquist, ‘Panel Discussion on International Environmental Crimes: Problems of 
Enforceable Norms and Accountability’ (1997) 3 ILSA Journal of International Law 697.
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act deliberately targeted the environment and led to signifi cant damage. On the 
other hand, the deliberate manipulation or modifi cation of the environment – 
for example, American military eff orts to alter natural weather patterns so as to 
cause unusual fl ooding through rainfall during the Vietnam War – illustrates 
how the environment could be utilized as a weapon in order to seek a military 
advantage.
Such acts, both in the sense of the environment as a victim but also when utilized 
as a weapon, have been described as ‘environmental warfare.’56 Both represent 
not only an unacceptable approach towards the environment, but also may 
result in irreversible and unpredictable consequences, irrespective of the manner 
in which the environment is involved. It is submitted that both aspects of 
environmental damage should be appropriately regulated, and that the existing 
legal frameworks are inadequate in this regard.
Moreover, the long-term environmental costs of warfare – both in terms 
of economic57 as well as health and safety58 terms – are oft en impossible to 
determine for a considerable period of time, and may escalate dramatically 
beyond the immediate short-term impacts.59 Following the 1999 bombing of 
Serbia and Kosovo by NATO forces (Operation Allied Force), the Government 
of Yugoslavia60 initiated proceedings in the International Court of Justice 
against ten NATO member States, seeking an order for provisional measures. 
In its pleadings, the applicant alleged that the NATO States had violated their 
obligation ‘to protect the environment’ and were directly responsible for 
56 See, for example, Mansour Jabbari-Gharabagh, ‘Type of State Responsibility for 
Environmental Matters in International Law’ (1999) 33 Revue Juridique Th emis 59, 98. 
Th e author (at 98) also quotes Richard Falk, who has defi ned ‘environmental warfare’ as 
‘including all those weapons and tactics which … intend to destroy the environment per se …’
57 Up until 2007, when it completed its payments to individuals, the United Nations 
Compensation Commission established to deal with claims, including environmental 
damage, arising from the actions taken by Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War, had received more 
than 2.6 million claims from nearly 100 States, on behalf of their nationals, corporations 
and/or themselves, seeking a total of approximately US$352 billion in compensation: United 
Nations Compensation Commission, ‘Th e Claims’ <www.uncc.ch/theclaims.htm> at 21 June 
2013.
58 Th e State-owned Pancevo petrochemical plant near Belgrade was damaged during Operation 
Allied Force, resulting in serious pollution and threats to human health, including abnormal 
levels of bronchitis, as well as cancers and leukemia: see Aaron Schwabach, ‘NATO’S War in 
Kosovo and the Final Report to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia’ (2001) 9 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 167, 174 
and the corresponding footnotes.
59 Th e immediate impact of environmental destruction may give rise to lack of food and the 
outbreak of disease and, in the longer term, whole communities may be destroyed.
60 Th e name of the Applicant in these proceedings subsequently became ‘Serbia and 
Montenegro’. In 2006, those areas separated to become two independent countries.
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signifi cant environmental damage. Th e applicant alleged, among other things, 
that:61
[t]he bombing of oil refi neries and oil storage tanks as well as chemical plants is 
bound to produce massive pollution of the environment, posing a threat to human 
life, plants and animals. Th e use of weapons containing depleted uranium warheads 
is having far-reaching consequences for human health
Th e substance of these claims was not considered by the Court,62 but they do 
refl ect the potential gravity of assertions that a party to an armed confl ict has 
engaged in intentional environmental destruction.63 Yet, environmental damage 
undoubtedly has been overlooked when assessing the toll wrought by warfare.64 
Th is approach is not sustainable, particularly, as noted, in light of the ongoing 
development of weapons with unimaginable and ever increasing destructive 
capability.65
It is submitted, therefore, that the deliberate nature of such actions requires 
stringent legal regulation and accountability. Th e relevant legal measures must 
‘stigmatise’ such acts, so as to properly refl ect the unsustainable risks they 
entail. Intentional damage to the environment during armed confl ict cannot be 
regarded as immaterial or of secondary importance. Th e International Court of 
61 Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. France) (Request for the Indication of Provisional 
Measures submitted by Applicant, 28  April 1999) para 3 <www.icj-cij.org/docket/
fi les/105/10545.pdf> at 19 January 2015.
62 On 2  June 1999, the International Court of Justice dismissed, on jurisdictional grounds, 
the cases brought by Yugoslavia against Spain (Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain) 
(Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures)) [1999] ICJ Rep 761, and against United 
States of America (Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America) (Request 
for Provisional Measures)) [1999] ICJ Rep 916. On 15 December 2004, the Court held that it 
did not have jurisdiction to entertain the remaining eight claims: see, for example, Legality of 
Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium) (Preliminary Objections, Judgment) [2004] 
ICJ Rep 328, para 129.
63 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Humanitarian Law and the Environment’ (2000) 28 Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy 265, 274.
64 A committee established by the Offi  ce of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to consider whether any crimes falling within 
the jurisdiction of that Tribunal had been committed by NATO forces during Operation 
Allied Force failed to consider the full environmental consequences of the operation: Steven 
Freeland, ‘Th e Bombing of Kosovo and the Milosevic Trial: Refl ections on Some Legal Issues’ 
[2002] Australian International Law Journal 150, 164. Th e committee’s report is discussed in 
subsequent chapters.
65 For example, it has been asserted that tens of thousands of children born in Vietnam to 
war veterans and exposed civilians shortly aft er the Vietnam war had physical and mental 
deformities that could be directly linked to the widespread spraying of the herbicide Agent 
Orange by the United States, as well as the continuing presence in the destroyed regions of its 
poisonous residue, dioxin: Seth Mydans, ‘Vietnam Sees War’s Legacy in Its Young’, Th e New 
York Times (New York), 16  May 1999, <www.nytimes.com/1999/05/16/world/vietnam-sees-
war-s-legacy-in-its-young.html> at 19 January 2015.
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Justice has affi  rmed that, ‘the environment is not an abstraction but represents 
the living space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings, 
including generations unborn’.66 Th is is a truism even during times of warfare.
Of course, warfare by its very nature results in damage to the natural 
environment, as well as to other ‘protected sites’.67 However, this alone cannot 
be justifi cation for the intentional targeting of the environment. Th e increasing 
concern regarding the state of the environment and the need for a system of 
greater culpability for intentional environmental destruction has previously 
given rise to proposed crimes such as ‘ecocide’68 and ‘geocide’,69 as well as calls 
for an Ecocide Convention, to be enforced by an International Environmental 
Court.70 Whilst these proposals have generally not been limited to situations 
of armed confl ict, they are demonstrative of the need to at least address those 
circumstances more comprehensively. Th e appropriate regulation of unjustifi ed 
damage to the environment during armed confl ict has been described as the 
‘unmet challenge of the 20th century’.71
It is argued in this book that the most appropriate method to address the issue is 
not through environmental protection measures but rather under international 
criminal law (although it is hoped that this will have positive consequences for 
66 Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 242, para 
29. See also Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, 
para 53.
67 For example, similar concerns arise from the deliberate destruction of cultural property 
during armed confl ict. Th e Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Confl ict (opened for signature 14  May 1954, 249 UNTS 240 (entered into 
force 7  August 1956)) (Cultural Property Convention), obligates States to refrain from any 
act of hostility directed against cultural property, and to abstain from using such property 
for military purposes. Th e Cultural Property Convention does not provide for international 
criminal responsibility, although article  28 does provide for the possibility of prosecution 
under national criminal jurisdiction: see also article 15 of the Second Protocol to the Hague 
Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Confl ict, 
opened for signature 26  March 1999, 38 ILM 769 (entered into force 9  March 2004). Some 
have argued that the deliberate destruction of important cultural property should be made 
a crime within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: see, for example, Robert 
Bevan, ‘Heritage caught in the crossfi re’, Th e Australian (Sydney), 24 March 2006, 15.
68 See, for example, Ludwik A. Teclaff , ‘Beyond Restoration – the Case of Ecocide’ (1994) 34 
Natural Resources Journal 933; Mark Allan Gray, ‘Th e International Crime of Ecocide’ (1996) 
26 California Western International Law Journal 215.
69 See, for example, Lynn Berat, ‘Defending the Right to a Healthy Environment: Toward a 
Crime of Geocide in International Law’ (1993) 11 Boston University International Law Journal 
327.
70 Mark A. Drumbl, ‘Waging War against the World: Th e Need to Move from War Crimes 
to Environmental Crimes’, in Jay E. Austin and Carl E. Bruch (eds), Th e Environmental 
Consequences of War: Legal, Economic, and Scientifi c Perspectives (2000), 620, 641.
71 Parsons, supra note 37, 442 and footnote 344.
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the environment), so that those who intentionally target the environment during 
armed confl ict can be made criminally liable.
Th is approach is both timely and appropriate. International criminal law has been 
developing rapidly, particularly over the past two decades. Th is has principally 
been through the operation of the United Nations ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals, as well as a number of ‘hybrid’ or ‘internationalised’ courts, 
established to deal with international crimes perpetrated during specifi c 
confl icts.72 More recently, of course, the world’s fi rst permanent international 
criminal institution, the ICC, was established in 2002. Th e development of this 
system of international criminal justice has been described as ‘one of the few 
bright spots in the recent history of international law.’73
Th e process of articulating the crimes that exist under international (criminal) 
law has generally been subject to the traditional principle of legality (nullum 
crimen sine lege), which is reiterated in the Rome Statute.74 Partially in 
response to arguments (which were inconclusively dealt with by the judges) by 
the defendants at the Nuremberg trials, that the ex post facto punishment of 
the crimes in the Charter of that Tribunal75 off ended the nullum crimen sine 
72 Th e United Nations ad hoc Tribunals are the ICTY (established by United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 827 (25  May 1993) UN Doc S/RES/827/1993 and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 
955 (8 November 1994) UN Doc S/RES/955/1994) (ICTR). In December 2010, the Mechanism 
for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT) was established to continue the ‘obligations and 
essential functions’ of the ICTR and the ICTY: United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1966 (22 December 2010) UN Doc S/Res/1966/2010 on the ICTY and ICTR. Th e ‘hybrid’ or 
‘internationalised’ criminal tribunals include those that operate or have operated in East 
Timor (established in 2000 by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET), pursuant to UNTAET Regulations 2000/11 and 2000/15 (6  March 2000 and 
6  June 2000 respectively)), Sierra Leone (established by an agreement between the United 
Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone dated 16  January 2002, pursuant to United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1315 (14 August 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1315/2000), and 
Cambodia (established by an agreement between the United Nations and the Government 
of Cambodia dated 6  June 2003, pursuant to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
57/228 B (13  May 2003) UN Doc A/RES/57/228 B. Th ere is also Th e Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon, which operates in Th e Netherlands and was established by United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1757 (30  May 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1757/2007 on the Situation in the 
Middle East.
73 Florian Jessberger and Julia Geneuss, ‘Down the Drain or Down to Earth? International 
Criminal Justice under Pressure’ (2013) 11 Journal of International Criminal Justice 501, 501.
74 See Rome Statute, article 22(1).
75 Charter of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, annexed to the 1945 London 
Agreement for the Establishment of an International Military Tribunal (8 August 1945) 82 
UNTS 279, article 6.
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lege principle,76 the ICTY was established to prosecute only crimes that were 
‘doubtless part of customary international law.’77
However, this may not always be the case,78 since the defi nition of the crimes 
specifi ed in (one of) the statutes of the international criminal tribunals may 
diff er from the crime as it existed at the relevant time under customary 
international law. In addition, the development of these crimes is, in reality, a 
‘reactive’ process. As Th eodor Meron has noted that, in the context of discussing 
the evolving principles of international humanitarian law, ‘[c]alamitous events 
and atrocities have repeatedly driven the development of … law’.79
Th is is equally the case with respect to the development of international crimes 
and the principles of international criminal law. In other words, the acceptance 
by the international community that certain behaviour is unacceptable and 
illegal under international criminal law is a responsive act, perhaps also 
stemming from changing views regarding the conduct of armed confl ict. As such, 
international criminal law is a dynamic area of legal regulation, and continues to 
evolve over time. It is therefore important to assess the appropriateness of the 
existing rules of international criminal law from time to time.80 For a crime to 
fall within the classifi cation of international crimes – which have been described 
as crimen contra omnes81 – it is to be regarded as an aff ront to us all, violating 
fundamental norms that regulate the peaceful co-existence of the international 
community.82 Th e factors underlying such a determination are, however, 
dynamic, and will change and evolve over time.
76 For example, the concept of ‘crimes against humanity’ was fi rst codifi ed in the Charter of 
the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (article  6(c)), and then applied to actions 
that took place at an earlier time. It is unclear whether such a crime existed coincidentally 
under customary international law: see, for example, the judgments of Justice Brennan 
(587–590) and Justice Toohey (664–677) of the High Court in Australia in Polyukhovich v 
Commonwealth and Another (1991) 172 CLR 501.
77 United Nations Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 
2 of Security Council Resolution 808’ (3  May 1993) UN Doc S/25704, para 33–5. See 
also Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal 
Enterprise, Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović and Dragoljub Ojdanić, Case. No. 
IT-99-37-AR72, Appeals Chamber, 21 May 2003, para 9.
78 With respect to the ICTR, see Kenneth S. Gallant, ‘Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and Jurisdiction 
to Prescribe in International Criminal Courts’ (2003) 48 Villanova Law Review 764, 783.
79 Th eodor Meron, ‘Th e Humanization of Humanitarian Law’ (2000) 94 American Journal of 
International Law 239, 243.
80 Tullio Scovazzi, ‘State Responsibility for Environmental Harm’ (2001) 12 Yearbook of 
International Environmental Law 43, 43.
81 Louis Rene Beres, ‘Iraqi Crimes and International Law: Th e Imperative to Punish’ (1993) 21 
Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 335, 338.
82 Marcos A. Orellana, ‘Criminal Punishment for Environmental Damage: Individual and State 
Responsibility at a Crossroad’ (2005) 17 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 
673, 689.
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Th e establishment of, and resort to these international(ised) criminal courts 
indicates a broad acceptance of international criminal law as an appropriate legal 
mechanism to address grave violations of human rights and crimes that confl ict 
with humanity. A signifi cant element in this evolution was the establishment of 
the ICC in July 2002. Described by the then United Nations Secretary-General 
Kofi  Annan as ‘a giant step forward in the march towards universal human 
rights and the rule of law’,83 the ICC seeks to address ‘the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole’.84 Such institutions help to 
further shape and develop important norms that seek to regulate the behaviour 
of those engaged inter alia in armed confl ict.
A clear example of the evolving nature of international criminal law (and 
its codifi cation) is the elaboration of an increasing number of acts involving 
sexual violence that can constitute the international crime of crimes against 
humanity.85 Similarly, we have seen the relatively recent characterization of 
rape as an act of genocide86 – the ‘crime of crimes’87 – representing a signifi cant 
further extension of the scope of international criminal law within the context of 
an armed confl ict.88
It is submitted that a similar shift  in sentiment is taking place in relation to 
the intentional destruction of the environment during armed confl ict. Th e 
universal condemnation of the acts committed by the Iraqi forces in 1991 
– involving not only the igniting of the oil wells, but also the dumping of 
83 United Nations, ‘Th e International Criminal Court’ (Fact Sheet, December 2002) <www.un. 
org/News/facts/iccfact.htm> at 17 March 2007.
84 Rome Statute, preamble para 4.
85 Compare article  5(g) of the ICTY Statute (Statute of the International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, 32 ILM 1159) 
and article  3(g) of the ICTR Statute (Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan 
Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of 
Neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, 33 ILM 1598), both of 
which specify ‘rape’ as an act that might constitute a crime against humanity, with article 7(1)
(g) of the Rome Statute, which refers not only to rape, but also to ‘sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of 
comparable gravity’.
86 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber, 
2 September 1998, para 734.
87 Judgement and Sentence, Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97–23-S, Trial 
Chamber, 4 September 1998, para 16.
88 Th e crime of genocide requires the existence of a special intent (dolus specialis) ‘to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such’: article II of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (opened for 
signature 9  December 1948, 78 UNTS 277 (entered into force 12  January 1951)) (Genocide 
Convention); see also Rome Statute, article 6.
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up to four million barrels of crude oil into the Persian Gulf89 – galvanised 
signifi cant support among the broader community for the establishment of 
stronger criminal sanctions. Although some commentators regarded such 
acts as constituting a violation(s) of article  53 of the Fourth 1949 Geneva 
Convention,90 no action was initiated under that instrument.91 Others called 
for the fi nalization and implementation of a ‘Fift h Geneva Convention’ 
specifi cally directed towards such acts,92 arguing that the existing legal 
regime was shown to be incapable of providing appropriate protection and 
enforcement in the circumstances.93
In the Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, one 
relevant issue was whether, and to what extent, environmental considerations 
restricted what could be regarded as legitimate military actions. In essence, as 
articulated by Edith Brown Weiss, the International Court of Justice was faced 
with three options on this question:94
that environmental considerations apply directly to armed confl icts; that 
environmental considerations do not apply to armed confl icts unless specifi cally 
provided for in an international agreement governing armed confl icts; or, third, in 
addition to any express provisions in international agreements governing armed 
confl icts, environmental considerations must be taken into account in applying laws 
related to armed confl ict
Th e Court affi  rmed that environmental issues do play a role in the overall 
assessment of military necessity, so that even though:95
existing international law relating to the protection and safeguarding of the 
environment does not specifi cally prohibit the use of nuclear weapons … States must 
take environmental considerations into account when assessing what is necessary 
and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives. Respect for the 
89 Yuzon, supra note 2, 794.
90 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for 
signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (1949 Geneva 
Convention IV).
91 Beres, supra note 81, footnote 16.
92 Th is was, for example, suggested at a conference sponsored by the London School of 
Economics and the British Centre for Defence Studies in June 1991, shortly aft er the 
environmental destruction in Kuwait had taken place: see Michael N. Schmitt, supra note 63, 
269 and the corresponding footnote.
93 Major Walter G. Sharp, Sr., ‘Th e Eff ective Deterrence of Environmental Damage During 
Armed Confl ict: A Case Analysis of the Persian Gulf War’ (1992) 137 Military Law Review 1, 3.
94 Edith Brown Weiss in Symposium, ‘Th e International Responses to the Environmental 
Impacts of War’ (2005) 17 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 565, 569.
95 Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 242, para 
33 and 30.
Chapter One. Th e Imperative to Regulate the Intentional Destruction of the 
Environment during Warfare under International Criminal Law
22 Intersentia
environment is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is in 
conformity with the principles of necessity and proportionality
It has been suggested that this conclusion indicates that the protection of the 
environment during armed confl ict ‘is an object and purpose of international 
law.’96 However, it remains for examination as to whether the overarching 
criteria of military necessity – which is itself oft en an extremely diffi  cult concept 
to quantify in the circumstances of decision-making – dilutes, within the 
context of an armed confl ict, the importance to be attached to the environment.
Th is poses some complex questions: do the existing legal rules provide the 
appropriate level of deterrence, and do they readily create mechanisms that allow 
for accountability and for suffi  cient condemnation of the perpetrators? Moreover, 
do they emphasize suffi  ciently the gravity and stigma that is associated with acts 
that intentionally target the environment as a victim, or use the environment as 
a weapon?
What is clear is that international law increasingly recognizes links between 
environmental and ecological rights and human rights.97 It is broadly accepted 
that customary international law requires that one’s actions do not cause 
signifi cant destruction to the environment so as to threaten fundamental human 
rights.98 It logically follows that international legal regulation intended to protect 
the environment should lead to accountability in appropriate circumstances 
for those individuals who intentionally set out to signifi cantly damage the 
environment.99 As a consequence, the intentional targeting of the environment 
as an act of warfare can and should give rise to individual criminal responsibility 
at the international level. Such acts can constitute an international crime that 
‘shocks the conscience’100 of humankind as a whole. Indeed, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights affi  rms that ‘disregard and contempt for human 
rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of 
mankind’.101
96 Parsons, supra note 37, 448.
97 Kenneth F. McCallion, ‘International Environmental Justice: Rights and Remedies’ (2003) 26 
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 427, 427.
98 Kenneth F. McCallion and H. Rajan Sharma, ‘Environmental Justice Without Borders: Th e 
Need for an International Court of the Environment to Protect Fundamental Environmental 
Rights’ (2000) 32 George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics 351, 354.
99 Robert McLaughlin, ‘Improving Compliance: Making Non-State International Actors 
Responsible for Environmental Crimes’ (2000) 11 Colorado Journal of International 
Environmental Law and Policy 377, 386.
100 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Advisory Opinion) [1951] ICJ Rep 16, 23.
101 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217A (III) (10 December 1948) UN Doc A/810 
on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, preamble para 2.
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Within this context, this book examines how acts that intentionally target 
the environment during the conduct of armed confl ict give rise to individual 
responsibility under international law, and specifi cally under international 
criminal law. To reach this point, however, it is also necessary to consider 
existing international humanitarian law (jus in bello), and elements of 
international environmental law. Th is study is limited to those acts that utilise 
a method or means of warfare, in circumstances where there is an intention to 
target the natural environment as a victim, or to use it as a weapon, in the sense 
that these concepts are referred to above. It is submitted that the heinous nature 
of such acts is particularly characterised by this specifi c intent.102
To reiterate, therefore, this book does not seek to create an environmental 
mechanism, but rather to examine and, if necessary adapt, international 
criminal law to address the issue, although there will clearly be the expectation 
that additional environmental protection may also be achieved in this way.103
1.4. THE NEED FOR LEGAL REGULATION
Th e focus of this book is thus on appropriate legal regulation in response to acts 
of intentional environmental destruction during armed confl ict. A fundamental 
characteristic of such regulation is its binding character supported, importantly, 
by associated enforcement mechanisms.
Law has traditionally been used to regulate acts that may aff ect the environment. 
In addition to those jus in bello treaties that may be relevant to environmental 
destruction during armed confl ict,104 there are many hundreds of multilateral 
treaties and bilateral instruments105 that have been concluded by States in an 
eff ort to regulate the state of the environment, primarily in times of peace. To 
the extent, however, that some of the principles in those instruments might also 
apply during armed confl ict, some parallel wartime environmental protections 
may emerge.106
Th e conclusion of many of these environmental instruments has coincided with 
the ‘rise of normative environmental consciousness’107 that emerged in the 1960s 
102 Th e issue of intent is discussed in detail in chapter 5.
103 See also Michael G. Faure and Marjolein Visser, ‘How to Punish Environmental Pollution? 
Some Refl ections on Various Models of Criminalization of Environmental Harm’ (1995) 
3 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 316, 317.
104 Th ese are discussed in detail in chapter 2.
105 McCallion and Sharma, supra note 98, 355.
106 Baker, supra note 28, 354. Th is issue is discussed in chapter 2.
107 Schmitt, supra note 63, 317.
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and 1970s, when it was recognised that international law could (and should) 
assume practical relevance in terms of environmental issues.108 Th is coincided 
with a growing awareness of the potential for future ‘risks’ to human health 
and the environment, and the uncertainties as to their eff ects, that could arise 
from the (in)action of States.109 Th is trend has since continued, as illustrated, 
for example, by the increasing eff orts over the past decade to implement 
legally binding standards to curb the eff ects of climate change. Th is is, as those 
eff orts demonstrate, a complex, diffi  cult and constantly evolving process. In 
some circumstances, even those international environmental agreements that 
historically have been ‘successful’ may no longer continue to remain eff ective 
without further refi nement and expansion.110
In addition to legal regulation, there are a number of other mechanisms that 
may contribute to greater protection of the environment, perhaps even in armed 
confl ict situations. Examples include important guidelines established through 
an ‘increasing resort to the so-called “soft  law” approach’ to international 
environmental law,111 as well as greater education of military personnel as to 
the long-term eff ects of environmental damage. However, although it has been 
argued by one commentator that the use of binding legal sanctions and standards 
actually exacerbates environmental damage, by entrenching an expectation that 
some degradation is acceptable or anticipated,112 it would be naive to assume 
that a system comprising primarily of non-compulsory ‘regulation’, without 
the concurrent application of legally binding (and enforceable) standards of 
behaviour, would be suffi  cient to establish appropriate sanctions directed 
against the intentional targeting of the environment. Th is is particularly so in 
the circumstances of an armed confl ict, where, in the mindset of those involved, 
108 Barend van Niekerk, ‘Environmental Pollution – Th e New International Crime’ (1976) 93 
South African Law Journal 68, 73.
109 Jacqueline Peel, Th e Precautionary Principle in Practice: Environmental Decision-Making and 
Scientifi c Uncertainty (2005), 1.
110 For example, it has been suggested that the terms of the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer (opened for signature 16  September 1987, 26 ILM 154 
(entered into force 1  January 1989)), described as ‘one of the world’s most successful 
multilateral environmental agreements’, must be reconsidered in light of the threats posed 
by climate change: see Donald Kaniaru, Rajendra Shende, Scott Stone and Durwood Zaelke, 
‘Strengthening the Montreal Protocol: Insurance Against Abrupt Climate Change’ (2007) 
7(2) Sustainable Development Law and Policy Journal 3.
111 Patricia W. Birnie and Alan E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment (1st ed, 1992), 
10. See also Steven Freeland, ‘For Better or For Worse? Th e Use of ‘Soft  Law’ within the 
International Legal Regulation of Outer Space’ (2011) XXXVI Annals of Air and Space Law 
409.
112 See, for example, Mark Halsey, ‘Environmental Crime: Towards an Eco-Human Rights 
Approach’ (1996) 8 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 217, who (at 235) suggests that there is a 
‘structural embeddedness of environmental harm’ implicit in the current general approach to 
environmental crime (emphasis in original).
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(real or perceived) military and strategic issues would almost certainly outweigh 
most (if not all) environmental concerns.
Th e principal ways in which law has been utilised to regulate the protection of the 
environment have been through the use of national law, as well as, as indicated 
above, international law instruments, either on a multilateral or bilateral basis. 
Some attempts have also been made on a regional basis to standardise laws 
relating to environmental protection. Th ese are each discussed below.
1.4.1. NATIONAL LAW
Th e emergence of an active environmental movement in many countries 
during the 1970s raised public consciousness in relation to the exploitation and 
destruction of the environment.113 Environmentalists and civil society called for 
government action to combat threats to the natural environment.114 Since then, 
many States have instituted systems of domestic environmental legal regulation, 
sometimes quite complex in structure. Environmental law in the United States, 
for example, has developed signifi cantly since the 1970s, and now comprises an 
extensive body of statute and case law,115 as well as a functioning enforcement 
mechanism.116 Within these domestic frameworks, the concept of environmental 
criminal enforcement has slowly emerged, as policy makers ‘became increasingly 
dissatisfi ed with [the] ‘administrative dependence’ of environmental criminal 
law’.117 Nevertheless, even as late as the mid-1990s, environmental ‘crimes’ were 
still regarded as a relatively ‘new’ concept in criminal law lexicon.118
More recently, the issues of environmental crime and enforcement have been the 
subject of increasing discussion among national and international environmental 
law experts.119 It has been argued that the development of national systems 
113 Keith P. McManus, ‘Civil Liberty for Wartime Environmental Damage: Adapting the 
United Nations Compensation Commission for the Iraq War’ (2006) 33 Boston College 
Environmental Aff airs Law Review 417, 419.
114 See, for example, J.H. Huebert and Walter Block, ‘Space Environmentalism, Property Rights, 
and the Law’ (2007) 37 University of Memphis Law Review 281, 283 and the corresponding 
footnotes.
115 Elizabeth Glass Geltman, Modern Environmental Law: Policy and Practice (1997), 1.
116 See, for example, Agence France-Presse, ‘Clean-burning fools: BP fi ned $413 million’, Th e 
Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 27–28 October 2007, 44.
117 Faure and Visser, supra note 103, 316.
118 Kathleen F. Brickey, ‘Environmental Crime at the Crossroads: Th e Intersection of 
Environmental and Criminal Law Th eory’ (1996) 71 Tulane Law Review 487, 487.
119 Hans Addink, Bas Arts and Arthur Mol, ‘Climate change policy in changing contexts: 
globalization, political modernization and legal innovation’, in Ekko C. van Ierland, Joyeeta 
Gupta and Marcel T.J. Kok (eds), Issues in International Climate Policy: Th eory and Policy 
(2003), 87.
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of environmental criminal law have generally become more eff ective as they 
have evolved from rather simplistic models based on administrative licence 
schemes to models intended to protect human health and the environment.120 
Yet, existing national environmental legislation in various jurisdictions is 
neither consistent nor universal.  Th is is even the case in circumstances where 
States are implementing the same international environmental treaty, since the 
implementation process, as well as the content of any implementing legislation, 
still falls within the sovereign discretion of each State.121
Th is does not, of course, deny the value in having binding domestic rules 
regulating specifi c environmental standards. An increasing number of 
States have, for example, even introduced the crime of ecocide into their 
national laws;122 however, there have been very few prosecutions based on 
these provisions. Moreover, in many cases, unlike international criminal law, 
national environmental law lacks a punitive character. It is not uncommon for 
environmental lawyers to regard domestic environmental crimes not as ‘real’ 
crimes, but rather ‘quasi-criminal regulatory off ences’.123 Th e penalties imposed 
under national law are oft en insuffi  cient to deter environmental off enders, 
particularly where there are strong fi nancial incentives to break the law.124 Even 
where the terms of national law do appear on their face to provide for stringent 
environmental standards, enforcement in practice may be compromised, in 
order to encourage inward investment of capital.125
Th ose national laws that have been developed, in deference to the traditional 
principles of territoriality, do not adequately regulate international 
environmental misconduct,126 and are thus typically not appropriate to deal with 
the transboundary consequences of intentional environmental destruction. In 
addition, they are unlikely to expressly apply to situations of armed confl ict and, 
even if they were applicable, a party to the confl ict is not likely to be concerned 
120 Faure and Visser, supra note 103, 357.
121 For example, New Zealand and Australia, two neighbouring and very similar countries, have 
enacted very diff erent terms in their respective implementing legislation of the Rome Statute: 
see Treasa Dunworth, ‘Th e International Crimes and International Criminal Court Act 
2000 (NZ): A Model for the Region?’, in Neil Boister and Alberto Costi (eds), Regionalising 
International Criminal Law in the Pacifi c (2006), 145.
122 See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (Volume II: Practice, Part 1, 2005), 883–7 and the corresponding 
footnotes.
123 Michael Watson, ‘Environmental Off ences: Th e Reality of Environmental Crime’ (2005) 7 
Environmental Law Review 190, 190.
124 Ibid, 192.
125 See, for example, Rob White, ‘Environmental Crime in Global Context: Exploring the 
Th eoretical and Empirical Complexities’ (2004) 16 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 271, 277.
126 Byung-Sun Cho, ‘Emergence of an International Environmental Criminal Law?’ (2001) 19 
UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 11, 11.
1.4. Th e Need for Legal Regulation
Intersentia 27
about the domestic laws of the other parties, nor would it necessarily have reason 
to fear sanction under its own domestic laws.127
In sum, therefore, reliance on national law as the only (or principal) mechanism 
to address intentional environmental destruction during armed confl ict is not 
appropriate. Th e reality is that national environmental law regimes are not 
designed, and have not been used for that purpose.
1.4.2. REGIONAL LAW
Th ere is scope for some common principles of law to be developed at a regional 
level. At times, this may be more eff ective than national eff orts regarding the 
protection of the environment, given the nature of some of the problems that 
may arise. Th e European Parliament and Council of the European Union 
have, for example, recognised that the protection of the environment ‘cannot 
be suffi  ciently achieved by the Member States and can therefore … be better 
achieved at Community level’.128
In the area of human rights protection, for example, we have seen the 
regionalization of regulatory systems, at least in some parts of the world. In 
the European, American and African regions, well-developed systems have 
emerged under widely accepted treaty regimes dealing with human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, reinforced with a structured judicial enforcement 
mechanism.129 Th ere is also an Arab Charter of Human Rights,130 as well as 
some (albeit slow) movement towards the development of a regional human 
rights regimen in the Asian region.131
127 Leibler, supra note 5, 80.
128 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, ‘Directive 2008/99/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the environment through 
criminal law’, 19  November 2008, preamble para 14. Th is Directive came into force in 
December 2008.
129 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
opened for signature 4  November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3  September 
1953), American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature 22  November 1969, 
1144 UNTS 123; 9 ILM 673 (entered into force 18 July 1978), and African Charter on Human 
and People’s Rights, adopted 27  June 1981, 1520 UNTS 217; 21 ILM 58 (entered into force 
21 October 1986).
130 See Arab Charter on Human Rights, adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States 
on 15 September 1994, reprinted in (1997) 18 Human Rights Law Journal 151 (not in force). 
Th is version was not ratifi ed by any State and, in 2004, a revised text was adopted by an Arab 
Summit meeting in Tunisia, and entered into force in 2008: see Council of the League of Arab 
States Resolution 5437.
131 For further details, see Steven Freeland, ‘International Criminal Justice in the Asia-Pacifi c 
Region – Th e Role of the International Criminal Court Treaty Regime’ (2013) 11(5) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 1029.
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Nonetheless, the use of regional systems of law to address important issues 
could exacerbate diff erences between the regions,132 rather than reinforce those 
universal standards that may be necessary to deal with issues such as intentional 
environmental destruction during armed confl ict. In fact, regional legal systems 
are oft en designed to achieve diff erent goals and take various forms,133 precisely 
due to the unique characteristics of a particular region.
Of course, there may well be some advantages to regional legal regulation in 
relation to ‘lesser’ environmental crimes. In 1998, the Council of Europe opened 
for signature the Convention on the Protection of the Environment Th rough 
Criminal Law, which required States Parties to adopt ‘appropriate measures as 
may be necessary to establish as criminal off ences’ certain acts of environmental 
damage.134 Even though it recognised that criminal law was a secondary 
measure in relation to the prevention of destruction of the environment and was 
not directly binding for natural or legal persons,135 this was the fi rst regional 
instrument designed to address environmental protection through the use of 
criminal law.136
However, this initiative was not widely accepted. Th e defi nition of environmental 
crimes still diff ered among the domestic law of the European States, and the 
applicable sanctions were generally inadequate, with some countries continuing 
to apply civil rather than criminal penalties.137 Th e Commission of the 
European Union (EU) unveiled a draft  proposal for a Directive in 2007138 that 
sought to create a series of ‘green crimes’ enforceable across the European Union 
(EU),139 following an important decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
132 See Steven Freeland, ‘Th e Internationalization of Justice – A Case for the Universal 
Application of International Criminal Norms’ (2007) 4 New Zealand Yearbook of 
International Law 45.
133 Gary W. Florkowski, Managing Global Legal Systems (2006), 71.
134 European Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law, 
opened for signature 4  November 1998, 38 ILM 259 (not in force), article  2(1). As at 
January 2015, only 1 State (Estonia) had ratifi ed this instrument, and it requires 3 
ratifi cations to come into force: <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.
asp?NT=172&CM=1&DF=&CL=ENG> at 19 January 2015.
135 Th omas Richter, ‘Transboundary environmental crimes: an analysis of Chinese and European 
Law’, in Michael Faure and Song Ying (eds), China and International Environmental Liability: 
Legal Remedies for Transboundary Pollution (2008), 253, 254.
136 John P. Grant and J. Craig Barker, International Criminal Law Deskbook (2006), 164.
137 For example, at the time, Spain and Greece applied civil law penalties to the illegal shipping of 
waste, even though that was deemed to be an environmental crime under the draft  directive: 
Fiona Harvey and Andrew Bounds, ‘Regulatory regime put to the test at borders’, Financial 
Times (London), 7 February 2007, 2.
138 Proposal of 9 February 2007 for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the protection of the environment through criminal law.
139 Andrew Bounds, ‘Brussels in push to lay down ‘green crime’ laws’, Financial Times (London), 
7  February 2007, 1. An earlier Framework Decision 2003/80 on the Protection of the 
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confi rming the power of the EU to take measures relevant to the national laws of 
Member States in respect of criminal penalties to combat serious environmental 
off ences.140
Th is draft  proposal was followed by the 2008 Directive, which allowed the EU to 
overrule Member States’ competence in relation to criminal justice in this area, 
so as to ensure a minimum standard of environmental protection under criminal 
law, and consistency of approach in relation to environmental damage.141 
However, the crimes that it established, although serious, do not purport to apply 
to intentional environmental destruction during armed confl ict, which is, of 
course, understandable given that a principal raison d’être for the establishment 
of what has become the EU was, in fact, to minimise the risk of future armed 
confl ict within Europe.142
1.4.3. INTERNATIONAL LAW, ARMED CONFLICT AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT
Th e inter-relationship between intentional environment destruction, human 
security and armed confl ict requires that eff ective enforcement measures exist at 
the international level. As indicated, both national law and regional law can only 
play a very limited role in addressing such acts. Th is book will therefore focus 
on the application of international law to the issue of intentional environmental 
damage during armed confl ict. In doing so, it is acknowledged that any 
suggestion of new ‘supranational’ environmental regulation will likely encounter 
diplomatic opposition.143 It is therefore necessary to fi rst examine the existing 
principles and, only then, determine whether, and if so in what way, additional 
standards may be necessary, bearing in mind that these should, to the greatest 
Environment had created intentional and negligence off ences. Th is was, however, annulled on 
13 September 2005.
140 Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union, Case C-176/03, 
Grand Chamber, 13  September 2005, (2005) EC Rep I-07879. Th e ECJ held that the power 
to require Member States to impose criminal penalties for certain environmental off ences 
fell under pillar one of the EU structure, highlighting the importance of environmental 
protection within the European regulatory system: see Helle Krunke, ‘Introduction: 
European Law as a Process between Constitutionalization and Democratization’, in 
Hanne Petersen, Anne Lise Kjaer, Helle Krunke and Mikael Rask Madsen (eds), Paradoxes 
of European Legal Integration (2008), 9, 11: Jane Holder and Maria Lee, Environmental 
Protection, Law and Policy: Text and Materials (2nd ed, 2007), 414 footnote 70.
141 See supra note 128.
142 See the 1957 Treaty of Rome (Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 
opened for signature 25 March 1957, 298 UNTS 11 (entered into force 1 January 1958)), which 
followed on from the 1951 Treaty of Paris (Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community, opened for signature 18 April 1951, 261 UNTS 140 (entered into force 24  July 
1952, expired 23 July 2002)).
143 Cho, supra note 126, 24.
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extent possible, be consistent with existing practice and law, as well as utilizing 
already established enforcement mechanisms.144
International law – and more particularly international criminal law – is 
particularly suited to regulating such acts since, even though some international 
crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity can (theoretically) occur 
in times of ‘peace’, the principles of international criminal law were developed 
principally within the context of armed confl ict.145 Th is is so even where the 
armed confl ict may be non-international (as opposed to international) in 
character, since the consequences of such damage do not necessarily end at the 
borders of any one country. Th ere is no overarching moral or legal justifi cation 
for treating perpetrators of very serious ‘international’ crimes in internal 
confl icts diff erently from those engaged in international armed confl icts.146 
For example, during the confl ict in Rwanda during the 1990s, culminating in 
the genocide that took place during 1994,147 signifi cant amounts of agricultural 
land were destroyed in order to force groups of people to move, both within the 
country and beyond its borders.148 Moreover, many of the more recent confl icts 
have been internal in nature.149
It is true that the distinction between non-international and international armed 
confl icts is still important in the context of various international crimes,150 a 
consequence of the traditional adherence of the ‘non-intervention’ principle 
that still pervades international law and international relations.151 However, 
it is equally clear that international criminal law already does apply to ‘armed 
144 Th is is one important reason why intentional damage to the environment during armed 
confl ict should be addressed by the ICC under the Rome Statute, rather than, potentially, 
through the establishment of a new judicial institution.
145 Orellana, supra note 82, 689.
146 See Jochen A. Frowein, Book Review – Th eodor Meron, ‘Th e Humanization of International 
Law’ (2007) 101 American Journal of International Law 680, 681.
147 Th e ICTR has held that the confl ict in Rwanda was an internal armed confl ict under 
international law: Judgement, Prosecutor v Akayesu, Case No ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber, 
2 September 1998, para 627.
148 Weinstein, supra note 8, 700.
149 See Carl E. Bruch, ‘All’s Not Fair in (Civil) War: Criminal Liability for Environmental 
Damage in Internal Armed Confl ict’ (2001) 25 Vermont Law Review 695, 698 and the 
corresponding footnotes.
150 Certain international crimes within the jurisdiction of the international criminal tribunals 
can only be committed where the confl ict is characterised as an international confl ict: 
compare, for example, articles  8(2)(a) and 8(2)(b)) of the Rome Statute with articles  8(2)(c) 
and 8(2)(e). See also Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 
Prosecutor v Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Appeals Chamber, 2  October 1995. Th is 
distinction is discussed further in chapters 4 and 5.
151 See also United Nations Charter, article 2(7).
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confl ict not of an international character’,152 as do the jus in bello.153 In 
circumstances where intentional environmental damage during armed confl ict 
is suffi  ciently serious to warrant criminalisation,154 the same imperatives should 
apply irrespective of the legal nature of the armed confl ict. Yet, the existing war 
crime relating to damage to the natural environment in the Rome Statute only 
applies in international armed confl ict.155
Th us, unless the context requires it, the discussion that follows in this book 
does not distinguish between armed confl ict of an international and non-
international character, and the examination of the legal principles regulating 
crimes against the environment will include both types of armed confl ict. In 
fact, there have been calls from time to time to ‘unify’ the jus in bello, so that 
they are equally applicable ‘in all forms’ of armed confl ict.156
As will be discussed in chapter 2, there is already a body of jus in bello treaties 
that deal with certain aspects of intentional environmental damage during 
armed confl ict. Th ese instruments must be analysed to determine whether they 
adequately refl ect the heinous nature associated with the intention to destroy 
the environment. On the other hand, the United Nations Charter, which is 
concerned with the maintenance of international peace and security,157 makes 
no mention of the problem of environmental degradation. Th is goes some way 
towards explaining why the environment has not been of particular focus to the 
main organs of the United Nations, particularly the Security Council.158 Th is 
is not particularly surprising given that, at the time that the United Nations 
Charter was draft ed, the issue of environmental protection was not regarded at 
all as a priority.159
As a result, legal regulation aimed at promoting criminal law to enforce 
important international environmental principles has only been a relatively 
recent phenomenon.160 International law has been even ‘slower’ to recognize the 
152 See, for example, Rome Statute, articles 8(2)(c) and 8(2)(e).
153 See, for example, 1977 Additional Protocol II, as well as article 3 common to the four Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims (Common Article 3).
154 Th e appropriate ‘threshold’ level of damage warranting criminal culpability for crimes 
against the environment is discussed in chapters 4 and 5.
155 See Rome Statute, article 8(2)(b)(iv). Th is issue will be addressed in chapters 4 and 5.
156 See, for example, Bruch, supra note 149, 738–43 and 750 and the corresponding footnotes.
157 See United Nations Charter, article 1(1).
158 Of course, there are some United Nations agencies that are directed towards the environment, 
such as UNEP.
159 Van Niekerk, supra note 108, 70.
160 Martin Hedemann-Robinson, Enforcement of European Union Environmental Law: Legal 
Issues and Challenges (2007), 516.
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need to address environment destruction during armed confl ict situations.161 
It was not until 1977, following the television broadcasts of the environmental 
destruction wrought during the Vietnam War, that the concept of the ‘natural 
environment’ appeared in the treaty principles that set out the rules of 
international humanitarian law, although the overriding principle of ‘military 
necessity’ still generally applies in any assessment of environmental damage 
caused during armed confl ict. Th ere are some jus in bello instruments that do 
not specifi cally refer to military necessity in this context,162 but it is necessary to 
critically consider the level of environmental damage required before a breach of 
those treaties is achieved, described by Carl Bruch as ‘extreme’.163
In terms of many international environmental agreements that have emerged 
since the 1970s, most do not refer to armed confl ict, although some may be 
applicable in wartime.164 However, while many of these treaties – and the relevant 
principles of customary international law – may provide for the prohibition of 
certain forms of environmental destruction, even during armed confl ict, they 
have been wholly ineff ective in terms of the prevention of such action. With some 
exceptions, the general focus of these international environmental agreements 
has instead been in relation to principles between States inter se – the breach of 
which gives rise to principles of State responsibility under the traditional rules of 
general international law. As the International Court of Justice has noted:165
in the fi eld of environmental protection, vigilance and prevention are required on 
account of the oft en irreversible character of damage to the environment and of the 
limitations inherent in the very mechanism of reparation of this type of damage
What appears to be lacking is a mechanism that provides suffi  cient deterrence 
and ‘facilitates condemnation and accountability’ in a more eff ective manner.166 
Th ere have been virtually no prosecutions of individuals for intentional 
161 Hans-Peter Gasser, ‘For Better Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Confl ict: A 
Proposal for Action’ (1995) 89 American Journal of International Law 637, 638.
162 See Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Confl icts Opened for signature 8  June 1977, 
1125 UNTS 3, 16 ILM 1391 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (1977 Additional Protocol 
I); Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modifi cation Techniques Opened for signature 10 December 1976, 1108 UNTS 151; 16 ILM 
88 (entered into force 5 October 1978) (ENMOD Convention). Both of these instruments are 
discussed in chapter 2.
163 Bruch, supra note 149, 703.
164 Th e jus in bello treaties, as well as the relevant international environmental agreements, are 
discussed in chapter 2.
165 Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 140 
(emphasis added).
166 Sharp, supra note 93, 5.
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environmental destruction in such circumstances,167 notwithstanding the 
inclusion in the jus in bello of the so-called ‘Martens clause’, which was fi rst 
incorporated into the 1899 Hague Convention II with Respect to the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land,168 and has been included in a number of subsequent 
treaties.169 Th is book will explore the reasons for this and determine what 
(if any) ‘solutions’ may be necessary and appropriate, particularly bearing in 
mind that the prosecution of those who commit international crimes helps to 
preserve a common belief in the importance of implementing an ‘international 
legal order’, as well as providing (an element of) deterrence to those who may 
otherwise contemplate committing such crimes in the future.170
Th ere have, in the past, been general calls – in non-binding instruments – for 
the absolute protection of the environment during times of war. Th e 1982 World 
Charter for Nature declares that ‘[n]ature shall be secured against degradation 
caused by warfare or other hostile activities’,171 and that ‘[m]ilitary activities 
damaging to nature shall be avoided’.172 Ten years later, the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development173 called for the protection of the environment 
during armed confl ict, with principles 23 and 24 providing inter alia:174
[t]he environment and natural resources of people under oppression, domination 
and occupation shall be protected (Principle 23);
[w]arfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall therefore 
respect international law providing protection for the environment in times of armed 
confl ict and cooperate in its further development, if necessary (Principle 24)
It has been somewhat optimistically asserted by one commentator that 
principle 23 establishes ‘an absolute right to environmental protection’,175 thus 
sidestepping ‘the pitfall of military necessity’.176 Yet, less than six months aft er 
167 One reason for this is that ‘environmental crimes [have been] overshadowed by other 
atrocities’: Weinstein, supra note 8, 698.
168 Hague Convention II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, opened for 
signature 29 July 1899, 26 Martens (2nd) 949 (entered into force 4 September 1900).
169 See further the discussion in chapter 2.
170 Alberto Costi, ‘Hybrid Tribunals as a Viable Transitional Justice Mechanism to Combat 
Impunity in Post-Confl ict Situations’ (2006) 22 New Zealand Universities Law Review 213, 
215.
171 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 37/7 (28 October 1982) UN Doc A/RES/37/7, 
Annex, principle 5 (emphasis added). Th ere were 110 States who voted in favour of this 
resolution, 1 (United States) against, with 18 abstentions.
172 Ibid, principle 20 (emphasis added).
173 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (14  June 
1992) UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Volume 1), 31 ILM 874 (Rio Declaration).
174 Ibid, principles 23 and 24.
175 Laurent R. Hourcle, ‘Environmental Law of War’ (2001) Vanderbilt Law Review 653, 678.
176 McManus, supra note 113, 428.
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the Rio Declaration was adopted, the United Nations General Assembly, while 
taking note of the Declaration, stressed that ‘destruction of the environment, 
not justifi ed by military necessity and carried out wantonly, is clearly contrary to 
existing international law’.177 A few years later, the International Court of Justice 
affi  rmed that the jus in bello prohibited ‘harm greater than that unavoidable to 
achieve legitimate military objectives’.178
Th e Rome Statute currently continues along the same path, incorporating 
military advantage into a consideration of whether a war crime involving 
damage to the environment has been committed.179 Some support this approach, 
arguing that it ‘remedies what many have seen as a fl aw’ in conventional law 
dealing with environmental damage during armed confl ict.180 However, the 
impact of the military necessity factor upon the current international criminal 
legal regime regulating intentional destruction of the environment during armed 
confl ict, as well as the existing thresholds of permissible damage, warrant a more 
circumspect analysis. Th e risks associated with allowing for weak accountability 
mechanisms can only become graver as weapons technology continues to 
evolve.181
1.5. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
AS A REGULATORY MECHANISM
Th is book proceeds on the basis that international criminal law can play a 
leading role in addressing intentional destruction of the environment during 
armed confl ict. To do so, the regulatory framework must be structured such 
that it does not, as is the current position, require a ‘balancing test stacked 
heavily against the environment’.182 As a precursor to this discussion, however, 
the following chapters will fi rst analyse how far the existing conventional and 
customary principles of international law go towards achieving these goals. 
Should these, when complementing the current Rome Statute regime, be shown 
to be inadequate to deal with the intentional destruction of the environment 
177 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/37 on the Protection of the environment 
in times of armed confl ict (25  November 1992) UN Doc A/RES/47/37, preamble para 5 
(emphasis added).
178 Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 242, para 
78 (emphasis added).
179 Rome Statute, article 8(2)(b)(iv).
180 Schmitt, supra note 63, 282.
181 In this regard, see, for example, Commentary by the International Law Commission on 
Article  19 ‘Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ [1976] 2 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission Part II, 96, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1976/
Add.l (Part 2), 108.
182 Sharp, supra note 93, 241.
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during armed confl ict, a further issue would arise as to how these fl aws might 
best be rectifi ed.
International criminal accountability on this issue results in the 
‘individualisation’ of responsibility for intentional destruction of the 
environment during armed confl ict, in that a guilty person(s) is held culpable 
without entire groups, or the State itself, deemed to be responsible.183 Th is may 
aid in seeking external assistance to help remediate the environmental damage. 
International criminal law is also an appropriate form of regulation in this 
area because it more directly expresses the outrage that such acts gives rise to, 
as well as the imperative of global compliance with appropriate standards of 
behaviour.184
Th at said, the concept of an ‘environmental crime’ has not, until quite recently, 
been a point of focus in the otherwise rapid evolution of international criminal 
law. However, it is now accepted that international criminal law is an appropriate 
mode to deal with this issue, and it is already addressed in one provision of the 
Rome Statute, which is regarded by many as the most up-to-date codifi cation 
of the nature and scope of international crimes, even though it does not refl ect 
existing customary international law in every respect.185 Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the 
Rome Statute provides that a war crime within the context of an international 
armed confl ict and ‘within the established framework of international law’ may 
have been committed in the event that an accused:186
[i]ntentionally launch[es] an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause … 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment which would be clearly 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated
Th is specifi c provision draws on principles also found in the 1977 Additional 
Protocol I, which proscribe methods or means of warfare that are intended, or 
may be expected to cause ‘widespread, long-term and severe’ environmental 
damage. At the time that the 1977 Additional Protocol I was concluded, those 
183 Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariezcurrena (eds), Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First 
Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice (2006), 6.
184 Cho, supra note 126, 13–4.
185 A Trial Chamber of the ICTY has described the Rome Statute as follows:
 ‘Depending on the matter at issue, the Rome Statute may be taken to restate, refl ect or clarify 
customary rules or crystallise them, whereas in some areas it creates new law or modifi es 
existing law. At any event, the Rome Statute by and large may be taken as constituting an 
authoritative expression of the legal views of a great number of States’: Judgement, Prosecutor 
v. Furundzjia, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Trial Chamber, 10  December 1998, para 227. More 
recently, see Judgement, Prosecutor v. Nikola Sainovic, Nebojsa Pavkovic, Vladimir Lazarevic 
and Sreten Lukic, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Appeals Chamber, 23 January 2014, para 1648.
186 Rome Statute, article 8(2)(b)(iv). See chapter 4 for an analysis of this provision.
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provisions were regarded as an important step forward in acknowledging the 
issue of environmental damage during confl ict. Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome 
Statute has already been considered by the respective Offi  ces of the Prosecutor of 
both the ICTY and the ICC,187 but, for various reasons, was not used as a basis 
of any charges in either case. In analysing claims relating to the use of cluster 
bombs in the situation in Iraq, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the then Prosecutor of the 
ICC, concluded inter alia that, on the basis of the information available to his 
offi  ce at that time, there was ‘a lack of information indicating clear excessiveness 
in relation to military advantage’.188
Tara Weinstein has suggested that the environmental pollution wrought by 
Saddam’s forces in 1991 would probably not have been suffi  cient to constitute a 
breach of article 13(b)(5) of the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, which, as 
noted, is identical with article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute.189 Th e applicability 
of the existing legal regime to such acts will be the subject of detailed analysis in 
the remaining chapters of this book. In undertaking this examination, it will do 
well to bear in mind the words of the International Court of Justice:190
[…] one of the most eff ective ways of preventing criminal acts, in general, is to 
provide penalties for persons committing such acts, and to impose those penalties 
eff ectively on those who commit the acts one is trying to prevent
1.6. COULD STATE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
APPLY?
Before examining whether and how intentional destruction of the environment 
during armed confl ict may attract individual criminal responsibility under 
international law, there is a preliminary, but important, threshold question to 
resolve; can the relevant State also be held criminally responsible for such acts 
(by individuals) where there is signifi cant State involvement in the deliberate 
destruction?
187 See, for example, Final Report to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing 
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 13 June 2000, 39 ILM 1257, para 21; 
Offi  ce of the Prosecutor, Th e International Criminal Court, ‘Iraq Response’, (9  February 
2006), 5 <www.iccnow.org/documents/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February_2006.
pdf> at 19 January 2015.
188 ‘Iraq Response’, ibid, 6.
189 Weinstein, supra note 8, 710.
190 Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment) [2007] ICJ 
Rep 43, para 426 (Application of the Genocide Convention Case).
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1.6.1. STATE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY?
States bear a responsibility towards the environment, which extends also 
to situations of armed confl ict.191 In its Advisory Opinion in the Legality of 
the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, the International Court of Justice 
affi  rmed that:192
[t]he existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas 
beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the 
environment
However, the Court did not prescribe any principles of criminal responsibility for 
a breach of this obligation.193 Indeed, few, if any, international instruments give 
rise to specifi c legally binding criminal sanctions against States for the deliberate 
degradation of the environment. While issues of intentional environmental 
damage are subject to various ‘non-criminal’ legal processes at the international 
level, these generally do not refl ect the magnitude of the destruction that 
may result, or the intentional nature of such acts. Th is regime more generally 
prescribes that criminal processes be undertaken at the domestic level based on 
traditional national jurisdiction principles,194 thus giving rise to the problems of 
ineff ective implementation and enforcement noted earlier.
States can incur ‘classical (civil)’195 responsibility for acts that constitute 
international crimes committed by individuals, or even by simply failing to 
provide for adequate national legislation making such acts a criminal off ence, 
under the traditional international law principles of State responsibility.196 
Th is may arise if an organ of that State, or a person or group whose acts are 
attributable to the State, commits an international crime. State responsibility 
191 Refer, for example, to the sentiments underpinning principle 24 of the Rio Declaration.
192 Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 242, para 
29.
193 A Chamber for Environmental Matters was established in the International Court of Justice 
in 1993, but was not extended beyond 2006, since it had not been utilized by States, even in 
those cases that had raised important environmental issues.
194 See, for example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
(10 December 1982) 1833 UNTS 3; 21 ILM 1261, articles 213–222.
195 T.D. Gill, ‘Th e “Genocide” case: Refl ections on the ICJ’s Decision in Bosnia-Herzegovina v 
Serbia’, Th e Hague Justice Portal (Th e Netherlands), 26 March 2007 <www.haguejusticeportal.
net/index.php?id=7266> at 19 January 2015.
196 One example of the failure of a State to properly incorporate an international crime (in 
this case genocide) into its national law is the domestic implementation of the Genocide 
Convention by Australia. Even though it ratifi ed the Convention in 1949, the crime of 
genocide was not incorporated into Australian domestic law until 2002.
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may exist even if no individual has been convicted of the crime by a competent 
court.197
However, this degree of State accountability represents a diff erent level 
of culpability from the possibility that the State itself may be criminally 
responsible. Th is can be seen, for example, in relation to the accountability of 
a State for a violation of the Genocide Convention. In the discussions leading 
to the fi nalization of that instrument, there was considerable debate over the 
inclusion of a notion of State criminality.198 However, this idea was, in the end, 
not incorporated into the treaty, which instead entails a civil liability regime for 
States. In the Application of the Genocide Convention Case, the International 
Court of Justice, when considering the various ‘crimes’ specifi ed in article 
III of the Genocide Convention, and in particular the crime of ‘complicity in 
genocide’,199 drew this distinction by stating:200
[i]t would however not be in keeping with the object and purpose of the Convention 
to deny that the international responsibility of a State – even though quite diff erent in 
nature from criminal responsibility – can be engaged through one of the acts, other 
than genocide itself, enumerated in Article III
Th is ‘duality of responsibility’201 is further illustrated by article  25(4) of the 
Rome Statute, which states that ‘[n]o provision in this Statute relating to 
individual criminal responsibility shall aff ect the responsibility of States under 
international law’.202
As noted by the International Court of Justice, article 58 of the International Law 
Commission’s (ILC) Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts affi  rms ‘the other side of the coin’,203 by emphasizing that 
‘[t]hese articles are without prejudice to any question of the individual 
responsibility under international law of any person acting on behalf of a 
State.’204 Th e distinction is more than a question of semantics – it demonstrates 
that, irrespective of the degree of involvement by the ‘machinery’ of a State, its 
197 Application of the Genocide Convention Case, para 182. Th e International Court of Justice 
held that a State could be internationally responsible under the Genocide Convention for 
genocide and complicity to commit genocide, ‘without an individual being convicted of the 
crime or an associated one’.
198 William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law (2000), 419, 444.
199 Genocide Convention, article III(e).
200 Application of the Genocide Convention Case, para 167 (emphasis added).
201 Ibid, para 173.
202 Rome Statute, article 25(4).
203 Application of the Genocide Convention Case, para 173.
204 International Law Commission, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, annex to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/83 (12 December 
2001) UN Doc A/RES/56/83, article 58 (ILC Articles on State Responsibility).
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culpability for actions that constitute international crimes, even where they 
result in very serious consequences for humans or the environment, is to be 
regarded diff erently – one could assert with less ‘stigma’ – than the standards by 
which we judge those individuals who actually ‘commit’ the crime.
For example, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949205 specify the scope of what 
now represent a number of war crimes – which can only be committed by 
individuals – associated with ‘grave breaches’ of those treaties206 while, at the 
same time, ‘merely’ providing for State responsibility for a State Party where one 
of those crimes is committed by an individual who is the national of that State.207
Yet, in the period 1976–2001, the ILC,208 which in 1949 was asked by the United 
Nations General Assembly to formulate the draft  articles, advanced the notion 
of an international crime committed by States. In the Special Rapporteur’s fi ft h 
report,209 the ILC adopted inter alia draft  article 19 into the document,210 which 
distinguished between two diff erent types of internationally wrongful acts 
giving rise to the responsibility of a State under international law – international 
crimes and international ‘delicts’. Th e distinction rested on the subject matter 
205 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into 
force 21 October 1950) (1949 Geneva Convention I), Geneva Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 
opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (1949 
Geneva Convention II), Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (1949 
Geneva Convention III), and 1949 Geneva Convention IV.
206 See 1949 Geneva Convention I, article 50; 1949 Geneva Convention II, article 51; 1949 Geneva 
Convention III, article 130; 1949 Geneva Convention IV, article 147. See also ICTY Statute, 
article 2 and Rome Statute, article 8(2)(a).
207 See Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (2003), 19 footnote 4. Also compare 
R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Magistrate and others, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty 
International and others intervening) (No 3) (1999) 2 All ER 97 (HL), with Al-Adsani v. 
United Kingdom (2001) 34 EHRR 273: in the former, the eff ect of the judgment was that an 
individual (Pinochet) alleged to have committed torture should face trial in a Spanish court, 
despite a claim of Head of State immunity whilst, in the latter, the majority of the European 
Court of Human Rights concluded that the defence of State immunity was suffi  cient to 
prevent the English courts from exercising jurisdiction in a civil case against a State (Kuwait) 
for alleged torture.
208 Th e ILC was established following the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of 
Resolution 174 (II) (21  November 1947) UN Doc A/519, which approved the Statute of the 
International Law Commission (ILC Statute). Article 1(1) of the ILC Statute provides that the 
objects of the ILC are the ‘promotion of the progressive development of international law and 
its codifi cation.’
209 Fift h Report on State Responsibility, Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur [1976] 2 Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission Part I, Chapter III, sections 1–4, pp. 3 et seq., UN Doc A/
CN.4/291 and Add. 1–2.
210 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on its work of the 
thirty-second session, [1980] 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission Part II, 32, UN 
Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.l (Part 2).
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of the international obligation that had been breached. An ‘international crime’ 
related to a ‘limited category comprising particularly serious wrongs’211 and was 
defi ned as:212
[a]n internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State of an 
international obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the 
international community that its breach is recognized as a crime by that community 
as a whole
Th e draft  article then specifi ed a non-exhaustive list of acts that may constitute 
an international crime, which included:213
a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the 
safeguarding and preservation of the human environment, such as those prohibiting 
massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas
Th e other specifi ed acts involved serious breaches of what can be regarded as 
peremptory rules or jus cogens norms of international law,214 thus indicating the 
gravity accorded acts involving the destruction of the environment referred to in 
draft  article 19(3)(d).215 Th e ILC referred on several occasions to the concept of jus 
cogens norms of international law, and to article 53 of the VCLT, in explaining why 
it proposed the separate regimes of international responsibility in draft  article 19.216 
By contrast, draft  article 19(4) dealt with the failure to fulfi l ‘an obligation of lesser 
and less general importance’,217 and provided that ‘[a]ny internationally wrongful 
act which is not an international crime in accordance with paragraph 2, constitutes 
an international delict’. Supplementing draft  article  19, draft  articles  52 and 53 
provided for the consequences of the commission by a State of an international 
crime, including the possibility of collective sanctions.
Th e question of whether States could be criminally responsible had also been 
raised by various commentators,218 and draft  article  19 gained some support 
211 Commentary by the International Law Commission on Article  19 ‘Articles on State 
Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ [1976] 2 Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission Part II, 96, 97, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1976/Add.l (Part 2).
212 Draft  article 19(2).
213 Draft  article 19(3)(d).
214 See Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (opened for signature 23 May 
1969, 1155 UNTS 331; 8 ILM 679 (entered into force 27 January 1980)) (VCLT).
215 See draft  article 19(3)(a), (b) and (c).
216 See, for example, paragraphs 16–18 of Commentary by the International Law Commission 
on Article  19 ‘Articles on State Responsibility for International Wrongfully Acts’ [1976] 2 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission Part II, 96, 102, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1976/
Add.l (Part 2).
217 Ibid.
218 See, for example, Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (1963), 154.
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at the time, mainly from developing and Eastern European States. In its 
commentary on the draft  article, the ILC noted that:219
[c]ontemporary international law has reached the point of condemning outright 
the practice of certain States in … acting … gravely to endanger the preservation 
and conservation of the human environment … [T]hese acts genuinely constitute 
“international crimes”, that is to say international wrongs which are more serious 
than others and which as such, should entail more severe legal consequences
On the other hand, draft  article  19 provoked controversy among some other 
States, as well as commentators,220 and various members of the ILC itself, 
who argued that it promoted the idea of collective responsibility of the entire 
population of a State for the actions of their leaders, as well as the notion of 
collective punishment.221 In the end, draft  article 19 (and draft  articles 52 and 
53) was not included in the version of the draft  Articles adopted by the ILC and 
noted by the General Assembly in 2001.222
Indeed, as confi rmed by the International Court of Justice in the Application 
of the Genocide Convention Case, the concept of the international criminal 
responsibility of a State does not currently represent either customary 
international law or the general view and practice of States. Th is deferential 
view that international law takes with respect to State sovereignty is refl ected in 
the Joint Declaration of Judges Shi and Koroma in that case, where they affi  rm 
that:223
[Th e Genocide Convention] does not impose criminal responsibility on the State 
as a State. Indeed, it could not have done so at the time it was adopted given that 
the notion of crime of State was not part of international law and even today general 
international law does not recognize the notion of the criminal responsibility of the 
State
219 Commentary by the International Law Commission on Article  19 ‘Articles on State 
Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ [1976] 2 Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission Part II, 96, 109, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1976/Add.l (Part 2).
220 See, for example, Giorgio Gaja, ‘Should All References to International Crimes Disappear 
from the ILC Draft  Articles on State Responsibility?’ (1999) European Journal of International 
Law 365; Alain Pellet, ‘Can a State Commit a Crime? Defi nitely, Yes!’ (1999) European Journal 
of International Law 425.
221 D.J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (5th ed, 1998) 489, referring to the 
comments of Mr Rosenstock, the United States member of the ILC, reported at (1995) 89 
American Journal of International Law 390, 393.
222 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/83 (12  December 2001) UN Doc A/
RES/56/83 on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.
223 Joint Declaration of Judges Shi and Koroma, Application of the Genocide Convention Case 
[2007] ICJ Rep 279, para 1 (emphasis added).
Chapter One. Th e Imperative to Regulate the Intentional Destruction of the 
Environment during Warfare under International Criminal Law
42 Intersentia
Similar views had earlier been expressed by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in 
the Blaskic case, when it stated that ‘[u]nder present international law it is clear 
that States, by defi nition, cannot be the subject of criminal sanctions akin to 
those provided for in national criminal systems’.224
However, notwithstanding these statements, it can be argued that the sentiments 
enunciated in draft  article 19(3)(d) may eventually refl ect an emerging trend in 
relation to the law on environmental damage resulting from deliberate State 
policy. Articles  40 and 41 of the draft  articles that were ultimately adopted by 
the ILC in 2001 are expressed to apply in the case of a serious breach by a State of 
‘an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law.’225 
Th ese provisions and the associated ILC commentary make no specifi c reference 
to damage to the environment, although the commentary does not purport to 
be exhaustive.226 However, it is noteworthy to observe that, at its 65th session 
in 2013, the ILC decided to include the topic of ‘Protection of the Environment 
in relation to Armed Confl icts’ in its program of work, on the basis of the 
recommendations contained in a working group report.227
Notwithstanding the absence of a concept of criminal responsibility for States 
for intentional environmental destruction during armed confl ict, there are 
various other enforcement mechanisms that have been instituted. Following 
the environmental damage occasioned in both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia by the 
Iraqi regime in the period during and immediately following the invasion of 
Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council passed a Resolution which, in part, 
provided that Iraq was ‘liable under international law for any direct loss, damage 
– including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources’.228 
Iraq eventually accepted, although under protest, the terms of that Resolution.229 
A compensation fund, administered by the United Nations Compensation 
224 Judgement on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial 
Chamber II of 18  July 1997, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-AR, Appeals 
Chamber, 29 October 1997, para 25.
225 International Law Commission, Draft  Articles on Responsibility of States for International 
Wrongfully Acts contained in Report of the International Law Commission to the General 
Assembly on its work of the fi ft y-third session, [2001] 2:2 Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 1, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), 112.
226 Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd ed, 2005), 895.
227 International Law Commission, ‘Protection of the environment in relation to armed confl icts’ 
(5 June 2013) <www.un.org/law/ilc/index.html> at 19 January 2015. For further background, 
see Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on its work of 
the sixty-third session, [2011], General Assembly Offi  cial Records, Sixty-sixth Session, 
Supplement No. 10, UN Doc A/66/10, Annex E, ‘Protection of the environment in relation to 
armed confl icts’.
228 United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (3  April 1991) UN Doc S/RES/687/1991, 
para 16.
229 See Koppe, supra note 13, 247 and the corresponding footnotes.
1.6. Could State Criminal Responsibility Apply?
Intersentia 43
Commission (UNCC),230 was subsequently established, and is still operating, to 
deal with civil claims for damage caused as a direct result of Iraq’s invasion and 
subsequent occupation of Kuwait.231
Th us, although there may exist the possibility of legal redress against a State for 
intentional environmental destruction during armed confl ict, this has not been 
extended to include criminal responsibility at the international level.
1.6.2. INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
International criminal law clearly applies to individuals. Th e judgment of the 
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal represents the traditional view, 
rejecting as it did the argument that individuals could not be held responsible for 
‘acts of state’.232 In an oft -quoted passage, the Tribunal stated that, although:233
international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon 
States … [c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not abstract 
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the 
provisions of international law be enforced
Th is view was also repeated in various war crimes trials conducted by the United 
States Military Tribunal in Nuremberg.234 Th e notion of individual criminal 
responsibility for international crimes is also refl ected in the jurisdictional 
mandates of all subsequently established international(ised) criminal tribunals. 
Th ese courts are not designed to prosecute non-natural entities, particularly 
States. Th e ICC, for example, only has jurisdiction over ‘natural persons’.235 
Given that international criminal law is not in the position to hold a State 
culpable for such acts, this book will focus on how individuals, who themselves 
bear a responsibility towards the environment,236 are regulated for acts of 
intentional environmental damage during armed confl ict.
230 United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (3 April 1991) UN Doc S/RES/687/1991 on 
Iraq-Kuwait, para 18.
231 United Nations Security Council Resolution 692 (20 May 1991) UN Doc S/RES/692/1991 on 
Iraq-Kuwait, para 3. See also supra, note 57.
232 Nina H.B. Jørgensen, Th e Responsibility of States for International Crimes (2000), 19.
233 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals 1 October 
1946, reprinted in (1947) 41 American Journal of International Law 172, 221.
234 See, for example, United States v. Flick and Others (Judgment), United States Military 
Tribunal, Nuremberg, (1949) IX War Crimes Reports 1, 18: United States. v. Krupp and Others 
(Judgment), United States Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, (1949) X War Crimes Reports 69, 
150.
235 Rome Statute, article 25(1).
236 Patricia W. Birnie and Alan E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment (2nd ed, 2002) 
282.
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In this regard, there is the need to affi  rm such criminality at the international 
level, particularly in light of the ‘traditional reluctance’ of States to prosecute 
persons accused of international crimes within their domestic legal systems.237 
Given the well-accepted presumption that international crimes represent an 
aff ront to the community as a whole, it is argued in this book that intentionally 
targeting the environment during armed confl ict can in certain circumstances 
meet this level of abhorrence. Warfare has been shown to have contributed to 
the large scale depletion of natural resources and serious degradation of the 
environment.238 Th e international legal regime must therefore adequately 
provide for accountability in relation to such acts.
Seen in this context, it will be argued that the most appropriate mechanism 
of international criminal justice to prosecute such acts is the permanent 
international criminal court, the ICC, acting in accordance with the terms of 
the Rome Statute. Moreover, this may also ‘incentivise’ States – at least those 
that have ratifi ed the Rome Statute – to ‘upgrade’ their domestic laws, in order 
to ensure that their respective national courts would have jurisdiction to deal 
with any alleged act that constituted an international crime within the mandate 
of the Court, thus minimising the risk of falling within the ‘unable’ criteria for 
complementarity set out in article 17 of the Rome Statute.239
Although there are, undoubtedly, some uncertainties as to precisely how aspects 
of the complementarity principle may apply in practice, it does represent a 
safeguard for those States who would otherwise be concerned that its nationals 
would face trial before the Court.240 Even though a number of State Parties to 
the Rome Statute have yet to pass appropriate implementing legislation, as 
the international system of criminal justice evolves and the acceptance of the 
ICC broadens, national governments will come under increasing pressure to 
recognise the international crimes within their own legal systems. As has been 
suggested, the Rome Statute itself plays ‘a powerful trendsetting role’241 in 
articulating and shaping the actions of States.
237 Antonio Cassese, ‘Th e Role of Internationalized Courts and Tribunals in the Fight Against 
International Criminality’, in Cesare P.R. Romano, André Nollkaemper and Jann K. Kleff ner 
(eds), Internationalized Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia 
(2004), 3, 3.
238 Sands, supra note 226, 308.
239 Under the system of complementarity established by the Rome Statute, a case is inadmissible 
inter alia where it ‘is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction 
over it, unless that State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution’: Rome Statute, article 17(1)(a). See also chapter 4.
240 See Alexis Goh and Steven Freeland, ‘Australia and the International Criminal Court’, in 
Gabriel A. Moens and Rudolphe Biff ot (eds), Th e Convergence of Legal Systems in the 21st 
Century – An Australian Approach (2002), 285.
241 Mark A. Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy (2012), 121.
1.7. Key Questions
Intersentia 45
1.7. KEY QUESTIONS
Following on from the observations above, the following chapters of this book 
focus on the following key questions:
(a) To what extent do treaty and customary principles of international law 
currently address the intentional destruction of the environment during 
armed confl ict?
(b) Is the current position suffi  cient to allow for criminal accountability for such 
acts in appropriate circumstances?
(c) What function should the mechanisms of justice under international 
criminal law, in particular the ICC, play in addressing this issue?
(d) Is it therefore necessary to amend the Rome Statute in order to more 
appropriately deal with the intentional destruction of the environment 
during armed confl ict?242
242 As suggested in chapter 5, such actions might be termed as ‘crimes against the environment’, 
an expression that has previously been used by some commentators: see, for example, 
Stephen  C. McCaff ery, ‘Crimes Against the Environment’ (1986) 1 International Criminal 
Law 541.
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CHAPTER TWO
REGULATION OF THE 
INTENTIONAL DESTRUCTION 
OF THE ENVIRONMENT DURING 
WARFARE UNDER TREATY LAW
2.1. INTRODUCTION – TREATIES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Th e previous chapter demonstrated the imperative for appropriate mechanisms 
of accountability to address the intentional destruction of the environment 
during armed confl ict. Th is requires an analysis of the current treaty provisions, 
in order to assess whether they are suffi  cient and adequate in this regard. 
Most of the relevant conventional principles that do apply are specifi ed in the 
treaties that set out the basic norms of international humanitarian law – the jus 
in bello (‘rules in war’). Th ere may also be other applicable general principles 
in a number of multilateral international environmental law instruments. 
Th e development of both of these categories of treaties coincides with two 
trends – the advances in military technology on the one hand, and the rise of 
environmental consciousness on the other.1 An examination of these treaties 
provides a collective framework upon which a subsequent analysis of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court2 – can (at least partially) be based.
It is fi rst important to determine the nature of these instruments. Th e Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties defi nes a treaty for the purposes of that 
instrument as follows:3
1 Christopher D. Stone, ‘Th e Environment in Wartime: An Overview’, in Jay E. Austin and 
Carl E. Bruch (eds), Th e Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Economic, and Scientifi c 
Perspectives (2000), 16, 17–8.
2 Opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3; 37 ILM 999 (entered into force 1 July 2002) 
(Rome Statute).
3 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 
331; 8 ILM 679 (entered into force 27 January 1980) (VCLT), article 2(1)(a).
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an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed 
by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more 
related instruments and whatever its particular designation
Treaties are binding on States Parties, who are under an obligation to perform 
the terms of the relevant treaty in good faith in accordance with the principle 
of pacta sunt servanda.4 Th e defi nition of a treaty in the VCLT does not 
necessarily encompass the complete range of international treaties, which 
also include those concluded by ‘non-States’. For example, an international 
organisation like the United Nations can enter into treaties, since it possesses ‘a 
large measure of international personality and the capacity to operate upon an 
international plane’.5 However, for the purposes of this chapter, the defi nition 
in the VCLT suffi  ces to describe the jus in bello and international environmental 
instruments that are discussed.
Treaties and custom represent the two principal ‘sources’ of international law.6 
Th e other sources, as set out in article 38(1) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, are general principles of law, and judicial decisions and the 
writings of the most highly qualifi ed publicists.7 Th is book will focus primarily 
on international law principles under treaties (this chapter) or by virtue of 
customary international law (chapter 3). With regard to general principles 
of law, as discussed in chapter 1, there are no relevant and suffi  ciently widely 
accepted principles to be found within the national laws of States as to constitute 
a comprehensive ‘source’ of international law dealing with the intentional 
destruction of the environment during warfare. In the course of this analysis, 
the decisions of international(ised) criminal tribunals and the International 
Court of Justice, as well as other judicial decisions, will also be considered to the 
extent they are relevant.
4 Ibid, article 26.
5 Reparation for Injuries Suff ered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1949] 
ICJ Rep 174, 179. See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or between International Organizations, opened for signature 
21 March 1986 25 ILM 543 (not in force), preamble para 1.
6 It is generally asserted that article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
opened for signature 26 June 1945, 1 UNTS 16, 59 Stat. 1031 (entered into force 24 October 
1945) (ICJ Statute), lists the so-called ‘sources’ of international law: see, for example, 
Georg Schwarzenberger, International Law (3rd ed, Vol 1, 1957), 21–22; Antonio Cassese, 
International Law (2nd ed, 2005), 156.
7 It should be noted that articles 21(1) and (2) of the Rome Statute codify the ‘Applicable law’ 
relevant to the judicial activities of the International Criminal Court.
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2.2. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW ( JUS 
IN BELLO) – RELEVANT TREATY PROVISIONS
One (among many) tragic aspect of armed confl ict is that innocent civilians 
are oft en (and increasingly) the victims. In 1900, it was estimated that civilians 
represented approximately fi ve per cent of the casualties of confl ict. By the 
time of the Second World War, this fi gure had risen to approximately 65 per 
cent. Human rights groups now calculate that approximately 90 per cent of all 
casualties in more recent armed confl icts8 are made up of civilians, of which 
40 per cent are children.9 Such casualties arise through direct injury or death 
caused by military action, as well as other causes, including the destruction of 
the environment, which will oft en have immediate and longer-term eff ects on 
the security of human populations.
Over time, the disastrous consequences of armed confl ict led to a general 
consensus that legal rules should be introduced and implemented in an eff ort 
to alleviate human suff ering during hostilities. Th is process has rather astutely 
been described as:10
a concerted attempt on the part of nations and individuals to bring the tools 
of rational analysis to bear upon a fi eld of endeavour that oft en appears to be 
incorrigibly rooted in irrationality
Th is has seen the emergence of various legal principles limiting the methods and 
means of warfare, and prescribing the rights and protections both of civilians 
and non-civilians in times of hostilities, a distinction lying ‘at the very heart 
of the law of armed confl ict’.11 Th ese rules are regarded as ‘the most essential’ 
of ‘all of the law of nations’, in view of the broad and long-lasting eff ects of 
warfare.12 Th e laws and customs of war had their origins in the customary 
practices of armies on the battlefi eld and have existed in various forms almost 
8 Kristin Dorman, ‘Proportionality and Distinction in the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia’ (2005) 12 Australian International Law Journal 83, 83.
9 Stephanie H. Bald, ‘Searching for a Lost Childhood: Will the Special Court of Sierra Leone 
Find Justice for Its Children?’ (2002) 18 American University International Law Review 537, 
543, citing ‘Women and Children Bear Brunt of War’ Saigon Times Daily (Ho Chi Minh City), 
3 May 2002. In the period 1986–1996, for example, it has been estimated that as many as two 
million children alone were killed in armed confl ict: Nienke Grossman, ‘Rehabilitation or 
Revenge: Prosecuting Child Soldiers for Human Rights Violations’ (2007) 38:2 Georgetown 
Journal of International Law 323, 359.
10 Peter J. Richards and Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Mars Meets Mother Nature: Protecting the 
Environment During Armed Confl ict’ (1999) 28 Stetson Law Review 1047, 1047.
11 W. Michael Reisman, ‘Editorial Comment: Holding the Center of the Law of Armed Confl ict’ 
(2006) 100 American Journal of International Law 852, 856.
12 Dana Zartner Falstrom, ‘Can International Law Survive the 21st Century? Yes, with Patience, 
Persistence and a Peek at the Past’ (2007) 8 San Diego International Law Journal 291, 326. Th at 
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since antiquity.13 Even in ancient civilizations, examples can be found of 
prohibitions on such things as the poisoning of water sources and the razing of 
forests.14
Th e fi rst signifi cant attempt to codify the laws of war came in 1863, when 
American President Lincoln issued a General Order authorising the so-called 
‘Lieber Instructions’ or ‘Lieber Code’,15 which introduced a set of legal guidelines 
to be applied at the time of the American Civil War. Although these rules were 
only binding on United States military forces, they corresponded with several 
important general aspects of the laws of war that existed at the time.16 Following 
on from the Lieber Code, a number of other States draft ed military manuals 
during the second half of the 19th Century.17
In 1864, the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded in Armies in the Field was concluded, following a conference convened 
by the Swiss Federal Council.18 Th is was the fi rst international agreement 
that purported to specify rules of warfare, and was in part inspired by Henri 
Dunant’s account of what he had witnessed on the Solferino battlefi eld.19 As well 
as specifying principles relating to the relief for wounded,20 the neutrality of 
medical personnel,21 and the special status of the sign of the ‘red cross on a white 
ground’,22 the 1864 Geneva Convention laid the groundwork for more detailed 
multilateral treaties on the laws of war.23
author opines (at 340) that war is sometimes ‘necessary’ to achieve the goals of international 
law – to ‘uphold the peace and stability of the entire globe’.
13 For a discussion of the historical evolution of the regulation of armed confl ict going back 
some 5,000 years, see M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed), A Manual on International Humanitarian 
Law and Arms Control Agreements (2000), 5–15.
14 Royal Swedish Ministry for Foreign Aff airs, ‘Conventional Weapons, their Deployment 
and Eff ects from a Humanitarian Aspect: Recommendations for the Modernization of 
International Law’ (1973), 11.
15 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, promulgated as 
General Orders No. 100, 24 April 1863.
16 Dietrich Schindler and Jiri Toman (eds), Th e Law of Armed Confl icts (4th ed, 2004), 3.
17 Th ese included Prussia (1870), Th e Netherlands (1871), France (1877), Russia (1877 and 1904), 
Serbia (1878), Argentina (1881), Great Britain (1883 and 1904) and Spain (1893): see Michael 
A. Newton, Symposium, ‘Modern Military Necessity: Th e Role and Relevance of Military 
Lawyers’ (2007) 12 Roger Williams University Law Review 877, 886 and the corresponding 
footnote.
18 Opened for signature 22 August 1864, 18 Martens (1st) 607 (entered into force 22 June 1865) 
(1864 Geneva Convention).
19 See Henry Dunant, A Memory of Solferino (reprinted 1986).
20 1864 Geneva Convention, article 6.
21 Ibid, articles 1 and 2.
22 Ibid, article 7.
23 Schindler and Toman, supra note 16, vi. Traditionally, the law regulating the methods and 
means of warfare was referred to as the ‘law of war’ (jus in bello). It has subsequently also 
come to be known as the ‘law of armed confl ict.’ Non-military organizations, in particular 
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Over time, important conventional norms – some of which also now represent 
rules of customary international law24 – have emerged to regulate a broader 
range of military activities conducted during the course of armed confl ict. Th ere 
are now more than 100 instruments that comprise the jus in bello.25 Th e scope 
of these norms extends beyond traditional State combatants, applying to non-
State actors and even, in certain circumstances, to United Nations Peacekeeping 
Forces.26 As a general observation, however, there remains signifi cant tension 
between those restrictions imposed on the methods and means of warfare and 
the military goals sought through such acts, even though it has been argued that 
military considerations should not be the sole, or indeed primary, determining 
factor in how warfare is to be conducted.27
In its early codifi cation, the jus in bello rules focused principally on the 
protection of medical personnel and the prohibition of certain types of 
weapons.28 However, even in the absence of provisions limiting a specifi c aspect 
of warfare, the evolution of the jus in bello stemmed largely from a recognition 
of fundamental humanitarian values of a ‘social, religious, political, moral, 
military and scientifi c’ nature.29 Indeed, Jean Pictet has defi ned international 
humanitarian law as:30
a branch of public international law which owes its inspiration to a feeling for 
humanity and which is centered on the protection of the individual
the International Committee of the Red Cross, prefer the name ‘international humanitarian 
law.’ In the more recent jus in bello treaties, the term ‘armed confl ict’ is used rather than ‘war’ 
or ‘warfare’: Michael H. Hoff man, ‘Th e Legal Status And Responsibilities of Private Internet 
Users under the Law of Armed Confl ict: A Primer for the Unwary on the Shape of Law to 
Come’ (2003) 2 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 415, 417. Th ese terms are 
used interchangeably in this book with no intended diff erence in meaning, unless otherwise 
expressly stated.
24 Th e relevant principles of customary international law are discussed in chapter 3.
25 Jaume Saura, ‘Lawful Peacekeeping: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’ (2007) 58 Hastings Law Journal 479, 488.
26 See Daphna Shraga, ‘UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of International 
Humanitarian Law and Responsibility for Operations-Related Damage’ (2000) 94 American 
Journal of International Law 406.
27 See, for example, Richard A. Falk, Law, Morality, and War in the Contemporary World (1984), 
9–12.
28 William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law (2000), 15.
29 René Provost, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (2002), 5.
30 Jean Pictet, quoted in Yves Beigbeder, Judging War Criminals: Th e Politics of International 
Justice (1999), 1.
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Th is is explicitly refl ected in the Martens Clause,31 which, as noted, fi rst appeared 
in 1899, and which provided that the following broad principles were applicable 
to the conduct of warfare:32
the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among 
civilized peoples, the laws of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience
Th ere has been some conjecture over the years as to the precise signifi cance 
of the Martens clause. Although it is probably the case that principles of 
humanity are not regarded as independent ‘sources’ of international law,33 the 
International Court of Justice has indicated that they do express customary 
international law.34 Th eodor Meron suggests that the sentiments of the Martens 
Clause play an important role in the ‘humanization of the law of war’.35 Th e 
International Court of Justice has, on several occasions, emphasized ‘elementary 
considerations of humanity’ when interpreting principles of international law.36
In terms of its applicability to environmental damage, one commentator 
has suggested that ‘[i]n modern international law, there is no reason why 
[the principles included within the Martens clause] should not encompass 
environmental protection’.37 At a minimum, it plays an important role in that, 
in terms of the conduct of warfare, even if an action is not expressly prohibited, 
it does not follow that it is ‘necessarily permitted’.38 Moreover, the Martens 
clause suggests the existence of a ‘belief in common values’,39 by introducing a 
31 Professor Friedrich (Fyodor) Martens was a delegate of Tsar Nicholas II at the Hague Peace 
Conferences of 1899 and 1907: Dieter Fleck (ed), Th e Handbook of Humanitarian Law in 
Armed Confl icts (1999), 28.
32 See, for example, the preamble of the Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War, opened for signature 18  October 1907, 3 Martens (3rd) 461 (entered into 
force 26 January 1910).
33 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago 
Josipovic, Dragan Papic and Vladimir Santic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, 14 January 
2000, para 525. See also Knut Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary (2004), 168.
34 Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 84.
35 See Jochen A. Frowein, Book Review – Th eodor Meron, ‘Th e Humanization of International 
Law’ (2007) 101 American Journal of International Law 680, 680.
36 See, for example, Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
v. Albania) (Merits) (Judgment) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 22; Military and Paramilitary Activities in 
and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits) (Judgment) [1986] ICJ 
Rep 14, para 215.
37 Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd ed, 2005), 311.
38 Saura, supra note 25, 490. In relation to suggestions of an express permissive rule in general 
international law, see the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice in Th e Case 
of the S.S. ‘Lotus’ (France v. Turkey) (Judgment) [1927] PCIJ Rep, Series A, No. 10, 18–9.
39 Dinah Shelton, ‘Centennial Essay: In Honor of the 100th Anniversary of the AIJL and 
the ASIL: Normative Hierarchy in International Law’ (2006) 100 American Journal of 
International Law 291, 295.
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‘public conscience’ standard into the application of international humanitarian 
law to ‘real-life’ occurrences, although this may still be too vague to be of great 
assistance.40 Yet, a consideration of several of the jus in bello treaties discussed 
below suggests that the rules of international humanitarian law are based on a 
balance between military necessity and principles of humanity.41
Th e central objectives of international humanitarian law are the protection of 
those aff ected by armed confl ict, and the regulation of the conduct of hostilities. 
Th is refl ects the need to establish a system of regulation to minimise the 
inevitable horrors rendered on ‘people, property and the environment’ by war.42 
Th e principles of international humanitarian law and the ‘humanization that 
it brings to modern warfare’ are now important elements in contemporary 
international law,43 setting out minimum international standards that regulate 
how, with what and against whom armed hostilities can be conducted. Th is 
description is, of course, somewhat simplistic, but as has been noted by Judge 
Koroma, international humanitarian law is:44
formulated and codifi ed to restrict the use of various weapons and methods of 
warfare, [and] is intended to limit the terrible eff ects of war
In the same case, Judge Weeramantry explained the signifi cance of international 
humanitarian law in the following way:45
Humanitarian law and custom have a very ancient lineage. Th ey reach back 
thousands of years. Th ey were worked out in many civilizations … many religious 
and philosophical ideas have been poured into the mould in which modern 
humanitarian law has been formed. Th ey represented the eff ort of the human 
conscience to mitigate in some measure the brutalities and dreadful suff erings of war
Th e jus in bello rules are not directly concerned with the legality of a belligerent’s 
resort to force – this is regulated by the jus ad bellum (‘rules to war’).46 Rather, 
40 Fleck, supra note 31, 29.
41 Anthony E. Cassimatis, ‘International Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights 
Law, and Fragmentation of International Law’ (2007) 56 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 623, 628–9.
42 L.C. Vohrah, Kelly Dawn Askin and Daryl A. Mundis, ‘Contemporary Law Regulating 
Armed Confl ict at Sea’, in Nisuke Ando, Edward McWhinney and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds), 
Liber Amicorum: Judge Shigeru Oda (Volume 2, 2002), 1523, 1541 (emphasis added).
43 Saura, supra note 25, 494.
44 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma in Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
(Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 558.
45 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry in Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 443.
46 Th e central core of the existing principles of the jus ad bellum is the prohibition of the threat 
or use of force, which is also refl ected in article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, opened 
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they deal with the methods and means employed during armed confl ict, as 
well as the rights of those individuals involved in the hostilities. Th e Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) has described international humanitarian law as:47
a realistic body of law, grounded on the notion of eff ectiveness and inspired by the 
aim of deterring deviation from its standards to the maximum extent possible
However, even though the ICTY has provided a now well-accepted defi nition 
of what constitutes an armed confl ict,48 the precise nature of armed confl ict 
continues to change, more particularly in recent decades, coinciding with 
the development of new and potentially devastating methods and means of 
warfare. For example, it is evident that recent armed confl icts diff er from the 
type of war envisaged by the draft ers of the 1949 Geneva Conventions49 and 
the 1977 Additional Protocols,50 not the least due to the much broader range of 
weaponry and technologically advanced ‘hardware’ and ‘soft ware’ available for 
use by combatants,51 as well as the general shift  of the battlefi eld towards civilian 
for signature 26  June 1945, 1 UNTS 16; 59 Stat. 1031 (entered into force 24  October 1945) 
(United Nations Charter). Although this book does not focus on the jus ad bellum, as noted 
in chapter 1, there have been suggestions made that an adaptation of those rules may emerge 
over time so as to permit a State to meet environmental threats to its security with force: 
Michael K. Murphy, ‘Note: Achieving Economic Security with Swords as Ploughshares: Th e 
Modern Use of Force to Combat Environmental Degradation’ (1999) 39 Virginia Journal of 
International Law Association 1181.
47 Judgement, Prosecutor v Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, para 
96.
48 See Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v Duško 
Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, para 70.
49 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into 
force 21 October 1950) (1949 Geneva Convention I), Geneva Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 
opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (1949 
Geneva Convention II), Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (1949 
Geneva Convention III), Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War, opened for signature 12  August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 
21 October 1950) (1949 Geneva Convention IV).
50 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Confl icts, opened for signature 8  June 1977, 
1125 UNTS 3, 16 ILM 1391 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (1977 Additional Protocol 
I) and Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Confl icts, opened for signature 8 June 
1977, 1125 UNTS 609, 16 ILM 1442 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (1977 Additional 
Protocol II).
51 Th e jus in bello treaties place a responsibility upon States to determine whether the use of 
a ‘new’ weapon represents a violation of applicable international law: see 1977 Additional 
Protocol I, article 36. See also James D. Fry, ‘Contextualized Legal Reviews for the Methods 
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population centres. Additionally, many contemporary confl icts now involve 
non-State actors as belligerents.
As a result, the long-term threats and potential for death and destruction 
from armed confl ict are now signifi cantly graver than previously. It therefore 
follows that the minimum standards of what might once have been regarded 
as ‘acceptable’ behaviour by belligerents during armed confl ict may also 
have changed, thus requiring closer scrutiny and more comprehensive legal 
regulation. To meet (some of) these challenges, the scope of the jus in bello 
rules has, over time, expanded on the questions of protection of property and of 
people and, more recently, express reference has also been made to the protection 
of the environment, at least in certain circumstances.52 As Judge Lachs of the 
International Court of Justice has observed:53
the great acceleration of social and economic change, combined with that of science 
and technology, have confronted law with a serious challenge: one it must meet, lest it 
lag even farther behind events than it has been wont to do.
It is therefore important to note that the interpretation of the principles outlined 
in the jus in bello treaties, as well as those customary international law principles 
(see chapter 3), are not to be regarded as ‘static’. Th is is particularly so given that 
the methods, means, and underlying context of warfare are constantly changing 
and, even more broadly, that armed confl icts continue to occur despite any 
eff orts by the broader international community to prevent them.54
As a consequence, the applicable law must adapt to meet changing circumstances. 
Th e mere fact, for example, that weapons technology has developed in ways that 
may not have been contemplated by the draft ers of the relevant instruments does 
not necessarily mean that the principles of international humanitarian law are 
not applicable to their use. As the International Court of Justice noted in the 
Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, adopting the 
written statement submitted by New Zealand:55
and Means of Warfare: Cave Combat and International Humanitarian Law’ (2006) 44 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 453, 468–90.
52 David Hunter, James Salzman and Durwood Zaelke, International Environmental Law and 
Policy (2nd ed, 2002), 1379.
53 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Lachs, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of 
Germany v. Denmark and Federal Republic of Germany v. Th e Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep 3, 
230 (emphasis added).
54 Provost, supra note 29, 1.
55 Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para. 
86. One specifi c area where weapons technology has developed very signifi cantly in recent 
years involves the military uses of outer space: see Steven Freeland, ‘Th e Applicability of 
the Jus in Bello Rules of International Humanitarian Law to the Use of Outer Space’ (2006) 
49 Proceedings of the Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 338; Michel Bourbonièrre, ‘Th e 
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international humanitarian law has evolved to meet contemporary circumstances, 
and is not limited in its application to weaponry of an earlier time. Th e fundamental 
principles of this law endure: to mitigate and circumscribe the cruelty of war for 
humanitarian reasons
In this way, the conventional jus in bello principles are, where appropriate, to 
be regarded as ‘by defi nition evolutionary’, as that phrase has been used by the 
International Court of Justice.56 Indeed, the Court noted that:57
an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework 
of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation
On the other hand, the VCLT sets out clear principles for the interpretation of a 
treaty. Th e general rule of interpretation is set out in article 31, which provides 
inter alia that:58
[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose
Th ese requirements are cumulative in nature and therefore should not be read 
in isolation.59 Th e International Court of Justice has on several occasions 
confi rmed that both article  31 and article  32 of the VCLT refl ect customary 
international law,60 and thus the rules that they set out might also apply 
to treaties that came into force prior to 1980.61 Although the meaning of 
article 31(1) ‘could conceivably change as a result of the practice of states with 
Ambit of the Law of Neutrality and Space Security’ (2006) 36 Israel Yearbook on Human 
Rights 205, 211.
56 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) Advisory Opinion [1971] 
ICJ Rep 16, para 53.
57 Id.
58 VCLT, article 31(1).
59 James Harrison, ‘Th e role of international conventions in solving transboundary pollution 
disputes’, in Michael Faure and Song Ying (eds), China and International Environmental 
Liability: Legal Remedies for Transboundary Pollution (2008), 38, 41.
60 See, for example, Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad) (Judgment) [1994] 
ICJ Rep 6, para 41; Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahrain) 
(Judgment) [1995] ICJ Rep 6, para 33; Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of 
Iran v. United States of America) (Preliminary Objections, Judgment) [1996] ICJ Rep 803, para 
23; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
(Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136, para 94.
61 Th e VCLT entered into force on 27  January 1980 and does not generally have a retroactive 
eff ect (article 4). As a consequence, it is generally regarded that the terms of the VCLT can, 
strictly speaking, only be applied to treaties that themselves come into force aft er that date. 
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regard to treaty interpretation’,62 in the absence of ambiguity in the terms of a 
treaty, it would be inappropriate to ‘read into’ a particular treaty rules relating to 
the intention to destroy the environment during armed confl ict, if such rules do 
not appear from an interpretation based on the customary principles codifi ed in 
the VCLT.63
Th is is so notwithstanding that it may be ‘desirable’ to infer rules into the 
applicable conventional provisions. Th is principle of interpretation was 
reaffi  rmed by Sir Percy Spender and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, when commenting 
on the decision of the International Court of Justice in the International Status of 
South-West Africa Advisory Opinion,64 as follows:65
[t]he principle of interpretation directed to giving provisions their maximum eff ect 
cannot legitimately be employed in order to introduce what would amount to a 
revision of those provisions
Th us, even though the meaning of a particular treaty may not necessarily be 
‘fi xed’ at the time of its conclusion66 if, in the absence of ambiguity, the scope 
of a jus in bello treaty provision is clear in accordance with the well accepted 
principles of interpretation, then broader protections or prohibitions cannot 
simply be ‘added’ to the meaning of those provisions. Th is must be borne in 
mind when considering the treaties discussed below.
Another important issue is that of nomenclature. Th e earlier jus in bello treaties 
oft en refer to acts committed during ‘war’ or ‘warfare’. As noted above, more 
recent treaties, particularly those concluded since the end of the Second World 
War, typically refer to ‘armed confl ict’ or, occasionally, ‘hostilities’. One reason 
for this is that a view gradually emerged in the fi rst part of the 20th Century that 
62 Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, ‘Changing the rules about rules? Unilateral 
humanitarian intervention and the future of international law’, in J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert 
O. Keohane (eds), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (2003), 
177, 187.
63 By way of illustration, in the Interpretation of Peace Treaties Case Advisory Opinion, the 
International Court of Justice refused to ‘rewrite’ a series of three peace treaties between the 
Allied Powers and Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania in such a way as to override the clear 
meaning of the text, affi  rming that ‘[i]t is the duty of the Court to interpret the Treaties, not to 
revise them’: Interpretation of Peace Treaties Case (second phase) (Advisory Opinion) [1950] 
ICJ Rep 221, 229.
64 [1950] ICJ Rep 128.
65 As quoted in William A. Schabas, ‘Th e Crime of Genocide in the Jurisprudence of the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda’, in Horst Fischer, 
Claus Kress and Sascha Rolf Lüder (eds), International and National Prosecution of Crimes 
Under International Law: Current Developments (2001), 447, 451.
66 See, for example, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa 
in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) 
(Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16, para 53.
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‘war’ was unlawful under international law. Indeed, in 1928, a highly symbolic 
instrument, usually referred to either as the ‘Pact of Paris’ or the ‘Kellogg-Briand 
Pact’,67 renounced war ‘as an instrument of national policy in their relations 
with one another.’68
Although this was a positive development in relation to the (il)legality of war, 
it became clear that it was an unrealistic and ineff ective declaration.69 Various 
States subsequently asserted that they would be exempted from the prohibitions 
when involved in a ‘confl ict’ rather than a war,70 leading to disagreement among 
commentators as to whether they applied to what came to be categorized as 
‘force short of war’.71
Th e illegality of war was subsequently reinforced by the adoption of the United 
Nations Charter, which expresses the determination of Members to ‘save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war’.72 Moreover, uncertainties 
regarding the scope of the Kellogg-Briand Pact were resolved by the express 
prohibition of the threat or use of force specifi ed in article  2(4) of the United 
Nations Charter, which provided for a more comprehensive conventional 
prohibition than had previously existed (‘force’ as opposed to ‘war’). 
Nevertheless, the jus in bello rules are still sometimes referred to as the ‘laws 
of war’,73 although as noted above, the expression ‘international humanitarian 
law’, is now generally preferred, since it highlights that the rules apply not just to 
States, but are also designed to protect individuals.74
With respect to the issue of intentional environmental destruction during 
the course of warfare, the most important of the jus in bello treaties are the 
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the four Genev a Conventions of 1949, 
67 Th ese were the names of the United States Secretary of State and the French Foreign Minister 
respectively who were involved in the negotiation of the treaty.
68 Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (Kellog-
Briand Pact), opened for signature 27 August 1928, 94 LNTS 57 (entered into force 24  July 
1929), article I.
69 Beigbeder, supra note 30, 11.
70 Alex Conte, Security in the 21st Century: Th e United Nations, Afghanistan and Iraq (2005), 3.
71 See, for example, D.J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (6th ed, 2004), 886–9 
and the corresponding references.
72 United Nations Charter, preamble para 1.
73 See, for example, Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff , Documents on the Laws of War (3rd ed, 
2005). However, the word ‘war’ is now used in many contexts, with recent usages including 
the ‘war on drugs’ and the ‘global war on terror’. Th ese might simply be examples of what 
could be regarded as poetic licence or, instead, may indicate that the defi nition of ‘war’ is 
expanding. Most commentators suggest that the term ‘war’ has a specifi c legal meaning: see, 
for example, Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (3rd ed, 2001), 3. In any event, 
the international instruments that have been concluded in relation to these non-traditional 
‘wars’ are not generally regarded as part of the jus in bello.
74 Michael Byers, War Law: International Law and Armed Confl ict (2005), 9.
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the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modifi cation Techniques of 1976,75 and the Additional Protocols 
I and II to the Geneva Conventions of 1977. Th e importance o f the obligations 
arising under Th e Hague and Geneva instruments has been reaffi  rmed by 
the United Nations Security Council in a number resolutions relating to the 
protection of civilians in armed confl ict.76
While there are only a relatively small number of directly relevant treaty 
provisions, other conventional norms applicable in times of armed confl ict, 
although not specifi cally directed towards environmental damage, may be 
pertinent in particular circumstances. In addition, several other treaties prohibit 
resort to certain weapons, the use of which may be highly destructive of the 
environment. Th e various jus in bello treaties that might be relevant to the issue 
of intentional destruction of the environment during warfare are discussed 
below in chronological order.
2.2.1. 1868 ST. PETERSBURG DECLARATION77
Th is important landmark in the evolution of international humanitarian law 
was the fi rst modern treaty that sought to limit the type of weapons to be used 
during warfare.78 It specifi ed for the fi rst time in an international instrument 
that ‘the necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity’.79 
Th is is an early illustration of the customary international law ‘principle of 
humanity’,80 which is discussed further in chapter 3. Not surprisingly, the 
St. Petersburg Declaration makes no mention of the environment, but does 
provide that:81
75 Opened for signature 10  December 1976, 1108 UNTS 151; 16 ILM 88 (entered into force 
5 October 1978).
76 See, for example, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1674 (28 April 2006) UN Doc 
S/RES/1674/2006 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Confl ict, para 6; United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1738 (23  December 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1738/2006 on the 
Protection of Civilians in Armed Confl ict, preamble para 5 and 10.
77 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under 400 
Grammes Weight, opened for signature 29 November 1868, 18 Martens (1st) 474 (entered into 
force 11 December 1868) (St. Petersburg Declaration).
78 Erik V. Koppe, Th e Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Protection of the Environment During 
International Armed Confl ict (2006), 95. Th ere have been earlier examples where specifi c 
weapons have been prohibited: for details, see Roberts and Guelff , supra note 73, 53.
79 St. Petersburg Declaration, para 1.
80 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Humanitarian Law and the Environment’ (2000) 28 Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy 265, 294.
81 St. Petersburg Declaration, para 3.
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the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is 
to weaken the military forces of the enemy
Th ese sentiments are refl ected in more recent jus in bello instruments. On a 
literal reading of this provision, one could perhaps argue that any environmental 
damage occasioned during war by acts not intended to ‘weaken the military 
forces of the enemy’ would be prohibited. However, the issue of environmental 
damage was not at all a relevant factor in the draft ing of the St. Petersburg 
Declaration; rather it was primarily directed against the use of ‘exploding’ bullets 
that shattered upon contact with hard and soft  surfaces, such as those developed 
in the Indian city of Dum-Dum and used by the British Army in colonial India 
in the 19th Century.
Th e St. Petersburg Declaration expressly states that it does not apply to warfare in 
which a non-contracting State Party was a belligerent, even where a State Party 
was involved.82 Th is so-called ‘all participation’ (si omnes) clause was a common 
term of several of the early jus in bello treaties. It was also included in the 1907 
Hague Convention IV (see below), thus limiting the applicability of that treaty 
during the First World War, since a number of the major participants in that 
confl ict were not States Parties.83 By contrast, in the more recent international 
humanitarian law treaties – for example the 1949 Geneva Conventions (discussed 
below) – the treaty is applicable to all combatants who are States Parties, even 
where one (or more) of the combatants is not a State Party.84
2.2.2. 1899 HAGUE CONFERENCE CONVENTIONS AND 
DECLARATIONS
In 1874, a Diplomatic Conference was convened in Brussels at the initiative of 
Tsar Alexander II of Russia. Th e conference adopted an International Declaration 
on the Laws and Customs of War which, however, was not ratifi ed, although it 
did have some infl uence in the negotiation of subsequent instruments.85 As the 
19th Century was drawing to a close, the major States of the time agreed to meet 
in Th e Hague to discuss possible restrictions as to the methods and means of 
warfare, with a particular focus on the limitation of armaments. A conference 
was held in 1899 to discuss these issues. Although there was little agreement in 
82 Ibid, para 9 and 10.
83 Leslie C. Green, Th e Contemporary Law of Armed Confl ict (2nd ed, 2000), 135.
84 Françoise Hampson, ‘Other areas of customary law in relation to the Study’, in Elizabeth 
Wilmshurst and Susan Breau (eds), Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law (2007), 50, 50 and 71.
85 Hilaire McCoubrey, International Humanitarian Law: Modern Developments in the 
Limitation of Warfare (2nd ed, 1998), 19.
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relation to arms limitations, the 26 participants concluded three conventions, 
the most important of which was the 1899 Hague Convention II with Respect 
to the Laws and Customs of War on Land.86 Th is was the fi rst comprehensive 
international instrument to codify those principles that had thus far developed 
from the practice of States.87
Th e 1899 Hague Conference also concluded with three declarations,88 one of 
which required States to:89
agree to abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diff usion of 
asphyxiating or deleterious gases
It has been suggested that these restrictions were derived from then existing 
customary law principles.90 Th ey were embodied in the regulations annexed to 
the 1899 Hague Convention II and the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land (see below). Th e wording from the St. 
Petersburg Declaration was also adopted into the 1899 Hague Declaration 
concerning expanding bullets,91 and is widely assumed to represent customary 
international law, at least in relation to the broad prohibition of weapons that 
cause unnecessary suff ering.92
86 Opened for signature 29 July 1899, 26 Martens (2nd) 949 (entered into force 4 September 1900) 
(1899 Hague Convention II). Th e other conventions were the Convention I for the Pacifi c 
Settlement of International Disputes, opened for signature 29 July 1899, 26 Martens (2nd) 720 
(entered in force 4 September 1900) (1899 Hague Convention I), and Convention III for the 
Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of Principles of the Geneva Convention of 1864 opened for 
signature 29 July 1899, 26 Martens (2nd) 979 (entered in force 4 September 1900) (1899 Hague 
Convention III).
87 Bassiouni, supra note 13, 25.
88 Th ese were the Declaration on the Launching of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons, 
29 July 1899, 32 Stat. 1839 (entered in force 4 September 1900) (1899 Hague Declaration I), the 
Declaration on the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diff usion of Asphyxiating 
or Deleterious Gases, date of signature 29 July 1899, 26 Martens (2nd) 998 (entered into force 
4  September 1900) (1899 Hague Declaration II), and the Declaration on the Use of Bullets 
Which Expand or Flatten Easily in the Human Body, date of signature 29  July 1899, 26 
Martens (2nd) 1002 (entered into force 4 September 1900) (1899 Hague Declaration III).
89 1899 Hague Declaration II, para 1.
90 Roberts and Guelff , supra note 73, 59.
91 Declaration on the Use of Bullets Which Expand or Flatten Easily in the Human Body, date of 
signature 29 July 1899, 26 Martens (2nd) 1002 (entered into force 4 September 1900).
92 See, for example, Robin Coupland and Dominique Loye, ‘Th e 1899 Hague Declaration 
concerning Expanding Bullets: A treaty eff ective for more than 100 years faces complex 
contemporary issues’ (2003) 85 International Review of the Red Cross 135, 135–7; Roberts and 
Guelff , supra note 73, 64.
Chapter Two.  Regulation of the Intentional Destruction of the 
Environment during Warfare under Treaty Law
62 Intersentia
2.2.3. 1907 HAGUE CONVENTION IV RESPECTING THE 
LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR ON LAND93
Th e Final Act of the 1899 Conference called for a ‘follow up’ conference to 
address unresolved issues.94 Aft er some delay, primarily due to the Russo-
Japanese War (1904–1905), this took place in Th e Hague in 1907. At this 
conference, 13 conventions were adopted by the 44 States that took part. Of 
these, the most relevant in relation to damage to the environment during warfare 
was the 1907 Hague Convention IV, which embodied some of the principles of 
the 1899 Hague Convention II. Th e regulations to the 1907 Hague Convention 
IV, annexed to the treaty, specifi ed a quite comprehensive set of rules relating to 
the laws of war, including a number of principles that have subsequently come to 
represent rules of customary international law.
Th e 1907 Hague Convention IV and its regulations do not specifi cally address 
environmental destruction as such. However, article  22 of the regulations 
confi rms that ‘[t]he right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy 
is not unlimited’. Some commentators have interpreted this provision as a basis 
for restrictions on the destruction of the environment during the conduct of 
warfare.95 In addition, article  23(a) relates indirectly to the protection of the 
environment during the conduct of hostilities by prohibiting the use of ‘poison 
or poisoned weapons’. Other provisions call for the protection of property, 
including article 23(g), which prohibits the destruction of ‘the enemy’s property’, 
unless justifi ed by the ‘necessities of war’. While there are uncertainties as to 
what might constitute ‘property’ – it would not extend, for example, to ‘objects’ 
such as the climate or the atmosphere96 – the prohibition probably does 
encompass tangible areas, whose destruction would constitute environmental 
damage.
Th e general prohibitions envisaged by article 23(g) of the 1907 Hague Convention 
IV formed the basis of charges brought against various German military and 
administrative offi  cers following the conclusion of the Second World War. 
General Lothar Rendulic was accused before a United States Military Tribunal 
at Nuremberg of wanton destruction of property, based upon a ‘scorched earth 
policy’ implemented under his command in an attempt to hinder the advancing 
93 Opened for signature 18  October 1907, 3 Martens (3rd) 461 (entered into force 26  January 
1910) (1907 Hague Convention IV).
94 Schmitt, supra note 80, 294.
95 Ibid, 295, footnote 154.
96 Anthony Leibler, ‘Deliberate Wartime Environmental Damage: New Challenges for 
International Law’ (1992) 23 California Western International Law Journal 67, 105–6.
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Russian forces in the Norwegian province of Finnmark.97 In a decision that was, 
not surprisingly, widely criticised in Norway, the Tribunal, aft er considering the 
terms of article 23(g), dismissed the charges, concluding that Rendulic’s actions 
were justifi ed by military necessity founded upon his ‘honest judgment on the 
basis of the conditions prevailing at the time’, even though, as it transpired, his 
actions proved to be unnecessary in the circumstances.98
In emphasizing the signifi cance of the military necessity justifi cation expressed 
in article 23(g), the Tribunal stated:99
[t]here is evidence in the record that there was no military necessity for this 
destruction and devastation. An examination of the facts in  retrospect can well 
sustain this conclusion. But we are obliged to judge the situation as it appeared to the 
defendant at the time. If the facts were such as would justify the action by the exercise 
of judgment, aft er giving consideration to all the factors and existing possibilities, 
even though the conclusion reached may have been faulty, it cannot be said to be 
criminal. Aft er giving careful consideration to all the evidence on the subject, we are 
convinced that the defendant cannot be held criminally responsible although when 
viewed in retrospect, the danger did not actually exist.
Th e conviction of Alfred Jodl, Chief of the Operations Staff  of the High 
Command of the German Armed Forces, by the International Military Tribunal 
for the Trial of the German Major War Criminals at Nuremberg (Nuremberg 
Military Tribunal), was partly based on the Nazi regime’s scorched earth 
policies.100 Th e Nuremberg Military Tribunal found that, in October 1944, he 
had ordered the evacuation of all persons in Northern Norway and the burning 
of their houses, so they could not help the Russians. Th e Norwegian Government 
claimed that some 30,000 houses were damaged in this operation.101
Th e Nuremberg Military Tribunal rejected arguments by the defence that the 
si omnes clause in the 1907 Hague Convention IV,102 as well as in the 1929 
97 Th is case was one of 12 so-called ‘Nuremberg follow-up trials’ conducted by United States 
Military Tribunals pursuant to ‘Law No. 10 on the Punishment of Persons Guilty of War 
Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity’, issued by the Allied Control 
Council on 20 December 1945. Th ese judgments are regarded by some commentators as still 
infl uencing international criminal law today: see, for example, Gerhard Werle, Principles of 
International Criminal Law (2005), 12–3.
98 Trial of William List and Others (Th e Hostages Trial) (Judgment), United States Military 
Tribunal, Nuremberg, (1949) VIII Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Case No. 47, 69.
99 Ibid, 68–9 (emphasis added).
100 Tara Weinstein, ‘Prosecuting Attacks that Destroy the Environment: Environmental Crimes 
or Humanitarian Atrocities?’ (2005) 17 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 
697, 704.
101 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals 1 October 
1946, reprinted in (1947) 41 American Journal of International Law 172, 316.
102 See 1907 Hague Convention IV, article 2.
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Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,103 prevented 
prosecution on this issue, based on the fact that several of the belligerents were 
not States Parties. Th e Nuremberg Military Tribunal concluded that it was 
unnecessary to decide that question since:104
the Convention expressly stated that it was an attempt ‘to revise the general laws 
and customs of war,’ which it thus recognised to be then existing, but by 1939 these 
rules laid down in the Convention were recognised by all civilized nations, and were 
regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war which are referred to in 
Article 6 (b) of the Charter
In another Nuremberg trial, conducted by the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission, 10 German civil administrators who had worked at the Forestry 
Administration in the period 1939–1944 were accused of war crimes arising from 
their ‘ruthless exploitation of Polish forestry’, which involved widespread cutting 
down of Polish forests far in excess of what was appropriate to preserve the 
timber resources of the country. Th e United Nations War Crimes Commission 
concluded that a prima facie case of war crimes had been demonstrated, and 
nine of the accused were thus classifi ed as war criminals.105
Some other provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention IV might also be relevant 
to the issue of intentional destruction of the environment. Article  55 imposes 
an obligation on an occupying State to ‘safeguard’ the capital value of various 
properties – including ‘forests, and agricultural estates’ – situated in occupied 
States, and to ‘administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct’.106 
Th ese rules provide that an occupying State may use such properties, but must 
not destroy or permanently alter them.107 A more general protection is aff orded 
by article  23(e), which proscribes the use of ‘arms, projectiles, or material 
calculated to cause unnecessary suff ering’. Th is could possibly be applied to 
actions that damage the environment.108 Moreover, as noted, the 1907 Hague 
103 Opened for signature 27  July 1929, 118 LNTS 343 (entered into force 19  June 1931): see 
Th eodor Meron, ‘Th e Humanization of Humanitarian Law’ (2000) 94 American Journal of 
International Law 239, 247–8 and the corresponding footnote.
104 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals 1 October 
1946, reprinted in (1947) 41 American Journal of International Law 172, 248–9.
105 Adam Roberts, ‘Failures in protecting the environment in the 1990–91 Gulf War’, in Peter 
Rowe (ed), Th e Gulf War 1990–91 in International and English Law (1993), 111, 124.
106 Usufruct is a Roman Law concept defi ned as ‘Th e right of using and taking the fruits of 
something belonging to another’: Shelia Bone (ed), Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary (9th ed, 
2001), 396.
107 Marcos A. Orellana, ‘Criminal Punishment for Environmental Damage: Individual and State 
Responsibility at a Crossroad’ (2005) 17 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 
673, 679.
108 Major Walter G. Sharp, Sr., ‘Th e Eff ective Deterrence of Environmental Damage During 
Armed Confl ict: A Case Analysis of the Persian Gulf War’ (1992) 137 Military Law Review 1, 
10.
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Convention IV also included a Martens clause, which was expressed to apply 
‘[u]ntil a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued’.109
Nevertheless, it is clear that the 1907 Hague Convention IV does not expressly 
provide for extensive protection of the environment, or the prohibition of 
intentional destruction of the environment during hostilities. Rather, some of 
its provisions might be applicable to environmental destruction, if such damage 
results directly from actions specifi cally proscribed by the instrument. Th e 1907 
Hague Convention IV also does not expressly provide for criminal liability 
arising from a violation of its terms.
Th e prohibitions included in the 1907 Hague Convention IV are considered to 
represent customary international law,110 as are the annexed regulations.111 As 
noted, in 1946, the Nuremberg Military Tribunal confi rmed that:112
[t]he rules of land warfare expressed in the [1907 Hague Convention IV] undoubtedly 
represented an advance over existing international law at the time of their adoption 
… by 1939 these rules laid down in the Convention were recognised by all civilised 
nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war
2.2.4. 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL FOR THE PROHIBITION 
OF THE USE IN WAR OF ASPHYXIATING, 
POISONOUS AND OTHER GASES, AND OF 
BACTERIOLOGICAL METHODS OF WARFARE
Despite the positive developments fl owing from the 1899 and 1907 conferences 
in Th e Hague, the conclusion of further international agreements regulating 
the methods and means of warfare was stymied by the onset of the First World 
War. Th e then existing conventional provisions did not deter actions such as 
the widespread use, by both the Germans (at Ypres in 1915), and the British 
(at Loos in 1916), of mustard gas.113 Indeed, in 1919, a British Commission had 
concluded:114
109 1907 Hague Convention IV, preamble para 8.
110 Patricia W. Birnie and Alan E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment (2nd ed, 2002), 
148.
111 See, for example, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136, para 89.
112 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals 1 October 
1946, reprinted in (1947) 41 American Journal of International Law 172, 248–9.
113 James Carroll, ‘Proving nuclear realists wrong’, Th e International Herald Tribune (Paris), 
23 June 2008 <www.iht.com/articles/2008/06/23/opinion/edcarroll.php> at 23 June 2008.
114 As quoted in ibid.
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[t]hat gas is a legitimate weapon of war [is beyond a] shadow of doubt … for history 
shows that in no case has a weapon which has proved successful in war been 
abandoned
Nonetheless, at the end of the war, the 1919 Treaty of Versailles provided that:115
[t]he use of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases and all analogous liquids, 
materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly 
forbidden in Germany
Similar prohibitions were included in the 1922 Washington Treaty Relating to 
the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare,116 concluded between 
France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. However, France 
subsequently decided not to ratify this treaty, with the result that it never entered 
into force.
During the post-First World War period, there was relatively little enthusiasm for 
further codifi cation of the laws of war. It was generally thought that a widespread 
revision of the jus in bello, even in the face of the obvious inadequacies that 
existed, would undermine confi dence in the attempts of the newly-established 
League of Nations to prevent future wars.117 Yet, whenever the League of Nations 
sought to promote disarmament discussions, it frequently met with widespread 
resistance, since the general international atmosphere in the late 1920s and 1930s 
was increasingly one of distrust.118
One of the relatively few steps forward during this period came in 1925, when 
an International Conference on the Control of the International Trade in 
Arms and in Implements of War, convened by the League of Nations, adopted 
the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous and Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925 
Geneva Protocol).119 Th is instrument confi rmed that the prohibition of the use 
of ‘asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials 
or devices’120 was ‘universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding 
alike the conscience and the practice of nations’.121
115 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, opened for 
signature 28 June 1919, 112 BFSP 317 (entered into force 10 January 1920), article 171.
116 Roberts and Guelff , supra note 73, 155.
117 Schindler and Toman, supra note 16, vi.
118 David Armstrong, Lorna Lloyd and John Redmond, From Versailles to Maastricht: 
International Organisation in the Twentieth Century (1996), 46–7.
119 Opened for signature 17 June 1925, 26 Martens (3rd) 643 (entered into force 8 February 1928).
120 1925 Geneva Protocol, preamble para 1 and 2.
121 Ibid, preamble para 3.
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Th e 1925 Geneva Protocol also extended the prohibition to ‘bacteriological 
methods of warfare’,122 and was thus the fi rst major convention that restricted 
the use of biological weapons,123 a new legal development at that time and largely 
directed towards weapons of the future.124 Th is instrument is widely accepted by 
States125 (137 States Parties).126 However, many States have entered reservations 
– although some of these were subsequently withdrawn127 – when ratifying or 
acceding to the instrument, and there also have been several clear violations of 
its terms.128
Th e move towards broader acceptance of the prohibitions in the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol has also been encouraged by a number of United Nations General 
Assembly Resolutions. For example, in 1969, the General Assembly declared that 
the 1925 Geneva Protocol:129
embodies the generally recognized rules of international law prohibiting the use 
in international armed confl icts of all biological and chemical methods of warfare, 
regardless of any technical developments
122 Ibid, para 1.
123 Ensign Florencio J. Yuzon, ‘Deliberate Environmental Modifi cation Th rough the Use of 
Chemical and Biological Weapons: “Greening” the Environmental Laws of Armed Confl ict 
to Establish an Environmentally Protective Regime’ (1996) 11 American University Journal of 
International Law and Policy 793, 827.
124 See generally Jack M. Beard, ‘Th e Shortcomings of Indeterminacy in Arms Control Regimes: 
Th e Case of the Biological Weapons Convention’ (2007) 101 American Journal of International 
Law 271.
125 For example, in 1989 alone, the 1925 Geneva Protocol was ratifi ed, or acceded to, by Albania, 
Bangladesh, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, North Korea, South 
Korea, Laos and Saint Kitts and Nevis.
126 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘State Parties to the Following International 
Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties’ <www.icrc.org/ihl/%28SPF%29/party_main_
treaties/$File/IHL_ and_other_related_Treaties.pdf> at 19 January 2015.
127 Several States had sought to retain the right to retaliate in kind with weapons prohibited 
under the 1925 Geneva Protocol: Roberts and Guelff , supra note 73, 155. Subsequent 
treaties, such as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction, 
opened for signature 10 April 1972, 1015 UNTS 163 (entered into force 26 March 1975) (1972 
Biological Weapons Convention) and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Th eir Destruction, opened 
for signature 13 January 1993, 32 ILM 800 (entered into force 29 April 1997) (1993 Chemical 
Weapons Convention), have repudiated any such right, leading to the withdrawal of some 
of these reservations. For example, article I of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention 
prohibits the use ‘under any circumstances’ of the weapons covered by the instrument. See 
also Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 
para 57.
128 See, for example, Roberts and Guelff , supra note 73, 156–7.
129 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2603A (XXIV) (16 December 1969) UN Doc A/
RES/2603(XXIV)A on the Question of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, 
para 5.
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Th e General Assembly has also declared that the use in international armed 
confl ict of the following weapons is contrary to these rules:130
(a) Any chemical agents of warfare – chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid 
or solid – which might be employed because of their direct toxic eff ects on man, 
animals or plants;
(b) Any biological agents of warfare – living organisms, whatever their nature, or 
infective material derived from them – which are intended to cause disease or 
death in man, animals or plants, and which depend for their eff ects on their 
ability to multiply in the person, animal or plant attacked
Th e war crime specifi ed in the Rome Statute arising from the use of 
‘asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or 
devices’131 is derived from the 1925 Geneva Protocol.132
2.2.5. 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS
Th e Swiss city of Geneva has been the site of several landmark jus in bello 
agreements. In addition to the 1864 Geneva Convention and the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol, other conventions and protocols were concluded in 1868,133 1906134 
and 1929.135 Th ese were intended to revise and expand upon a number of 
the general principles of the 1864 Geneva Convention, as well as the rights of 
prisoners of war and other individuals.
Th e tragic events of the Second World War demonstrated that the codifi ed rules 
of armed confl ict at that time remained inadequate, particularly in relation to the 
protection of civilians and other non-combatants. Th e need to revise and extend 
the existing jus in bello treaty rules was obvious. A Diplomatic Conference for 
the Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of 
War was held in Geneva from 21 April to 12 August 1949. Th e principal purpose 
130 Ibid, para 8.
131 Rome Statute, article 8(2)(b)(xvii).
132 Knut Dörmann, ‘War Crimes in the Elements of Crimes’, in Horst Fischer, Claus Kress 
and Sascha Rolf Lüder (eds), International and National Prosecution of Crimes Under 
International Law: Current Developments (2001), 95, 128.
133 Additional Articles relating to the Condition of the Wounded in War, opened for signature 
20 October 1868, 18 Martens (1st) 612. Th is instrument did not enter into force.
134 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the 
Field, opened for signature 6 July 1906, 11 LNTS 440 (entered into force 9 August 1907). Th is 
instrument is no longer in force.
135 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in 
the Field, opened for signature 27 July 1929, 118 LNTS 303 (entered into force 19 June 1931); 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature 27 July 1929, 
118 LNTS 343 (entered into force 19 June 1931).
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of the conference was to provide for a more comprehensive framework for the 
protection of victims of war. Th e conference set out to revise the 1907 Hague 
Convention X for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the 
1906 Geneva Convention,136 as well as the two 1929 Geneva Conventions, and to 
conclude a new convention directed towards the protection of civilians.
In the three-year period leading up to the conference, a series of meetings 
had taken place at which four draft  conventions were prepared, ultimately to 
be adopted by the Geneva conference.137 Each of the conventions deals with 
diff erent, but related, aspects of the conduct of hostilities and the rights of, 
and protections to be aff orded to victims.138 In contrast to Th e Hague rules, 
which focused primarily on the methods and means of warfare, the principles 
codifi ed in the Geneva rules were directed towards the ‘humanitarian aspects of 
confl ict’, dealing specifi cally with the protection of both combatants and non-
combatants.139
Nonetheless, both sets of rules refl ect an overriding concern to mitigate the 
conduct and consequences of warfare, and thus there is a degree of overlap.140 In 
this regard, the International Court of Justice has noted that:141
[t]hese two branches of the law applicable in armed confl ict have become so closely 
interrelated that they are considered to have gradually formed one single complex 
system, known today as international humanitarian law. Th e provisions of the 
Additional Protocols of 1977 give expression and attest to the unity and complexity 
of that law
As noted, unlike the 1907 Hague Conventions, the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
do not contain an ‘all participation clause’, and thus apply even where one of 
the belligerents is not a State Party.142 Th is also refl ects the fact that there has, 
over time, been a ‘progressive trend towards the so-called ‘humanisation’ 
136 Hague Convention X for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the 1906 
Geneva Convention, opened for signature 18 October 1907, 3 Martens (3rd) 360 (entered into 
force 26 January 1910).
137 Roberts and Guelff , supra note 73, 195.
138 Th ese were the wounded and sick in armed forces in the fi eld (1949 Geneva Convention I), 
the wounded, sick and ship-wrecked in armed forces at sea (1949 Geneva Convention II), the 
treatment of prisoners at war (1949 Geneva Convention III) and the protection of civilians 
(1949 Geneva Convention IV).
139 See Yuzon, supra note 123, 813; Carl E. Bruch, ‘All’s Not Fair in (Civil) War: Criminal 
Liability for Environmental Damage in Internal Armed Confl ict’ (2001) 25 Vermont Law 
Review 695, 701.
140 McCoubrey, supra note 85, 2.
141 Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 
75.
142 Green, supra note 83, 44.
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of international legal obligations’, with the result that traditional notions of 
reciprocity in the application of international humanitarian law have been 
eroded.143 Instead, principles of international humanitarian law are now largely 
regarded as ‘absolute’ obligations, rather than being dependent on the conduct of 
opposing parties.
Each of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions has received almost universal 
acceptance, with over 190 States Parties and, together with the 1977 Additional 
Protocols, they form the core of the modern jus in bello rules.144 Th e four 
treaties contain several common articles, both in terms of procedural aspects 
and substantive principles. One of the most important of these is common 
article  3, which specifi es certain minimum standards of conduct during non-
international armed confl icts,145 based on principles that have been described 
by the International Court of Justice as refl ecting ‘elementary considerations 
of humanity’.146 A breach of common article  3 is expressly defi ned as a crime 
within the competence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR).147
143 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago 
Josipovic, Dragan Papic and Vladimir Santic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, 14 January 
2000, para 518.
144 Nsongurua J. Udombana, ‘War is Not Child’s Play! International Law and the Prohibition of 
Children’s Involvement in Armed Confl icts’ (2006) 20 Temple International and Comparative 
Law Journal 57, 72.
145 As noted, since the end of the Second World War, the majority of armed confl icts have been 
non-international (or internal) rather than international in nature: see Lindsay Moir, Th e Law 
of Internal Armed Confl ict (2002), 1.
146 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America) (Merits) (Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 218, citing Corfu Channel Case (United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania) (Merits) (Judgment) [1949] ICJ 
Rep 4, 22.
147 See article  4 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution 
of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens 
Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of 
Neighbouring States, between 1  January 1994 and 31  December 1994, 33 ILM 1598 (ICTR 
Statute). Th e interpretation of common article 3 by the ICTR has, however, been the subject 
of some conjecture. For example, in 2001, the Belgian Government successfully requested 
to submit an amicus curiae brief before a Trial Chamber of that Tribunal, asserting that 
the provision had been ‘too restrictively applied in the Tribunal’s judgements in the cases 
of Akayesu, Kayishema et al., and Rutaganda’: Decision on the Kingdom Of Belgium’s 
Application to File an Amicus Curiae Brief and on the Defence Application to Strike Out 
the Observations of the Kingdom of Belgium Concerning the Preliminary Response by the 
Defence, Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Trial Chamber, 9 February 
2001, para 2. In considering the request, the ICTR was of the opinion that ‘it may be useful 
to gather additional legal views on the scope of applicability of Article 3 common to the four 
Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II’ (para 10).
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Th e 1949 Geneva Conventions were concluded shortly aft er the adoption by 
the United Nations General Assembly of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), which brought into focus the rights of individuals.148 Th e 
UDHR infl uenced the subsequent codifi cation of the laws of war, gradually 
transforming it into more of a ‘human rights oriented law’.149 Indeed, the 1949 
Geneva Conventions refer to ‘rights’ of protected persons, as well as imposing 
obligations on belligerents. Th e 1949 Geneva Convention IV was the fi rst jus in 
bello instrument specifi cally directed towards the protection of civilians in times 
of war,150 a response to horrifi c events during the Second World War, which had 
seen civilians killed far in excess of the rate of any previous major confl ict.151
Although it does not seek to replace the principles of Th e Hague Conventions, 
but rather is expressed to be ‘supplementary’ to those instruments, the ‘civilian 
focus’ in the 1949 Geneva Convention IV was a signifi cant new development in 
the evolution of the jus in bello.152 Despite the fact that it deals principally with 
the treatment of civilians held by an adversary, rather than focusing on the eff ects 
of a confl ict, the 1949 Geneva Convention IV is the most important of the four 
conventions in relation to the issue of intentional environmental destruction 
during the course of armed confl ict.
Th e 1949 Geneva Convention IV contains a general prohibition of ‘pillage’, which 
may be of some relevance.153 Of greater signifi cance, article 53 provides that:154
[a]ny destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging 
individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State [whose territory is being 
occupied], or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, 
is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by 
military operations
Th is provision only applies in relation to occupied territory,155 and would 
therefore not be relevant to environmental destruction caused in locations that 
are not occupied but still are areas of armed confl ict, as might be the case, for 
148 Adopted by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217A (III) (10 December 1948) UN 
Doc A/810 on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
149 Schindler and Toman, supra note 16, vii.
150 Th e 1899 Hague Convention II and 1907 Hague Convention IV both refer in general terms to 
civilians, but only in the context of enemy occupation.
151 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘What treaties make up international 
humanitarian law?’ (October 2002) <www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5KZGE6> at 
19 January 2015.
152 1949 Geneva Convention IV, article 154.
153 Ibid, article 33.
154 Ibid, article 53.
155 Section III of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV, in which article  53 appears, is headed 
‘Occupied Territories’.
Chapter Two.  Regulation of the Intentional Destruction of the 
Environment during Warfare under Treaty Law
72 Intersentia
example, with the aerial bombardment of an enemy country.156 While this limits 
the applicability of the provision, it has been noted that occupied territory is 
‘particularly susceptible’ to deliberate environmental damage not justifi ed by 
military operations,157 when compared to the territory of the Occupying Power 
itself. Th is was demonstrated, for example, by the Iraqi actions in Kuwait in 
1991 referred to earlier. James Terry has suggested that, had the principles of the 
1907 Hague Convention IV been followed by Iraq, ‘there would have been no 
signifi cant violation of the Kuwaiti environment’.158
As with article  23(g) of the 1907 Hague Convention IV, to the extent that 
article  53 does proscribe acts that constitute intentional destruction of 
the environment during armed confl ict, this is subject to the overarching 
consideration of military necessity.159 Although the provision purports to set 
a higher standard than the 1907 Hague Convention IV – by requiring that the 
act be absolutely necessary to avoid constituting a violation – it again reaffi  rms 
the viewpoint that military considerations take precedence over environmental 
destruction. Th at said, the 1949 Geneva Convention IV does regard as a ‘grave 
breach’ actions that amount to:160
extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justifi ed by military 
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly
Th us, if the destruction of property in an Occupied Territory is regarded as 
‘extensive’, it may be deemed as a grave breach, in which case States Parties 
are obligated to ‘provide eff ective penal sanctions’, as well as search for alleged 
off enders and either try them before their own national courts, or hand them 
over to another State Party for trial, provided that a prima facie case has been 
made out.161 It has been noted, however, that this aut dedere aut judicare 
obligation ‘has not, in practice, been implemented’ to any signifi cant degree.162
156 Leibler, supra note 96, 106.
157 Schmitt, supra note 80, 298.
158 Colonel James P. Terry, ‘Th e Environment and the Laws of War: Th e Impact of Desert 
Storm’ (1992) 45 Naval War College Review 61, 63. Iraq was not a party to the 1907 Hague 
Convention IV at the time of its occupation of Kuwait.
159 See chapters 3 and 4.
160 1949 Geneva Convention IV, article 147.
161 Ibid, article  146. See also United Nations Security Council Resolution 1738 (23  December 
2006) UN Doc S/RES/1738/2006 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Confl ict, preamble 
para 7. Acts that are grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions might also constitute 
war crimes, attracting individual criminal responsibility: see Statute of the International 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, 32 ILM 
1159 (ICTY Statute), article 2, and Rome Statute, article 8(2)(a).
162 Beigbeder, supra note 30, 8–9.
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2.2.6. 1954 HAGUE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION 
OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF 
ARMED CONFLICT163
Although earlier instruments had included general references to the protection 
of cultural property in times of war and occupation,164 the 1954 Hague 
Convention represented the fi rst comprehensive agreement to deal with the issue. 
It was a response to the widespread damage and destruction of such property 
during the Second World War. Th e convention, together with a Protocol,165 was 
adopted under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientifi c and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO).166 It sought to provide for a regime that 
protected cultural property not only during, but also prior to and aft er an armed 
confl ict.167
Th e 1954 Hague Convention is largely directed towards protection of property 
that is not ‘environmental’ in nature; however the intentional destruction of 
the environment could place cultural objects at risk.168 Obligations to protect 
cultural property specifi ed in the convention have been supplemented by 
the 1977 Additional Protocols169 and, as a general principle, represent rules 
of customary international law.170 However, the obligations under the 1954 
Hague Convention are, once again, subject to ‘cases where military necessity 
imperatively requires … a waiver’.171 Moreover, any special protection placed 
163 Opened for signature 14 May 1954, 249 UNTS 240 (entered into force 7 August 1956) (1954 
Hague Convention).
164 See, for example, article 5 of the 1907 Hague Convention IX Concerning Bombardment by 
Naval Forces in Time of War, opened for signature 18  October 1907, 3 Martens (3rd) 604 
(entered into force 26 January 1910).
165 1954 First Hague Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Confl ict, opened for signature 14  May 1954, 249 UNTS 358 (entered into force 7  August 
1956). Th is instrument deals principally with the exportation of cultural property from an 
occupied territory.
166 Article I(2)(c) of the UNESCO Constitution provides that the organization will ‘maintain, 
increase and diff use knowledge’ by inter alia ‘assuring the conservation and protection of 
the world’s inheritance of books, works of art and monuments of history and science, and 
recommending to the nations concerned the necessary international conventions’: UNESCO 
Constitution (adopted 16  November 1945) <http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_
ID=15244&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html> at 19 January 2015. See also 
Juliana V. Campagna, ‘War or Peace: It is Time for the United States to Ratify the 1954 Hague 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Confl icts’ (2005) 
17 Florida Journal of International Law 271, 342–3.
167 Craig J.S. Forrest, ‘Th e Doctrine of Military Necessity and the Protection of Cultural 
Property During Armed Confl icts’ (2007) 37 California Western International Law Journal 
177, 200.
168 Michael N. Schmitt, supra note 80, 299.
169 See the 1977 Additional Protocol I, article 53, and the 1977 Additional Protocol II, article 16.
170 Roberts and Guelff , supra note 73, 372.
171 1954 Hague Convention, article 2.
Chapter Two.  Regulation of the Intentional Destruction of the 
Environment during Warfare under Treaty Law
74 Intersentia
on refuges or centres that contain cultural property during times of armed 
confl ict only applies provided they ‘are not used for military purposes’.172 
Th e circumstances that constitute military necessity for the purposes of the 
protections aff orded to cultural property are elaborated in the Second Protocol 
to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Confl ict (see below).173
2.2.7. 1972 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
Th is treaty expands upon the prohibitions specifi ed in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, 
which had introduced several restrictions on the use of biological weapons. Th e 
1972 Biological Weapons Convention provides that States Parties undertake:174
never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or 
retain:
1. microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of 
production, of types and in quantities that have no justifi cation for prophylactic, 
protective or other peaceful purposes;
2. weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins 
for hostile purposes or in armed confl ict
Th e 1972 Biological Weapons Convention provides for a conference to be held 
‘to review the operation of the Convention’. In 2006, the United Nations General 
Assembly ‘welcomed’ the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference,175 
which reaffi  rmed:176
that under all circumstances the use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons 
and their development, production and stockpiling are eff ectively prohibited under 
article I of the Convention
Th e instrument also requires that State Parties ‘destroy, or … divert to peaceful 
purposes’ all such agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery,177 
172 Ibid, article 8(1)(b).
173 Opened for signature 26 March 1999, 38 ILM 769 (entered into force 9 March 2004).
174 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, article I.
175 Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition 
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic 
Weapons and on their Destruction, (6 December 1996) BWC/CONF.IV/9, part II.
176 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 61/102 (6  December 2006) UN Doc A/
RES/61/102 on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction, 
preamble para 4.
177 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, article II.
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as well as restricting their transfer.178 In implementing their obligations, States 
Parties are to observe ‘all necessary safety precautions … to protect populations 
and the environment’.
Some commentators argue that, strictly speaking, the 1972 Biological Weapons 
Convention is a ‘disarmament’ treaty, and thus does not form part of the jus in 
bello.179 While this may be true, biological agents can be produced quickly and 
easily and have (in one form or another) been used in warfare for centuries, such 
as when, for example, plague-infected bodies were catapulted into cities under 
siege.180 In their more contemporary form, the use of such weapons during 
armed confl ict has the potential not only to kill large numbers of people, but also 
to destroy various elements of the environment. Th e 1972 Biological Weapons 
Convention therefore contributes to the body of treaty law that indirectly 
regulates the protection of the environment during hostilities.
Th e fact that biological weapons have only been used ‘sporadically’ during 
history in no way detracts from the potentially devastating impact that they 
may have.181 Yet, there are several signifi cant ‘loopholes’ in the 1972 Biological 
Weapons Convention – for example, the failure to prohibit ‘biological 
weapons research’.182 It should also be noted that the 1972 Biological Weapons 
Convention only applies to biological weapons, although it does make reference 
to the ‘recognised objective’ of prohibiting chemical weapons.183 Both forms 
of weapons have the capability to contaminate soil, water and plants, and 
thus to devastate ecosystems and the natural environment, for periods far 
exceeding the damage caused by explosive munitions.184 In 1971, a Conference 
on Disarmament decided to separate the negotiations regarding chemical and 
biological weapons, thus paving the way for the conclusion of the 1972 Biological 
Weapons Convention. Comprehensive international regulation of chemical 
178 Ibid, article III.
179 See, for example, Schindler and Toman, supra note 16, 135.
180 Scott Spence, ‘Th e Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and its Implementation 
through National Law’, speech delivered at the T.M.C. Asser Institute attended by the author, 
Th e Hague, Th e Netherlands, 25 November 2008.
181 For a description of the use of biological weapons during historical military campaigns, 
see Mark Wheelis, ‘A Short History of Biological Warfare and Weapons’, in Marie Isabelle 
Chevrier, Krzysztof Chomiczewski, Henri Garrigue, György Granasztói, Malcolm R. Dando 
and Graham S. Pearson (eds), Th e Implementation of Legally Binding Measures to Strengthen 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (2004), 15 et seq.
182 Michael P. Scharf, ‘Clear and Present Danger: Enforcing the International Ban on Biological 
and Chemical Weapons Th rough Sanctions, Use of Force, and Criminalization’ (1999) 20 
Michigan Journal of International Law 477, 483.
183 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, article IX.
184 Barry Kellman, ‘Th e Chemical Weapons Convention: A Verifi cation and Enforcement Model 
for Determining Legal Responsibility for Environmental Harm Caused by War’, in Jay E. 
Austin and Carl E. Bruch (eds), Th e Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Economic, 
and Scientifi c Perspectives (2000), 579, 579.
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weapons had to wait until the conclusion of the 1993 Chemical Weapons 
Convention (see below).
2.2.8. 1976 CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF 
MILITARY OR ANY OTHER HOSTILE USE OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES185
Notwithstanding claims that it was done for ‘a valid strategic and tactical 
purpose’,186 the widespread use by the United States of defoliants during the 
Vietnam War to destroy crops and forests as a deliberate military strategy led 
to signifi cant concerns about the environmental eff ects of warfare, as well as 
the development of methods of environmental modifi cation. Th ese were further 
heightened by the revelation in 1972 that, during that war, the United States had 
attempted to manipulate weather patterns in the Indo-China region, in order to 
fl ood various strategic routes.187 Th ese actions highlighted quite starkly the need 
to introduce direct environmental protections into the body of law regulating 
the conduct of those engaged in armed confl icts.188
In July 1973, the United States Senate resolved to:189
seek the agreement of other governments to a proposed treaty prohibiting the use of 
any environmental or geophysical modifi cation activity as a weapon of war
Negotiations subsequently took place both within the United Nations General 
Assembly and under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament (CCD), including a series of bilateral discussions between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. In late 1974, the General Assembly accepted 
a Soviet Union initiative, which stressed the need to prohibit:190
185 Opened for signature 18 May 1977, 1108 UNTS 151; 16 ILM 88 (entered into force 5 October 
1978) (ENMOD Convention). Th e instrument is dated 1976, since it was in that year that 
the text, together with a series of ‘Understandings’ relating to articles I, II, II and VIII of the 
convention (1976 Understandings), were adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
and referred to all States for ‘their consideration, signature and ratifi cation’: see United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 31/72 (10  December 1976) UN Doc A/RES/31/72 on 
the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modifi cation Techniques, preamble para I. Th e 1976 Understandings are not incorporated 
into the ENMOD Convention, but are generally thought to be part of the record of the 
negotiations leading to the conclusion of the instrument. However, there is not complete 
unanimity as to the legal status of the 1976 Understandings: see Koppe, supra note 78, 113–5.
186 Terry, supra note 158, 99.
187 Roberts and Guelff , supra note 73, 407.
188 Karen Hulme, War Torn Environment: Interpreting the Legal Th reshold (2004), 71.
189 Roberts and Guelff , supra note 73, 407.
190 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3264 (XXIX) (9 December 1974) UN Doc A/
RES/3264(XXIX) on the Prohibition of Action to Infl uence the Environment and Climate for 
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action to infl uence the environment and climate for military and other hostile 
purposes, which are incompatible with the maintenance of international security, 
human well-being and health
Th ese developments culminated two years later with the conclusion of the 
ENMOD Convention, the main purpose of which is to prohibit the manipulation 
of the environment as a weapon of warfare. Th e core obligation requires that a 
State Party:191
undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental 
modifi cation techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe eff ects as the 
means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party
Th e term ‘environmental modifi cation techniques’ is defi ned as:192
any technique for changing – through the deliberate manipulation of natural 
processes – the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, 
lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space
Article I of the ENMOD Convention is the fi rst treaty obligation that directly 
addresses the issue of deliberate manipulation of the environment during 
hostilities. Indeed, it represents the fi rst time that the word ‘environment’ 
appears in a jus in bello treaty.193 Th e defi nition of environmental modifi cation 
techniques appears to envisage a broad approach as to what might constitute the 
‘environment’, although there are uncertainties as to the range of actions that 
might represent such a technique.194 Th e terms of the ENMOD Convention 
are not limited to warfare or armed confl ict, but are expressed to apply in 
broader circumstances – ‘military or any other hostile use’. Th us, the ENMOD 
Convention may also apply in times of peace, although not in relation to 
environmental modifi cation techniques undertaken ‘for peaceful purposes’.195
Nor does the instrument diff erentiate between lawful and unlawful uses of 
force.196 In this respect, the general ambit of the ENMOD Convention is wide, so 
Military and Other Purposes, Incompatible with the Maintenance of International Security, 
Human Well-Being and Health.
191 ENMOD Convention, article I(1).
192 Ibid, article II.
193 Adam Roberts, ‘Th e Law of War and Environmental Damage’, in Jay E. Austin and Carl 
E. Bruch (eds), Th e Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Economic, and Scientifi c 
Perspectives (2000), 47, 50.
194 See, for example, Hulme, supra note 188, 72, who poses the question as to whether ‘the 
burning of a forest in order to kill its inhabitants’ falls within the defi nition of ‘environmental 
modifi cation techniques’.
195 ENMOD Convention, article III.
196 Leibler, supra note 96, 82.
Chapter Two.  Regulation of the Intentional Destruction of the 
Environment during Warfare under Treaty Law
78 Intersentia
as to refl ect the stated desire of the United Nations General Assembly at the time 
to avert the ‘potential dangers’ of environmental modifi cation techniques.197 
It is also signifi cant that the prohibitions specifi ed in the convention are not 
expressed to be subject to any ‘defence’ of military necessity, which might 
otherwise (legally) justify the use of an environmental modifi cation technique. 
A violation of the treaty thus occurs as soon as the threshold level of damage is 
caused through the use of such a technique.
Th us, in order to more clearly determine the scope of the general prohibition, 
it is necessary to ascertain the meaning of the qualifying words ‘widespread, 
long-lasting or severe’ as used in article I. Th ese terms describe the requisite 
damage necessary to constitute a violation. Th ey are expressed in the disjunctive 
– separated by the word ‘or’. Consequently, an environmental modifi cation 
technique that results in any of these eff ects is suffi  cient to (potentially) bring 
the prohibition into play. Th ese three terms are defi ned, for the purposes of the 
ENMOD Convention, in the fi rst of the 1976 Understandings as follows:198
(a) ‘widespread’: encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square 
kilometres;
(b) ‘long-lasting’: lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season;
(c) ‘severe’: involving serious or signifi cant disruption or harm to human life, natural 
and economic resources or other assets
Th ese defi nitions are:199
intended exclusively for [the ENMOD Convention] and … not intended to prejudice 
the interpretation of the same or similar terms if used in connexion with any other 
international agreement
Notwithstanding the clarifi cations provided by the fi rst of the 1976 
Understandings, the use of these terms has been criticised as being too broad and 
vague, and thus not readily applicable in reality.200 At the time that it became a 
signatory to the ENMOD Convention in May 1977, Turkey made an interpretive 
statement as follows:201
197 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 31/72 (10  December 1976) UN Doc A/
RES/31/72 on the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modifi cation Techniques, preamble.
198 1976 CCD Understanding Relating to Article I of ENMOD, 31 United Nations General 
Assembly Offi  cial Records Supp. No. 27 (A/31/27), Annex I.
199 Id.
200 See, for example, Roberts and Guelff , supra note 73, 408; Sharp, supra note 108, 20.
201 Interpretative Statement relating to the ENMOD Convention by the Government of Turkey, 
18 May 1977, quoted in Roberts and Guelff , supra note 73, 415. As at January 2014, Turkey 
was still not a party to the ENMOD Convention: International Committee of the Red Cross, 
‘State Parties to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties 
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[i]n the opinion of the Turkish Government the terms “widespread”, “long-lasting” 
and “severe eff ects” contained in the Convention need to be more clearly defi ned. So 
long as this clarifi cation is not made, the Government of Turkey will be compelled to 
interpret itself the terms in question and consequently it reserves the right to do so as 
and when required
Th e fact that the defi nitions are expressly applicable only to the ENMOD 
Convention is important, since similar terms – ‘widespread, long-term and 
severe’ – are used in 1977 Additional Protocol I to qualify damage to the 
natural environment resulting from certain methods or means of warfare.202 
In addition, the crime of ‘wilful and severe’ damage to the environment was 
included in the fi rst reading in 1991 of the Draft  Code of Off ences against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind (Draft  Code of Mankind) prepared by the 
International Law Commission (ILC).203 In reaction to the concerns raised by 
various governments, the Special Rapporteur subsequently proposed a ‘slimmed 
down’ version of the Draft  Code of Mankind,204 with the result that only four 
(international) crimes205 were included in the text adopted by the ILC in 1996.206 
as at 29  January 2014’ <www.icrc.org/ihl/%28SPF%29/party_main_treaties/$File/IHL_and_
other_related_Treaties.pdf> at 3 February 2014.
202 1977 Additional Protocol I, articles 35(3) and 55(1). Th ese provisions are discussed in more 
detail later in this chapter.
203 Th e ILC was initially mandated by the United Nations General Assembly to prepare a Draft  
Code of Off ences against the Peace and Security of Mankind in 1947: United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 174 (II) (21  November 1947) UN Doc A/519 on the Establishment of 
an International Law Commission, para 2(b). Th e General Assembly then decided to delay 
further work on the draft , primarily due to diffi  culties relating to the defi nition of the crime 
of ‘aggression’: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 897 (IX) (4  December 1954) 
UN Doc A/RES/897/(IX) on the Draft  Code of Off ences against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind, para 3. Th e ILC recommenced its work on the draft  in the early 1980s, culminating 
in the fi nalization of the 1996 text. In Judgement, Prosecutor v. Furundzjia, Case No. IT-95-
17/1, Trial Chamber, 10 December 1998, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY described the 1996 
text of the Draft  Code of Mankind in the following terms (para 227):
 ‘… the Draft  Code is an authoritative international instrument which, depending upon the 
specifi c question at issue, may (i) constitute evidence of customary law, or (ii) shed light on 
customary rules which are of uncertain contents or are in the process of formation, or, at the 
very least, (iii) be indicative of the legal views of eminently qualifi ed publicists representing 
the major legal systems of the world.’
 Following the subsequent entering into force of the Rome Statute and the establishment of 
the International Criminal Court in 2002, the Draft  Code of Mankind is generally thought to 
be of no further practical relevance: Rosemary Rayfuse, ‘Th e Draft  Code of Crimes Against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind: Eating Disorders at the International Law Commission’ 
(1997) 8 Criminal Law Forum 43, 85.
204 See ibid, Rayfuse, 47 et seq.
205 Th ese were the crimes of aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Th e 
text also included the crime of ‘Crimes against United Nations and associated personnel’.
206 Draft  Code of Off ences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the 
International Law Commission on Its Forty-eighth session, United Nations General Assembly 
Offi  cial Records 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, 9 UN Doc A/51/10 (1996).
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Th ese did not include the previously proposed crime specifi cally relating to the 
environment.
Th ese threshold terms are also relevant to individual criminal responsibility 
under article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute, which classifi es as a war crime an 
attack launched:207
in the knowledge that [it] will cause … widespread, long-term and severe damage to 
the natural environment …
Th e ENMOD Convention does not prohibit damage to the environment during 
the conduct of hostilities per se, even if it may be deliberate, unless such an act 
can be regarded as constituting an environmental modifi cation technique. In 
this regard, the second of the 1976 Understandings sets out the following non-
exhaustive list of phenomena that could be caused through the modifi cation of 
the environment:208
earthquakes; tsunamis; an upset in the ecological balance of a region; changes in 
weather patterns (clouds, precipitation, cyclones of various types, and tornadic 
storms); changes in climate patterns; changes in ocean currents; changes in the state 
of the ozone layer; and changes in the state of the ionosphere
Th e clarifi cation goes on to state that each of these phenomena, when produced 
by an environmental modifi cation technique:209
would result, or could reasonably be expected to result, in widespread, long-lasting or 
severe destruction, damage or injury [to another State Party]
Th e ENMOD Convention calls for a process of consultation and cooperation in 
the event of a dispute. Th ere is no reference either to criminal responsibility or 
civil liability in case of breach. Th e formal enforcement mechanism established 
under the instrument has been described as ‘post hoc’,210 and ‘political in 
nature’.211 A State Party can lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security 
Council if it has reason to believe that another State Party is in violation of its 
terms. In the event that the Security Council considers that a violation of the 
convention that has harmed or is likely to harm a State Party has occurred, the 
other States Parties are required to provide assistance to that State Party, if it 
207 Rome Statute, article 8(2)(b)(iv). Th is provision is discussed further in chapter 4.
208 1976 CCD Understanding Relating to Article II of ENMOD, 31 United Nations General 
Assembly Offi  cial Records Supp. No. 27 (A/31/27), Annex II.
209 Id.
210 Weinstein, supra note 100, 701.
211 Schmitt, supra note 80, 280.
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should so request.212 Any possible response by the Security Council to a violation 
is, of course, always subject to the power of veto being exercised by one of the fi ve 
permanent members.213
Article VIII of the ENMOD Convention contemplated a review conference fi ve 
years aft er the treaty entered into force. Th e First Review Conference took place 
in 1984 and the participants reaffi  rmed their support for the treaty. A Second 
Review Conference was held in September 1992, at which various diff erences of 
interpretation emerged regarding the scope of the instrument. Th is conference 
called for a meeting of a committee of experts to clarify these matters, but this 
did not eventuate.214
It should also be noted that there are only a relatively small number of States 
Parties to the ENMOD Convention (76 as at January 2015).215 Th is probably 
refl ects the fact that the use of environmental modifi cation techniques as a 
method or means of warfare is not a strategy that is within the contemplation 
(or capability) of most States.216 In this regard, the applicability of the ENMOD 
Convention is therefore relatively limited, given that it generally relates to the 
manipulation of the environment by way of extremely advanced technology.217 
Nevertheless, some commentators have suggested that the ENMOD provisions 
may now represent customary international law.218
2.2.9. 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I
Even aft er the entry into force of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, humankind 
has continued to witness a large number of confl icts ‘aff ecting almost every 
continent’.219 Although those treaties represented a very signifi cant advance in 
212 ENMOD Convention, article V(5).
213 See United Nations Charter, article 27(3).
214 Articles V(1) and V(2) of the ENMOD Convention enable a State Party to request that a 
‘Consultative Committee of Experts’ be convened to discuss issues relating to the objectives 
or application of the treaty.
215 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘State Parties to the Following International 
Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties as at 29 January 2014’ <www.icrc.org/ihl/%28 
SPF%29/party_main_treaties/$File/IHL_and_other_related_Treaties.pdf> at 19 January 2015.
216 Koppe, supra note 78, 107.
217 Major Richard M. Whitaker, ‘Environmental Aspects of Overseas Operations’ (1995) 4 Army 
Lawyer 27, 37.
218 See, for example, Roman Reyhani, ‘Comment: Protection of the Environment During 
Armed Confl ict’ (2007) 14 Missouri Environmental Law and Policy Review 323, 325 and the 
corresponding footnote.
219 Jean-Marie Henckaerts, ‘Study on customary international humanitarian law: A contribution 
to the understanding and respect for the rule of law in armed confl ict’ (2005) 87:857 
International Review of the Red Cross 175, 175.
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the development of the jus in bello rules, the changing nature of armed confl ict 
highlighted various of their shortcomings. It became apparent that the rules 
regulating the methods and means of hostilities, as well as the rights of those 
aff ected by armed confl ict, were no longer adequate to deal with the circumstances 
of every ‘modern’ confl ict, and thus required revision and expansion.
In addition, the three decades following the conclusion of the 1949 Geneva 
Convention were characterised by a process of decolonization, primarily under 
the auspices of the United Nations,220 with the result that many new States came 
into existence during that period.221 Th e process of decolonization, and the 
associated recognition of the right of peoples to engage in a (armed) struggle in 
order to exercise their right of self-determination, also made a revision of the 
Geneva rules necessary, since armed confl ict, hitherto primarily of an inter-State 
nature, was now increasingly becoming intra-State.222
Moreover, none of these new (decolonized) States had been involved in the 
fi nalization of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and it was important that they 
had some input into the revised jus in bello provisions, so as to encourage a 
universality of acceptance.
In 1968, the United Nations General Assembly called for the adoption of:223
additional humanitarian international conventions or for other appropriate legal 
instruments to ensure the better protection of civilians, prisoners and combatants in 
all armed confl icts and the prohibition and limitation of the use of certain methods 
and means of warfare
Th e International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Swiss Federal 
Council subsequently convened a series of conferences. On 8  June 1977, 
less than a month aft er the ENMOD Convention was opened for signature, 
the participants at the fourth session of the Diplomatic Conference on the 
Reaffi  rmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable 
in Armed Confl icts adopted the Additional Protocols of 1977.224 Th ese 
220 One of the expressed principal purposes of the United Nations is the ‘self-determination 
of peoples’: United Nations Charter, article 1(2). Th e International Court of Justice has also 
elaborated on the extent of this right in the Western Sahara Case (Advisory Opinion) [1975] 
ICJ Rep 12, para 54 et seq.
221 Cassese, supra note 6, 329.
222 Koppe, supra note 78, 117.
223 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2444 (XXIII) (19 December 1968) UN Doc A/
RES/2444(XXIII) on the Respect for Human Rights in Armed Confl icts, article 2(b).
224 A third Additional Protocol was adopted in 2005 – Protocol III Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive 
Emblem, date of adoption 8 December 2005, 45 ILM 558 (entered into force 14 January 2007).
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instruments address international armed confl icts and non-international 
armed confl icts. Th e provisions relating to the former (in the 1977 Additional 
Protocol  I) are much more extensive than those relating to non-international 
armed confl icts in the 1977 Additional Protocol II, which was the fi rst treaty 
focusing solely on the regulation of such confl icts.225 Th is is due partly to the 
fact that the negotiation of restrictions over ‘civil wars’ raised some diffi  cult 
tensions between the (perceived) sovereign rights of States to deal with what they 
regarded as internal matters, and the need for the international community to 
respond to ‘the new world of “internationalised” internal confl icts’.226
Yet, it was also clear that the rules elaborated in common article 3 of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions had proven to be inadequate to deal with the increasing 
number (and range) of internal confl icts. In fact, the scope of law applicable to 
internal confl icts has since expanded quite signifi cantly,227 with every jus in bello 
treaty adopted since 1996 expressly applicable to both international and internal 
armed confl icts.228 Although these provisions generally do not address damage 
to the environment directly, acts that constitute a violation of these restrictions 
may result in environmental degradation.
Th e 1977 Additional Protocol I signifi cantly expands the ambit of 1949 Geneva 
Convention IV, and relates to the protection of the environment, both by setting 
standards as to what harm is permissible, and establishing rules as to what may 
constitute an acceptable target.229 It contains a number of general provisions 
that expressly provide for protection of various ‘environmental targets’.230 More 
signifi cantly, the treaty introduces two specifi c provisions that expressly apply to 
damage to the natural environment during the course of an international armed 
confl ict.
225 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Response of Jean-Marie Henckaerts to the 
Bellinger/Haynes Comments on Customary International Law Study’ (2007) 46 International 
Legal Materials 959, 965.
226 Bill Bowring, Th e Degradation of the International Legal Order? Th e Rehabilitation of Law and 
the Possibility of Politics (2008), 78.
227 Roberts and Guelff , supra note 73, 483.
228 International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 225, 965: see, for example, Amended 
Protocol II to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, date of adoption 3 May 
1996, 35 ILM 1206 (entered into force 3 December 1998), articles 2 and 3; Ottawa Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines 
and on Th eir Destruction, opened for signature 3  December 1997, 36 ILM 1507 (entered 
into force 1  March 1999), article  1; Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for 
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Confl ict, opened for signature 
26 March 1999, 38 ILM 769 (entered into force 9 March 2004), articles 3 and 22.
229 Philippe Sands and Paolo Galizzi (eds), Documents in International Environmental Law (2nd 
ed, 2004), 989.
230 Leibler, supra note 96, 107.
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Dealing fi rst with the more general provisions, article  54 sets out a non-
exhaustive list of ‘objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population’ 
that cannot be ‘attack[ed], destroy[ed] or render[ed] useless’.231 Th ese 
prohibitions are subject to ‘imperative military necessity’ in the situation of 
the ‘defence [by a State Party] of its national territory against invasion’.232 As a 
consequence, article 54 has been described as providing ‘very modest (at times, 
negligible) protection’.233 Th e objects to which it applies include:234
foodstuff s, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuff s, crops, livestock, 
drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works
Article 56(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I prohibits attacks against certain 
‘works and installations containing dangerous forces’, even in circumstances 
where they are regarded as ‘military objectives’. Th ese include ‘dams, dykes and 
nuclear electrical generating stations’.235 However, these protections cease to 
apply if the object is used:236
in regular, signifi cant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is 
the only feasible way to terminate such support
as well as, in the case of a dam or dyke, ‘for other than its normal function’.237 
During the negotiations leading to the fi nalisation of the 1977 Additional 
Protocol I, another provision, relating to the protection of ‘nature reserves’, was 
discussed.238 Th is proposal did not receive much support and was not included 
in the fi nal version of the instrument.239
Turning to the more specifi c provisions, as noted, the 1977 Additional Protocol 
I was the fi rst instrument to make direct reference to the issue of environmental 
damage during an international armed confl ict. Although, as discussed below, 
these provisions fall well short of providing a comprehensive protection of 
the environment, they still represented a ‘signifi cant innovation’240 for the 
time. Articles  35(3) and 55 expressly apply to damage caused to the ‘natural 
231 1977 Additional Protocol I, article 54 (2).
232 Ibid, article 54 (5).
233 Leibler, supra note 96, 108.
234 1977 Additional Protocol I, article 54 (2).
235 Ibid, article 56(1).
236 Ibid, articles 56(2)(a), (b) and (c).
237 Ibid, article 56(2)(a).
238 Draft  article 48 ter provided that:
 ‘Publicly recognized nature reserves with adequate markings and boundaries declared as 
such to the adversary shall be protected and respected except when such reserves are used 
specifi cally for military purposes’.
239 Hulme, supra note 188, 112.
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environment’. Unlike the ENMOD Convention, the 1977 Additional Protocol I 
does not specify what is encompassed by the natural environment, although the 
ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols suggests that:241
[t]he concept of the natural environment should be understood in the widest sense to 
cover the biological environment in which a population is living. It does not consist 
merely of the objects indispensable to survival … but also includes forests and other 
vegetation … as well as fauna, fl ora and other biological or climatic elements
Article 35(3), which appears under the general heading of ‘Methods and Means 
of Warfare, Combatant and Prisoner-of-War Status’, specifi es the following 
‘basic rule’:242
[i]t is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or 
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment
On the other hand, article 55, headed ‘Protection of the natural environment’, 
specifi es that:243
1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against 
widespread, long-term and severe damage. Th is protection includes a prohibition 
of the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected 
to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the 
health or survival of the population.
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited
At fi rst sight, these two articles appear to be quite similar. Both refer to the same 
threshold terms of environmental damage. Neither provision is expressed to 
be subject to any notion of military necessity, so that the existence of military 
advantage or imperative appears to be ‘irrelevant’ to their application.244
Yet there are some important diff erences between them. Th e provisions represent 
diff erent forms of obligation,245 and appear to operate from diff erent perspectives. 
Whereas article 35(3) seeks to limit the methods and means of warfare, article 55 
– which appears in a chapter headed ‘Civilian Objects’ – has been likened more to 
241 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Confl icts 
(Protocol I), 8 June 1977 (ICRC Protocol I Commentary); Commentaries’, para 2126 <www.
icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/470–750070?OpenDocument> at 19 January 2015.
242 1977 Additional Protocol I, article 35(3).
243 Ibid, article 55.
244 Leibler, supra note 96, 109.
245 Hulme, supra note 188, 73.
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a ‘Geneva law’, in that it ‘creates a protected object, [being] the environment’.246 
Th e former prohibits acts that are intended (or may be expected) to cause a 
specifi c threshold of damage, while the latter seeks to impose a ‘standard of 
care’.247 Moreover, in its second sentence, article 55(1) refers (albeit not exclusively 
– ‘includes’) to harm to humans as a necessary element in its application. Whilst 
it is not clear whether this requirement must also be ‘intended’ and qualifi es 
the duty of care set out in the fi rst sentence,248 this should be compared with 
article 35(3), which does not make any reference to human injury.
Some commentators argue that the fact that article  55 refers to the ‘health or 
survival of the population’, whereas article  35(3) focuses on the environment 
without reference to human beings, gives rise to an ‘intrinsic value paradigm’ 
– where military commanders might be forced to choose between alternate acts 
that either cause human injury or damage environmentally fragile areas.249 Th is 
raises complex (philosophical) questions as to the relative value of what might 
(initially) appear to be competing interests.250
Article  55(2) appears to provide for a blanket prohibition of any deliberate 
environmental damage that forms an act of reprisal.  On its own terms, this 
represents a signifi cant protection to the environment, at least in the relatively 
narrow context of reprisals. Th ere is also some debate as to whether one of 
the articles sets a higher requisite standard than the other. For example, the 
ICRC Commentary suggests that the duty of ‘care’ elaborated in article  55(1) 
allows ‘some latitude of judgment’.251 On the other hand, some commentators 
argue that article  55(1) has a ‘wider scope of application and entails a larger 
responsibility’ than article 35(3).252
As noted, both provisions contain the terms ‘widespread, long-term and severe’ 
when specifying the quantum of harm to the environment. Th ese terms are, 
of course, similar to those specifi ed in article I(1) of the ENMOD Convention. 
However, as used in the 1977 Additional Protocol I, these terms relate to damage 
to the environment regardless of the weapons utilised – thus classifying the 
environment as a ‘victim’ – whereas in the ENMOD Convention, they apply to 
the eff ects of the manipulation of the environment in the sense that it has been 
utilized as a ‘weapon’.253
246 Schmitt, supra note 80, 275.
247 Ibid, 276.
248 See, for example, Hulme, supra note 188, 74–8.
249 See, for example, Richards and Schmitt, supra note 10, 1084.
250 See ibid, 1082–6.
251 ICRC Protocol I Commentary, supra note 241, para 2133.
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Also as noted, the clarifi cations of those terms in the 1976 CCD Understanding 
Relating to Article I of the ENMOD Convention expressly apply only to that 
instrument. Th is is signifi cant, given that the ENMOD Convention and the 
1977 Additional Protocol I, although negotiated separately, were concluded at 
approximately the same time. It can reasonably be assumed that those involved 
in the draft ing of each instrument would have been aware of the other.254 
Moreover, the travaux préparatoires of the two instruments indicate that the 
terms were intended to have diff erent meanings in each of them.255
Anthony Leibler has suggested that the meaning of the terms as used in 
article 35(3) and 55(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I might be as follows:256
(1) ‘Widespread’: encompassing at least an entire region of several hundred 
kilometres;
(2) ‘Long-term’: lasting for at least several decades;
(3) ‘Severe’: causing death, ill-health or loss of sustenance to thousands of people, at 
present or in the future
Unlike article I(1) of the ENMOD Convention, in article  35(3) and 55(1), the 
terms are used in the conjunctive (‘and’) form, with the result that the relevant 
environmental harm must meet each of those descriptors before the provision 
is applicable. Even apart from the uncertainties as to the precise meaning of 
these terms, this indicates that an extremely high degree of harm must be proven 
before either provision will be relevant.
Th is threshold was considered by a committee (the Committee) established by 
the Prosecutor of the ICTY on 14 May 1999 to examine certain aspects of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) conduct during ‘Operation Allied 
Force’, a bombing campaign conducted against the (former) Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia from 24 March to 9 June 1999.257 Th e Committee had been asked 
to determine whether the Prosecutor should be advised to begin an ex-offi  cio 
investigation, pursuant to article  18 of the ICTY Statute, into allegations 
254 Id, Dinstein.
255 See Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Philippe Sands (eds), International Law, Th e 
International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons (1999), 345 and the corresponding 
footnote.
256 Leibler, supra note 96, 111. Florencio Yuzon fi nds such attempts to characterize these 
terms as ‘unavailing’: Yuzon, supra note 123, 822. See also Jozef Goldblat, ‘Th e Mitigation 
of Environmental Disruption by War: Legal Approaches’, in Arthur Westing (ed), 
Environmental Hazards of War: Releasing Dangerous Forces in an Industrialized World (1990) 
48, 52.
257 For a description of the background to the implementation of Operation Allied Force, see 
Steven Freeland, ‘Th e Bombing of Kosovo and the Milosevic Trial: Refl ections on Some Legal 
Issues’ [2002] Australian International Law Journal 150, 156–9.
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that NATO personnel had committed serious violations of international 
humanitarian law during that campaign.258
In June 2000, the Committee issued its fi nal report,259 which raised some 
interesting issues relating to international law and the principles of the jus 
in bello. Whilst recognizing that mistakes and ‘errors of judgment’ may have 
occurred,260 the Committee concluded that, on the basis of evidence available 
to it at the time, it would recommend to no investigation be commenced. Th e 
Prosecutor accepted all of these recommendations, and did not proceed to 
investigate the matter further. Nevertheless, the reasoning and fi nal conclusions 
in the Committee Report have attracted signifi cant criticism.261
Within its analysis of NATO’s actions, the Committee found it necessary to 
consider the possible applicability of articles 35(3) and 55 of the 1977 Additional 
Protocol I to the environmental damage caused by the bombing campaign, 
in particular, relating to the use of depleted uranium projectiles and cluster 
bombs.262 Th e Committee concluded that the two provisions had a ‘very high 
threshold of application,’ stating that:263
[t]he adjectives ‘widespread, long-term, and severe’ used in Additional Protocol I are 
joined by the word ‘and’, meaning that it is a triple, cumulative standard that needs 
to be fulfi lled.
Consequently, it would appear extremely diffi  cult to develop a prima facie case upon 
the basis of these provisions, even assuming they were applicable.
258 See ICTY Statute, article 18. Th e recommendations of the Committee were not binding on 
the Prosecutor, who retained complete independence as to whether or not to initiate a formal 
investigation.
259 Final Report to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 13 June 2000, 39 ILM 1257 (Committee Report).
260 Ibid, para 90.
261 See, for example, Michael Cottier, ‘Did NATO Forces Commit War Crimes During the 
Kosovo Confl ict? Refl ections on the Prosecutor’s Report of 13  June 2000’, in Horst Fischer, 
Claus Kress and Sascha Rolf Lüder (eds), International and National Prosecution of Crimes 
Under International Law: Current Developments (2001), 505; Freeland, supra note 257.
262 See Convention on Cluster Munitions, opened for signature 3  December 2008, 48 ILM 
357 (entered into force 1  August 2010), which came into force despite opposition by major 
producers of cluster bombs, and those countries that stockpile them, including the United 
States, Russia and China: ‘Cluster bomb ban treaty approved’ (28  May 2008) BBC News 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7423714.stm> at 19  January 2015. As at January 
2015, the United States, Russia and China have neither signed nor ratifi ed this convention: 
International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘State Parties to the Following International 
Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties’ <www.icrc.org/ihl/%28SPF%29/party_main_
treaties/$File/IHL_and_other_related_Treaties.pdf> at 19 January 2015.
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Th e Committee found that the required level of damage had not been reached, 
concluding that, while there was an obligation to avoid excessive long-term 
damage to the natural environment even when bombing legitimate military 
targets, what was ‘excessive’ in this context could not be clearly defi ned.264 It also 
held that the real impact of the campaign at that time was ‘unknown and diffi  cult 
to measure.’265 In essence, it has been argued, the Committee’s interpretation of 
the provisions meant that they would have ‘almost no applicability’ in virtually 
every circumstance.266
Th e Committee’s reference to a requirement of ‘excessive’ damage is of interest 
in two respects. First, there is, in fact, no reference to this threshold in the two 
articles of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, although it is used in other provisions 
of that instrument,267 which suggests that the draft ers of the two articles 
deliberately chose not to include the word. Notwithstanding this, it appears that 
the Committee found it appropriate to ‘add’ this extra requirement – contrary 
to the accepted principles of treaty interpretation – so that the provisions 
would accord with what it regarded as the general (customary) international 
law obligation. Yet, by immediately observing that what constitutes excessive 
damage is perhaps not always capable of clear defi nition, the Committee Report 
severely compromised the force of any such obligation. Th e Committee, in 
essence, tacked on a requirement that it then held was incapable of application to 
the events before it. Clearly, this was a fl awed approach.
Secondly, the war crime defi ned in the Rome Statute requires that the:268
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment [must be] 
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage 
anticipated
Th e International Criminal Court has not yet been required to determine 
precisely what this provision might mean. Somewhat confusingly, given its 
fi nding that a determination of what is excessive is diffi  cult, the Committee 
concluded that the use of the word ‘clearly’ in article  8(2)(b)(iv) ‘ensures that 
criminal responsibility would be entailed only in cases where the excessiveness 
of the incidental damage was obvious.’269
264 Ibid, para 23.
265 Id.
266 Aaron Schwabach, ‘NATO’S War in Kosovo and the Final Report to the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (2001) 9 Tulane Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 167, 175.
267 See, for example, 1977 Additional Protocol I, article 57(2)(a)(iii).
268 Rome Statute, article 8(2)(b)(iv) (emphasis added).
269 Committee Report, para 21.
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In the course of its fi ndings, the Committee also referred to the Legality of the 
Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion,270 suggesting – incorrectly 
– that the International Court of Justice had cast doubt as to whether article 55 
also represented customary international law.271 In its decision, the Court 
concluded as follows:272
[t]he Court notes further-more that Articles 35, para 3, and 55 of Additional Protocol 
I provide additional protection for the environment. Taken together, these provisions 
embody a general obligation to protect the natural environment against widespread, 
long-term and severe environmental damage; the prohibition of methods and means 
of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause such damage; and the 
prohibition of attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals. Th ese are 
powerful constraints for all the States having subscribed to these provisions
Notwithstanding the Court’s sentiments, it is apparent that the protections to the 
environment provided by articles 35(3) and 55(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol 
I are inadequate, given both the uncertainties and ambiguities of the threshold 
terms included, as well as the ‘extreme environmental damage’273 required 
for either provision to be applicable. Moreover, in light of these uncertainties, 
as well as the large number of reservations lodged by States Parties to the 1977 
Additional Protocol I, it is widely thought that these provisions do not represent 
customary international law,274 although this view is not unanimous.275 At the 
same time, however, it should be noted that the instrument does refl ect the 
principles of the Martens clause by specifying that:276
civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles 
of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity 
and from the dictates of public conscience
It has been suggested that, because they purport to prohibit environmental 
damage in circumstances where such acts might be justifi able under the 
principle of military necessity, articles  35(3) and 55(1) of the 1977 Additional 
Protocol I ‘probably still have no customary equivalents’.277 Certainly, the quote 
referred to above from the Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
270 [1996] ICJ Rep 226.
271 Committee Report, para 15. See Freeland, supra note 257, 163.
272 [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 31.
273 Bruch, supra note 139, 703.
274 See, for example, Dinstein, supra note 253, 185; Anthony Leibler, supra note 96, 112; Yuzon, 
supra note 123, 822.
275 Sands, supra note 37, 315.
276 1977 Additional Protocol I, article 1(2) (emphasis added). See also 1977 Additional Protocol 
II, preamble para 4.
277 Fleck, supra note 31, 118. Th at author also applies the same argument to the specifi c 
environmental prohibitions in the ENMOD Convention.
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Advisory Opinion does not expressly contradict this view, seeming instead 
to emphasize how important the provisions are as treaty obligations, with the 
implied conclusion that non-States Parties to the convention are not bound by 
these provisions. It is relevant to note, however, that both of the 1977 Additional 
Protocols have been widely ratifi ed,278 although not by the United States.279
Th e terms of article 35(3) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I are repeated in the 
preamble to the 1981 Certain Conventional Weapons Convention.280 France 
has lodged a reservation to that instrument in which it considered that the 
obligations codifi ed in the paragraph only applied to ‘States Parties to the 
Protocol’, and thus by implication did not represent a principle of customary 
international law.281
Th e terms of the 1977 Additional Protocol I do not expressly categorise 
a violation of either article  35(3) or article  55 as a ‘grave breach’ of the 
instrument.282 A proposal that a violation of article  55(1) would fall within 
the grave breaches regime of the Geneva rules was defeated in the discussions 
leading to the conclusion of the 1977 Additional Protocol I.283 Nevertheless, 
there is some disagreement as to whether, and in what circumstances, a breach 
of these provisions may constitute a grave breach.284 Th is further refl ects 
uncertainties both as to the precise scope of each provision, as well as the extent 
to which they represent principles of customary international law.
Overall, although the inclusion of the prohibitions provided for in both 
articles 35(3) and 55 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I represented a step forward 
278 As at January 2015, there were 174 States Parties to the 1977 Additional Protocol I and 168 
States Parties to the 1977 Additional Protocol II: International Committee of the Red Cross, 
‘State Parties to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties’ 
<www.icrc.org/ihl/%28SPF%29/party_main_treaties/$File/IHL_and_other_related_Treaties. 
pdf> at 19 January 2015.
279 Th e United States became a signatory to both of the 1977 Additional Protocols on 
12 December 1977.
280 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Eff ects, opened 
for signature 10  April 1981, 1342 UNTS 137 (entered into force 2  December 1983) (1981 
Certain Conventional Weapons Convention), preamble para 4.
281 At the time of making this reservation (10 April 1981), France was not a State Party to the 
1977 Additional Protocol I (it became a State Party on 11 April 2001).
282 See 1977 Additional Protocol I, articles  11 and 85, and 1949 Geneva Convention IV, 
article 147.
283 Hulme, supra note 188, 77.
284 Compare, for example, Rymn James Parsons, ‘Th e Fight to Save the Planet: U.S. Armed 
Forces, “Greenkeeping,” and Enforcement of the Law Pertaining to Environmental Protection 
During Armed Confl ict’ (1998) 10 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 441, 
452, with Rayfuse, supra note 203, 84.
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in the jus in bello at the time,285 they have not established a comprehensive 
regime of accountability for intentional environmental damage in times of war, 
particularly since the threshold requirements of damage are unclear and, in 
any case, are too high as to have signifi cant practical application. Th ey do have 
some value, however, highlighting the need for combatants in armed confl icts 
to consider the environment, a point that has also been emphasized by the 
International Court of Justice.286
2.2.10. 1981 CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS 
CONVENTION
Th is treaty, together with three Protocols,287 was adopted at the second session 
of a United Nations Conference held in Geneva in 1980.288 Already by this time, 
States Parties to the 1977 Additional Protocol I were, as noted in chapter 1, under 
the following obligation with respect to ‘new weapons’:289
[i]n the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or 
method of warfare … to determine whether its employment would, in some or all 
circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international 
law
Th e 1981 Certain Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols provide 
for several prohibitions and restrictions in respect of particular weapons. 
Th e obligation to ensure that weapons employed during an armed confl ict 
285 Dinstein, supra note 253, 185.
286 Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 
30.
287 Th e most relevant of these for the purposes of protection of the environment during 
hostilities is Protocol III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons 
to the, opened for signature 10 April 1981, 1342 UNTS 137 (entered into force 2 December 
1983) (1981 Protocol III). Th e other two Protocols relate to Non-Detectable Fragments and 
Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices respectively. Of course, by restricting these forms of 
weapons in particular circumstances, those two protocols may also have indirect eff ects in 
terms of protecting the environment. Th is is particularly the case in relation to restrictions 
on the use of anti-personnel mines, the use of which can render large areas of land unusable. 
Th e Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer 
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Th eir Destruction, opened for signature 3 December 1997, 36 
ILM 1507 (entered into force 1 March 1999), is discussed below.
288 United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Eff ects. For a description of the background to the negotiations leading to the conclusion of 
the 1981 Certain Conventional Weapons Convention, see Captain J. Ashley Roach, ‘Certain 
Conventional Weapons Convention: Arms Control or Humanitarian Law?’ (1984) 105 
Military Law Review 3, 5–17.
289 1977 Additional Protocol I, article 36.
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are legal was, of course, not new.290 Th e underlying theme of the 1981 Certain 
Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols derives from fundamental 
principles applied in earlier jus in bello treaties – that the ‘methods and means of 
warfare [are] not unlimited’ and that, during the conduct of armed confl ict, the 
use of the following is prohibited:291
weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause 
superfl uous injury or unnecessary suff ering
As noted, the preamble of the 1981 Certain Conventional Weapons Convention 
reiterates that:292
it is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or 
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment
For the purposes of its interpretation, and notwithstanding any reservations, 
this provision forms part of the ‘context’ of the treaty – material related to 
its conclusion293 – even though it does not in and of itself create a legally 
binding obligation.294 Moreover, the preamble of a treaty may also assist in the 
determination of its ‘object and purpose’,295 assuming that it is not inconsistent 
with the main text of the treaty.296
In any event, the reaffi  rmation of a general prohibition of ‘widespread, long-
term and severe damage to the natural environment’ in the preamble of the 1981 
Certain Conventional Weapons Convention – terms similar to those found in 
290 W. Hays Parks, ‘Conventional Weapons and Weapons Reviews’ (2005) 8 Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law 55, 57. In early 2013, an arms trade treaty that sought to 
impose restrictions on the trade and export of certain conventional weapons, including 
weapons that might be used for acts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly: United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 67/234 B (2 April 2013) UN Doc A/RES/67/234 B on the Arms Trade Treaty. Th e 
treaty subsequently entered into force in December 2014.
291 1981 Certain Conventional Weapons Convention, preamble para 3.
292 Ibid, preamble para 4. In similar vein to the French reservation in relation to this paragraph 
noted earlier, the United States lodged an ‘understanding’ to the eff ect that this paragraph:
 ‘which refers to the substance of provisions of Article  35(3) and Article  55(1) of [the 1977 
Additional Protocol I], applies only to States which have accepted those provisions’.
293 Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2nd ed, 2007), 234.
294 See VCLT, article 31(2).
295 Tim Hillier, Sourcebook on Public International Law (1998), 144. See, for example, Golder v. 
United Kingdom (1975) 1 EHRR 524, where the European Court of Human Rights (at 535–6) 
stated that:
 ‘the preamble is generally very useful for the determination of the ‘object’ and ‘purpose’ of the 
instrument to be construed’.
296 Aust, supra note 293, 426.
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the then recently concluded ENMOD Convention and the 1977 Additional 
Protocol I – refl ected the growing concern of the international community for 
the protection of the environment during times of armed confl ict. Antonio 
Cassese, while acknowledging that the general prohibition in the preamble does 
not refl ect customary law, argues that it may already refl ect ‘a general consensus 
and thus is binding on all members of the world community’,297 notwithstanding 
the uncertainties regarding the precise meaning to be attributed to each of the 
descriptors.
Article  2(4) of the 1981 Protocol III also provides some protection for the 
environment, although this has been described as ‘merely incidental’.298 Th is 
instrument relates to the use of incendiary weapons,299 refl ecting international 
concern triggered by the frequent use of napalm by the United States Air Force 
during the Vietnam War,300 and which were raised again in relation to the 
alleged use by Israel of white phosphorus weapons during its military action in 
Gaza in early 2009.301 Under the heading of ‘Protection of civilians and civilian 
objects’, it provides as follows:302
[i]t is prohibited to make forests or other kinds of plant cover the object of attack 
by incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are used to cover, conceal 
or camoufl age combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves military 
objectives
A ‘military objective’ in this context is defi ned as:303
any object which by its nature, location, purpose or use makes an eff ective 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or 
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, off ers a defi nite military 
advantage
‘Civilian objects’ are defi ned as all objects ‘which are not military objectives’.304 
It has been suggested that a forest would be a military objective for these 
purposes ‘in jungle warfare or if it were likely to be used by retreating or 
advancing forces as a cover in the future’.305 In one sense, article 2(4) of the 1981 
297 Cassese, supra note 6, 421–2.
298 Yuzon, supra note 123, 823.
299 Article 1(1) of the 1981 Certain Conventional Weapons defi nes an incendiary weapon for the 
purposes convention.
300 Roberts and Guelff , supra note 73, 517.
301 Rory McCarthy, ‘Fatal burns never seen before Israel’s war’, Th e Guardian (London), 
21 January 2009, 24.
302 1981 Protocol III, article 2(4).
303 Ibid, article 1(3).
304 Ibid, article 1(4).
305 Green, supra note 83, 141.
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Protocol III could be said to provide for broader protection of the environment 
than either of articles 35(3) and 55(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, in that it 
is not limited by any requisite threshold of damage. However, in other respects, 
it is narrower than articles  35(3) and 55(1), since it applies only to attacks by 
incendiary weapons causing damage to forests and other kinds of plant cover.
Moreover, unlike articles  35(3) and 55(1), article  2(4) of the 1981 Protocol III 
allows for an exception based on military necessity, thus making the provision 
more acceptable to States.306 Erik Koppe suggests that this undermines the 
practical eff ect of article  2(4), arguing that the type of ‘scorched earth tactics’ 
contemplated by the provision would most likely only be undertaken where 
there was a military advantage to be gained.307 Articles  35(3) and 55(1) of the 
1977 Additional Protocol I might still apply in such circumstances, but then one 
is again faced with the diffi  culties of proving the requisite very high threshold 
level of environmental damage.
In 2003, the States Parties to the 1981 Certain Conventional Weapons Convention 
adopted a Protocol dealing with ‘Explosive Remnants of War’.308 Th is instrument 
was the fi rst multilateral agreement to address the problem of unexploded and 
abandoned ordnances, which pose a serious and ongoing threat to civilians 
long aft er the end of an armed confl ict, and render the aff ected environment as 
unusable. In adopting the 1981 Protocol V, the States Parties reiterated:309
their determination to address the humanitarian, developmental and environmental 
impact of explosive remnants of war, including existing explosive remnants of war
Th e 1981 Protocol V came into force in late 2006 and introduces various obligations 
upon participants in armed confl ict in relation to the clearance, removal or 
destruction of such ordnances in relation to territory under its control.310
306 Schmitt, supra note 80, 289.
307 Koppe, supra note 78, 153–4.
308 Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other 
Devices, date of adoption 28  November 2003, 2399 UNTC 100 (entered into force 
12  November 2006) (1981 Protocol V). For a discussion of the negotiations leading to 
the fi nalization of the 1981 Protocol V, see Louis Maresca, ‘A New Protocol on Explosive 
Remnants of War: Th e History and Negotiation of Protocol V to the 1980 Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons’ (2004) 86:856 International Review of the Red Cross 815.
309 Declaration on the Occasion of the Entry into Force of the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of 
War (Protocol V) Adopted by the Th ird Review Conference of the Convention on Prohibitions 
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Eff ects on 13 November 2006, preamble para 
8 (emphasis added) <www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/682877B24ABF
F1BFC12572810063FB74/$fi le/Declaration+on+EIF+Protocol+V.pdf> at 20 January 2015.
310 1981 Protocol V, article 3.
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2.2.11. 1993 CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
As noted, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention only went part of the way 
to addressing some of the shortcomings of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which 
had specifi ed prohibitions on the use of chemical and biological weapons, but 
had been silent with regard to their production and possession.311 It would be 
a further two decades before a comprehensive international treaty would be 
fi nalised relating to chemical weapons. In the meantime, chemical weapons had 
been used, to tragic eff ect, in various confl icts, including by both sides in the 
Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s,312 and also by the Saddam Hussein regime against 
the Kurds in Halabja and elsewhere in 1988.313
Th e 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention was concluded aft er lengthy 
negotiations and welcomed by the United Nations General Assembly, which 
reiterated the:314
urgent necessity of a total ban on chemical weapons, so as to abolish an entire 
category of weapons of mass destruction, and thus to eliminate the risk to mankind 
of renewed use of these inhumane weapons
While the preamble of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention refers 
specifi cally to the use of herbicides,315 they are not specifi cally included in 
the defi nitions of ‘chemical weapons’ and a ‘toxic chemical’ in the substantive 
clauses of the instrument,316 notwithstanding that their use can have very 
311 Schindler and Toman, supra note 16, 239.
312 Schmitt, supra note 80, 289.
313 See United Nations Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Mission Dispatched by the Secretary-
General to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Confl ict between 
Th e Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq’ (12 March 1986) UN Doc S/17922, para 58(a). In April 
1991, the United Nations Security Council noted Iraq’s ‘prior use of chemical weapons’ and 
‘invited’ that country to reaffi  rm its obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 
1972 Biological Weapons Convention (this was prior to the conclusion of the 1993 Chemical 
Weapons Convention): United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (3  April 1991) UN 
Doc S/RES/687/1991 on Iraq-Kuwait, preamble para 8 and para 11 respectively. In September 
2007, the Iraqi High Criminal Tribunal confi rmed the death sentence in the ‘Anfal’ trial 
against Ali Hassan al-Majid (known as ‘Chemical Ali’) and four others for crimes against 
humanity involving the deaths of approximately 100,000 Kurds during 1988, including 
approximately 5,000 Kurdish civilians who were killed by chemical weapons (mustard 
and nerve gas) in the northern Iraqi town of Halabja: “Chemical Ali’ Sentence Confi rmed’ 
(4  September 2007) BBC News <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6977842.stm> at 
20 January 2015.
314 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/39 (30  November 1992) UN Doc A/
RES/47/39 on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling 
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Th eir Destruction, preamble para 5.
315 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, preamble para 7.
316 Ibid, articles II(1) and (2).
2.2. International Humanitarian Law (Jus in Bello)
– Relevant Treaty Provisions
Intersentia 97
serious ecological and environmental eff ects.317 However, those defi nitions are 
broad in scope and, in any event, the United States – which had negotiated for 
the exclusion of herbicides within the defi nitional provisions – has formally 
renounced their ‘fi rst use … in time of armed confl ict’.318
Like the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the 1993 Chemical Weapons 
Convention is usually described as a ‘disarmament agreement’319 rather than 
an international humanitarian law instrument. However, the use of chemical 
weapons would inevitably have detrimental eff ects on the environment. Th e 
1993 Chemical Weapons Convention comprehensively prohibits the use of 
chemicals that are likely to harm the environment,320 and represents the fi rst 
international agreement where a complete category of weapons is banned and 
their use prohibited. Article I(1) of the convention provides that the States 
Parties undertake ‘never under any circumstances’:321
(a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or 
transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;
(b) To use chemical weapons;
(c) To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons;
(d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity 
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
In addition, States Parties are required to destroy their stockpiles of chemical 
weapons, as well as their production facilities,322 and are prohibited from 
using ‘riot control agents as a method of warfare’.323 States Parties must also 
‘assign the highest priority to … protecting the environment’ during the 
transportation, sampling, storage and destruction of chemical weapons,324 
the destruction of weapons facilities,325 the national implementation of 
obligations under the treaty,326 and during production activities that are not 
prohibited.327
317 Royal Swedish Ministry for Foreign Aff airs, supra note 14, 109.
318 See Dinstein, supra note 253, 188 and the corresponding footnote.
319 For a comprehensive analysis of the disarmament aspects of the 1993 Chemical Weapons 
Convention, see Eric P.J. Myjer (ed), Issues of Arms Control Law and the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (2001).
320 Schmitt, supra note 80, 291.
321 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, article I(1).
322 Ibid, articles I(2), I(3) and I(4).
323 Ibid. A riot control agent is defi ned in article I(5).
324 Ibid, article IV(10).
325 Ibid, article V(11).
326 Ibid, article VII(3).
327 Ibid, Annex on implementation and verifi cation, part VI(C)(7).
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A specialised body – Th e Hague-based Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) – is established under the 1993 Chemical Weapons 
Convention, with the following specifi c tasks:328
to achieve the object and purpose of this Convention, to ensure the implementation 
of its provisions, including those for international verifi cation of compliance with it, 
and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties
While the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention represents another step forward 
towards an international regime of weapons control, some commentators 
argue that its enforcement mechanisms fall short of what is required to ensure 
the prevention of the proliferation of chemical weapons.329 Michael Scharf 
suggests that the success of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 
1993 Chemical Weapons Convention will ultimately depend upon a widespread 
acceptance of a ‘chemical and biological weapons taboo’.330
2.2.12. 1997 OTTAWA CONVENTION ON THE 
PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, 
PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-
PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR 
DESTRUCTION331
Th e indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines and similar weapons can have 
serious detrimental environmental impacts, rendering otherwise valuable areas 
unusable and highly dangerous, and obstructing economic development.332 In 
the 1980s and 1990s, their use became the subject of signifi cant concern. A 1996 
Report issued by the ICRC, citing the United States State Department, estimated 
that there were about 84 million ‘uncleared’ landmines in 64 countries around 
the world.333 Despite the fact that there has been steady progress in the clearing 
of some mined areas – for example, in 2006, over 450 square kilometers of land 
328 Ibid, article VIII(1).
329 See, for example, Kellman, supra note 184, 600–1.
330 Scharf, supra note 182, 510.
331 Opened for signature 3 December 1997, 36 ILM 1507 (entered into force 1 March 1999) (1997 
Ottawa Convention).
332 Christopher Stone refers to contrary arguments that suggest that the mining of ‘delicate 
landscapes’ such as the Sinai or the Korean Demilitarized Zone might even represent a 
‘benefi t to the environment by providing the natural terrain with a macabre reprieve from 
human incursion’: Stone, supra note 1, 21.
333 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Anti-personnel Landmines: Friend or Foe? – 
A Study of the Military Use and Eff ectiveness of Anti-personnel Mines’ (1996) <www.icrc.
org/eng/assets/fi les/other/icrc_002_0654.pdf> para 1, at 20  January 2015 (ICRC Landmines 
Report).
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was cleared334 – the task ahead looks formidable. Indeed, the ICRC Landmines 
Report estimated that there were a 100 million such mines stockpiled around the 
world,335 and referred to United Nations projections that:336
if the use of mines were stopped immediately it would take 1,100 years and $33 billion 
dollars to clear, at current rates, those already in place
As noted, Protocol II to the 1981 Certain Conventional Weapons Convention 
relates to mines, booby-traps and other devices.337 While it did prohibit the 
use of such devices indiscriminately or when directed against civilians,338 its 
practical eff ects were minimal. It did not restrict the use of such weapons per se, 
did not place any limits on their manufacture or transfer, and was not formally 
applicable to civil wars.339 In 1996, the 1981 Protocol II was amended so as to 
rectify various shortcomings, but no agreement could be reached on a total 
prohibition of the use of anti-personnel mines.
Included within a landmark Resolution headed ‘General and Complete 
Disarmament’340 adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in late 1996, 
States were urged:341
to pursue vigorously an eff ective, legally binding international agreement to ban the 
use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines … as soon as 
possible
A series of meetings led by Canada eventually gave rise to the conclusion of the 
1997 Ottawa Convention, which was expressed to be based upon:342
the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an 
armed confl ict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the 
principle that prohibits the employment in armed confl icts of weapons, projectiles 
and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfl uous injury 
334 Stephanie Holmes, ‘Delicate territory: the landmine ban’ BBC News, 2  December 2007 
<http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/7121419.stm> at 20 January 2015.
335 ICRC Landmines Report, para 103.
336 Ibid, para 1.
337 Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other 
Devices to the, opened for signature 10  April 1981, 1342 UNTS 137 (entered into force 
2 December 1983) (1981 Protocol II).
338 Ibid, articles 3(2) and (3).
339 Roberts and Guelff , supra note 73, 645.
340 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 (10  December 1996) UN Doc A/
RES/51/45 on General and Complete Disarmament.
341 Ibid, para 1.
342 1997 Ottawa Convention, preamble para 11.
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or  unnecessary suff ering and on the principle that a distinction must be made 
between civilians and combatants
In terms similar to the general obligations under the 1972 Biological Weapons 
Convention and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, States Parties to the 
1997 Ottawa Convention undertake, ‘never under any circumstances’:343
(a) To use anti-personnel mines;
(b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, 
directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
(c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity 
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
Th e 1997 Ottawa Convention provides for a complete ban on the use of anti-
personnel mines, and thus provides for further (indirect) protection of the 
environment, as well as for remediation of their harmful eff ects. Clearly, however, 
the eff ectiveness of such treaty-based bans is dependent upon widespread 
ratifi cation and practical implementation. Without universal acceptance of these 
prohibitions, ‘awkward situations’ may arise.344
Moreover, it is apparent that the scale of the existing problem of landmines 
poses signifi cant challenges to the eff ective implementation of its principal 
goals. Th e 1997 Ottawa Convention contemplates that the process of destroying 
all stockpiles of anti-personnel mines in areas under a State’s jurisdiction or 
control may take up to 10 years, with allowance for an extension of time based 
on various submitted reasons, including ‘[t]he humanitarian, social, economic, 
and environmental implications of the extension’.345
2.2.13. 1999 SECOND PROTOCOL TO THE HAGUE 
CONVENTION OF 1954 FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF ARMED 
CONFLICT346
As noted, the 1954 Hague Convention could be waived in certain cases of 
military necessity. Th is was seen as compromising the protections aff orded by 
343 Ibid, article 1.1.
344 See, for example, Byers, supra note 74, 124, where the author describes how, in 2001, Canadian 
Soldiers had been ordered by their American commander to lay mines around their camp in 
Afghanistan. When the Canadian soldiers refused to do so, American soldiers, who were not 
subject to the restrictions of the 1997 Ottawa Convention, laid the mines.
345 1997 Ottawa Convention, article 5(4)(c).
346 Opened for signature 26 March 1999, 38 ILM 769 (entered into force 9 March 2004) (Second 
Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention).
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that instrument, particularly aft er several of those States that had called for 
the waiver failed to ratify the treaty.347 During the 1990s, there were renewed 
calls to supplement the provisions of the convention and to clarify the extent of 
its application. Th e fact that it was not applicable to non-international armed 
confl icts also raised some concerns, particularly in light of the fact that:348
in many recent cases the destruction of the physical evidence of the existence of the 
national, ethnic and/or religious community under attack has been an integral part 
of the various types and levels of humanitarian abuse of the civilian peoples, through 
to the level of alleged genocide [in the then former Yugoslavia]
A Diplomatic Conference in Th e Hague in March 1999 adopted the Second 
Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention. Th is instrument supplements the 1954 
Hague Convention in a number of ways. In particular, it expressly applies to 
armed confl icts not of an international character349 and, in addition, clarifi es 
the concept of ‘military necessity’ for the purposes of determining whether a 
‘waiver’ may be invoked under article  4(2) of the 1954 Hague Convention.350 
Th e instrument also specifi es particular precautions that a State Party must 
take in the conduct of military operations, so as to minimize the possibility of 
‘incidental damage to cultural property’ protected under article  4 of the 1954 
Hague Convention. Included within these is the obligation to ‘cancel or suspend 
an attack if it becomes apparent’:351
that the attack may be expected to cause incidental damage to cultural property 
protected under Article 4 of the [1954 Hague] Convention which would be excessive 
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated
2.3. APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW TREATIES
As noted, as well as a consideration of the relevant jus in bello treaty instruments, 
it is pertinent to consider whether and, if so, to what extent, any of the existing 
international environmental law treaties might also regulate intentional 
environmental destruction during armed confl ict.
347 Forrest, supra note 167, 210.
348 Patrick J. Boylan, Review of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event 
of Armed Confl ict: (Th e Hague Convention of 1954) (1993), para A8.
349 Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention, articles 3(1) and 22(1).
350 Ibid, article 6.
351 Ibid, article  7(d)(ii). Th e words in articles  7(b) and 7(d)(ii) of the Second Protocol to the 
1954 Hague Convention are similar to those used in article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute, 
although the latter refers to damage that is ‘clearly’ excessive and requires a consideration of 
the ‘overall’ military advantage.
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2.3.1. DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW TREATIES
Th e body of law that is now categorized as international environmental law (IEL) 
has developed very rapidly over the past few decades, particularly following 
the 1972 Stockholm Declaration,352 which, as noted, was the fi rst signifi cant 
statement of fundamental international principles relating to the protection 
of the environment.353 Th e Stockholm Conference had been convened by the 
United Nations General Assembly, which was ‘convinced’ that there was:354
the need for intensifi ed action at national, regional and international level to limit 
and, where possible, to eliminate the impairment of the human environment and in 
order to protect and improve the natural surroundings in the interests of man
Shortly aft erwards, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was 
established ‘[t]o provide leadership and encourage partnership in caring for 
the environment by inspiring, informing, and enabling nations and peoples to 
improve their quality of life without compromising that of future generations.’355 
Further momentum for the development of international environmental 
standards was provided by the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development.356
Even before these landmark events, however, there had been a number of 
important developments, including the judicial awards in the Fur Seals 
Arbitration357 and the Trail Smelter Arbitration358 – the latter being described 
352 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (16  June 1972) 
UN Doc A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1972 Stockholm Declaration).
353 Parsons, supra note 284, 455.
354 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2398 (XXIII) (3 December 1968) UN Doc A/
RES/2398(XXIII) on the Problems of the Human Environment, preamble para 11.
355 United Nations Environment Programme, ‘About UNEP: Th e Organization’ <www.unep.org/ 
Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=43> at 20 January 2015.
356 Th is conference either directly resulted in, or provided the impetus for, the conclusion of a 
number of important IEL instruments, including the Declaration of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (14  June 1992) UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 
(Volume 1), 31 ILM 874 (1992 Rio Declaration), the Non-Legally Binding Authoritative 
Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and 
Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests (14  June 1992) UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 
(Vol. III), 31 ILM 881, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
opened for signature 4 June 1992, 31 ILM 849 (entered into force 21 March 1994) (UNFCCC), 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5  June 1992, 31 ILM 822 
(entered into force 29 December 1993), and the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development Report, ‘Agenda 21’ UN Doc A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (vol I) (1993).
357 Bering Sea Fur Seals Fisheries Arbitration (Great Britain v. United States) (1893) 1 Moore’s 
International Arbitration Awards 755. For a discussion of the case, see Sands, supra note 37, 561–7.
358 Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada) (1941) 3 RIAA 1905. Th is case arose from 
damage caused in Washington State by sulphur dioxide emissions from a smelter in Trail, 
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as the ‘grandfather’ of international environmental law359 – as well as the 
conclusion of various treaties dealing with diverse environment-related 
issues, including nuclear testing,360 oil pollution at sea,361 and the dumping of 
radioactive waste.362
Th e use of nuclear weapons during the Second World War had begun a process 
of discussion regarding the environmental consequences of such weapons.363 
Th e 1972 Stockholm Declaration made specifi c reference to these weapons, 
principle 26 providing as follows:
[m]an and his environment must be spared the eff ects of nuclear weapons and all 
other means of mass destruction. States must strive to reach prompt agreement, in 
the relevant international organs, on the elimination and complete destruction of 
such weapons
As noted in chapter 1, the 1982 World Charter for Nature contained a number 
of general principles relating to the environment and armed confl ict, including 
that ‘[n]ature shall be secured against degradation caused by warfare or 
other hostile activities’ and ‘[m]ilitary activities damaging to nature shall be 
avoided’.364
Ten years later, the Rio Declaration provided that:365
[t]he environment and natural resources of people under oppression, domination 
and occupation shall be protected
and:
British Colombia. Th e Arbitral Tribunal concluded (at 1965) that ‘[n]o State has the right 
to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury … in or to the 
territory of another …’ Th is decision is regarded as establishing the general principle of State 
responsibility for environmental damage: Leibler, supra note 96, 70. Within the context of 
international armed confl ict, the International Court of Justice has endorsed the Trail Smelter 
principle, affi  rming that it was ‘every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to 
be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States’: Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania) (Merits) (Judgment) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 22.
359 Kenneth F. McCallion, ‘International Environmental Justice: Rights and Remedies’ (2003) 26 
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 427, 429.
360 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, 
opened for signature 5 August 1963, 480 UNTS 43 (entered into force 10 October 1963).
361 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, opened for 
signature 12 May 1954, 327 UNTS 3 (entered into force 26 July 1958).
362 Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature 1  December 1959, 402 UNTS 71 (entered into force 
23 June 1961), article 5(1).
363 John O’Brien, International Law (2002), 551.
364 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 37/7 (28 October 1982) UN Doc A/RES/37/7 on 
the World Charter for Nature, Annex, principles 5 and 20.
365 1992 Rio Declaration, principles 23 and 24.
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[w]arfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall therefore 
respect international law providing protection for the environment in times of armed 
confl ict and cooperate in its further development, if necessary
Th e 1972 Stockholm Declaration and the 1992 Rio Declaration are important 
examples of the broad non-binding ‘soft  law’ instruments that also relate to the 
environment. Th ese instruments provide guidelines or standards of conduct that 
may oft en infl uence the actions of States in relation to environmental protection, 
but they do not have the legal ‘force’ of binding treaties.366 Rather, it is only the 
refl ection (if any) in treaties and customary law of the relevant concepts contained 
in these soft  law instruments that gives rise to international legal obligations.367
As noted, the past three decades have also seen a large number of binding 
international instruments directed towards protecting the environment.368 
Perhaps not surprisingly, there is no single legal defi nition of the ‘environment’ 
consistently applied in these instruments;369 rather, the meaning of that expression 
(if it is defi ned at all) will depend upon the context of the particular treaty.
Cherif Bassiouni has calculated that, in the period 1899–1996, there had been 
55 instruments that have dealt with unlawful acts against certain internationally 
protected elements of the environment.370 Whilst this list also includes the 
ENMOD Convention and the 1977 Additional Protocol I, several of the other 
more signifi cant conventions had been negotiated and agreed under the auspices 
of the UNEP,371 which, however, for most practical purposes lacks real authority 
to enforce international environmental law.372
366 For a discussion of the role of soft  law instruments in various international law regimes, see 
Christine Chinkin, ‘Th e Challenge of Soft  Law: Development and Change in International 
Law’ (1989) 38 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 850; Dinah Shelton, Commitment 
and Compliance; Th e Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (2000): 
Steven Freeland, ‘For Better or For Worse? Th e Use of ‘Soft  Law’ within the International Legal 
Regulation of Outer Space’ (2011) XXXVI Annals of Air and Space Law 409.
367 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘Soft  Law and the International Law of the Environment’ (1991) 12 
Michigan Journal of International Law 420, 428.
368 Kenneth F. McCallion and H. Rajan Sharma, ‘Environmental Justice Without Borders: Th e 
Need for an International Court of the Environment to Protect Fundamental Environmental 
Rights’ (2000) 32 George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics 351, 355.
369 John H. Currie, Craig Forcese and Valerie Oosterveld, International Law: Doctrine, Practice, 
and Th eory (2007), 719.
370 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (2003), 155–6 and 253–5.
371 Th ese include the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for 
signature 16 September 1987, 26 ILM 154 (entered into force 1 January 1989) (Montreal Protocol), 
the UNFCCC, and the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, opened for signature 16 March 1998, 37 ILM 22 (entered into force 16 February 2005).
372 Peggy Rodgers Kalas, ‘International Environmental Dispute Resolution and the Need for 
Access by Non-State Entities’ (2001) 12 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law 
and Policy 191, 230–1.
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Drawing from the Trail Smelter Arbitration principles, many of these IEL 
agreements give rise to obligations on States to exercise ‘due diligence’ to prevent 
environmental damage to other States – or, in some cases, to areas beyond 
the territorial jurisdiction of any State – arising from activities under their 
jurisdiction or control. It has therefore been argued that accountability arises 
not so much from the environmental harm per se, but rather from the failure 
to exercise the requisite standard of care.373 Th ese instruments, both soft  law 
and binding agreements, are typically not punitive in nature.374 Instead, the 
prevention of environmental damage is the ‘underlying objective’.375
In the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project Case, the International Court of Justice 
was asked to consider a dispute relating (in part) to the possible environmental 
eff ects of a system of locks diverting a section of the River Danube. Although it 
decided the dispute primarily on the basis of the relevant treaty376 rather than on 
environmental principles, as noted previously, the Court affi  rmed that it was:377
mindful that, in the fi eld of environmental protection, vigilance and prevention are 
required on account of the oft en irreversible character of damage to the environment 
and of the limitations inherent in the very mechanism of reparation of this type of 
damage.
2.3.2. APPLICABILITY DURING WARFARE?
One could assert that environmental law and policy alone may not be suffi  cient to 
protect the environment in normal (peace time) circumstances.378 Whereas IEL 
has traditionally been developed as an autonomous discipline,379 increasingly 
diverse international (and national) human activities continue to have a 
greater impact upon the environment. Th is is even more the case in relation 
373 Mark Allan Gray, ‘Th e International Crime of Ecocide’ (1996) 26 California Western 
International Law Journal 215, 242.
374 Robert McLaughlin, ‘Improving Compliance: Making Non-State International Actors 
Responsible for Environmental Crimes’ (2000) 11 Colorado Journal of International 
Environmental Law and Policy 377, 380.
375 Hulme, supra note 188, 52.
376 Th is was a bilateral treaty between Hungary and Czechoslovakia dated 17 September 1977. 
Th e Court held that Slovakia, as successor to Czechoslovakia, became a party to the treaty as 
from 1 January 1993: Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] 
ICJ Rep 7, 83.
377 Ibid, para 140.
378 Avi Brisman, ‘Toward a More Elaborate Typology of Environmental Values: Liberalizing 
Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws and Policies’ (2007) 33 New England Journal on Criminal 
and Civil Confi nement 283, 454.
379 Jane Holder and Maria Lee, Environmental Protection, Law and Policy: Text and Materials 
(2nd ed, 2007), xliv.
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to environmental damage during armed confl ict, where, as noted in chapter 1, 
experience has shown that the soft -law declarations and binding IEL agreements 
have largely been ineff ective and, in any event, may not even be applicable.
Indeed, the development of international law regarding the protection of 
the environment during wartime has ‘lagged’ behind the development of 
environmental protection during peace time.380 One reason for this is that, in 
general, most rules of international law, including many of the IEL principles 
– but with the exception of the jus in bello, and perhaps also human rights 
principles381 – do not expressly extend to situations of armed confl ict.382 Th ere 
are very few multilateral IEL treaties that specifi cally relate to environmental 
protection during armed confl ict, and many are silent as to their applicability 
following the outbreak of hostilities.383 Th ere is no general or specifi c rule of 
international law that assumes that such agreements will continue to operate 
during times of hostilities, and there is signifi cant disagreement among 
commentators as to what the correct position may be.384 Moreover, there is 
‘insuffi  cient uniformity of opinion’ among States on the issue.385 Previously, it 
had traditionally been assumed that all treaties between the belligerents in a war 
terminated ipso facto upon the outbreak of hostilities; however, it is now more 
generally thought that the question will depend on the type of treaty itself.386
Th e VCLT is not particularly helpful in this regard, simply stating that:387
[t]he provisions of the present Convention shall not prejudge any question that may 
arise in regard to a treaty from … the outbreak of hostilities between States
380 See Andy Rich, ‘Th e Environment: Adequacy of Protection in Times of War’ (2004) 12 Penn 
State Environmental Law Review 445, 455 and the corresponding footnote.
381 In Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
(Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136, the International Court of Justice (at para 106) 
considered that ‘the protection off ered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of 
armed confl ict’. Th is repeats the view expressed by the Court in Legality of the Th reat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 25.
382 Hampson, supra note 84, 51.
383 Sands, supra note 37, 309.
384 See Silja Vöneky, ‘Peacetime Environmental Law as a Basis of State Responsibility for 
Environmental Damage Caused by War’, in Jay E. Austin and Carl E. Bruch (eds), Th e 
Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Economic, and Scientifi c Perspectives (2000), 190, 
193–4 and the corresponding footnotes.
385 Iain Scobbie, ‘Th e approach to customary international law in the Study’, in Elizabeth 
Wilmshurst and Susan Breau (eds), Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law (2007), 15, 41. Th e author notes (at 41) the diff ering 
submissions made by the four States that addressed the issue in Legality of the Th reat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, also referred to in the 2005 ICRC 
‘Study on Customary International Law’, which is discussed in chapter 3.
386 Vöneky, supra note 384, 197 and the corresponding footnotes.
387 VCLT, article 73.
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In 1993, a panel of experts was convened under the auspices of the ICRC to 
draft  ‘Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the 
Environment in Times of Armed Confl ict’. Article 5 of this document provided 
that:388
international environmental agreements and relevant rules of customary law may 
continue to be applicable in times of armed confl ict to the extent that they are not 
inconsistent with the applicable law of armed confl ict
In 1994, the ICRC Guidelines were submitted to the United Nations General 
Assembly which, without formally approving the draft , passed a general 
resolution relating to the ‘Decade of International Law (1990–1999), in which 
it:389
invite[d] all States to disseminate widely the revised guidelines for military manuals 
and instructions on the protection of the environment in times of armed confl ict 
received from the International Committee of the Red Cross and to give due 
consideration to the possibility of incorporating them into their military manuals 
and other instructions addressed to their military personnel
However, this invitation has thus far not been widely taken up, although a 
number of States, including the United States (in its Army Operational Law 
handbook),390 and Germany (in its Joint Services Regulations), have amended 
their respective military regulations in direct response the ICRC Guidelines, 
but even then not to the degree of environmental protection refl ected in that 
document.391
In the end, whether a specifi c IEL treaty applies during periods of armed confl ict 
will generally be determined by reference to the express terms of the treaty 
itself. Th ere have been several suggested methodologies as to how this question 
388 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions 
on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Confl ict’ (ICRC Environment 
Guidelines), article II(5), (1995) <www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jn38.
htm> at 20 January 2015. See also Hans-Peter Gasser, ‘Guidelines for Military Manuals and 
Instructions on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Confl ict’ (1996) 311 
International Review of the Red Cross 230, appendix.
389 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/50 (9 December 1994) UN Doc A/RES/49/50 
on the United Nations Decade of International Law, para 11.
390 In addition, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which applies to all members 
of the United States Armed Forces, provides for prosecution in situations of environmental 
damage caused by United States military personnel. Some commentators believe that this 
is the most appropriate enforcement mechanism to deal with illegal environmental damage 
during wartime: see, for example, Eric Talbot Jensen and James J. Teixeira, Jr., ‘Prosecuting 
Members of the U.S. Military for Wartime Environmental Crimes’ (2005) 17 Georgetown 
International Environmental Law Review 651, 671.
391 Schmitt, supra note 80, 270–1.
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might be determined in practice. Philippe Sands classifi es the applicability (or 
otherwise) of diff erent IEL treaties in times of armed confl ict in the following 
ways:392
(a) treaties that expressly exclude their applicability in relation to damage that 
occurs as a result of war or armed confl ict;
(b) treaties that allow for total or partial suspension at the instigation of one of 
the Parties;
(c) treaties that require the consequences of hostilities to infl uence subsequent 
decisions under the relevant treaty;
(d) treaties that expressly exclude their applicability to any military activities, 
even during times of peace;
(e) treaties that expressly apply to specifi c activities associated with the conduct 
of hostilities; or
(f) treaties that expressly or impliedly apply at all times.
Edith Brown Weiss, while acknowledging that most IEL treaties do not indicate 
whether they are applicable during an armed confl ict, asserts that some treaties 
can only eff ectively fulfi l their purposes if they do continue to apply during 
times of hostilities.393
In more general terms, Silja Vöneky asserts that State practice and legal doctrine 
commonly result in the following fi ve categories of treaties continuing to bind 
States Parties even during times of international armed confl ict:394
(a) treaties expressly providing for continuance during war;
(b) treaties that are compatible with the maintenance of war;
(c) treaties creating an international regime or status;
(d) human rights treaties; and
(e) jus cogens rules and obligations erga omnes.395
392 See Sands, supra note 37, 309–10, who provides examples of IEL treaties that fall within each 
of these categories.
393 Edith Brown Weiss, ‘Opening the Door to the Environment and to Future Generations’, 
in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Philippe Sands (eds), International Law, Th e 
International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons (1999), 338, 347–8. Th e author cites as 
examples the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 
opened for signature 16 November 1972, 11 ILM 1358 (entered into force 17 December 1975), 
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 
opened for signature 3 March 1973, 993 UNTS 243 (entered into force 1 July 1975), and the 
Montreal Protocol.
394 Vöneky, supra note 384, 198.
395 Th is is not an entirely accurate statement, since a jus cogens rule or erga omnes obligation 
is a principle of customary international law, although it may also be included as a term(s) 
of a treaty. Th e existence of identical conventional and customary rules was recognized by 
the International Court of Justice in North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of 
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Silja Vöneky provides a number of examples of IEL treaties that may fall within 
the fi rst three categories specifi ed.396 In terms of human rights treaties, article 12 
of the ICESCR recognizes ‘the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health’.397 Th e provision specifi es 
that, in order to achieve the realization of this right, States Parties to the treaty 
shall take necessary steps for ‘[t]he improvement of all aspects of environmental 
and industrial hygiene’.398 With respect to this provision, the Special Rapporteur 
of the (then) United Nations Commission on Human Rights asserted that:399
in times of armed confl ict, the deliberate causing of large-scale environmental 
damage which severely aff ects the health of a considerable proportion of the 
population concerned, or creates risks for the health of future generations, amounts 
to a serious violation of [article 12 ICESCR]
All in all, in the absence of specifi c provisions dealing with the point, the 
application of IEL and other signifi cant multilateral treaties in times of armed 
confl ict is oft en problematic. For example, the 1982 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea400 was intended to regulate the use of the seas in times 
of peace.401 However, the terms of the treaty may still be relevant in relation to 
various military uses of the seas.402
Germany v. Denmark and Federal Republic of Germany v. Th e Netherlands) (Judgment) [1969] 
ICJ Rep 3, para 71: see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits) (Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 177–8. 
Article 53 of the VCLT defi nes a ‘peremptory norm’, and this is oft en used as a defi nition of 
a jus cogens rule. An obligation erga omnes has been described by the International Court 
of Justice as an obligation owed by a State ‘towards the international community as a whole 
… the concern of all States … [and that] all States can be held to have a legal interest in 
their protection’: Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain) 
(Judgment) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, para 33. Th e International Court of Justice has also made 
reference to the issue of erga omnes obligations in the context of environmental concerns: see 
Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) (Judgment) [1974] ICJ Rep 253, para 50; Nuclear Tests 
Case (New Zealand v. France) (Judgment) [1974] ICJ Rep 457, para 52.
396 Vöneky, supra note 384, 198–203.
397 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 
16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976) (ICESCR), article 12(1).
398 Ibid, article 12(2)(b).
399 Commission on Human Rights, Report prepared by Special Rapporteur Walter Kälin in 
accordance with Human Rights Commission Resolution 1991/67, ‘Report on the situation of 
human rights in Kuwait under Iraqi occupation’ (16 January 1992) UN Doc E/CN.4/1992/26, 
para 208, quoted in Vöneky, supra note 384, 201.
400 Opened for signature 10  December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3; 21 ILM 1261 (entered into force 
16 November 1994) (UNCLOS).
401 R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, Th e Law of the Sea (2nd ed, 1988), 307.
402 Th ere are a number of treaties within the jus in bello rules relating to the use of the seas, 
stemming primarily from the Hague Peace Conferences. In addition, the 1949 Geneva 
Convention II addresses the rights of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed 
forces at sea. For a discussion of the relevant rules relating to the military uses of the sea, see, 
for example, ibid, Churchill and Lowe, 307 et seq; Wolff  Heintschel von Heinegg, ‘Th e Law of 
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When presented with the opportunity to do so, the International Court of 
Justice has chosen not to ‘categorize’ the vast array of IEL treaties in terms of 
their possible applicability to times of armed confl ict, but has instead adopted 
a diff erent approach. In the Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
Advisory Opinion, the Court heard confl icting arguments as to whether certain 
IEL treaties – as well as some of the jus in bello treaties discussed above403 – 
were applicable in times of armed confl ict in general, and to the use of nuclear 
weapons in particular. In response, the Court somewhat ‘side-stepped’ the 
diff ering viewpoints,404 instead concluding:405
that the issue is not whether the treaties relating to the protection of the environment 
are or are not applicable during an armed confl ict, but rather whether the obligations 
stemming from these treaties were intended to be obligations of total restraint during 
military confl ict
Citing Principle 24 of the Rio Declaration, the Court continued:406
[t]he Court does not consider that the treaties in question could have intended to 
deprive a State of the exercise of its right of self-defence under international law 
because of its obligations to protect the environment.
However, as noted in chapter 1, the Court subsequently affi  rmed that 
environmental considerations were relevant when assessing the acts designed to 
support military objectives.
In his report on the eff ects of armed confl icts on treaties, the ILC Special 
Rapporteur, whilst acknowledging that there was no consensus among States 
on the specifi c legal question, suggested that the comments of the International 
Court of Justice:407
provide general and indirect support for the use of a presumption that environmental 
treaties apply in case of armed confl ict
In reaching its conclusions, the Court affi  rmed that (customary) principles of 
international environmental law are relevant to the conduct of armed confl ict, 
in that they can help to determine whether a particular action that has adverse 
Armed Confl ict at Sea’, in Fleck (ed), Th e Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Confl icts 
(1999), 405–83; Dinstein, supra note 253, 102–8.
403 Th ese included the ENMOD Convention and the 1977 Additional Protocol I.
404 Sands, supra note 37, 310.
405 [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 30.
406 Id.
407 First Report on the Eff ects of Armed Confl icts on Treaties, by Ian Brownlie, Special 
Rapporteur, (21 April 2005) UN Doc A/CN.4/552, para 91.
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eff ects on the environment is reasonable and proportional in the context of what 
constitutes military necessity in the circumstances.408 It has also been suggested 
that many of the arguments presented to the Court were premised on the 
continued applicability of the environmental treaties during an armed confl ict 
involving the use of a nuclear weapon.409
Yet, even then, in the end, the Court could not categorically say that the threat 
or use of nuclear weapons – which would have dire environmental consequences 
– would in every circumstance constitute a violation of international law.410 Th e 
irony of this fi nding was highlighted by Roger Clark, who asked the question:411
[i]f it is absolutely forbidden by humanitarian law to use one dum-dum bullet on one 
person, how can it not be absolutely forbidden to use a nuclear weapon on millions?
Yet, as a result of the Court’s ultimate decision – perhaps more accurately 
described as a ‘non-decision’ – if the use of such weapons may be lawful in 
specifi c circumstances, it follows that the consequential and undoubtedly severe 
environmental damage associated with such use would also be lawful.412 At the 
same time, the fi ndings of the Court highlight the fact that the IEL treaties in 
general do not directly address the issue of the use of nuclear weapons. Th is is 
indicative of the ‘great caution shown by [S]tates’,413 when codifying principles 
in relation to criminal responsibility for environmental damage, particularly in 
the context of warfare.
2.3.3. LIABILITY AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY RATHER 
THAN CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
As noted in chapter 1, to the extent that issues of accountability for environmental 
damage have been specifi cally addressed in IEL treaties, the tendency has been 
to design this as a regime of liability for States, based upon traditional principles 
408 See also Betsy Baker, ‘Legal Protections for the Environment in Times of Armed Confl ict’ 
(1993) 33 Virginia Journal of International Law 351, 354–5.
409 International Law Commission, ‘Th e eff ect of armed confl ict on treaties: an examination 
of practice and doctrine: Memorandum by the Secretariat’ (1  February 2005) UN Doc A/
CN.4/550, footnote 117.
410 On this issue the Court was divided equally, with the casting vote of President Bedjaoui 
deciding the matter: see ICJ Statute, article 55(2).
411 Roger S. Clark, ‘International Court of Justice: Advisory Proceedings on the Legality of the 
Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Question Posed by the General Assembly): Th e Laws of 
Armed Confl ict and the Use or Th reat of Use of Nuclear Weapons’ (1996) 7 Criminal Law 
Forum 265, 288.
412 Karen Hulme, ‘Natural Environment’, in Elizabeth Wilmshurst and Susan Breau (eds), 
Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law (2007), 204, 216.
413 Birnie and Boyle, supra note 110, 286.
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of State responsibility,414 rather than as a system encompassing criminal 
responsibility for individuals (or States). Th is is refl ective of traditional notions 
of environmental justice, which are concerned with ‘the distribution of benefi ts 
and burdens in the use and management of environmental resources’.415 Th e 
application of these principles means that the liability that arises is ‘remedied’ 
by the making of reparations,416 which may oft en constitute a monetary 
compensation – a traditional ‘civil’ remedy.417 Th is approach has been used, for 
example, in relation to marine pollution and nuclear accidents; in both of these 
enforcement regimes, however, there is no express reference or applicability to 
armed confl ict.
Although not ‘just’ an IEL treaty, UNCLOS does regulate the marine 
environment. As noted above, the extent to which it applies during times 
of armed confl ict remains uncertain. Section 9 of UNCLOS deals with 
‘Responsibility and Liability’ and provides that:418
[S]tates are responsible for the fulfi llment of their international obligations 
concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment. Th ey shall be 
liable in accordance with international law
In similar vein, a number of IEL treaties introduce a scheme of liability for 
damage caused by nuclear accidents.419 While in certain circumstances these 
conventions impose liability not upon States, but rather upon the operator of a 
nuclear installation or ship (which may include the handler or carrier of nuclear 
material), they do not impose any criminal responsibility.
414 O’Brien, supra note 363, 559.
415 Gerard C. Rowe, ‘Environmental Justice as an Ethical, Economic and Legal Principle’, in 
Benjamin J. Richardson and Klaus Bosselmann (eds), Environmental Justice and Market 
Mechanisms (1999), 58, 58.
416 See Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland) (Jurisdiction) [1927] PCIJ 
Rep, Series A, No. 9, 21.
417 Parsons, supra note 284, 454.
418 UNCLOS, article 235(1) (emphasis added). See further Birnie and Boyle, supra note 110, 382–92.
419 Th e principal treaties dealing with damage caused by nuclear accidents are the Paris 
Convention on Th ird Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, opened for signature 
29  July 1960, 956 UNTS 251 (entered into force 1  April 1968) and the Vienna Convention 
on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, opened for signature 29 May 1963, 1063 UNTS 255 
(entered into force 12  November 1977), established under the auspices of the Organisation 
for Economic Development (OECD) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
respectively. Two amending Protocols to these conventions were adopted in 1988 (Joint 
Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage and the Paris Convention on Th ird Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, 
opened for signature 21 September 1988, 1672 UNTS 301 (entered into force 27 April 1992)) 
and 1997 (Protocol to amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage, opened for signature 12 September 1997, 36 ILM 1462 (entered into force 4 October 
2003)).
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It has been asserted that neither of these liability regimes, nor other 
accountability systems provided for within the framework of the IEL treaties, 
are particularly eff ective in ‘shap[ing] the behaviour of the polluter’,420 and that 
existing international dispute mechanisms relating to environmental destruction 
are ‘inadequate to protect the rights of individuals and the environment in the 
21st century.’421 Indeed, it has been noted that, although there are certain IEL 
treaties that have successfully established a liability regime, this remains the 
exception, and setting up such regimes for other types of environmental damage 
‘has been much more diffi  cult’.422 Whether or not these criticisms underestimate 
the value and eff ect of the broad range of IEL conventions in operation, in general 
terms, to the extent that specifi c IEL treaties do apply during the course of armed 
confl ict, they are weak and inadequate to provide for a comprehensive and 
stringent set of binding principles regulating acts of intentional environmental 
damage.
As noted, one reason for this is that the enforcement procedures and 
accountability regime they establish are not directed towards the criminalization 
of such acts, but rather are based on the concept of State responsibility. Even 
then, State responsibility in the context of international environmental damage 
has traditionally not oft en been raised, and a signifi cant number of IEA treaties 
do not even contain specifi c environmental standards that could give rise to 
claims of a ‘wrongful act’ in a situation of violation.423 Th ere is, consequently, 
relatively little international case law concerning State responsibility for 
environmental damage, although this may now be changing.424
In the end, the enforcement of international environmental law ‘rests with 
national interest’.425 Given the sometimes highly politicized circumstances 
surrounding disputes between States involving environmental harm, as well 
420 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘International Responsibility and Liability’, in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta 
Brunnée and Ellen Hey (eds), Th e Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law 
(2007), 1010, 1034.
421 Kalas, supra note 372, 192.
422 See Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law (2005).
423 Elli Louka, International Environmental Law: Fairness, Eff ectiveness, and World Order (2006), 
468–9.
424 For example, a number of disputes between States involving environmental issues have in 
recent times been brought before the International Court of Justice. Th ese include disputes 
relating to the environmental impact of a proposed system of locks diverting part of the River 
Danube (Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7), 
and of two proposed pulp mills on the River Uruguay (Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the 
River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) (Judgment) [2010] ICJ Rep 14). More recently, that 
Court has adjudicated in a dispute between Australia and Japan regarding Japan’s whaling 
activities in Antarctic waters: see Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand 
intervening) (Judgment) 31 March 2014 <www.icj-cij.org/docket/fi les/148/18136.pdf>.
425 Ben Boer, Ross Ramsay and Donald R. Rothwell, International Environmental Law in the Asia 
Pacifi c (1998), 18.
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as the broader ramifi cations that may arise when one State seeks to enforce 
an obligation against another State through a judicial (and highly public) 
process, there remains an inherent disincentive to undertake contentious 
adjudication, even though it may be legally justifi ed under the principles of State 
responsibility.426 Th is may be even more so in circumstances where the particular 
IEL treaty does not establish a comprehensive dispute resolution procedure. In 
this sense, the pressures of realpolitik may further limit the already inadequate 
environmental protections in times of armed confl ict aff orded by IEL treaties.
Of course, as noted in chapter 1, liability was attributed to Iraq following its 
deliberate acts of ‘environmental terrorism’427 during the 1990–1991 Gulf 
War. Th e United Nations Security Council resolved that Iraq was ‘liable 
under international law’ for inter alia ‘environmental damage and the 
depletion of natural resources’. Th is represented the fi rst formal international 
acknowledgement that deliberate acts of environmental destruction during 
wartime were compensable.428 It was also the fi rst time that international 
law was used as the tool by which parties sought compensation for wartime 
environmental damage.429 Given the high ‘profi le’ of the damage, an enforcement 
regime was instituted to coordinate and determine claims for compensation – 
principally through the establishment and operation of the United Nations 
Compensation Commission (UNCC).430 Th is regime is signifi cantly more 
comprehensive than most other mechanisms established under international law.
Yet, this was an ad hoc response that was implemented aft er the fact. What the 
events in Kuwait in 1990–1991 did demonstrate is that, for all practical purposes, 
such acts were not adequately dealt with by the existing IEL treaties. Certainly, 
the provisions of the IEL treaties to which Iraq was a State Party clearly did not 
deter it from carrying out the acts of environmental destruction.431 In addition, 
426 Orellana, supra note 107, 686.
427 Th is was a term used by the United States Pentagon at the time to describe the actions of the 
Iraqi forces: Andrew Rosenthal, ‘War in the Gulf: Th e President; Bush Calls Gulf Oil Spill 
a ‘Sick’ Act by Hussein’, Th e New York Times (New York), 26 January 1991 <www.nytimes.
com/1991/01/26/world/war-in-the-gulf-the-president-bush-calls-gulf-oil-spill-a-sick-act-by-
hussein.html> at 20 January 2015.
428 Luan Low and David Hodgkinson, ‘Compensation for Wartime Environmental Damage: 
Challenges to International Law Aft er the Gulf War’ (1995) 35 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 405, 406.
429 Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, supra note 52, 1392.
430 See United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 on Iraq-Kuwait (3 April 1991) UN Doc 
S/RES/687/1991, para 18.
431 Iraq was not in violation of either the ENMOD Convention, or the 1977 Additional 
Protocol I, in relation to such acts, since it was not a State Party to either instrument at the 
time (it became a State Party to the 1977 Additional Protocol I in April 2010: International 
Committee of the Red Cross, ‘State Parties to the Following International Humanitarian 
Law and Other Related Treaties <www.icrc.org/ihl/%28SPF%29/party_main_treaties/$File/
IHL_and_other_related_Treaties.pdf> at 19 January 2015. Moreover, at least in the opinion 
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due to the nature of these treaties, no individuals were found criminally 
responsible for such acts under international law.
Moreover, from a broader perspective, it has been argued that reliance on the 
principles of State responsibility for environmental destruction ‘merely imposes 
a threat of [possible] post-war fi nancial obligations’, which a belligerent State 
will almost invariably ‘overlook’ in order to achieve its military objectives.432 
In most circumstances, the benefi ts of achieving military objectives during 
hostilities will outweigh the fi nancial burdens associated with the protection of 
the environment.433
In any event, the degree of eff ectiveness of compensatory regimes focusing on 
the concept of reparation for environmental damage is even more complex and 
unsatisfactory given the diffi  culty with arriving at an appropriate evaluation 
(in monetary terms) of the damage caused to the environment,434 as well as the 
severely limited powers of enforcement under which the secretariats established 
under the various IEL treaties will have to operate.435 Of course, there may also 
be a considerable time lag before the full environmental eff ects of any such acts 
can be more accurately determined, thus potentially giving rise to considerable 
delays in relation to any system of sanctions based upon a (monetary) reparation 
for actual damage caused.
2.4. CONCLUSION
Th is chapter has reviewed the various relevant jus in bello instruments and broad 
IEL framework to demonstrate that no comprehensive treaty regime has been 
established to provide for accountability in respect of the intentional destruction 
of the environment during armed confl ict. To the extent that conventional 
environmental limits do exist, compliance is not uniform and oft en relies upon 
the requisite political will within the international community.436
of some commentators, the environmental protection provisions of those two treaties did not 
represent customary international law at the time of such actions: see, for example, Dinstein, 
supra note 253, 193. However, the actions of the Iraqi forces may have constituted a violation 
of 1949 Geneva Convention IV: Louis Rene Beres, ‘Iraqi Crimes and International Law: Th e 
Imperative to Punish’ (1993) 21 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 335, footnote 
16, and may have infringed the necessity or proportionality requirements under customary 
international law (see further chapter 3) governing military activities: Birnie and Boyle, supra 
note 110, 149.
432 Leibler, supra note 96, 77.
433 Yuzon, supra note 123, 803.
434 Hulme, supra note 188, 60.
435 Kalas, supra note 372, 223.
436 Gillian D. Triggs, International Law: Contemporary Principles and Practices (2006), 829.
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Th e IEL treaties also provide little direct relevance to the issue. Apart from the 
fact that it is not clear as to how far any particular IEL instrument may apply in 
times of war, to the extent that they are applicable, they do not provide a scheme 
for criminal responsibility for such actions. Rather, they institute a regime based 
on traditional principles of State responsibility, incorporating notions of liability 
and the obligation of a State to make reparation or provide compensation where 
there has been a violation, without addressing specifi cally the issue of individual 
criminal responsibility.437
It is true that the International Court of Justice has affi  rmed that environmental 
considerations are to be taken into account in times of armed confl ict. However, 
this still leaves much room for uncertainty. While it may be eff ective on an ex 
post facto basis, in circumstances where there is a broad consensus that some 
form of enforcement must be implemented (such as occurred aft er the 1990–
1991 Gulf War), in general terms the (possible) application of international 
environmental principles, and a regime based on liability as an enforcement 
mechanism, provides very little disincentive, and is too weak to represent an 
eff ective system of deterrence.
In terms of the jus in bello, it has been noted that, while those rules may have, 
over time, become more ‘humanized’, they have not shown any signs of being 
‘environmentalized’ to any signifi cant degree.438 Th ere are, as has been discussed, 
a number of jus in bello provisions that do refer either directly or indirectly to the 
environment, refl ecting what has been described as the ‘incipient convergence’ of 
international humanitarian law and increasing concern for the environment.439 
However, for the most part, these provisions are either subject to overarching 
considerations of military necessity (for example in the case of article 2(4) of the 
1981 Protocol III), subject to seemingly unattainable threshold standards (in the 
case of articles 35(1) and 55(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I), or capable of 
restrictive interpretation (the ENMOD Convention). It is also the case that only a 
limited range of intentional acts of environmental destruction would be covered 
by the more specifi c provisions in the 1977 Additional Protocol I or the ENMOD 
Convention.440
As noted, in response to the failure of the jus in bello principles to adequately 
address the deliberate environmental destruction caused by the Iraqi forces 
437 Lyal S. Sunga, Th e Emerging System of International Criminal Law: Developments in 
Codifi cation and Implementation (1997), 224.
438 Mark A. Drumbl, ‘International Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law, and 
Environmental Security: Can the International Criminal Court Bridge the Gaps?’ (2000) 6 
ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 305, 306.
439 Richards and Schmitt, supra note 10, 1048.
440 Dinstein, supra note 253, 196.
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in 1990–1991, a ‘radical’441 proposal emerged to conclude a ‘Fift h Geneva’ 
Convention on the Protection of the Environment in Time of Armed Confl ict. 
A conference was convened in June 1991 in order to discuss what the provisions 
of such an instrument might cover, including prohibitions on the use of the 
environment as a weapon, of weapons aimed against the environment, and of 
‘indirect’ damage to the environment.442
Participants at the conference acknowledged that the existing corpus of treaty 
law was highly defi cient in the area of environmental protection, and the 
proposal also gained the backing of Greenpeace.443 However, on the whole, this 
‘solution’ was not more broadly supported, with several participants arguing 
that, instead of negotiating a new instrument, greater eff orts should be made to 
encourage more eff ective implementation of the existing rules, notwithstanding 
their shortcomings.444 One participant made the observation that ‘creating an 
eff ective legal regime in relation to environmental protection will require more 
than a comprehensive international treaty’.445
Various other commentators have subsequently suggested that the proposed 
Fift h Geneva Convention would not properly diff erentiate between ‘active’ and 
‘passive’ environmental damage caused during armed confl ict,446 and that it may 
not be an appropriate or adequate way to address the ‘challenges of our time’, 
since there is a ‘need for a more complex and diversifi ed approach’ to regulating 
the jus in bello.447
Th e generally critical reaction to the proposal for a new treaty for the protection 
of the environment during war was perhaps indicative of the fact that the broad 
assumptions regarding the emergence of a ‘New World Order’ following the 
Gulf War were overly ambitious.448 Certainly, however, it also refl ected a reality 
441 Gasser, supra note 388, 639.
442 Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, supra note 52, 1395.
443 Id.
444 Günther Handl, Book Review – Glen Plant (ed), ‘Environmental Protection and the Law of 
War: A “Fift h Geneva” Convention on the Environment in Time of Armed Confl ict’ (1993) 
42:4 Th e International and Comparative Law Quarterly 976, 976.
445 Comments by Richard Falk in Glen Plant (ed), Environmental Protection and the Law of War: 
A “Fift h Geneva” Convention on the Environment in Time of Armed Confl ict (1992), 95.
446 See, for example, Eric Talbot Jensen, ‘Th e International Law of Environmental Warfare: 
Active and Passive Damage During Armed Confl ict’ (2005) 38 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 145, 181.
447 Carsten Stahn, ‘Th e Future of Jus Post Bellum’, in Carsten Stahn and Jann K. Kleff ner (eds), 
Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition From Confl ict to Peace (2008), 231, 236.
448 Handl, supra note 444, 977. Th e idea of a ‘New World Order’ was raised by United States 
President George H.W. Bush in a speech in September 1990, when he said: ‘Out of these 
troubled times … a new world order … can emerge: a new era – freer from the threat of terror, 
stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace’: George H.W. Bush, 
Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, 11 September 1990.
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that States were reluctant to adequately address, through binding international 
legal instruments, situations where participants in an armed confl ict intend to 
damage to the environment. As the review of the relevant treaties in this chapter 
has indicated, this remains the position today.
Th e following chapter therefore considers whether, instead, the principles of 
customary international law, particularly those relating to the jus in bello, off er 
any greater degree of appropriate legal regulation of, and accountability for such 
acts.
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CHAPTER THREE
REGULATION OF THE INTENTIONAL 
DESTRUCTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
DURING WARFARE UNDER 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
3.1. INTRODUCTION – CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW WITHIN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Th e previous chapter examined those treaty provisions in the jus in bello 
instruments, as well as in some international environmental law (IEL) 
agreements, which might, in specifi c circumstances, directly or indirectly apply 
to intentional environmental damage during armed confl ict. As was seen, there 
are several treaty provisions of relevance which, in conformity with the general 
nature of the jus in bello rules, restrict the methods and means of warfare, but 
they do not comprehensively prohibit such acts. Indeed, at least within those 
two treaty regimes, there is no mechanism in place that would adequately assign 
culpability. In addition, some of the (potentially) applicable conventional rules 
place military necessity as an overarching consideration, thus signifi cantly 
diluting their eff ectiveness in seeking to regulate intentional environmental 
destruction.
It is therefore necessary to consider whether there are any rules of international 
law of a non-conventional nature that may also be applicable. Th is chapter thus 
considers those customary international law principles that might also have 
some bearing on situations where there is intentional damage to the environment 
during armed confl ict.
As noted, customary international law is one of the traditional sources of 
international law, as specifi ed in article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice.1 Th e classic description of what constitutes a rule of customary 
1 Opened for signature 26 June 1945, 1 UNTS 16, 59 Stat. 1031 (entered into force 24 October 
1945) (ICJ Statute).
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international law was given by the International Court of Justice in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases.2 Th e Court confi rmed that customary international 
law evolves over time,3 and is derived from suffi  cient evidence of both the 
‘settled practice’ of States, as well as opinio juris (‘recognition as law’), which it 
described as ‘a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a 
rule of law requiring it’.4
As such, the traditional view of customary international law is that it 
encompasses an objective element, as well as a subjective or ‘psychological’ 
element.5 Much has been written about these two elements and how they 
should be properly formulated,6 which is also relevant to the process by which 
they may be adduced in relation to a specifi c customary rule. As noted by the 
International Court of Justice:7
[i]t is of course axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to be 
looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of States
For the purposes of examining the relevant customary rules, reference to 
principles of customary international law in this book will relate to this 
traditional view of how it is to be adduced, despite some disagreement in relation 
to the use of this methodology.8 Th at said, it should be noted in passing that 
there is no longer uniform agreement among international law commentators 
2 See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark and Federal 
Republic of Germany v. Th e Netherlands) (Judgment) [1969] ICJ Rep 3, para 77. Th ere have 
been prior defi nitions of international custom, some dating back to early international law 
treatises: for details, see Christiana Ochoa, ‘Th e Individual and Customary International Law 
Formation’ (2007) 48 Virginia Journal of International Law 119, 122. See also Dana Zartner 
Falstrom, ‘Can International Law Survive the 21st Century? Yes, with Patience, Persistence 
and a Peek at the Past’ (2007) 8 San Diego International Law Journal 291.
3 Note, however, the observations of Judge Lachs of the International Court of Justice that:
 ‘[t]he fi rst instruments that men sent into outer space traversed the air space of States and 
circled above them in outer space, yet the launching States sought no permission, nor did the 
other States protest. Th is is how the freedom of movement into outer space, and in it, came 
to be established and recognised as law within a remarkably short period of time’: Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Lachs, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany 
v. Denmark and Federal Republic of Germany v. Th e Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep 3, 230 
(emphasis added).
4 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark and Federal 
Republic of Germany v. Th e Netherlands) (Judgment) [1969] ICJ Rep 3, para 77.
5 Erik V. Koppe, Th e Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Protection of the Environment During 
International Armed Confl ict (2006), 166.
6 See, for example, Heather Cash, ‘Security Council Resolution 1593 and Confl icting Principles 
of International Law: How the Future of the International Criminal Court is at Stake’ (2007) 
45 Brandeis Law Journal 573, 592.
7 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta) (Judgment) [1985] ICJ Rep 13, para 27.
8 See, for example, John O. McGinnis and Ilya Somin, ‘Symposium: Global Constitutionalism: 
Global Infl uence on U.S. Jurisprudence: Should International Law be Part of our Law?’ (2007) 
59 Stanford Law Review 1175, 1199.
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that the two distinct elements specifi ed by the Court in the late 1960s are still 
‘necessary’ to prove the existence of a rule of customary international law.9 
Th ere have, for example, been suggestions that, if one were to apply the classical 
defi nition of customary international law, some human rights norms would fail 
to qualify as custom, due to a lack of consensus as to State practice.10
Th ere has therefore developed a growing body of contemporary academic 
literature – described as ‘revisionist accounts of custom formation’11 – that 
questions the traditional understanding of what constitutes a rule of customary 
international law. For example, it has been suggested that the practice of non-
State actors is also relevant for the formation of customary international 
humanitarian law.12
What is not disputed is that, unlike conventional principles, which usually bind 
only those parties to the relevant treaty,13 rules of customary international law 
are binding on all States, subject to the (possible) exception of the so-called 
‘persistent objector’ rule.14 Consequently, the customary international law 
principles applicable to the conduct of armed confl ict – and the associated 
9 See, for example, International Law Association, ‘Final Report of the International Committee 
on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law; Principles Applicable to the 
Formation of General Customary International Law’, in Report of the Sixty-Ninth Conference 
(2000), 712, 720–1.
10 See, for example, McGinnis and Somin, supra note 8, 1200; Jochen A. Frowein, Book Review 
– Th eodor Meron, ‘Th e Humanization of International Law’ (2007) 101 American Journal of 
International Law 680, 683.
11 See, for example, Iain Scobbie, ‘Th e approach to customary international law in the 
Study’, in Elizabeth Wilmshurst and Susan Breau (eds), Perspectives on the ICRC Study on 
Customary International Humanitarian Law (2007), 15, 24 and the commentaries listed in 
the corresponding footnote.
12 See Jonathan Somer, ‘Jungle justice: passing sentence on the equality of belligerents in non-
international armed confl ict’ (2007) 89:867 International Review of the Red Cross 655, 662 and 
the corresponding footnotes. See also Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Appeals Chamber, 2  October 
1995, para 108.
13 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23  May 1969, 1155 
UNTS 331; 8 ILM 679 (entered into force 27 January 1980) (VCLT), article 34. Th is general 
rule, refl ected in the maxim pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt, represents a principle of 
customary international law: D.J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (6th ed, 
2004), 847. Articles 35 and 36 of the VCLT respectively specify the circumstances whereby 
obligations and rights may be created for a third State, based on the consent of that State.
14 See Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway) (Judgment) [1951] ICJ Rep 116, page 131. Some 
commentators have, however, cast doubt as to whether the persistent objector rule exists: 
see, for example, Jean-Marie Henckaerts, ‘Study on customary international humanitarian 
law: A contribution to the understanding and respect for the rule of law in armed confl ict’ 
(2005) 87:857 International Review of the Red Cross 175, 181 and corresponding footnote. 
Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that the authors of the ICRC Study on International 
Humanitarian Law (discussed below) appear to have accepted that the concept of a persistent 
objector may have some relevance in relation to the applicability of several (suggested) 
customary jus in bello rules: see Scobbie, supra note 11, 34.
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obligations to prevent their breach and to punish the perpetrators of international 
crimes – bind each State, regardless of any specifi c treaty obligations it may, or 
may not, have accepted.
For this reason, it is appropriate to investigate what customary international law 
principles are relevant to the intentional destruction of the environment during 
warfare. As noted in chapter 2, some of the signifi cant jus in bello treaties have 
not been universally ratifi ed. For example, notwithstanding its wide acceptance, 
there is a diverse group of States that have not ratifi ed the 1977 Additional 
Protocol I.15 Th is compromises not only the extent to which those jus in bello 
treaty rules can have widespread application, but also how they may apply 
as comprehensive and binding standards in relation to the conduct of armed 
confl ict. As Michael Bothe has put it, the number of States who have, up until 
now, withheld ratifi cation of that instrument, highlights its ‘non-universality’.16
Th ere are also other important reasons why a consideration of the relevant 
rules of customary international law applying to armed confl ict is necessary. 
Even though, as illustrated in the previous chapter, the development of a 
signifi cant corpus of conventional jus in bello rules has meant that international 
humanitarian law is ‘heavily regulated by treaty’,17 customary international law 
is still a ‘critically important’ part of this area of law.18 In fact, it is true to say that 
the jus in bello rules were founded in customary law,19 and it is generally agreed 
15 Th ese include India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Malaysia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, 
Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Th ailand, Turkey and the United States: see 
International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘State Parties to the Following International 
Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties’ <www.icrc.org/ihl/%28SPF%29/party_main_
treaties/$File/IHL_and_other_related_ Treaties.pdf> at 19 January 2015.
16 Michael Bothe, ‘Customary International Humanitarian Law: Some Refl ections on the ICRC 
Study’ (2005) 8 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 143, 146. Th e author was, 
in fact, referring to both the 1977 Additional Protocol 1 and Protocol II Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Confl icts, opened for signature 8  June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, 16 ILM 
1442 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (1977 Additional Protocol II).
17 Daniel Bethlehem, ‘Th e methodological framework of the Study’, in Elizabeth Wilmshurst 
and Susan Breau (eds), Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (2007), 3, 6.
18 Dennis Mandsager, ‘Introductory Note to Response of Jean-Marie Henckaerts to the U.S. 
Joint Letter from John Bellinger III, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, and William J. 
Haynes, General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense to Dr. Jakob Kellenberger, President, 
International Committee of the Red Cross, Regarding Customary International Law Study’ 
(2007) 46 International Legal Materials 957, 957.
19 Oonagh E. Fitzgerald, ‘Implementation of International Humanitarian and Related 
International Law in Canada’, in Oonagh E. Fitzgerald (ed), Th e Globalized Rule of Law: 
Relationships between International and Domestic Law (2006), 625, 627.
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that the treaties still do not encompass the full extent of the rules applicable to 
the conduct of armed confl ict. As Judge Koroma has written:20
[t]he relevant treaty law covers a wide variety of aspects of warfare, but treaty law, by 
its very nature, is unable to provide a complete picture of the state of the law
Th is reiterates the observations of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal in 194621 
– admittedly when there were considerably fewer jus in bello treaties in force – 
that:22
[t]he law of war is to be found not only in treaties, but in the customs and practices 
of states which gradually obtained universal recognition, and from the general 
principles of justice applied by jurists and practiced by military courts. Th is law is not 
static, but by continual adaptation follows the needs of a changing world. Indeed, in 
many cases treaties do no more than express and defi ne for more accurate reference 
the principles of law already existing.
Indeed, as noted, the message conveyed by the opening words of the Martens 
clause – ‘[u]ntil a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued 
…’23 – has been repeated in various forms in a number of subsequent jus in 
bello treaties,24 and clearly indicates that the terms of the relevant treaties are 
themselves not to be regarded as completely exhaustive, since the principles 
of the jus in bello continue to evolve. Th is is particularly the case in relation 
20 Abdul G. Koroma, ‘Foreword’, in Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), 
Customary International Humanitarian Law (Volume I: Rules, 2005), xii, xii.
21 International Military Tribunal for the Trial of the German Major War Criminals at 
Nuremberg (Nuremberg Military Tribunal).
22 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals 1 October 
1946, reprinted in (1947) 41 American Journal of International Law 172, 219.
23 See, for example, Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
opened for signature 18  October 1907, 3 Martens (3rd) 461 (entered into force 26  January 
1910) (1907 Hague Convention IV), preamble para 8.
24 See, for example, the 1977 Additional Protocol I, article 1(2) (‘[i]n cases not covered by this 
Protocol or by other international agreements …’), and the Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Eff ects, opened for signature 10 April 1981, 
1342 UNTS 137 (entered into force 2 December 1983) (1981 Certain Conventional Weapons 
Convention), preamble para 5 (‘… in cases not covered by this Convention and its annexed 
Protocols or by other international agreements …’). Both of these provisions make express 
reference to the applicability of the ‘principles of international law derived from established 
custom’. On the other hand, the formulation of the Martens clause in the preamble of the 
1977 Additional Protocol II makes no reference to ‘established custom’ since, at the time it 
was formulated, it was assumed that the practice of States had not yet developed to the point 
where there was a body of customary rules in relation to confl icts not of an international 
nature: Michael Bothe, Karl Josef Partsch and Waldemar A. Solf, New Rules for Victims 
of Armed Confl icts: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 (1982), 620.
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to those armed confl icts that are not of an international nature,25 which now 
constitute the majority of armed confl icts26 and which bear witness to many 
atrocities (even if this has historically not been readily acknowledged).27 As 
noted in previous chapters, there are signifi cantly fewer treaty rules regulating 
these confl icts as compared to international confl icts.28
Indeed, in relation to many non-international armed confl icts, it still remains 
the case that common article  3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions29 remains 
the most signifi cant applicable conventional provision, notwithstanding the 
subsequent conclusion of the 1977 Additional Protocol II. Although common 
article  3 is a very important provision, the rules that it encompasses cannot 
be considered as representing a completely comprehensive framework.30 As a 
consequence, it has been suggested that the ‘most signifi cant contribution’ of 
customary international law in relation to the conduct of armed confl ict relates 
to the regulation of internal armed confl icts,31 where it is seen as fi lling some 
important gaps over and above the scope of common article  3 and the 1977 
Additional Protocol II.32
25 Mandsager, supra note 18, 957.
26 Carl E. Bruch, ‘All’s Not Fair in (Civil) War: Criminal Liability for Environmental Damage in 
Internal Armed Confl ict’ (2001) 25 Vermont Law Review 695, 720 and 749.
27 Mark Findlay, Governing through Globalised Crime: Futures for international criminal justice 
(2008), 198. For example, Henry Stimson, who was involved in the establishment of the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunal, had suggested to President Roosevelt before that Tribunal was 
set up that: ‘I have great diffi  culty in fi nding any means whereby military commissions may 
try and convict those responsible for excesses committed in Germany both before and during 
the war which have no relation to the conduct of war’: quoted in John Hagan, Justice in the 
Balkans: Prosecuting War Crimes in Th e Hague Tribunal (2003), 25.
28 Henckaerts, supra note 14, 178.
29 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into 
force 21 October 1950) (1949 Geneva Convention I), Geneva Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 
opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (1949 
Geneva Convention II), Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (1949 
Geneva Convention III), Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War, opened for signature 12  August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 
21 October 1950) (1949 Geneva Convention IV).
30 Henckaerts, supra note 14, 177–8.
31 Ibid, 189.
32 See International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Response of Jean-Marie Henckaerts to the 
Bellinger/Haynes Comments on Customary International Law Study’ (2007) 46 International 
Legal Materials 959, 965. In any event, the 1977 Additional Protocol II has been described as 
‘notoriously diffi  cult to apply’, since States involved in internal armed confl icts oft en deny its 
relevance to their situation: Mark Freeman and Gibran van Ert, International Human Rights 
Law (2004), 131.
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For example, the 1977 Additional Protocol II does not include a provision 
expressly applying the principle of distinction (discussed below) to non-
international armed confl icts. Th is is to be compared to the 1977 Additional 
Protocol I, in which the principle is included as a conventional norm.33 It is, 
therefore, important to explore any relevant customary international law rule, 
since that will apply to the conduct of States engaged in a non-international 
armed confl ict. In this regard, in 2005, a United Nations Commission of Enquiry 
on Darfur noted that:34
a body of customary rules regulating internal armed confl icts has thus evolved in 
the international community … For example, some States in their military manuals 
for their armed forces clearly have stated that the bulk of international humanitarian 
law also applies to internal confl icts. Other States have taken a similar attitude with 
regard to many rules of international humanitarian law.
Th e relevance of customary international law to the conduct of armed confl ict 
has been affi  rmed on a number of occasions by the International Court of Justice. 
In the Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the 
Court noted that:35
a great many rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed confl ict are so 
fundamental to the respect of the human person and “elementary considerations 
of humanity” … [and] are to be observed by all States whether or not they have 
ratifi ed the conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible 
principles of international customary law
Of relevance also are the observations of the Court in the Legal Consequences 
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Advisory 
Opinion, where, citing the passage quoted above, it expressed the view that:36
these rules [of international humanitarian law] incorporate obligations which are 
essentially of an erga omnes character
33 See 1977 Additional Protocol I, article 48 (discussed below).
34 International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, ‘Report of the International Commission 
of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004’ (25 January 2005), para 159 <www.un.org/News/dh/
sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf> at 20 January 2015.
35 [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 79.
36 [2004] ICJ Rep 136, para 157. In Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited 
(Belgium v. Spain) (Judgment) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, the International Court of Justice (at para 
34) cited obligations that derived from the outlawing of aggression and genocide, as well as 
from the principles and rules ‘concerning the basic rights of the human person’, as examples 
of obligations erga omnes. It has also applied the concept of obligations (and rights) owed 
to the international community as a whole in relation to the right of a ‘peoples’ to self-
determination: East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) [1995] ICJ Rep 90, para 29.
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Th is also refl ects earlier views expressed by the Court regarding the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,37 in relation to 
which it concluded that ‘the rights and obligations enshrined by the Convention 
are rights and obligations erga omnes’.38 A similar observation was made by 
Judge Simma in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, when he noted 
that:39
at least the core of the obligations deriving from the rule of international 
humanitarian and human rights law are valid erga omnes
Yet another reason why it is important to consider any relevant rules of 
customary international law in relation to intentional environmental damage 
during armed confl ict is that customary law may be of assistance in interpreting 
any applicable treaty provisions. Article  31(3)(c) of the VCLT specifi es that, 
when interpreting a treaty in accordance with the fundamental rule set out 
in article  31(1),40 ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relationship between the parties’ shall, ‘together with the context’, also be taken 
into account.41
Th us, just as multilateral treaties ‘may have an important role to play in 
recording and defi ning rules deriving from custom, or indeed developing 
them’,42 when interpreting a jus in bello treaty, the relevant principles of 
37 Opened for signature 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 277 (entered into force 12  January 1951) 
(Genocide Convention).
38 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) (Preliminary Objections, Judgment) [1996] ICJ Rep 
595, para 31.
39 Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep 168, 334, para 39.
40 In Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber 
I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to Appeal, Situation in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04–168, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 13  July 2006, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber of the International Criminal Court, when considering the eff ect of article 31(1) of 
the VCLT, confi rmed (at para 33) that:
 ‘[t]he context of a given legislative provision is defi ned by the particular subsection of the 
law read as a whole in conjunction with the section of an enactment in its entirety. Its objects 
may be gathered from the chapter of the law in which the particular section is included and 
its purposes from the wider aims of the law as may be gathered from its preamble and general 
tenor of the treaty’.
 Th is was expressly adopted by the Appeals Chamber of that Court in Judgment on the Appeal 
Against the Decision on Joinder rendered on 10  March 2008 by the Pre-Trial Chamber in 
the Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui Cases, Th e Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04–01/07, Appeals Chamber, 9 June 
2008, para 5.
41 VCLT, article 31(3)(c).
42 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta) (Judgment) [1985] ICJ Rep 13, para 27.
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customary international law must also be taken into consideration.43 Indeed, 
article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT appears to encompass the full gamut of applicable 
customary international law rules (through the use of the word ‘any’), not 
just those that relate solely to the specifi c content of the relevant treaty being 
interpreted. However, unless otherwise indicated, the discussion in this chapter 
of the relevant rules of customary international law will be confi ned to those 
specifi cally in the area of international humanitarian law.
A norm of customary international law may, in particular circumstances, be 
identical in its terms to a conventional provision.44 Th is may well be the case in 
relation to some of the customary rules that relate to intentional environmental 
destruction during armed confl ict. However, even if this were always the position 
(which it is not), it is still useful to consider these customary rules separately 
from the relevant treaty provisions. Th e applicable treaty and customary rules 
have a diff erent normative base from each other,45 and may ultimately apply in 
varying ways in relation to a particular factual circumstance. In this regard, the 
International Court of Justice has observed that:46
[t]here are a number of reasons for considering that, even if two norms belonging to 
two sources of international law appear identical in content, and even if the States 
in question are bound by these rules both on the level of treaty-law and on that of 
customary international law, these norms retain a separate existence … Rules which 
are identical in treaty law and in customary international law are also distinguishable 
by reference to the methods of interpretation and application
In attempting to set out the relevant customary international law rules, and 
notwithstanding the reasons outlined above as to why this is necessary in order 
to consider the key questions addressed in this book, it must be borne in mind 
that an elaboration of the exact scope of these rules, and indeed even their very 
existence as such – as opposed, for example, to only describing non-binding 
patterns of behaviour or acts done ‘merely for reasons of political expediency’47 
– is sometimes a diffi  cult exercise. Apart from universally accepted and clearly 
established principles of customary international law about which there is 
43 Anthony E. Cassimatis, ‘International Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights 
Law, and Fragmentation of International Law’ (2007) 56 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 623, 634.
44 See, for example, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark 
and Federal Republic of Germany v. Th e Netherlands) (Judgment) [1969] ICJ Rep 3, para 71: 
see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America) (Merits) (Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 177–8.
45 Scobbie, supra note 11, 47.
46 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America) (Merits) (Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 178.
47 Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru) (Judgment) [1950] ICJ Rep 266, 277.
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little doubt, it is oft en not easy to affi  rm with certainty the precise terms and 
scope of a particular customary rule, or indeed whether such a rule exists.48 
As Judge Koroma has noted, customary international law is ‘notorious for its 
imprecision’.49 Erik Koppe has suggested that:50
customary international law is surrounded by mystery and uncertainty and is one of 
the most diffi  cult and intangible topics of international law
One should therefore be cautious before defi nitively asserting that a particular 
rule of customary international law actually exists. Naturally, the terms of 
specifi c rules can be more confi dently asserted on the basis of conclusions 
reached by the International Court of Justice, which are generally to be regarded 
as authoritative, and perhaps also from decisions in other international courts 
and/or tribunals, that a particular customary principle has been established. 
It is harder (although not impossible) to defi nitively substantiate the existence 
of a customary rule of international law in the absence of such a judicial 
pronouncement. Th at said, even where an international (criminal) court does 
conclude that a customary international law rule exists, that may not necessarily 
be universally accepted and might instead be viewed with some scepticism.51
However, drawing on the jurisprudence of, in particular, the International 
Court of Justice, there are several fundamental jus in bello principles that 
48 For example, as noted, in the decision of the High Court of Australia in Polyukhovich v 
Commonwealth and Another (1991) 172 CLR 501, two of the Judges considered the question 
of whether the crime of ‘crimes against humanity’ existed under customary international law 
prior to being ‘introduced’ into article  6(c) of the Charter of the Nuremberg International 
Military Tribunal, annexed to the 1945 London Agreement for the Establishment of an 
International Military Tribunal (8  August 1945) 82 UNTS 279. Th e two Judges came to 
opposite conclusions on this point: see 172 CLR 501, 587–90 (per Justice Brennan) and 664–
77 (per Justice Toohey).
49 Koroma, supra note 20, xii.
50 Koppe, supra note 5, 173.
51 For example, in Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, 
Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, Ayyash et al, Case No. ST-11–01/I, Appeals 
Chamber, 16  February 2011, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
handed down an interlocutory decision in which it concluded inter alia that a ‘customary rule 
of international law has evolved on terrorism in time of peace’, and then proceeded to set 
out the fi rst international judicial defi nition of the crime of terrorism. Th is decision has been 
met with considerable criticism and has attracted controversy, with various commentators 
arguing strongly that this conclusion was incorrect and unsubstantiated; see, for example, 
Elies van Sliedregt and Larissa van den Herik, ‘Introduction: Th e STL Interlocutory Decision 
on the Defi nition of Terrorism – Judicial Ingenuity or Radicalism?’ (2011) 24:3 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 651; Kai Ambos, ‘Judicial Creativity at the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon: Is Th ere a Crime of Terrorism under International Law?’ (2011) 24:3 Leiden Journal 
of International Law 655; Ben Saul, ‘Legislating from a Radical Hague: Th e United Nations 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon Invents an International Crime of Transnational Terrorism’ 
(2011) 24:3 Leiden Journal of International Law 677.
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clearly represent rules of customary international law, notwithstanding that 
there may still be some discussion as to their precise scope.52 Th ese rules 
include what are commonly referred to as the principle of humanity, the 
principle of military necessity, the principle of distinction and the principle of 
proportionality, although they are sometimes categorized in diff erent ways.53 
As a general observation, an analysis of these principles indicates that they only 
serve to protect the natural environment ‘indirectly and inadequately’.54 Th is is 
discussed in more detail below.
In the Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, 
the International Court of Justice described the principle of humanity in the 
following terms:55
it is prohibited to cause unnecessary suff ering to combatants: it is accordingly 
prohibited to use weapons causing them such harm or uselessly aggravating their 
suff ering. In application of [this] principle, States do not have unlimited freedom of 
choice of means in the weapons they use
Th is principle has also been discussed by several commentators.56 Its elements 
are largely refl ected in the terms of the Martens clause and, for the purposes of 
this book, are assumed to fall within the principles of military necessity and 
proportionality. Th e customary international law principles of military necessity, 
distinction and proportionality require a more detailed analysis, which is found 
in the following section.
52 For example, Kenneth Watkin has noted that ‘[t]here may be no other term in international 
humanitarian law … which evokes such debate or controversy as ‘proportionality’’: Kenneth 
Watkin, ‘Assessing Proportionality: Moral Complexity and Legal Rules’ (2005) 8 Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law 3, 4.
53 For example, some descriptions of the principles of international humanitarian law 
combine issues of distinction and military necessity into a broader principle known as 
‘discrimination’. Th is author prefers to diff erentiate between these two so as to emphasize 
the need to distinguish between civilians and combatants without reference to sometimes 
subjective considerations as to what constitutes a military target in the context of military 
necessity.
54 John Alan Cohan, ‘Modes of Warfare and Evolving Standards of Environmental Protection 
under the International Law of War’ (2003) 15 Florida Journal of International Law 481, 491.
55 [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 78.
56 See, for example, Bruch, supra note 26, 702; Rymn James Parsons, ‘Th e Fight to Save the 
Planet: U.S. Armed Forces, “Greenkeeping,” and Enforcement of the Law Pertaining to 
Environmental Protection During Armed Confl ict’ (1998) 10 Georgetown International 
Environmental Law Review 441, 447; Marcos A. Orellana, ‘Criminal Punishment for 
Environmental Damage: Individual and State Responsibility at a Crossroad’ (2005) 
17 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 673, 676–7; Andy Rich, ‘Th e 
Environment: Adequacy of Protection in Times of War’ (2004) 12 Penn State Environmental 
Law Review 445, 448.
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Apart from these fundamental and widely accepted principles, there has also 
been much academic discussion regarding the (possible) development of other 
customary rules within the scope of the jus in bello. An important research 
project was undertaken by the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), culminating in the publication in 2005 of the ‘Study on Customary 
International Humanitarian Law’ (ICRC Study).57
Th e ICRC Study listed 161 separate customary rules of international 
humanitarian law, of which 147 are stated as being applicable in both 
international and non-international armed confl icts.58 Among the rules set 
out in the ICRC Study are a number that relate specifi cally to ‘Th e Natural 
Environment’.59
3.2. FUNDAMENTAL CUSTOMARY RULES OF THE 
JUS IN BELLO
Bearing in mind the complexities involved in defi nitively determining the 
terms of specifi c customary rules, this chapter will now consider the scope of 
the widely accepted jus in bello rules of customary international law, and their 
(possible) relevance to the intentional destruction of the environment during 
armed confl ict. Th ese principles are generally founded upon the proposition 
noted above, that ‘the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy 
is not unlimited’.60
As mentioned, it is proposed to examine the three major customary international 
humanitarian law rules; the principles of military necessity, distinction and 
proportionality.
57 Th e study was published in two Volumes: Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck 
(eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law (Volume I: Rules, 2005) and Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law 
(Volume II: Practice (2 Parts), 2005).
58 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Custom as a Source of International 
Humanitarian Law’ (14  September 2007) <www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/
customary-law-publication-140907> at 19 January 2015.
59 ICRC Study, Chapter 14. Th ree specifi c rules of customary law are identifi ed: ICRC Study, 
Rules 43–45. Th ese are discussed later in this chapter.
60 Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV, article  22. See Anthony Leibler, 
‘Deliberate Wartime Environmental Damage: New Challenges for International Law’ (1992) 
23 California Western International Law Journal 67, 97–8.
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3.2.1. PRINCIPLE OF MILITARY NECESSITY61
Military necessity has long been regarded as a fundamental element of the jus in 
bello rules.62 It was included in the Lieber Code,63 the fi rst formal text of rules 
applicable to the conduct of warfare, in the following terms:64
[m]ilitary necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, consists in the 
necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of war, and 
which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war
Th e identifi cation of the principle of military necessity has been described as 
the ‘greatest theoretical contribution to the modern law of war’ made by the 
Lieber Code.65 Th e Lieber Code also provided that the requirements of military 
necessity prohibited ‘the wanton destruction of a district’.66 However, as noted, 
even though the Lieber Code expressly applied to the conduct of the Union 
soldiers during the American Civil War, there is little evidence to suggest that 
the ‘total warfare’ strategies of Union Generals Ulysses S. Grant, William T. 
Sherman and Phillip Sheridan were ever punished.67
Th e principle of military necessity was also expressly recognized in a codifi ed 
version of the laws of armed confl ict published in 1987 under the auspices of 
the ICRC.68 It has traditionally been regarded as the ‘dominant’ customary 
international law rule relating to the jus in bello.69 Historically, it has 
been invoked to justify from a legal perspective – and thus eliminate legal 
responsibility – actions committed during warfare that might otherwise have 
been regarded as violating important humanitarian standards.70
61 Expressions such as ‘necessity of military operations’, ‘military exigencies, motives and 
reasons’, ‘reasons of war’, and ‘security reasons’ have been categorized as synonyms of 
‘military necessity’: Pietro Verri, Dictionary of the International Law of Armed Confl ict 
(translated from French into English by Edward Markee and Susan Mutti) (1992), 75.
62 Mark A. Drumbl, ‘Waging War against the World: Th e Need to Move from War Crimes 
to Environmental Crimes’, in Jay E. Austin and Carl E. Bruch (eds), Th e Environmental 
Consequences of War: Legal, Economic, and Scientifi c Perspectives (2000), 620, 628.
63 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, promulgated as 
General Orders No.100, 24 April 1863 (Lieber Code). See also chapter 2.
64 Ibid, article 14.
65 Burrus M. Carnahan, ‘Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: Th e Origins and Limits of the 
Principle of Military Necessity’ (1998) 92 American Journal of International Law 213, 213.
66 Lieber Code, article 16.
67 See Bruch, supra note 26, 695–7.
68 Frederic de Mulinen, Handbook on the Law of War for the Armed Forces (1987), 82–3.
69 Orellana, supra note 56, 677.
70 Mark A. Drumbl, ‘International Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law, and 
Environmental Security: Can the International Criminal Court Bridge the Gaps?’ (2000) 6 
ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 305, 319.
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Prior to World War I, for example, Germany had developed a doctrine of 
warfare known as Kriegsraison geht vor Kriegsmanier (‘military necessity comes 
before military conduct’), by which any rule of international humanitarian law 
was ‘outweighed’ by considerations of military necessity71 although, even at 
that time, its legality was questioned.72 Th is doctrine was applied by German 
military forces during the Second World War, but was subsequently rejected by 
the United States Military Tribunals in Nuremberg in the Krupp case, when it 
concluded that:73
these rules and customs of warfare are designed specifi cally for all phases of war … 
To claim that they can be wantonly – and at the sole discretion of any one belligerent 
– disregarded when he considers his own situation to be critical, means nothing more 
or less than to abrogate the laws and customs of war entirely
Th e foundation of this rule stemmed from the requirement that all acts of force 
employed in the context of armed confl ict must, as a minimum, be necessary 
from a military perspective.74 Without further qualifi cation, this might suggest 
that any act that carries with it some perception of military advantage might 
be permitted, regardless of the context and consequences of such action. Th is 
conception of military necessity ignores the fact that the principle operates as 
a ‘critical component’ within the jus in bello rules, rather than as an external 
element.75
In light of the disastrous consequences that could possibly fl ow from adopting 
too broad a view of what might be permissible, the jus in bello rules developed 
further qualifi cations as to what was required in order to comply with this 
principle. It is now the case that a proper application of the concept of military 
necessity also requires a consideration of other issues, which are then to be 
weighed against the military advantage. Th us, although military necessity is 
a crucial element in determining the permissible application of force during 
armed confl ict:76
71 Craig J.S. Forrest, ‘Th e Doctrine of Military Necessity and the Protection of Cultural 
Property During Armed Confl icts’ (2007) 37 California Western International Law Journal 
177, 186.
72 See, for example, Jesse S Reeves, ‘Th e Neutralization of Belgium and the Doctrine of 
Kriegsraison’ (1915) 13:3 Michigan Law Review 179.
73 United States. v. Krupp and Others (Judgment), United States Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 
(1949) X War Crimes Reports 69, quoted in Karen Hulme, War Torn Environment: 
Interpreting the Legal Th reshold (2004), 130.
74 Leibler, supra note 60, 98.
75 Peter J. Richards and Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Mars Meets Mother Nature: Protecting the 
Environment During Armed Confl ict’ (1999) 28 Stetson Law Review 1047, 1077.
76 Michael A. Newton, Symposium, ‘Modern Military Necessity: Th e Role and Relevance of 
Military Lawyers’ (2007) 12 Roger Williams University Law Review 877, 880 (emphasis added).
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it cannot [now] concurrently serve as a convenient rationale for any level of 
unrestrained violence in the midst of an operation
Th is ‘tension’ between military necessity and restraint on the part of combatants 
has been described by Th eodor Meron as ‘the hallmark’ of international 
humanitarian law.77 Th e evolution of this principle was described in another 
case before the United States Military Tribunal in Nuremberg in the following 
way:78
[m]ilitary necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply any 
amount and kind of force to compel the complete submission of the enemy with the 
least possible expenditure of time, life and money. In general, it sanctions measures 
by an occupant necessary to protect the safety of his forces and to facilitate the 
success of his operations. It permits the destruction of life of armed enemies and 
other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable by the armed confl icts of 
the war … Th e destruction of property to be lawful must be imperatively demanded 
by the necessities of war. Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of international 
law. Th ere must be some reasonable connection between the destruction of property 
and the overcoming of the enemy forces
As a result, the customary rule that has emerged establishes a link between 
the overcoming of an enemy by the use of force, and the level of casualties and 
destruction (which may include environmental destruction) that is a direct 
consequence of such actions. Th e two issues must be considered concurrently.79 
A proper application of the principle requires a balance between the need to 
achieve a military victory, and the broad concepts of humanity and the limits 
on warfare, and thus it is intended to restrict ‘unbridled barbarity’.80 In this 
regard, military necessity is no longer considered as an ‘authorization’ of actions 
that would otherwise be a violation of the jus in bello; rather it is intended to 
serve from the opposite perspective – as a ‘protection’ against excessive military 
force.81
Viewed from this perspective, the rule prohibits acts during armed confl ict 
that are unnecessary to achieve a military advantage; however, where the 
act is militarily necessary, ‘collateral’ damage is permitted to the extent that 
77 Th eodor Meron, ‘Th e Humanization of Humanitarian Law’ (2000) 94 American Journal of 
International Law 239, 243.
78 Trial of William List and Others (Th e Hostages Trial) (Judgment), United States Military 
Tribunal, Nuremberg, (1949) VIII Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Case No. 47, 66.
79 Jackson Maogoto and Steven Freeland, ‘Th e Final Frontier: Th e Laws of Armed Confl ict and 
Space Warfare’ (2007) 23:1 Connecticut Journal of International Law 165, 176.
80 Forrest, supra note 71, 181.
81 Betsy Baker, ‘Legal Protections for the Environment in Times of Armed Confl ict’ (1993) 33 
Virginia Journal of International Law 351, 360.
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the prevailing military circumstances so require.82 Th is is also refl ected in 
article 51 of the 1977 Additional Protocol 1, which elaborates on the principle of 
proportionality discussed below.
In Strugar, Trial Chamber II of the ICTY considered that the concept of military 
necessity:83
may be usefully defi ned for present purposes with reference to the widely 
acknowledged defi nition of military objectives in Article 52 of Additional Protocol 
I as “those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an eff ective 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or 
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, off ers a defi nite military 
advantage”
In the same paragraph, the Trial Chamber confi rmed that, when there is a 
legitimate military objective, the question of proportionality becomes relevant in 
determining military necessity.
Despite the qualifi cations imposed by this customary rule in relation to when 
and how force may be employed during armed confl ict, there is still uncertainty 
as to the precise level of military advantage necessary to justify (from a legal 
perspective) such an act. Historically, the balancing test between military 
advantage and environmental concerns has been ‘stacked heavily against the 
environment’.84 It has, for example, been argued that the use of atomic devices 
in Japan during the Second World War was a military necessity – as a means of 
shortening the war,85 notwithstanding the massive environmental devastation 
and loss of life caused86 – although of course there remains strong disagreement 
on this issue.87 In this regard, the principle of military necessity has been 
82 Tara Weinstein, ‘Prosecuting Attacks that Destroy the Environment: Environmental Crimes 
or Humanitarian Atrocities?’ (2005) 17 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 
697, 703.
83 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Pavel Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Trial Chamber II, 31  January 
2005, para 295.
84 Peter Sharp, ‘Prospects for Environmental Liability in the International Criminal Court’ 
(1999) 18 Virginia Environmental Law Journal 217, 241.
85 See Leibler, supra note 60, 98 and the corresponding footnote.
86 On 6  August 1945, the crew of the Enola Gay dropped an atomic device, nick-named 
‘Little Boy’, over the city of Hiroshima. Th ree days later, Bock’s Car dropped ‘Fat Man’ over 
Nagasaki. Th e Japanese Armies surrendered on 14  August 1945. It was estimated that, by 
the end of 1945, approximately 140,000 people died in Hiroshima and a similar number in 
Nagasaki, as a direct result of the atomic explosions: Koppe, supra note 5, 31–2. Many further 
deaths were reported in the years following the end of the war.
87 Richards and Schmitt, supra note 75, 1052. In December 1963, the Tokyo District Court, 
referring to the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land (1907 Hague IV Regulations), and the Geneva Protocol for 
the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases, and of 
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criticised for prohibiting ‘only that which the most powerful do not fi nd militarily 
useful or expedient’.88 Richard Falk has made this point in even starker terms:89
what dominant states fi nd militarily useful in war is unlikely to be prohibited, and, if 
it is, the prohibition is unlikely to be respected in the next war
It is diffi  cult to form a conclusive view as to the accuracy of this assertion. It is, 
however, probably the case that the ‘malleability’ of the principle of necessity is, 
somewhat ironically, an important reason why it has been widely recognised as 
representing customary international law.90
Th e rule does establish an obligation on a belligerent to specify the imperative 
military advantage intended to be gained by a particular act.91 Th is would 
normally require the identifi cation of a connection between the use of force and 
the suppression of the enemy’s military capability. However, one’s perception of 
what is ‘necessary’ in the context of armed confl ict will, of course, depend on 
the particular point of view and values of the person making that judgment. As 
a general observation, it might be expected that a military commander, whose 
principal responsibility would typically be to maximise the military advantage to 
be gained from any specifi c action, may have a diff erent – perhaps less ‘rigorous’ 
– threshold than a civilian as to what acts are necessary in order to achieve that 
goal. Whilst this might not always be the case, these diff ering perspectives are 
illustrated by comments made by a former military lawyer, who has opined 
that:92
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, opened for signature 17  June 1925, 26 Martens (3rd) 
643 (entered into force 8  February 1928), concluded that ‘an aerial bombardment with an 
atomic bomb on both cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was an illegal act of hostility as 
the indiscriminate aerial bombardment on undefended cities’: (1964) 8 Japanese Annual 
of International Law 212, quoted in Yves Beigbeder, Judging War Criminals: Th e Politics of 
International Justice (1999), 69. Th is represents one of the very few express statements by a 
court of law that the use of these bombs violated fundamental principles of international 
law: Nina H.B. Jørgensen, Th e Responsibility of States for International Crimes (2000), 229. 
An action brought by Japanese citizens alleging that the use of atomic weapons against 
Japan constituted a war crime was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Japan on technical 
jurisdictional grounds: see M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Introduction to the Symposium: Th e 
Normative Framework of International Humanitarian Law: Overlaps, Gaps and Ambiguities’ 
(1998) 8 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 199, footnotes 136 and 137.
88 Parsons, supra note 56, 447.
89 Richard Falk, ‘Th e Environmental Law of War: An Introduction’, in Glen Plant (ed), 
Environmental Protection and the Law of War: A “Fift h Geneva” Convention on the 
Environment in Time of Armed Confl ict (1992), 78, 80.
90 Parsons, supra note 56, 448.
91 See Verri, supra note 61, 75.
92 Colonel James P. Terry, ‘Th e Environment and the Laws of War: Th e Impact of Desert Storm’ 
(1992) 45 Naval War College Review 61, 102, quoting (and endorsing) the comments made by 
another military commentator, Colonel Harry Summers.
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[j]ust as the military needs to be aware of political, economic and social issues, so our 
civilian leadership must be aware of the imperatives of military operations
Moreover, the conduct of warfare is oft en undertaken without full knowledge 
of the capacities of the enemy. In addition, the perspective of the combatant 
undertaking the relevant action as to what is necessary will oft en diff er from that 
of the opposing party.93 Th e United States Military Tribunal in Nuremberg has 
observed that:94
[t]he course of a military operation by the enemy is loaded with uncertainties, such as 
the numerical strength of the enemy, the quality of his equipment, his fi ghting spirit, 
the effi  ciency and daring of his commanders, and the uncertainty of his intentions
Th is is relevant to the application of the customary rule, since a determination 
of whether an action is militarily necessary is to be made on a ‘subjective’ basis 
– that is, based on the circumstances as determined by the relevant military 
commander at the time – even where those acts may, in hindsight, be shown to 
have been unnecessary. A ‘reasonableness’ standard is to be applied; however, 
this generally relates to whether the actions of the relevant military commander 
were reasonable, not to a more standardised conception of what might be 
reasonable.
Th ese issues were highlighted in the Rendulic case,95 described as ‘a classic 
example of the operation of military necessity as a defense to environmental 
crimes’.96 Th e United States Military Tribunal hearing the case concluded that 
‘[t]he destructions of public and private property by retreating military forces 
which would give aid and comfort to the enemy’97 may be acceptable under 
the ‘necessities of war’ exception in article 23(g) of the 1907 Hague Convention 
IV. Th is was so, notwithstanding that the Tribunal had concluded that, in all 
likelihood, there was no military necessity for the acts of the defendant, which 
had resulted in widespread environmental destruction. Rendulic was acquitted 
on the specifi c charges relating to the environmental destruction,98 principally 
93 Yoram Dinstein, Th e Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Confl ict 
(2004), 86.
94 Trial of William List and Others (Th e Hostages Trial) (Judgment), United States Military 
Tribunal, Nuremberg, (1949) VIII Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Case No. 47, 69.
95 Id.
96 Drumbl, supra note 70, footnote 25.
97 Trial of William List and Others (Th e Hostages Trial) (Judgment), United States Military 
Tribunal, Nuremberg, (1949) VIII Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Case No. 47, 69.
98 He was, however, found guilty of a number of other serious crimes not related to his acts of 
environmental destruction and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, which was subsequently 
reduced to 10 years. He was released from prison in February 1951 and died in Austria in 
1971.
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because his actions were ‘justifi ed’ under the circumstances at the time they 
were undertaken.99
Th is appears to also refl ect the terms of the customary rule of military necessity 
today. Questions of military necessity (and proportionality) are to be considered 
in light of a reasonable interpretation of prevailing circumstances at the time.100 
As a consequence, if the principle is applied to intentional environmental 
damage during armed confl ict, these subjective factors would, in most cases 
outweigh concerns about such damage,101 and thus render lawful what might 
otherwise be regarded as unacceptable destruction.
Such actions may therefore be lawful within the scope of the rule if it was 
reasonable for the military commander to believe that they were necessary.102 
In this regard, it has been suggested that the ‘justifi cation’ of military necessity 
has been ‘overused’ as a (legal) reason to excuse environmental damage,103 thus 
providing belligerents with a ‘means to suspend the laws of armed confl ict’.104
On the other hand, some commentators believe that the development of broad 
principles of international environmental law has ‘signifi cantly qualifi ed’ the 
application of the customary international law rules of military necessity and 
proportionality.105 While, as discussed in chapter 2, the general eff ectiveness 
of international environmental law (treaties) during periods of armed confl ict 
is questionable, and it is therefore diffi  cult to specify the precise extent of this 
development in practice, the International Court of Justice has, as noted in 
99 Th e United States Military Tribunal in Nuremberg concluded:
 ‘[t]here is evidence in the record that there was no military necessity for this destruction and 
devastation. An examination of the facts in retrospect can well sustain this conclusion. But 
we are obliged to judge the situation as it appeared to the defendant at the time. If the facts 
were such as would justify the action by the exercise of judgment, aft er giving consideration 
to all the factors and existing possibilities, even though the conclusion reached may have been 
faulty, it cannot be said to be criminal. Aft er giving careful consideration to all the evidence 
on the subject, we are convinced that the defendant cannot be held criminally responsible 
although when viewed in retrospect, the danger did not actually exist’: Trial of William List 
and Others (Th e Hostages Trial) (Judgment), United States Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 
(1949) VIII Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Case No. 47, 68–9 (emphasis added).
100 Terry, supra note 92, 91.
101 See Baker, supra note 81, 361 and the corresponding footnote.
102 See Weinstein, supra note 82, 703 and the references in the corresponding footnote.
103 Parsons, supra note 56, 448.
104 Ensign Florencio J. Yuzon, ‘Deliberate Environmental Modifi cation Th rough the Use of 
Chemical and Biological Weapons: “Greening” the Environmental Laws of Armed Confl ict 
to Establish an Environmentally Protective Regime’ (1996) 11 American University Journal of 
International Law and Policy 793, 812.
105 See, for example, Orellana, supra note 56, 677.
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chapter 1, indicated that environmental considerations must be taken into 
account when assessing issues of necessity and proportionality.106
As noted, there has been a growing tendency for provisions relating to the 
environment to be included in the military manuals of a number of countries,107 
thus refl ecting an increasing awareness of the need to take account of the 
possibility of environmental destruction during armed confl ict. Enhanced 
training programs and more sophisticated education of military units, such in 
the United States, are now being undertaken in relation to the environmental 
eff ects of preparing for war.108 As Betsy Baker has (perhaps optimistically) 
noted, ‘the mere fact that these restrictions exist is evidence that the defi nition of 
military necessity is changing’.109
Nevertheless, as noted, the concept of military necessity – and the underlying 
assumption that military considerations should, in general, be a predominant 
consideration – remains an important cornerstone of the laws of armed 
confl ict. Various signifi cant jus in bello treaty provisions make specifi c 
reference to military necessity, including the principles codifi ed in the 1907 
Hague Convention IV – which the United States Military Tribunal described 
as ‘mandatory provisions of International Law’110 – and also in others such as 
the 1949 Geneva Convention IV,111 the 1954 Hague Convention,112 the 1977 
Additional Protocol I,113 and Protocol III to the 1981 Certain Conventional 
Weapons Convention.114
106 Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 
30.
107 Th is has been particularly the case in Europe, the United States, Australia, and for NATO 
forces generally: Carl Bruch, ‘Closing Remarks’, Symposium, ‘Th e International Responses to 
the Environmental Impacts of War’ (2005) 17 Georgetown International Environmental Law 
Review 565, 644.
108 Nancye L. Bethurem, ‘Environmental Destruction in the Name of National Security: Will 
the Old Paradigm Return in the Wake of September 11?’ (2002) 8 Hastings West-Northwest 
Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 109, 112–7.
109 Baker, supra note 81, 362.
110 Trial of William List and Others (Th e Hostages Trial) (Judgment), United States Military 
Tribunal, Nuremberg, (1949) VIII Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Case No. 47, 69.
111 1949 Geneva Convention IV, article 53.
112 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Confl ict, 
opened for signature 14 May 1954, 249 UNTS 240 (entered into force 7 August 1956) (1954 
Hague Convention), article 2.
113 1977 Additional Protocol I, article 54.
114 Protocol III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons to the 
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Eff ects, opened 
for signature 10 April 1981, 1342 UNTS 137 (entered into force 2 December 1983) (Protocol 
III to the 1981 Certain Conventional Weapons Convention), article 2(4).
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Th is serves to reinforce the importance of military necessity as a relevant 
consideration as to what may be lawful in the context of armed confl ict. Whilst 
this might seem logical to some, it has even been suggested that, in certain 
circumstances, military necessity may be used as a justifi cation for acts that 
would otherwise violate a jus in bello treaty, even where this possibility is not 
mentioned in the text itself,115 although others have dismissed this assertion.116
In relation to the issue of environmental damage during armed confl ict, it thus 
remains the case that military necessity is a highly relevant factor. Drawing upon 
‘existing international legal obligations and from State practice concerning the 
protection of the environment against the eff ects of armed confl ict’,117 the ICRC 
draft  ‘Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the 
Environment in Times of Armed Confl ict’, which provides a model for national 
military manuals,118 provides that:119
(8) Destruction of the environment not justifi ed by military necessity violates 
international humanitarian law …
(9) Th e general prohibition to destroy civilian objects, unless such destruction is 
justifi ed by military necessity, also protects the environment
Th is also refl ects the view expressed in 1992 by the United Nations General 
Assembly, when it stressed that:120
destruction of the environment, not justifi ed by military necessity and carried out 
wantonly, is clearly contrary to existing international law
Th e 1990s proposal to establish a ‘Fift h Geneva’ Convention on the Protection 
of the Environment in Time of Armed Confl ict encompassed the suggestion 
that, in certain circumstances, military necessity was not to be regarded as a 
115 Forrest, supra note 71, 192–3.
116 Dinstein, supra note 93, 18–9.
117 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions 
on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Confl ict’ (ICRC Environment 
Guidelines), article I(1), (1995) <www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jn38.
htm> at 19 January 2015. See also Hans-Peter Gasser, ‘Guidelines for Military Manuals and 
Instructions on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Confl ict’ (1996) 311 
International Review of the Red Cross 230, appendix.
118 Aurelie Lopez, ‘Criminal Liability for Environmental Damage Occurring in Times of Non-
International Armed Confl ict: Rights and Remedies’ (2007) 18 Fordham Environmental Law 
Review 231, 251.
119 ICRC Environmental Guidelines, articles III(8) and III(9) (emphasis added).
120 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/37 (25  November 1992) UN Doc A/
RES/47/37 on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Confl ict, preamble para 
5.
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justifi cation for the destruction of the environment.121 As noted, this proposal 
did not receive widespread support at the time.
Th e relevance of military necessity within the jus in bello rules involving the 
destruction of property is also refl ected in some of the comparable international 
criminal law treaty provisions. Th ese instruments embody several principles 
of international humanitarian law,122 and represent important enforcement 
mechanisms.123 Th is has seen a ‘shift  [of] some state-to-state aspects of 
international humanitarian law to individual criminal responsibility’.124 In 
addition, the customary jus in bello principles also represent a ‘source’ of law for 
international criminal law, in particular as it is to be interpreted by the ICC. Th e 
Rome Statute provides that the Court shall apply:125
… where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international 
law, including the established principles of the international law of armed confl ict
Article  8(2)(a) of the Rome Statute incorporates ‘[g]rave breaches’ of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions within the defi nition of ‘war crimes’. Mirroring the 
wording from the 1949 Geneva Conventions,126 article  8(2)(a)(iv) of the Rome 
Statute defi nes one war crime as:127
[e]xtensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justifi ed by military 
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly
In similar vein, article 3(b) of the ICTY Statute provides that a violation of the 
laws or customs of war includes ‘wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, 
or devastation not justifi ed by military necessity’.128
121 Nicholas G. Alexander, ‘Notes and Comments: Airstrikes and Environmental Damage: Can 
the United States be Held Liable for Operation Allied Force?’ (2000) 11 Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental Law and Policy 471, 491–2.
122 Elaina I. Kalivretakis, ‘Are Nuclear Weapons Above the Law? A Look at the International 
Criminal Court and the Prohibited Weapons Category’ (2001) 15 Emory International Law 
Review 683, 688.
123 Karima Bennoune, ‘Do We Need International Law to Protect Women in Armed Confl ict?’ 
(2006–2007) 38 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 363, 364.
124 Meron, supra note 77, 243.
125 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17  July 1998, 2187 
UNTS 3; 37 ILM 999 (entered into force 1 July 2002) (Rome Statute), article 21(1)(b).
126 See 1949 Geneva Convention I, article 50; 1949 Geneva Convention II, article 51; 1949 Geneva 
Convention IV, article 147.
127 Rome Statute, article 8(2)(a)(iv) (emphasis added).
128 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991, 32 ILM 1159 (entered into force 25  May 1993) (ICTY Statute), 
article 3(b) (emphasis added).
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As noted in previous chapters, article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute defi nes a 
war crime arising from particular actions that cause ‘widespread, long-term and 
severe damage to the natural environment’. Th e defi nition expressly provides 
that the ‘direct overall military advantage anticipated’ by the attack is a relevant 
consideration in determining whether the provision has been violated.129 It 
is unclear as to how ‘direct’ the military advantage must be in order to be 
‘necessary’.130 Th ere is also disagreement as to how widely the notion of ‘military 
advantage’ might extend. Some commentators suggest that it is very broad and 
is ‘not necessarily restricted to tactical gains’.131 Others have suggested that 
the concept of military advantage may not as expansive as military necessity.132
Irrespective of (or perhaps due to) the uncertainties that the concept of military 
advantage introduces, its inclusion in article  8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute 
gives rise to a number of similar concerns as those raised by notions of military 
necessity, and refl ects the fact that, as indicated in the preparatory works of the 
Rome Statute, the protection of the environment was regarded as a ‘consideration 
secondary to military objectives’.133
3.2.2. PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION134
In the Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the 
International Court of Justice stated that one of the ‘cardinal principles’ of the 
jus in bello rules involves:135
129 Rome Statute, article  8(2)(b)(iv). Th e provision also introduces a ‘proportionality’ test, by 
requiring that the environmental damage be ‘clearly excessive’ in relation to the military 
advantage: Drumbl, supra note 62, 629. Th e principle of proportionality is discussed later in 
this chapter and article 8(2)(b)(iv) is analyzed in detail in chapter 4.
130 Richards and Schmitt, supra note 75, 1076.
131 See, for example, Dinstein, supra note 93, 86.
132 See, for example, Drumbl, supra note 62, 629.
133 Orellana, supra note 56, 694.
134 As with military necessity, some commentators have used diff erent names to describe 
the principle of distinction. Michael Schmitt, for example, describes the principle as 
‘discrimination’, which he suggests includes three components: distinction, minimizing 
collateral damage and incidental injury, and proportionality: Michael N. Schmitt, 
‘Humanitarian Law and the Environment’ (2000) 28 Denver Journal of International Law and 
Policy 265, 311–2. Aurelie Lopez appears to use the word ‘discrimination’ as a synonym of 
‘distinction’, as it is referred to in this chapter: Lopez, supra note 118, 247–8. Th e customary 
international law principles as described in this chapter encompass all of these concepts and, 
particularly because there is also considerable overlap between the underlying rationale 
for each, it is felt that they are all adequately covered within the framework used here, 
notwithstanding that there is some variation as to how these concepts may be classifi ed.
135 [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 78.
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the protection of the civilian population and civilian objects and establishes the 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants; States must never make 
civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are 
incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets
Th is statement refl ects in general terms the customary international law 
principle of distinction, which is another fundamental norm of international 
humanitarian law. Its importance, particular in relation to the protection of 
civilians and civilian objects, is underscored by the assertion of Kristin Dorman 
that:136
[i]n combat situations, the entire body of international humanitarian law can be 
reduced to the obligation to observe the principle of distinction
While this probably underestimates the importance of the other fundamental 
customary principles of international humanitarian law discussed in this 
chapter, it does highlight the essential need for all belligerents to ensure that 
only non-civilian targets (and persons) are attacked. In 1969, the United Nations 
General Assembly affi  rmed that:137
(a) … the right of the parties to a confl ict to adopt means of injuring the enemy is 
not unlimited;
(b) … it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian populations as such;
(c) … distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in the 
hostilities and members of the civilian population to the eff ect that the latter be 
spared as much as possible
Th ese principles were recognised at the time as refl ecting customary 
international law.138 In Galic, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY, when referring to 
article 52(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I (see below), and citing the dicta 
of the International Court of Justice quoted above, described the customary 
principle of distinction in the following terms:139
the provision in question explicitly confi rms the customary rule that civilians must 
enjoy general protection against the danger arising from hostilities. Th e prohibition 
against attacking civilians stems from a fundamental principle of international 
136 Kristin Dorman, ‘Proportionality and Distinction in the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia’ (2005) 12 Australian International Law Journal 83, 84.
137 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2444 (XXIII) (19 December 1968) UN Doc A/
RES/2444(XXIII) on the Respect for Human Rights in Armed Confl icts, para 1.
138 Royal Swedish Ministry for Foreign Aff airs, ‘Conventional Weapons, their Deployment 
and Eff ects from a Humanitarian Aspect: Recommendations for the Modernization of 
International Law’ (1973), 18.
139 Judgement and Opinion, Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber I, 
5 December 2003, para 45 (emphasis in original).
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humanitarian law, the principle of distinction, which obliges warring parties to 
distinguish at all times between the civilian population and combatants and between 
civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly to direct their operations 
only against military objectives
Th e principle of distinction interacts with the principle of military necessity, 
which prescribes those measures that are appropriate to overpower the enemy. 
Attackers must iden tify the prospective target in advance of the attack as one 
that is militarily legitimate, since attacks not directed at a legitimate military 
target are prohibited. In undertaking this assessment, attackers must distinguish 
between civilians and civilian objects on the one hand, and military objectives 
(combatants or objects) on the other, and also only use weapons capable of 
distinguishing between them.
In relation to weapons that are incapable of discriminating between legitimate 
military targets and civilians and civilian objects, which would include 
certain methods and means of armed confl ict that are capable of signifi cant 
environmental damage (such as biological weapons, chemical weapons and the 
use of environmental modifi cation), some specifi c prohibitions exist under the 
relevant jus in bello treaties discussed in chapter 2.140
With respect to the protection of civilians and civilian objects from attack, 
the principle of distinction requires that attacks can only be directed towards 
military objectives. Th e term ‘military objectives’ was fi rst introduced in the 
non-binding 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare, which specifi ed that:141
[a]n air bombardment is legitimate only when is directed against a military objective, 
i.e. an objective whereof the total or partial destruction would constitute an obvious 
military advantage for the belligerent
Th e expression has subsequently been defi ned in article  52(2) of the 1977 
Additional Protocol I in the following terms:142
140 See, for example, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction, 
opened for signature 10 April 1972, 1015 UNTS 163 (entered into force 26 March 1975) (1972 
Biological Weapons Convention); Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use 
of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to 
Have Indiscriminate Eff ects, opened for signature 10  April 1981, 1342 UNTS 137 (entered 
into force 2 December 1983); Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Th eir Destruction, opened for signature 
13  January 1993, 32 ILM 800 (entered into force 29  April 1997) (1993 Chemical Weapons 
Convention).
141 Rules concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare, draft ed 
by a Commission of Jurists at Th e Hague, December 1922 – February 1923, article 24(1).
142 1977 Additional Protocol I, article 52(2).
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[a]ttacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are 
concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, 
location, purpose or use make an eff ective contribution to military action and whose 
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at 
the time, off ers a defi nite military of advantage
Th is defi nition of the principle of distinction has been repeated in several 
subsequent jus in bello treaties,143 and is regarded by many commentators as 
representing customary international law.144 Civilian objects are regarded as all 
objects that are not military objectives.145 What is unusual about this is that the 
defi nition of civilians and civilian objects follows a ‘negative approach’,146 in that 
it is expressed in terms of what they are not. Th is formula has been criticized as 
‘vague, nebulous, and highly subjective’.147 Indeed, it has been suggested that, as 
a result of the approach taken in article 52(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 
restrictions imposed by the jus in bello in relation to incidental loss of civilian 
life are ‘probably [made] derogable in the case of military necessity’.148
On the other hand, some commentators contend that this negative approach 
has the advantage of ensuring that there is ‘no undistributed middle between 
the categories of combatants (or military objectives) and civilians (or civilian 
objects)’.149
143 Th ese include Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps 
and Other Devices to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Eff ects, opened for signature 10  April 1981, 1342 UNTS 137 (entered into 
force 2 December 1983) (Protocol II to the 1981 Certain Conventional Weapons Convention), 
article 2(4); Protocol III to the 1981 Certain Conventional Weapons Convention, article 1(3); 
Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Confl ict, opened for signature 26 March 1999, 38 ILM 769 (entered into 
force 9 March 2004), article 1(f).
144 See, for example, Dinstein, supra note 93, 83 and the corresponding footnote.
145 1977 Additional Protocol I, article  52(1); Protocol II to the 1981 Certain Conventional 
Weapons Convention, article 2(5).
146 Dinstein, supra note 93, 114.
147 See Dorman, supra note 136, 88 and the corresponding footnotes.
148 Timothy J. Heverin, ‘Case Comment: Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: 
Environmental and Humanitarian Limits on Self-Defense’ (1997) 72 Notre Dame Law Review 
1277, 1300. Th at author does, however, indicate that this is not always the case, referring to 
the terms of article 57(5) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, which deals with ‘Precautions in 
Attack’ and provides that ‘[n]o provision of this Article may be construed as authorizing any 
attacks against the civilian population, civilians or civilian objects’.
149 See, for example, Dinstein, supra note 93, 114 and the corresponding footnote. However, 
at the same time, that author (at 84) agrees that the ‘abstract character’ of the defi nition of 
military objectives in article 52(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I gives rise to ‘divergent 
interpretations’.
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Despite ongoing improvement in general weapons systems accuracy, compliance 
with the principle of distinction has become increasingly complicated. Th e 
changing nature of armed confl ict means that the lines between lawful targets 
and protected objects may become increasingly blurred, as might the distinction 
between civilians and combatants, due primarily to the growing involvement 
of civilians and civilian activities in armed confl icts.150 Since civilians can 
sometimes play a direct part in hostilities, it is perhaps now more accurate to 
state that the customary principle of distinction requires a diff erentiation to be 
made between ‘combatants, legal or otherwise,151 and those civilians who do not 
take a direct part in hostilities’.152
Th e principle of distinction was initially articulated in the St. Petersburg 
Declaration of 1868 in the following terms:153
the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is 
to weaken the military forces of the enemy
It was subsequently incorporated into a number of the jus in bello instruments,154 
as well as United Nations General Assembly Resolutions.155 More recently, the 
principle was affi  rmed in the 1977 Additional Protocol as follows:156
[i]n order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and between 
civilian objects, the Parties to the confl ict shall at all times distinguish between the 
civilian population and combatants and civilian objects and military objectives and 
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives
150 Maogoto and Freeland, supra note 79, 178.
151 Unlawful combatants may not be entitled to all of the protections that apply to lawful 
combatants under the relevant jus in bello treaties: see Ex Parte Quirin, United States Supreme 
Court, (1942) 317 US 1.
152 Kenneth Watkin, ‘Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in 
Contemporary Armed Confl ict’ (2004) 98 American Journal of International Law 1, 17.
153 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under 400 
Grammes Weight, opened for signature 29 November 1868, 18 Martens (1st) 474 (entered into 
force 11 December 1868), para 3.
154 See, for example, the 1907 Hague IV Regulations. In Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, the International Court of Justice noted (at 
para 80) that, in 1946, the Nuremberg Military Tribunal had held that, already by 1939, the 
1907 Hague IV Regulations ‘were recognized by all civilized nations and were regarded as 
being declaratory of the laws and customs of war’.
155 See, for example, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2444 (XXIII) (19 December 
1968) UN Doc A/RES/2444(XXIII) on the Respect for Human Rights in Armed Confl icts, 
para 1.
156 1977 Additional Protocol I, article 48.
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It is generally regarded that the rule specifi ed in article 48 is ‘identical or similar 
to’ the customary international law principle of distinction,157 although some 
doubts have been expressed on this point.158 A violation of the principles of 
distinction constitutes a grave breach of the 1977 Additional Protocol I,159 
although it is unfortunately the case that, as expressed by the then Foreign 
Minister of France in 2009, ‘there are few confl icts in which [the principle of 
distinction] is fully respected’.160 Th e obligation to distinguish between civilian 
and military targets under the 1977 Additional Protocol I is reinforced by 
article 57(1), which provides inter alia that:
[i]n the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the 
civilian population, civilians and civilian objects
Moreover, various precautions are to be taken by those who plan or decide upon 
an attack, including:161
[d]oing everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither 
civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but are military 
objectives within the meaning of [article 52(2)] and that it is not prohibited by the 
provisions of [the 1977 Additional Protocol I] to attack them
As noted, the 1977 Additional Protocol I relates only to international armed 
confl icts. Th ere are no comparable provisions in the 1977 Additional Protocol 
II, which regulates non-international armed confl icts, although that instrument 
does contain a more general prohibition of attacks against ‘the civilian 
population as such, as well as individual civilians’.162 However, it is now widely 
agreed that the customary principle of distinction applies to non-international 
armed confl icts, a conclusion that was affi  rmed by the Appeals Chamber of the 
ICTY in 1995,163 both in relation to the requirement to distinguish between 
combatants and non-combatants, as well as to the deployment of weapons. In 
relation to the latter, the Appeals Chamber stated that:164
elementary considerations of humanity and common sense make it preposterous that 
the use by States of weapons prohibited in armed confl icts between themselves be 
157 See, for example, Henckaerts, supra note 14, 187, where the author summarizes some of the 
conclusions of the ICRC Study; Watkin, supra note 152, 15; Dinstein, supra note 93, 82.
158 See, for example, Dorman, supra note 136, 86.
159 See 1977 Additional Protocol I, article 85(3).
160 Bernard Kouchner, ‘Th e savaging of humanitarian law’, Th e International Herald Tribune 
(Paris), 29 January 2009, 8.
161 1977 Additional Protocol I, article 57(2)(a)(i).
162 1977 Additional Protocol II, article 13(2).
163 Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v Duško 
Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, para 100–18.
164 Ibid, para 119.
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allowed when States try to put down rebellion by their own nationals on their own 
territory. What is inhumane, and consequently proscribed, in international wars, 
cannot but be inhumane and inadmissible in civil strife…
It also reiterated the same point a little later by stating that:165
[p]rinciples and rules of humanitarian law refl ect “elementary considerations of 
humanity” widely recognized as the mandatory minimum for conduct in armed 
confl icts of any kind. No one can doubt the gravity of the acts at issue, nor the 
interest of the international community in their prohibition
Th e principle of distinction has also been included in the relevant Statutes of 
the various international criminal justice mechanisms, including the ICC. For 
example, the Rome Statute regards ‘other serious violations [apart from grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions] of the laws and customs applicable in 
international armed confl ict’ as war crimes. Th ese include:166
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against 
individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are 
not military objectives
In terms of the protection of the environment, the ICRC Environment 
Guidelines confi rm that the principles of distinction and proportionality are 
relevant, but only in the following very general terms:167
[i]n addition to the specifi c rules set out below [including those set out in articles 
III(8) and III(9) quoted above], the general principles of international law 
applicable in armed confl ict – such as the principle of distinction and the principle 
of proportionality – provide protection to the environment. In particular, only 
military objectives may be attacked and no methods or means of warfare which 
cause excessive damage shall be employed. Precautions shall be taken in military 
operations as required by international law
Th e ICRC Environment Guidelines do, however, make specifi c reference to 
particular rules contained in various of the jus in bello treaties that restrict 
attacks by incendiary weapons on ‘forests or other kinds of plant cover’, but they 
confi rm that these are subject to a ‘military objectives’ exception, mirroring the 
terms of the Protocol III of the 1981 Certain Conventional Weapons Convention, 
discussed in chapter 2.168
165 Ibid, para 129.
166 Rome Statute, articles 8(2)(b)(i) and 8(2)(b)(ii).
167 ICRC Environment Guidelines, article II(4).
168 Protocol III to the 1981 Certain Conventional Weapons Convention, article 2(4).
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Overall, there are some fundamental practical diffi  culties in attempting to apply 
the principle of distinction, which is based on a subjective assessment of what 
is a civilian object (as opposed to a military objective). Th e relevant jus in bello 
treaties do not provide clear guidance as to what objects constitute military 
objectives, and thus what would be a civilian object. Th ere is some conjecture, 
for example, as to whether the concept of military objectives is restricted 
to inanimate objects, or also extends to military personnel.169 Th e lack of a 
suffi  ciently clear defi nition on this point has led to various criticisms, including 
that it has actually ‘contributed to the commission of serious human rights 
abuses’.170
In applying the principle of distinction, specifi c objects such as hospitals, schools 
and churches would normally be designated as civilian objects, meaning that 
‘military operations [should] simply remove them from their pool of potential 
targets.’171 Th is remains, however, subject to overarching military necessity 
in the specifi c circumstances prevailing at the time, so that, for example, ‘if a 
church steeple is used by snipers, it [may become] a military objective’.172
Th e diffi  culties associated with lawful target selection in relation to the principle 
of distinction are also complicated by the utilization of specifi c objects for both 
civilian and military purposes. Th ese so-called ‘dual use objects’173 give rise to 
complex legal questions, principally as to when a civilian object may cease to 
have the protection aff orded to such an object and instead ‘becomes’ a legitimate 
military objective, based upon the specifi c uses of that object.174
Th e practical diffi  culties associated with the principle of distinction are 
exacerbated even further when one attempts to apply it as a mechanism that is 
applicable to the environment during armed confl ict. Armed confl ict will always 
take place within the ‘environment’ and, by its inherent nature, will invariably 
have a destructive environmental eff ect, sometimes to a very signifi cant level. 
169 See Dinstein, supra note 93, 84–5 and the corresponding footnotes.
170 See Dorman, supra note 136, 89 and the corresponding footnote.
171 Richards and Schmitt, supra note 75, 1078.
172 Dinstein, supra note 93, 86.
173 See, for example, Meron, supra note 77, 275; Dinstein, supra note 93, 96–7.
174 Th e diffi  culties associated with this question were highlighted in the case of the NATO 
bombing campaign in Serbia and Kosovo in 1999, where one of the targets was the Serbian 
Television and Radio Station in Belgrade, which was at the same time being used for both 
military and non-military purposes. For a discussion, see Steven Freeland, ‘Th e Bombing 
of Kosovo and the Milosevic Trial: Refl ections on Some Legal Issues’ [2002] Australian 
International Law Journal 150. Th e same problems associated with the application of the jus in 
bello principles to objects serving both civilian and military purposes also extend to so-called 
‘dual use satellites’ in outer space: see, for example, Steven Freeland, ‘Th e Applicability of the 
Jus in Bello Rules of International Humanitarian Law to the Use of Outer Space’ (2006) 49 
Proceedings of the Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 338.
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Whilst it may be the case that the requirement to target only military objectives 
provides ‘a measure of indirect environmental protection’,175 such prohibitions 
can have a tangible and direct eff ect in this way only to the extent that the 
environment is to be accorded civilian ‘status’.176
Yet, it is unclear precisely how, and indeed whether, the ‘natural environment’ 
can for practical (and legal) purposes be designated as a civilian ‘object’. It 
has been suggested that the ‘nebulous character’ of the natural environment 
means that it is diffi  cult to consider it as an object per se, and to thus accord it 
with a civilian status for the purposes of applying the existing customary and 
conventional jus in bello rules.177 On the other hand, various commentators, 
as well as the ICRC Study, have concluded that the natural environment is to 
be regarded as a civilian object, and thus subject to the same protections under 
international humanitarian law as other civilian objects.178
Th e provisions of the 1977 Additional Protocol I do not provide any signifi cant 
clarifi cation in this regard. Article  55 is included in the chapter of that 
instrument that deals with ‘Civilian Objects’, but no defi nition of the ‘natural 
environment’ is included. Th is is, in part, symptomatic of the broader diffi  culties 
associated with reaching a widespread consensus as to what the defi nition 
of the environment should be for the purposes of both the customary rules of 
international humanitarian law,179 as well as the wide range of international 
environmental law treaties.
As a result, until it has been widely accepted – and, ideally, codifi ed – that the 
environment is a civilian objective for the purposes of the jus in bello and thus 
not subject to attack, the application of the principle of distinction in order 
to protect the environment in a signifi cant way will remain problematic. It 
also indicates that, under international criminal law, the various (war) crimes 
associated with protecting civilian objects are not particularly well-suited to 
addressing the issue of intentional environmental destruction during warfare. 
Th us, as discussed in detail in chapter 5, a ‘stand-alone’ crime is required that is 
specifi cally directed towards such acts in clear terms.
175 Hulme, supra note 73, 120.
176 Heverin, supra note 148, 1294.
177 Baker, supra note 81, 364.
178 Henckaerts, supra note 14, 191. Th e relevant (suggested) rules concerning the natural 
environment in the ICRC Study are discussed later in this chapter. See also Hulme, supra note 
73, 126.
179 See Baker, supra note 81, 364 and the corresponding footnotes.
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3.2.3. PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY
Even when a belligerent attacks a legitimate military objective, the extent of 
military force used, and any injury and damage infl icted upon civilians and 
civilian property, should not be disproportionate to any expected military 
advantage. Th us, an attack may still be unlawful if the civilian losses and/or 
damage are unacceptably high in the circumstances, taking into account the 
military contingencies. In these circumstances, the military objective does not 
cease to be a military objective; rather this principle of proportionality represents 
‘a further restriction’ on attacks on such objectives.180
Th e application of this principle requires that those who plan or decide upon 
an attack assess beforehand any potential ‘collateral’ or ‘incidental’ damage 
that may reasonably be expected to result from military action. Th ey are then 
required to:181
[t]ake all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with 
a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects
Having undertaken such an assessment, the attack must be cancelled or 
suspended:182
if it becomes apparent that … the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated
As with the principle of military necessity, it is oft en diffi  cult to apply the 
proportionality principle in practice, given that this requires a subjective 
assessment of the relative ‘values’ to be ascribed to military advantage vis-à-vis 
civilian injury and damage. In this regard, considerations of military necessity 
may again be relevant. Th e 1977 Additional Protocol I does not defi ne what is 
‘feasible’ in terms of the precautions to be taken; however, that term has been 
defi ned in Protocol II to the 1981 Certain Conventional Weapons Convention, as 
follows:183
180 See Dinstein, supra note 93, 120 and the corresponding footnote.
181 1977 Additional Protocol I, article 57(2)(a)(ii) (emphasis added).
182 Ibid, article 57(2)(b).
183 Article  3(4) (emphasis added). Th e relevant ‘circumstances’ are elaborated upon in 
a subsequent amendment to Protocol II to the 1981 Certain Conventional Weapons 
Convention, adopted in 1996.
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practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the 
time, including humanitarian and military considerations
Th is defi nition has also been taken up by a number of States. For example, when 
ratifying the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the Involvement of Children in Armed Confl ict,184 the United States included in 
its interpretive declaration an identical defi nition of the term ‘feasible measures’, 
as it is used in article 1 of that instrument. In addition, several countries have 
included a similar defi nition in interpretive declarations made at the time of 
their respective ratifi cations of the 1977 Additional Protocol 1.185 To the extent 
that this limited defi nition of what is feasible itself represents a customary norm 
of international humanitarian law, it will have a diluting eff ect on the principles 
to which it applies. Th is would inevitably limit the extent to which the principle 
of proportionality off ers tangible protection to the environment in the course of 
armed confl ict.
When the issue of incidental damage was fi rst addressed, it was considered to 
be the case that, if an attack was directed towards a clear military objective, 
then unavoidable injury to civilians and civilian objects was to be regarded as 
‘collateral damage’ and, as such, (legally) acceptable.186 Th us, the Lieber Code 
stated that:187
[m]ilitary necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed enemies, 
and other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed 
contests of war
Th is is no longer the position. Over time, the principle of proportionality has 
developed into a fundamental customary rule of international humanitarian 
law,188 involving a ‘balancing’ test between the military advantage to be gained 
and the risk of injury to civilians and/or damage to civilian objects. In Kupreskic 
et al, the ICTY Trial Chamber described articles 57 and 58 of the 1977 Additional 
Protocol I as:189
184 Opened for signature 25  May 2000, 2173 UNTS 222 (entered into force 12  February 2002) 
(Children in Armed Confl ict Protocol), article  1. See also Steven Freeland, ‘Mere Children 
or Weapons of War – Child Soldiers and International Law’ (2008) 29 University of La Verne 
Law Review 19, 37.
185 See Michael J. Dennis, ‘Current Development: Newly Adopted Protocols to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child’ (2000) 96 American Journal of International Law 789, 791.
186 Dinstein, supra note 93, 119.
187 Lieber Code, article 15 (emphasis added).
188 Dinstein, supra note 93, 120.
189 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago 
Josipovic, Dragan Papic and Vladimir Santic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, 14 January 
2000, para 524.
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now [being] part of customary international law, not only because they specify 
and fl esh out general pre-existing norms, but also because they do not appear to be 
contested by any State, including those which have not ratifi ed the Protocol
In addition, in her dissenting opinion in the Legality of the Th reat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, Judge Higgins noted that:190
[t]he principle of proportionality, even if fi nding no specifi c mention, is refl ected in 
many provisions of Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Th us 
even a legitimate target may not be attacked if the collateral civilian casualties would 
be disproportionate to the specifi c military gain from the attack
As indicated by the Judge, the term ‘proportionality’ was not expressly referred 
to in the 1977 Additional Protocol I. One author suggests that this was due to 
objections raised by States, apparently because of what they perceived to be the 
diffi  culties in ‘trying to compare things that were not viewed as comparable’.191 
Th e thrust of the principle as described by Judge Higgins is refl ected in 
articles 51(4) and 51(5)(b) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, the combined eff ect 
of which is to prohibit ‘indiscriminate attacks’, including:192
[a]n attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury 
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated
Stated in this way, the rule incorporates a requirement that the incidental loss 
not be excessive in relation to the ‘concrete and direct’ military advantage. Th ese 
qualifying words are also not defi ned in the 1977 Additional Protocol I, and have 
been described as ‘vague’.193 Yet, even though their precise meaning is unclear, 
their inclusion in the treaty does appear to further restrict the number of lawful 
targets that may be subject to an attack.194
Th e principle may also apply to unintended incidental damage,195 and thus 
might be regarded as imposing a ‘reasonableness’196 test in terms of ‘what may be 
expected’, although this will be based on the actual circumstances as perceived 
190 [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 587 (para 20). Th e Judge’s comments on this point did not form part of her 
reasons for dissenting from the conclusion of the majority of the Court.
191 Hulme, supra note 73, 127.
192 1977 Additional Protocol I, article 51(5)(b).
193 Drumbl, supra note 62, 629.
194 Hulme, supra note 73, 126.
195 See, for example, Judgement, Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko 
Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, Dragan Papic and Vladimir Santic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial 
Chamber, 14 January 2000, para 524.
196 W. Jason Fisher, ‘Targeted Killing, Norms, and International Law’ (2007) 45 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 711, 728 and 743.
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by the person(s) deciding to undertake the attack. In this regard, the Trial 
Chamber of the ICTY has stated that:197
[i]n determining whether an attack was proportionate it is necessary to examine 
whether a reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the actual 
perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available to him or her, could 
have expected excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack
It seems likely that damage to specifi c environmental components198 might also 
constitute incidental damage for the purposes of determining the applicability of 
the principle of proportionality. In this sense, Timothy Heverin has concluded 
that the requirements of proportionality ‘should prohibit environmental damage 
which exceeds military objectives’.199 However, even this rather optimistic 
viewpoint may not be suffi  cient – or suffi  ciently clear – to comprehensively 
protect the environment. For example, it has been argued that ‘a very substantial 
military advantage’ may render as legitimate:200
attacks against military targets which are known or can reasonably be assumed 
to cause grave environmental harm. At a minimum, actions resulting in massive 
environmental destruction, especially where they do not serve a clear and important 
military purpose, would be questionable.
Indeed, the Committee Report immediately added that the NATO attacks on the 
Serbian petro-chemical industries in 1999, which did in fact lead to signifi cant 
environmental damage, ‘may well have served a clear and important military 
purpose’.201
It should be noted that, although there are some diff erences (for example, the 
addition of the word ‘clearly’ excessive, and the requirement to consider the 
‘overall’ military advantage),202 article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute, which is 
discussed in detail in chapter 4, is in similar terms to article 52(5)(b) of the 1977 
197 Judgement and Opinion, Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber I, 
5 December 2003, para 58.
198 Th ese may include, for example, endangered species, fragile habitats and natural heritage 
sites: Hulme, supra note 73, 127.
199 Heverin, supra note 148, 1294.
200 Final Report to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 13 June 2000, 39 ILM 1257 (Committee Report), para 22 
(emphasis added).
201 Id.
202 It has been suggested that the inclusion of the word ‘overall’ in article  8(2)(b)(iv) of the 
Rome Statute ‘somewhat broadens the scope of military advantages which may be taken into 
account’: Ruth G. Wedgwood, ‘Proportionality, Cyberwar, and the Law of War’, in Michael 
N. Schmitt and Brian T. O’Donnell (eds), Computer Network Attack and International Law 
(2002), 219, 225.
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Additional Protocol I. In addition to the specifi c reference to environmental 
damage, article 8(2)(b)(iv) designates the following, if done within the context of 
an international armed confl ict, as a war crime:203
[i]ntentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects … which 
would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military 
advantage anticipated
Th e 1977 Additional Protocol I does not clearly specify a ‘maximum’ amount 
of collateral damage beyond which any attack would always be regarded as 
violating the principle of proportionality. In terms of environmental damage, 
the treaty does provide for a ‘widespread, long-term and severe’ threshold of 
destruction204 (as does article  8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute). In this regard, 
acts that damage the environment signifi cantly may be inconsistent with the 
principle of proportionality.205 However, as discussed in chapter 2, the precise 
limits of this damage threshold are diffi  cult to determine and, in any event, may 
in practical terms be so high as to have no real eff ect in all but the most extreme 
of circumstances.206 Moreover, as noted, there is much uncertainty as to what 
constitutes ‘excessive’ incidental damage in any specifi c circumstance.207
Indeed, as previously noted, one need only recall the (majority) conclusion of 
the International Court of Justice in the Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion.208 Th e Court had been asked by the General 
Assembly for an Advisory Opinion on the question: ‘Is the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?’209 Th e 
Resolution referring this question to the Court was highly controversial, having 
been adopted by less than a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly and 
having been opposed by France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United 
States.210
203 Rome Statute, article 8(2)(b)(iv).
204 1977 Additional Protocol I, articles 35(3) and 55(1).
205 See Baker, supra note 81, 367 and the corresponding footnote.
206 William Fenrick, when discussing the inclusion of this threshold in article  8(2)(b)(iv) of 
the Rome Statute, suggests that it ‘probably exclude[s] the sort of damage caused by heavy 
shelling during World War I battles on the Western Front’: William J. Fenrick, ‘Article 8: War 
Crimes – article 8(2)(b)(iv)’, in Otto Trifft  erer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (1999), 197.
207 See, for example, Dinstein, supra note 93, 122 and the corresponding footnotes.
208 [1996] ICJ Rep 226.
209 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/75K (15  December 1994) UN Doc A/
RES/49/75 on Request for an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice on the 
Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, para 11.
210 Th e vote was 78 in favour, 43 against and 38 abstentions.
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Th is division was also refl ected by the divided opinion rendered by the Court.211 
As noted, the Court did confi rm that environmental considerations should be 
taken into account in the ‘calculus’ of proportionality under the jus in bello.212 
However, while confi rming that the threat or use of a nuclear weapon – which 
will inevitably cause very substantial environmental damage – should comply 
with the requirements of international law relating to armed confl ict, in 
particular the principles of international humanitarian law, the Court could not 
say categorically that it would in every circumstance constitute a violation of 
international law. As Christyne Vachon has stated, the Court ‘failed to take the 
strongest step of all, [by] declaring [nuclear] weapons illegal’.213
Another complexity relating to the principle of proportionality is the suggestion 
that it may actually serve to prolong a war, and perhaps therefore lead to greater 
loss of life in the long term. Th e Lieber Code asserts that ‘[t]he more vigorously 
wars are pursued, the better it is for humanity. Sharp wars are brief ’.214 As 
noted, this ‘logic’ was applied by the United States to justify its use of two atomic 
devices against Japan in 1945.215
Th is is a diffi  cult legal (and moral) argument to substantiate, and will almost 
always involve speculation and hypothetical scenarios. In any event, there is 
no express requirement to take such a suggestion into account in the balancing 
exercise to be applied although, of course, it might be a factor considered by those 
planning an attack, under the broad rubric of ‘military advantage anticipated’.
Th e ICTY has developed a ‘cumulative eff ect’ test in determining what may be 
disproportionate incidental damage arising from an attack. Drawing upon the 
terms of the Martens clause, the Trial Chamber has suggested that, even though 
a single attack may in and of itself not give rise to unacceptable civilian casualties 
and/or damage:216
in case of repeated attacks, all or most of them falling within the grey area between 
indisputable legality and unlawfulness, it might be warranted to conclude that 
211 Beigbeder, supra note 87, 69–70.
212 Meron, supra note 77, 241.
213 Christyne J. Vachon, ‘Sovereignty Versus Globalization: Th e International Court of Justice’s 
Advisory Opinion on the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’ (1998) 26 Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy 691, 724.
214 Lieber Code, article 29, quoted in Meron, supra note 77, 241.
215 United States President Harry S. Truman, when justifying the use of the atomic bombs 
against Japan, was reported to have said that it was necessary ‘in order to shorten the agony 
of war, in order to save the lives of thousands and thousands of young Americans’: quoted in 
Beigbeder, supra note 87, 68.
216 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago 
Josipovic, Dragan Papic and Vladimir Santic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, 14 January 
2000, para 526.
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the cumulative eff ect of such acts entails that they may not be in keeping with 
international law
Th is approach was designed to broaden the eff ectiveness of the principle of 
proportionality as a way of limiting attacks, by suggesting that a series of 
‘legal’ attacks may, once accumulated, be regarded as disproportionate in the 
circumstances, and thus illegal. Th ere is nothing to suggest that this approach 
could not be applied to a series of attacks that may, in sum, cause signifi cant 
environmental damage. However, this ‘cumulative eff ect’ test was subsequently 
misinterpreted in the Committee Report, highlighting further the diffi  culties 
that oft en arise when applying the principle of proportionality in practice. While 
describing the approach outlined in Kupreskic et al as ‘a progressive statement 
of the applicable law with regard to the obligation to protect civilians’, the 
Committee Report suggests that it was ‘somewhat ambiguous and its application 
far from clear’.217
In fact, the Committee Report applies its own version of the cumulative test – 
which was very diff erent from that outlined by the ICTY Trial Chamber – in 
determining whether the NATO bombing campaign was within the acceptable 
limits of the principle of proportionality. It looked at the absolute numbers in 
relation to Operation Allied Force (38,400 sorties, 10,484 strike sorties and 
23,614 bombs released) and apparently concluded that, when considered in this 
context, the number of civilian deaths (approximately 500) was not suffi  ciently 
high so as to violate the principle.218
By adopting an approach based on absolute numbers, and thus testing the 
proportionality issue within the context of the totality of the campaign, the 
Committee Report gave no guidance as to what level of civilian deaths would 
have been disproportionate.219 Th is is essentially the reverse position from what 
appears to have been contemplated by the ICTY Trial Chamber in Kupreskic et 
al. Ironically, the approach set out in the Committee Report would mean that 
217 Committee Report, para 52.
218 Th is conclusion is even more startling when one considers that, in undertaking its campaign, 
NATO forces undertook a strategy of high altitude bombing, which ensured that it suff ered 
no losses – an example of what might be regarded as ‘zero casualty warfare’, except that there 
were, clearly, casualties on the other side. It has been suggested that this in itself might have 
been inconsistent with a good faith adherence to the principle of proportionality: Mary Ellen 
O’Connell, Book Review – Judith Gardam, ‘Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force 
by States’ (2006) 100 American Journal of International Law 973, 977 (commenting on the 
‘chief conclusion’ of the reviewed book in relation to the NATO bombing campaign).
219 Steven Freeland, ‘Commentary on the Findings of the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia into the actions of NATO in Serbia and 
Kosovo during 1999’, in André Klip and Göran Sluiter (eds), Annotated Leading Cases of 
International Criminal Tribunals, Volume V, Th e International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, 1999–2000 (2003), 38.
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single attacks that appear to have violated the principle of proportionality, and 
were thus (prima facie) illegal, have suddenly ‘become’ legal in the context of 
the whole attack. As Andreas Laursen has put it, this involves ‘dilut[ing] the 
signifi cance of a single attack by pouring it into a sea of integrated attacks’.220 
To undertake such an approach eff ectively denies the restraining power of 
the principle of proportionality and would appear to be ‘irreconcilable with 
humanitarian considerations’,221 as well as any environmental concerns.
Overall, despite the rationale underlying the principle of proportionality – that 
those undertaking attacks act in a way that is least likely to result in civilian 
injury and/or damage – there is no clear and generally accepted ‘formula’ as 
to how to properly balance this requirement with the military advantages 
associated with a legitimate military objective.222 Th e ICTY Trial Chamber in 
Kupreskic et al, when it was considering articles 57 and 58 of the 1977 Additional 
Protocol I (which also refl ect customary international law), noted that:223
these two provisions leave a wide margin of discretion to belligerents by using 
language that might be regarded as leaving the last word to the attacking party
Th us, as with the principles of military necessity and distinction, the application 
of proportionality involves subjective assessments by military personnel, whose 
main goal will, typically, be to maximise the military success to be gained by 
the actions undertaken by themselves or those within their command or control. 
Even though the principle of proportionality continues to evolve, and there 
appears to be increasing awareness among military leaders about the eff ects of 
armed confl ict on the environment,224 environmental considerations may, in 
practice, oft en still be far removed from such aims. In addition, the balancing of 
interests required between military necessity and proportionality will invariably 
involve subjective value judgements.225 Th is necessitates the attribution of a 
‘value’ to the competing military and humanitarian interests226 and, as noted, 
220 Andreas Laursen, ‘NATO, the War over Kosovo, and the ICTY Investigation’ (2002) 17 
American University International Law Review 765, 793.
221 Ibid, 796 and 813.
222 Rich, supra note 56, 450.
223 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago 
Josipovic, Dragan Papic and Vladimir Santic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, 14 January 
2000, para 524 (emphasis added).
224 See Richards and Schmitt, supra note 75, 1047, who explain (at 1083) that, compared with 
the increased concern for the environment shown today among both military and political 
leaders, ‘[w]ar’s devastating consequences on the environment – no new phenomenon – 
resulted in barely a murmur fi ft y years ago’.
225 See, for example, Jonathan Pearlman, ‘Dead baby and teenager ruled to be ‘collateral casualties’’, 
Th e Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney) 13  May 2008 <www.smh.com.au/news/national/dead-
children-ruled-collateral-casualties/2008/05/12/1210444338885.html> at 29 March 2013.
226 Richards and Schmitt, supra note 75, 1082.
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diff erent parties will have varying conceptions of what this relative value should 
be, depending on their perspective, aims and involvement in the activities.
Furthermore, the question (and relevance) of damage or injury caused indirectly 
by military action – described by Peter Richards and Michael Schmitt as the 
‘reverberating eff ects’ of an attack227 – makes a determination of what might 
be legally acceptable even more diffi  cult. Th is is also relevant to environmental 
damage during armed confl ict. Just as, for example, shutting off  access to power 
following an attack on an electricity grid might cause severe civilian injury 
and damage, so might an attack on a dam, resulting in water not being made 
available for irrigation purposes, lead to potentially signifi cant environmental 
damage. Yet, some might argue that, in these circumstances, it was not the 
attack that caused the damage, and that these ‘indirect’ eff ects should not be 
included in an assessment of the overall proportionality of the military actions 
undertaken.
While every circumstance is to be considered on a case-by-case basis, this 
illustrates further the complexities involved in seeking to apply the principle 
of proportionality. Th ese diffi  culties led the ICRC Study to conclude that 
‘the exact scope and application of the principle of proportionality in attack’ 
was ‘still open to question’.228 In the end, the balancing test required when 
assessing whether a particular action satisfi es the principle of proportionality 
is, in practice, only likely to be possible in cases where there is an ‘obvious’ 
imbalance.229
Th e diffi  culties in undertaking this assessment are even greater in a case 
necessitating a weighing of military advantage against any incidental damage 
to the environment.230 Th e sometimes intangible nature of the environment, 
coupled with the time that some forms of environmental damage may take 
to manifest (unlike damage to civilians and civilian objects), mean that, in 
most cases, ascribing the appropriate ‘weight’ to the environment will be very 
diffi  cult. In these circumstances, therefore, it is more likely that environmental 
concerns will simply be ascribed with minimal weight when compared to the 
more immediate military advantages. Th is is notwithstanding the fact that 
the environmental damage may ultimately prove to be very signifi cant. Th us, 
the eff ectiveness of the principle of proportionality in restraining actions that 
may, or are intended to cause signifi cant environmental damage during armed 
confl ict may be signifi cantly limited in practice.
227 Ibid, 1081.
228 Henckaerts, supra note 14, 191 and 197.
229 Dorman, supra note 136, 98.
230 Hulme, supra note 73, 127.
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3.2.4. THE FUNDAMENTAL CUSTOMARY JUS IN BELLO 
RULES ARE IMPORTANT BUT INSUFFICIENT
Th e discussion in this chapter has thus far focussed on the fundamental 
principles of the jus in bello and their possible application in relation to situations 
where acts are done with intent to cause signifi cant damage to the environment 
during armed confl ict. In summary, while the customary principles of military 
necessity, distinction and proportionality do represent very important rules with 
respect to the conduct of armed confl ict, there is still some uncertainty as to the 
precise standards with which combatants must, in practice, comply so as to not 
be in violation of the principles.
If anything, these uncertainties are further exacerbated when one considers the 
extent to which these principles might be applied in a practical way so as to address 
intentional destruction of the environment during hostilities. Whilst, in general 
terms, the principles do restrict some activities that may otherwise have signifi cant 
destructive consequences for the environment, it is diffi  cult to be much more precise 
than that. It is unlikely that these principles would adequately address such acts, and 
thus provide for criminal accountability in appropriate circumstances.
Th is is due to the uncertainties both as to the exact scope of each principle, as 
well as the relative ‘value’ to be ascribed to the environment when undertaking 
the relevant balancing tests. It may be that a signifi cant military advantage – or 
at least military considerations – could outweigh even extreme damage to the 
environment in certain circumstances.231
Indeed, it is not entirely clear as to whether, and if so, how, some of these rules 
apply to the environment at all. For example, as noted, an argument could be 
made that there is still an open question as to whether the natural environment 
can properly be considered as a civilian ‘object’ for the purposes of the principle 
of distinction, although the ICRC Study seems quite clear on this point (see 
below). Whilst the principle of proportionality is relevant, it has been suggested 
that, when applied to the environment, the principle would ‘prohibit very little’.232
In this context, the ICRC Study lists a number of (suggested) rules of customary 
international law that relate directly to the issue of environmental damage caused 
during armed confl ict. For the reasons discussed below, one cannot – unlike in 
relation to the principles of military necessity, distinction and proportionality – 
231 Karen Hulme, ‘Natural Environment’, in Elizabeth Wilmshurst and Susan Breau (eds), 
Perspectives on the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law (2007), 204, 
216.
232 Ibid, 215.
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assert unequivocally that these represent rules of customary international law 
in every respect. However, it is still appropriate to consider them, particularly 
in relation to the question of how, if at all, they may expand the scope of the 
fundamental rules discussed above, so as to apply specifi cally to such acts.
3.3. ADDITIONAL PROTECTION? ICRC STUDY – RULES 
RELATING TO ‘THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT’233
In December 1995, the 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent endorsed a recommendation by the Intergovernmental Group of 
Experts for the Protection of War Victims, which invited the ICRC:234
to prepare, with the assistance of experts in IHL [international humanitarian 
law] representing various geographical regions and diff erent legal systems, and in 
consultation with experts from governments and international organizations, a report 
on customary rules of IHL applicable in international and non-international armed 
confl icts, and to circulate the report to States and competent international bodies
Th is report, subsequently known as the ‘Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law’, was published nearly 10 years later ‘aft er extensive research 
and widespread consultation with [over 100] experts’.235 Th e aim of the ICRC 
Study was not to determine the customary nature of each provision of the jus in 
bello treaties, but rather to analyse various issues regulated by those treaties that 
had not been universally ratifi ed,236 in order to establish ‘what rules of customary 
international law can be found inductively on the basis of State practice in 
relation to these issues’.237 Th is exercise was undertaken partly to overcome what 
were considered to be ‘problems related to the application of humanitarian treaty 
law’ – specifi cally the fact that the conventional jus in bello rules were per se only 
binding on the States Parties to each instrument – as well as the lack of treaty 
provisions directly applicable to non-international armed confl icts.238
As an initial comment, and without in any way wishing to detract from the 
signifi cance and quality of the research involved, the ICRC Study does not have 
the authoritative status of a decision of the International Court of Justice; nor 
233 For a detailed discussion of the fi ndings of the ICRC Study in relation to these rules, and the 
State practice upon which its conclusions are based, see Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra 
note 57, Volume I, chapter 14 and Volume II, Part 1, chapter 14, sections A, B and C.
234 Meeting of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts for the Protection of War Victims, 
Geneva, 23–27 January 1995, Recommendation II.
235 Henckaerts, supra note 14, 177.
236 Ibid, 187.
237 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra note 57, Volume I, xxx.
238 Henckaerts, supra note 14, 177.
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in some cases does it express defi nitive conclusions. Whilst the ICRC Study 
is, obviously, an important document and has already been referred to in 
international criminal law239 and domestic jurisprudence,240 as well as having 
an impact upon the practice of States and on international relations,241 from the 
perspective of determining its legal signifi cance, it is probably best regarded as 
‘teachings of the most highly qualifi ed publicists’, which is expressed in the ICJ 
Statute as a ‘subsidiary’ source of law.242
Moreover, there have been suggestions that the ICRC Study does ‘not properly 
evaluate its primary sources’,243 and that the methodology employed, and some 
of the conclusions reached, should thus not be regarded as ‘the last word on the 
subject’ but rather:244
the appropriate starting point in a review of State practice and opinio juris relevant to 
the crystallisation of custom
Indeed, in relation to the three rules included in the ICRC Study that relate 
specifi cally to the natural environment, Karen Hulme has opined that:245
[w]hile many of the authors’ conclusions will be welcomed by those familiar with 
environmental law … it is suggested that they are not yet all a true refl ection of the 
status of customary law
239 For example, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY included references to a specifi c rule (Rule 
129) contained in the ICRC Study, when engaging in a survey of customary international 
law in relation to the scope of the crime of deportation as a crime against humanity under 
article  5(d) of the ICTY Statute: Judgement, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, Case No. IT-97-
24-A, Appeals Chamber, 22  March 2006, para 296–7, 305 and 307. In Decision on Joint 
Defence Interlocutory Appeal of Trial Chamber Decision on Rule 98 bis Motions for 
Acquittal, Prosecutor v. Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR73.3, 
Appeals Chamber, 11 March 2005, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY referred to the contents 
of military manuals as set out in the ICRC Study in relation to various aspects of international 
humanitarian law, including attacks on civilian objects in non-international armed confl icts 
(para 30), the prohibition against pillage (para 38), and the general protection of cultural 
property (para 45).
240 See, for example, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al (29  June 2006), United 
States Supreme Court, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
241 Bothe, supra note 16, 176.
242 See ICI Statute, article 38(1)(d). Of course, decisions of the International Court of Justice (and 
other international courts and tribunals) also fall within the scope of this provision. However, 
a conclusion by the International Court of Justice that a particular (alleged) rule of customary 
international law does (or does not) exist is regarded as authoritative.
243 Scobbie, supra note 11, 40.
244 Bethlehem, supra note 17, 14 (emphasis added).
245 Hulme, supra note 231, 237. See also Joshua H. Joseph, ‘Rethinking Yamashita: Holding 
Military Leaders Accountable for Wartime Rape’ (2007) 28 Women’s Rights Law Reporter 107, 
117 and the corresponding footnote.
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Even one of its editors has conceded that the ICRC Study is not a defi nitive 
refl ection of the rules of customary international humanitarian law, albeit for 
diff erent reasons:246
[t]his study should not be seen … as the fi nal word on custom; it is not exhaustive 
because the formation of customary law is an ongoing process
Th e ICRC Study lists 161 separate rules that were considered by its authors to be 
principles of customary international law, based on an extensive examination of 
relevant State practice. Th ese rules were formulated in six parts:
(i) Principle of Distinction (encompassing ICRC Study Rules 1–24);
(ii) Specifi cally Protected Persons and Objects (Rules 25–45) – which includes 
the specifi c provisions that relate to the natural environment;
(iii) Specifi c Methods of Warfare (Rules 46–69);
(iv) Weapons (Rules 70–86);
(v) Treatment of Civilians and Persons Hors de Combat (Rules 87–138); and
(vi) Implementation (Rules 139–161).
As can be seen from these general headings, the structure of the ICRC Study 
refl ects some of the important areas of the jus in bello principles, although 
the authors admit that it is not a comprehensive analysis of all relevant rules. 
For example, the authors argue that the ‘great majority’ of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, including common article 3, which have been almost universally 
ratifi ed, along with the 1907 Hague IV Regulations, are already ‘considered to be 
part of customary international law’.247 As a result, the customary nature of the 
provisions of those instruments was not the subject of the ICRC Study.
While several of the general rules specifi ed in the ICRC Study might have 
indirect relevance to intentional destruction of the environment during armed 
confl ict248 – in similar vein to some of the jus in bello treaty provisions249 – 
these do not appear to add any greater direct protection to the environment, or 
possibilities for direct accountability for such acts, than already exists within the 
broad scope of those instruments. In the context of this book, therefore, the most 
246 Jean-Marie Henckaerts, ‘Assessing the Laws and Customs of War: Th e Publication of 
Customary International Humanitarian Law’ (2006) 13 Human Rights Brief 8, 8.
247 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra note 57, Volume I, xxx.
248 See, for example, Rule 71 – ‘Th e use of weapons which are by nature indiscriminate is 
prohibited’; Rule 72 – ‘Th e use of poison or poisoned weapons is prohibited’; Rule 73 – ‘Th e 
use of biological weapons is prohibited’; Rule 74 – ‘Th e use of chemical weapons is prohibited’; 
Rule 76(e) – ‘Th e use of herbicides as a method of warfare is prohibited if they … would cause 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment’.
249 See, for example, 1972 Biological Weapons Convention; 1981 Certain Conventional Weapons 
Convention; 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention.
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directly relevant rules specifi ed in the ICRC Study are those that specifi cally 
apply to the ‘Natural Environment’ (Rules 43–45).
3.3.1. ICRC STUDY – RULE 43
Rule 43 of the ICRC Study provides as follows:
Th e general principles on the conduct of hostilities apply to the natural environment:
A. No part of the natural environment may be attacked, unless it is a military objective.
B. Destruction of any part of the natural environment is prohibited, unless required 
by imperative military necessity.
C. Launching an attack against a military objective which may be expected to cause 
incidental damage to the environment which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated is prohibited.
Th e rule is expressed to apply in relation to both international and non-
international armed confl icts.250 As noted, the ICRC Study concluded that the 
environment is to be considered as a civilian object and, as such, is protected 
by the same fundamental rules that protect other civilian objects, notably the 
principles of distinction and proportionality.251 Th is is refl ected in the terms of 
Rule 43. Th e rule also seeks to confi rm that the general principles of international 
humanitarian law discussed in this chapter are also applicable to the 
environment, although Parts A and C appear to extend this to any ‘part’ of the 
environment. Th is is an unclear term – how small is a part of the environment? 
In any event, this could be construed as setting too low a threshold and, thus, 
may not in fact constitute a rule of customary international law.252
Even assuming that the environment is, in fact, a civilian object253 – Michael 
Bothe suggests that the rule operates to protect the natural environment as ‘an 
element of the civilian world, to the extent that it really is’254 – Parts A and C 
of this rule are largely concerned with the protections aff orded by the existing 
fundamental principles of distinction and proportionality. Th us, they do not add 
any further level of regulation or restriction on acts conducted during armed 
250 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra note 57, Volume I, 143.
251 Henckaerts, supra note 14, 191.
252 Hulme, supra note 231, 214.
253 See, for example, ibid, where that author asserts (at 209) that this is ‘universally accepted 
although a little clumsy’. See also Michael N. Schmitt, Charles H.B. Garraway and Yoram 
Dinstein, Th e Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Confl ict (2006), where the 
draft ing committee (at para 4.2.4) state that ‘the natural environment is a civilian object’.
254 Bothe, supra note 16, 167.
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confl ict. It is also noted that Part C omits the word ‘natural’, but it has been 
suggested that this is a simple oversight.255
Part B appears to be slightly broader in scope, particularly due to the inclusion 
of the word ‘imperative’. Th is word is also included in Rule 50 of the ICRC 
Study, which prohibits inter alia the destruction of property, ‘unless required 
by imperative military necessity’.256 While it might be argued that the word 
in reality adds nothing – a ‘necessity’ is an ‘imperative’ – the inclusion of this 
qualifying word in Rule 43 probably does set a higher threshold standard as 
to what level of military necessity must be present before an attack on the 
environment may be legitimate, although Karen Hulme suggests that, ‘[i]f this 
were truly the law, it is being ignored on a daily basis.257
Once again, however, the presence of military ‘necessity’ is to be determined 
from the perspective of the military commander at the time. Moreover, the 
problems associated with a determination of what constitutes military necessity 
still remain, as does the issue of exactly what is an imperative (as opposed 
to a ‘non-imperative’) necessity. Th ese factors combine to make it diffi  cult 
to determine precisely when the rule might be violated in all but the most 
obvious situations – in which case the word ‘imperative’ would then seem to be 
unnecessary.
3.3.2. ICRC STUDY – RULE 44
Rule 44 of the ICRC Study provides as follows:
Methods and means of warfare must be employed with due regard to the protection 
and preservation of the natural environment. In the conduct of military operations, 
all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, 
incidental damage to the environment. Lack of scientifi c certainty as to the eff ects 
on the environment of certain military operations does not absolve a party to the 
confl ict from taking such precautions.
Th is rule is stated to apply in relation to international armed confl icts and 
‘arguably’ to non-international armed confl icts.258 Th e relevant State practice 
upon which the ICRC Study relies to assert the existence of this rule, particularly 
255 Hulme, supra note 231, 208.
256 ICRC Study, Rule 50.
257 Hulme, supra note 231, 211.
258 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra note 57, Volume I, 147.
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in relation to the application of a form of the ‘precautionary principle’,259 which 
has been incorporated into the second sentence, has been described as ‘somewhat 
scarce’.260
In the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project Case, the International Court of Justice 
referred to the fact that the parties in that dispute had agreed on the ‘need to 
take environmental concerns seriously and to take the required precautionary 
measures’.261
However, the Court made no reference to the precautionary principle, and this 
reference to the agreement of two States to a dispute (Hungary and Slovakia) does 
not in itself provide any signifi cant evidence of State practice regarding the status 
of that principle. In fact, there is a divergence of opinion as to the precise scope 
of the precautionary principle, with some commentators citing a lack of clarity 
and the ‘potential for over-regulation’ if it is applied too broadly.262 In any event, 
although it has been recognized by some as having crystallized into a general 
principle of international environmental law, there is not yet consensus that the 
precautionary principle itself represents a customary rule in international law,263 
259 Th e precautionary principle is based on a premise that the lack of scientifi c certainty as to 
the negative environmental consequences of a particular action should not be used as a 
justifi cation to carry out that action. In practical terms, this is oft en thought to reverse 
the burden of proof as to the consequences of an action, placing it on those who claim 
that an activity is not damaging; Elli Louka, International Environmental Law: Fairness, 
Eff ectiveness, and World Order (2006), 50. See also Principle 15 of the Declaration of the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, (14  June 1992) UN Doc A/
CONF.151/26 (Volume 1), 31 ILM 874 (Rio Declaration); article 2(2)(a) of the Convention for 
the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic, opened for signature 
22 September 1992, 32 ILM 1069, (entered into force 25 March 1998). For a detailed discussion 
of the precautionary principle see Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle, International Law and the 
Environment (2nd ed, 2002); Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law 
(2nd ed, 2005), 266–79; James Cameroon and Juli Abouchar, ‘Th e Precautionary Principle: 
A Fundamental Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment’ 
(1991) 14:1 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 1; Lothar Gündling, 
‘Th e Status in International Law of the Principle of Precautionary Action’ (1990) 5 
International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law 23.
260 Bothe, supra note 16, 167.
261 [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 113.
262 Th e Asia Pacifi c Forum of National Human Rights Institutions and the Advisory Council of 
Jurists, ‘Human Rights and the Environment: Final Report and Recommendations’, (September 
2007), 22 footnote 69, <www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/Submissions/Asia_
Pacifi c_Forum_of_NHRIs_1_HR_and_Environment_ACJ_Report_Recommendations.pdf>
 at 21 January 2015.
263 See, for example, Beef Hormones, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Decision), Panel of the World Trade Organisation, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, 
16  January 1998, para 123 (‘[w]hether it [the precautionary principle] has been widely 
accepted by Members as a principle of general or customary international law appears less 
than clear’) (emphasis in original); EC – Measures Aff ecting Biotech Products (Decision), 
Panel of the World Trade Organisation, DS291, 292, 293, 26 September 2006, para 7.88 (‘the 
legal status of the precautionary principle remains unsettled’).
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although the concept of precautionary measures, or a precautionary approach,264 
has been incorporated into several major international environmental treaties 
and various ‘soft  law’ instruments.265 Th is, however, gives rise to further 
uncertainty since, as discussed in chapter 2, there is no clear consensus as to 
whether, and to what extent, such treaties remain applicable during times of 
armed confl ict, in the absence of an express provision to that eff ect.
In addition, there is no signifi cant State practice referred to in the military 
manuals identifi ed in the ICRC Study regarding the applicability of the 
precautionary principle.266 In the end, the authors of the ICRC Study do not state 
that the precautionary principle is customary law, but rather that it ‘has been 
gaining increasing recognition’.267 It is therefore doubtful as to whether this 
international environmental concept can automatically be applied in the context 
of, and to the rules of armed confl ict; still less can it be claimed to represent a 
customary rule of international humanitarian law.
In any event, it will oft en (although not always) be the case that the destructive 
eff ects on the environment that would result from military action will be 
predictable, in which case the precautionary principle, based as it is on a lack 
of scientifi c certainty, would not be relevant. Th e commentary to Rule 44 in the 
ICRC Study refers to the fact that, in the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project Case, the 
International Court of Justice readily accepted that:268
264 Th e International Law Commission (ILC) has suggested that ‘[t]here are diff ering views 
whether or not the “precautionary principle” has been established as customary international 
law’ and that a ‘less disputed expression of “precautionary approach” could satisfy the basic 
necessity to introduce the special consideration of scientifi c uncertainties …’: International 
Law Commission, Draft  Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary 
Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities: General Commentary, contained in Report of 
the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on its work of the fi ft y-eighth 
session, UN Doc A/61/10 (2006), 222–3, para 6.
265 See Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for signature 22 March 
1985, 26 ILM 1529 (entered into force 22 September 1988), which refers in paragraph 5 of its 
preamble to ‘precautionary measures’. See also, for example, Convention for the Protection of 
the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic, opened for signature 22 September 1992, 
32 ILM 1069, (entered into force 25 March 1998), article 2(2)(a) (‘precautionary principle’); 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 4  June 
1992, 31 ILM 849 (entered into force 21 March 1994), article 3(3) (‘precautionary measures’); 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, (14  June 
1992) UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Volume 1), 31 ILM 874, Principle 15 (‘precautionary 
approach’). While there have been some suggestions that these various expressions have 
diff erent meanings, the prevailing interpretation seems to be that the ‘diff erence in 
terminology is not signifi cant’: see Lotta Viikari, Th e Environmental Element in Space Law: 
Assessing the Present and Charting the Future (2008), 160–1 and the corresponding footnotes.
266 Hulme, supra note 231, 221.
267 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra note 57, Volume I, 150.
268 Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 53. 
Article 33 of the document referred to dealt with the international law concept of ‘necessity’ 
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the concerns expressed by Hungary for its natural environment in the region 
aff ected by the Gabcíkovo Nagymaros Project related to an “essential interest” of that 
State, within the meaning given to that expression in Article 33 of the Draft  of the 
International Law Commission
It should perhaps be noted, however, that it might, in many cases, be diffi  cult for 
the International Court of Justice to ‘overrule’ a claim of an essential interest by 
a State, unless it is ‘completely disingenuous’.269
Th e Court went on to note that the ILC had expressed the view that a state 
of necessity may arise where there was ‘a grave danger to … the ecological 
preservation of all or some of [the] territory’ of a State,270 although at the same 
time it referred to diffi  culties associated with the271
verifi cation of the existence … of the “peril” invoked by Hungary, of its “grave and 
imminent” nature, as well as of the absence of any “means” to respond to it
Without providing an explanation as to how this might point directly towards 
the formation of Rule 44 as a customary norm, the ICRC Study uses the 
comments of the Court to highlight the fact that there has been a movement 
over the past few decades towards the protection of the environment from 
degradation ‘caused by humans’. Th is is undoubtedly the case, but it does not 
necessarily support the assertion that the rule as stated has acquired the status of 
a customary principle of international law.
Indeed, Michael Bothe, while regarding the arguments presented in the ICRC 
Study in relation to this rule as ‘convincing’, makes the point that it ‘is not really 
based on actual practice’.272 Karen Hulme questions the inclusion of the term 
‘preservation’.273 While these concerns may not detract from the desirability of 
as a ‘circumstance precluding wrongfulness’. Its terms were superseded by article  25 of 
the ‘Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts’, which was noted by the 
United Nations General Assembly in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/83 
‘Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts’ (12 December 2001) UN Doc A/
RES/56/83 on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Article  25 
does diff er from the terms of article 33(1) of the earlier draft , specifi cally in relation to the 
reference to the interest of ‘the international community as a whole’: Andreas Laursen, 
Changing International Law to Meet New Challenges: Interpretation, Modifi cation and the Use 
of Force (2006), 243.
269 Ibid, 245.
270 [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 53. See also LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., LG&E 
International Inc. v. Argentine Republic (Decision on Liability), International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), Case No. ARB/02/1, 3 October 2006, para 251.
271 [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 54.
272 Bothe, supra note 16, 167.
273 Hulme, supra note 231, 219.
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the rule as stated, they again raise doubts as to whether it represents customary 
international law.
3.3.3. ICRC STUDY – RULE 45
Rule 45 of the ICRC Study provides as follows:
Th e use of methods or means of warfare that are intended, or may be expected, to 
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment is 
prohibited. Destruction of the natural environment may not be used as a weapon.
Like Rule 44, this rule is stated to apply in relation to international armed 
confl icts and ‘arguably’ to non-international armed confl icts.274 Th e ICRC Study 
concludes that the ‘new’ rule introduced into the 1977 Additional Protocol I 
in relation to the natural environment, and refl ected in articles 35(3) and 55(1) 
(which at the time had no basis in existing customary international law),275 has 
subsequently:276
received such extensive support in State practice that it has crystallized into 
customary law, even though some States have persistently maintained that the rule 
does not apply to nuclear weapons and that they may, therefore, not be bound by it in 
respect of nuclear weapons
In its commentary to Rule 45, the ICRC Study suggests that:
[i]t appears that the United States is a ‘persistent objector’ to the fi rst part of this 
rule. In addition, France, the United Kingdom and the United States are persistent 
objectors with regard to the application of the fi rst part of this rule to the use of 
nuclear weapons
In fact, one of the editors of the ICRC Study has raised the possibility that the 
United States may even be a persistent objector:277
with respect to Rule 45 in general, including for conventional weapons, but this is a 
case the US would have to make
All of these qualifi cations cast doubt as to the strength of the claim that Rule 
45 does refl ect a rule of customary international law. It has been pointed out, 
274 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, supra note 57, Volume I, 151.
275 Hulme, supra note 231, 204.
276 Henckaerts, supra note 14, 191.
277 International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 32, 963 (emphasis added).
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for example, that the three countries referred to should be regarded as ‘specially 
aff ected’278 States, and that their contrary practice therefore precludes the 
formation of a rule of custom.279 In any event, these three States are signifi cant 
nuclear powers,280 giving rise to doubt as to whether there is suffi  cient State 
practice to lead to the establishment of the customary rule, at least in relation to 
nuclear weapons.
Michael Matheson has suggested that the signifi cant reliance by nuclear weapon 
States on a policy of deterrence – sometimes referred to as the ‘MAD’ principle 
(Mutually Assured Destruction) during the Cold War period – means that 
there is insuffi  cient opinio juris that the use of nuclear weapons is completely 
prohibited.281 In this regard, the International Court of Justice concluded in the 
Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion that:282
the members of the international community are profoundly divided on the matter 
of whether non-recourse to nuclear weapons over the past 50 years constitutes the 
expression of an opinio juris. Under these circumstances the Court does not consider 
itself able to fi nd that there is such an opinio juris
Other commentators have suggested that it is very diffi  cult to judge the 
current status of the principles incorporated in articles  35(3) and 55(1) of the 
1977 Additional Protocol I.283 However, even if one accepts that Rule 45 does 
represent a rule of custom, it does not appear to add signifi cantly to the existing 
prohibitions in articles  35(3) and 55(1), in relation to which, as discussed in 
chapter 2, there are a number of signifi cant practical limitations.
It should also be noted that the fi rst sentence of Rule 45 repeats the threshold 
requirement of ‘widespread, long-term and severe’ damage found in articles 35(3) 
and 55(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I. Th e diffi  culties associated with 
ascertaining a precise meaning for this threshold, and the practical problems of 
actually proving that it has been reached in all but the most extreme cases, are 
also discussed in chapter 2. On this issue, one of the editors of the ICRC Study 
278 See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark and Federal 
Republic of Germany v. Th e Netherlands) (Judgment) [1969] ICJ Rep 3, para 73.
279 Scobbie, supra note 11, 36; Hulme, supra note 231, 233.
280 It is generally acknowledged that there are currently nine or ten countries with existing 
nuclear weapons capability. Besides the United States, France and the United Kingdom, these 
comprise Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea, and (possibly) Iran: see, for 
example, Bothe, supra note 16, who, in 2005, suggested (at 168) that there were nine nuclear 
powers at that time.
281 Michael J. Matheson, ‘Th e Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Th reat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons’ (1997) 91 American Journal of International Law 417, 425.
282 [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 67.
283 See, for example, Hulme, supra note 73, 108.
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has acknowledged that the fact that Rule 45 has come into existence, at least with 
regard to conventional weapons:284
may not actually have much meaning, as the threshold of the cumulative conditions 
of long-term, widespread and severe damage is very high
It is not clear whether the second sentence of Rule 45 adds anything further 
as regards the protection of the environment over and above the fundamental 
principles of distinction and proportionality, which themselves also incorporate 
general rules regarding precautions to be taken when undertaking attacks, and 
the prohibition of wanton destruction of property.285 However, to the extent that 
it refl ects a customary rule, that sentence is signifi cant, in that it plainly does 
focus upon the prohibition of deliberate damage of the environment during 
warfare.
It should be noted that Rule 45 refers to the destruction of the environment 
as a ‘weapon’. Th is reinforces the fact that, as noted in chapter 1, in certain 
circumstances of intentional damage, the environment can be thought 
of not only as a victim, but in terms of being utilized as a weapon, as for 
example, through the employment of the specifi c techniques of environmental 
modifi cation proscribed by the ENMOD Convention.286
Overall, the three specifi c rules in the ICRC Study that directly relate to 
the natural environment largely refl ect the terms of the relevant jus in bello 
provisions, although in some respects they purport to extend the protections 
further. However, although the ICRC Study will undoubtedly have a practical 
impact and contribute to the wider dissemination of international humanitarian 
law, these rules should not themselves be regarded as ‘additional’ customary 
principles over and above the fundamental and generally accepted customary 
international humanitarian law principles of military necessity, distinction and 
proportionality. As such, they do not impose any additional specifi c binding 
(customary) obligations with respect to the conduct of armed confl ict, including 
in relation to acts perpetrated with intent to cause signifi cant damage to the 
environment.
284 International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 32, 963.
285 Hulme, supra note 231, 234.
286 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modifi cation Techniques, opened for signature 10 December 1976, 1108 UNTS 151; 16 ILM 
88 (entered into force 5 October 1978).
3.4. A General Customary Obligation to Take Account 
of the Environment during Armed Confl ict?
Intersentia 171
3.4. A GENERAL CUSTOMARY OBLIGATION TO 
TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
DURING ARMED CONFLICT?
As has been noted, in the Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice held that environmental 
considerations must be taken into account in determining the legality of 
acts taken during warfare.287 In support of its conclusions, the Court quoted 
Principle 24 of the Rio Declaration, which provides that:288
Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall therefore 
respect international law providing protection for the environment in times of armed 
confl ict and cooperate in its further development, as necessary
Th e Court also concluded that articles  35(3) and 55 of the 1977 Additional 
Protocol I:289
embody a general obligation to protect the natural environment against widespread, 
long-term and severe environmental damage
Taking all of these factors into account, the Court concluded that:290
while the existing international law relating to the protection and safeguarding of the 
environment does not specifi cally prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, it indicates 
important environmental factors that are properly to be taken into account in the 
context of the implementation of the principles and rules of the law applicable in 
armed confl ict
Th e signifi cance of the natural environment is also underscored by the 
conclusion of the International Court of Justice in the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros 
Project Case, noted above, that the protection of the environment may represent 
an ‘essential interest’ of a State, in the sense that this is relevant in determining 
the applicability of an alleged state of necessity as a circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness. In that case, the Court concluded that:291
the awareness of the vulnerability of the environment and the recognition that 
environmental risks have to be assessed on a continuous basis have become much 
stronger [since 1977]
287 [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 30.
288 Rio Declaration, Principle 24.
289 [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 31.
290 Ibid, para 33.
291 [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 112.
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All of these observations may suggest the existence of a general rule of customary 
international law – requiring States to undertake a ‘due regard’ (due diligence?) 
assessment of the environment in the calculation of their military actions during 
armed confl ict.292 Th is standard is included in a document prepared in 1994 by 
the International Institute of Humanitarian Law which, when draft ing principles 
related to naval warfare, concluded that:293
[m]ethods and means of warfare should be employed with due regard for the natural 
environment taking into account the relevant r ules of international law
Th is is also refl ected in the fi rst sentence of Rule 44 of the ICRC Study. 
Various aspects of the fundamental principles of customary humanitarian law 
discussed in this chapter, as well as the relevant provisions of the jus in bello 
treaties, reinforce this general obligation. Th is can be seen, for example, in the 
application of the principle of distinction, to the extent that the environment 
is to be regarded as a civilian object, and taking into account the conclusion of 
the International Court of Justice that environmental concerns form part of the 
calculation of the principles of necessity and proportionality.
In addition, articles  35(3) and 55(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I require 
a combatant to refrain from certain ‘methods or means of warfare which 
are intended, or may be expected’ to cause a specifi ed level of environmental 
damage. In other words, in each of these examples, consideration of the 
environmental consequences of a proposed action must be taken before that 
action is to be implemented.
Karen Hulme goes further, by suggesting that military decision makers must 
now recognise ‘the basic customary obligation to have regard to protection of 
the environment’.294 However, this appears to over-state the position. On the 
one hand, it is widely acknowledged that States are responsible under customary 
international law:295
292 Hulme, supra note 73, 108.
293 International Institute of Humanitarian Law, ‘San Remo Manual on International Law 
Applicable to Armed Confl icts at Sea’ (1995) 309 International Review of the Red Cross 595, 
para 44 (emphasis added).
294 Hulme, supra note 73, 108.
295 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm 
Declaration) (16  June 1972) UN Doc A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, Principle 21. Principle 21 was 
subsequently declared by the United Nations General Assembly as ‘lay[ing] down the basic 
rules’ governing the international responsibility of States in regard to the environment: 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2996 (XXVII) (15  December 1972) UN 
Doc A/RES/2996(XXVII) on the International Responsibility of States in Regard to the 
Environment.
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to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control do not cause damage to 
the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction
Th is represents an extension of a more general principle of ‘good neighbourliness’, 
which can be traced back to a well-established Roman Law principle sic utere tuo, 
ut alienum non laedas (‘use your own property in such a manner as to not injure 
that of another’).296 Th e obligation was specifi cally applied to the environment, in 
more restrictive terms, by the International Court of Justice in the Legality of the 
Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, when it confi rmed that:297
[t]he existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas 
beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the 
environment
However, the obligation not to cause environmental damage does not expressly 
extend to situations of armed confl ict. For one thing, this would be a non 
sequitor, given that warfare is inherently destructive of the environment, so that 
most decisions made in relation to military activities would be in breach of any 
such obligation. Moreover, various States, including the United States, take the 
view that Principle 21 is not applicable to environmental damage caused during 
armed confl ict.298 Th e statements of the International Court of Justice referred 
to above emphasise the relevance of environmental concerns in the decision-
making process, but do not appear to impose a positive obligation upon the 
military to protect the environment during armed confl ict.
Th is is also implied from a report produced by the International Institute of 
Humanitarian Law, which, when dealing with non-international confl icts, 
deliberately avoids listing a general obligation to protect the environment as a 
rule of customary international law.299 Rather, it appears, at least at the current 
time, that the strongest that any such obligation can be put is that military 
leaders must consider the possibility of damaging environmental consequences 
of any action they are planning, and that such considerations must form part of 
the decision-making process as to whether, and how, to implement that action.
However, on a practical level, it is not clear whether this advances the protection 
of the environment during armed confl ict in a signifi cant way. As with the 
296 Viikari, supra note 265, 150.
297 [1996] ICJ Rep 226, para 29 (emphasis added).
298 See Aaron Schwabach, ‘Ecocide and Genocide in Iraq: International Law, the Marsh Arabs, 
and Environmental Damage in Non-International Confl icts’ (2004) 15 Colorado Journal of 
International Law and Policy 1, 16–7 and the corresponding footnote.
299 Hulme, supra note 231, 221.
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principles underpinning the Martens clause, the International Court of Justice 
has indicated that environmental concerns are already to be regarded as relevant 
when assessing the fundamental principles of necessity and proportionality. 
Environmental considerations do diff er somewhat from elements of humanity, 
in that they do not (necessarily) have an anthropocentric focus.
However, as has been discussed, when applying fundamental principles of 
customary international humanitarian law, a balancing test must be undertaken, 
which will invariably include considerations of military advantage. Not only is 
this a diffi  cult exercise, but it is characterised by subjectivity and uncertainty, 
and the threshold level of environmental damage generally stipulated must be so 
high as to be unattainable in all but the most extreme circumstances. Moreover, 
the military advantage of any proposed action would normally be uppermost in 
the minds of military leaders, making it questionable as to how extensively they 
would view the environmental consequences of such actions in most situations.
In addition, the diff erent obligations that appear to apply with respect to the 
environment, depending upon whether an armed confl ict is of an international 
or non-international nature,300 make it diffi  cult to reach defi nitive conclusions 
as to the precise extent of the protections that customary international law 
currently provides. Nevertheless, it is clear that environmental concerns now do 
form part of a military assessment of any proposed action, and that regard for the 
environment might possibly represent a separate rule of customary international 
law, as opposed to just being a part of the rules of necessity and proportionality.
Whilst such a conclusion may indicate a certain momentum within international 
law towards greater protection of the environment during armed confl ict, it 
remains to be seen whether, in practice, such a rule (if it does exist) would serve 
to alter the behaviour of those engaged in armed confl ict. In any event, it seems 
prudent to bear in mind Judge Koroma’s words quoted earlier, regarding the 
‘notorious … imprecision’ of customary international law. Even if a relatively 
new customary principle can be identifi ed, its scope beyond existing principles 
may be diffi  cult to ascertain. Moreover, it would not necessarily provide for an 
adequate or eff ective mechanism for enforcement of any such obligation. Th e 
clear ‘codifi cation’ of obligations relating the environment during armed confl ict 
is therefore preferable, particularly in the context of specifying and clarifying 
the relevant international criminal law rules.
300 See the commentary to the ICRC Study in relation to Rules 44 and 45. See also Schmitt, 
Garraway and Dinstein, supra note 253, where the draft ing committee (at para 4.2.4) lists 
only one specifi c rule in relation to the environment in the context of non-international 
armed confl icts, as follows:
 ‘Damage to the natural environment during military operations must not be excessive in 
relation to the military advantage anticipated from those operations’.
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It has been noted by Rymn Parsons that the law protecting the environment 
during armed confl ict ‘must be dynamic and progressive’.301 Other 
commentators have suggested that, to be of use to the international community, 
law must lend itself to a ‘consistent, uniform and practical application’.302
As discussed in this chapter, there are a number of important principles of 
customary international law that underpin the conduct of armed confl ict. Th ese 
principles apply to all States, operating independently of, as well as coincidentally 
with, the provisions of all relevant jus in bello treaties to which combatants may 
be bound. However, in terms of their applicability to intentional destruction of 
the environment during hostilities, there are signifi cant shortcomings in relation 
to these customary rules. In general terms, the rules that purport to protect the 
environment are characterized by vagueness and uncertainty. Th is stems from 
several factors, including the diffi  culties associated with specifying the precise 
scope of the rules, the traditional and overarching importance accorded to 
considerations of military advantage, the imprecise ‘status’ and value to be 
accorded to the environment, the inherently destructive nature of warfare, and 
the overall complexity of the issues involved.
As with the jus in bello treaties, compliance with the customary rules of 
international humanitarian law has oft en been inconsistent and demonstrative 
of a lack of political will. Despite a strong imperative for eff ective enforcement, 
this is ‘diffi  cult to translate into eff ective policies’.303 Th e also makes eff ective 
implementation and enforcement harder to achieve. It is in this regard that 
documents such as the ICRC Study may have the greatest impact, because they 
highlight the existence of a separate body of international humanitarian law over 
and above the jus in bello treaties, even though the ICRC Study itself may not in 
all respects accurately describe the precise scope of those customary principles.
However, the realpolitik means that, to the extent that there is any accountability 
for violations of customary principles (and perhaps also of the jus in bello 
treaties), these are likely to take place against the backdrop of the concept of vie 
victis (‘woe to the vanquished’), with only the actions of the losing combatants 
likely to fall under judicial scrutiny,304 although it is true that this was 
301 Parsons, supra note 56, 483.
302 Richards and Schmitt, supra note 75, 1086.
303 Adam Roberts, ‘Th e Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in Contemporary Confl icts’ 
(1995) 6 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 11, 70.
304 Forrest, supra note 71, 196.
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(potentially) not the case in relation to the actions of NATO in Operation Allied 
Force.
Even though it is clear that the environment has become a more relevant 
consideration in the assessment of all military actions, the reluctance of States 
to adequately address the protection of the environment in times of war by way 
of binding international legal instruments also impacts upon, and refl ects, the 
lack of an eff ective complementary regime of customary rules. Th us, as with 
the jus in bello treaties, there is no comprehensive regime under customary law 
that adequately addresses intentional damage to the environment during armed 
confl ict. As a consequence, it is submitted that, within the treaty and customary 
principles of the jus in bello and international environmental law, there is 
currently no eff ective system for imposing a rigorous level of responsibility for 
such acts.
At the same time, however, there have been signifi cant advances in international 
criminal law and jurisprudence over the past two decades, and there is now 
widespread acceptance of the imperative to establish eff ective mechanisms 
and legal regimes to prosecute specifi c international crimes. It is therefore 
necessary to now turn to an examination of the existing applicable international 
criminal law provisions to determine whether they provide a suffi  cient degree of 
accountability for such acts. Th e next chapter thus examines the existing crimes 
articulated in the Rome Statute in order to determine their applicability (or 
otherwise) to such acts. Th is will include, in particular, a detailed analysis of the 
war crime specifi ed in article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute.
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CHAPTER FOUR
REGULATION OF THE INTENTIONAL 
DESTRUCTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
DURING WARFARE UNDER THE 
EXISTING ROME STATUTE REGIME
4.1. INTRODUCTION – THE CORE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
IN THE ROME STATUTE
Th e previous two chapters have examined the extent to which the intentional 
destruction of the environment during armed confl ict has been addressed under 
the jus in bello (and international environmental) treaties, and any applicable 
customary international law. Where appropriate, reference has also been made 
(as will also be the case in this chapter) to relevant jurisprudence of international 
courts and tribunals. However, as noted, there has been little judicial precedent 
directly relating to the prosecution of persons who have been specifi cally charged 
with intentionally causing such destruction.1
Based on the analysis undertaken in the previous chapters, the conclusion thus 
far is that, from the perspective of individual criminal responsibility for such 
acts, the various ‘sources’ of international law that apply in those two regimes of 
law are not suffi  cient, particularly when viewed in the light of the (potentially) 
adverse consequences that could fl ow from damage of this type, and the idea 
that a person would have the specifi c intention to signifi cantly damage the 
environment. Th is analysis has in fact reinforced the clear imperatives for the 
sanctioning of such behaviour within the scope of international criminal law 
that were raised in chapter 1.
1 Eric Talbot Jensen and James J. Teixeira, Jr., ‘Prosecuting Members of the U.S. Military for 
Wartime Environmental Crimes’ (2005) 17 Georgetown International Environmental Law 
Review 651, 655.
Chapter Four.  Regulation of the Intentional Destruction of the Environment 
during Warfare under the Existing Rome Statute Regime
178 Intersentia
Th is has been the approach taken by the international community. Whilst the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court2 does not contain a specifi c 
crime of ‘crimes against the environment’ within the crimes in relation to which 
the Court has jurisdiction,3 it does, as noted, set out the circumstances in which 
a particular level of damage to the ‘natural environment’ may constitute a war 
crime. Th is represents the fi rst time that the environment has been expressly 
mentioned in the constitutive documents of any of the international criminal 
courts and tribunals that have been established, commencing from (and 
including) the Nuremberg Military Tribunal.4
As a general observation, the inclusion of such a provision within the statute 
of what is intended to be a permanent international criminal court might, 
potentially, represent an important preliminary step towards individual criminal 
responsibility for intentional environmental destruction during armed confl ict. 
However, of course, the eff ectiveness of any proscriptive provision largely 
depends upon its express terms. It is therefore necessary to carefully analyse the 
precise scope and eff ect of this provision – and any other crime set out within the 
Rome Statute that might be relevant – to understand whether, in fact, they serve 
to expand the reach of the mechanisms of international justice that are designed 
to ‘end impunity’ for those who commit international crimes. Th e reality of the 
severe damage that has been, and inevitably will in the future be, infl icted on the 
environment during the course of armed confl ict, necessitates an understanding 
of whether the existing obligations are adequate, or whether, in fact, they may 
need further development and amendment.
Th e discussion below therefore examines whether, and to what extent (if at all), 
the position may have changed with the coming into force on 1  July 2002 of 
the Rome Statute, and the establishment of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC or the Court). In accordance with the provisions of the Rome Statute, the 
ICC has jurisdiction in relation to the specifi c crimes of genocide (as defi ned 
in article 6), crimes against humanity (article 7), war crimes (article 8), as well 
as the more recently defi ned crime of aggression.5 Th ese crimes, particularly 
2 Opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3; 37 ILM 999 (entered into force 1 July 2002) 
(Rome Statute).
3 Th is was partly due to the fact that such an idea ‘regrettably’ failed to gain support in the 
deliberations leading to the fi nalization of the Rome Statute; Alfred Rest, ‘Enhanced 
Implementation of International Environmental Treaties by Judiciary – Access to Justice 
in International Environmental Law for Individuals and NGOs: Effi  cacious Enforcement 
by the Permanent Court of Arbitration’ (2004) 1 Macquarie Journal of International and 
Comparative Environmental Law 1, 18.
4 International Military Tribunal for the Trial of the German Major War Criminals at 
Nuremberg (Nuremberg Military Tribunal).
5 Th e Rome Statute originally provided that the Court would exercise jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression once a provision defi ning the crime and setting out the conditions under 
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those of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, are broadly 
regarded as refl ecting universal international criminal norms.6 Shortly 
aft er the conclusion of the Rome Statute, a Trial Chamber of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia7 described the legal eff ect of the 
provisions of the Rome Statute in the following way:8
[d]epending on the matter at issue, the Rome Statute may be taken to restate, refl ect 
or clarify customary rules or crystallise them, whereas in some areas it creates new 
law or modifi es existing law. At any event, the Rome Statute by and large may be 
taken as constituting an authoritative expression of the legal views of a great number 
of States.
Since that time, it has been asserted that the Rome Statute ‘purports to contain 
a comprehensive stocktaking of the current status of customary international 
law’.9 Th is may be over-stating the case, since, as noted, particular aspects of the 
defi nitions of crimes in the Rome Statute, in particular, that of crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, and the crime of aggression as a whole, most likely 
also include(d) elements of ‘progressive development’, rather than already well-
established principles of law. Hence, arguments persist as to whether every 
aspect of the defi nitions of the crimes in the Rome Statute may (or may not) be 
identical to current customary international law.10 Nevertheless, it is generally 
which such jurisdiction would be exercised was adopted in accordance with the procedures 
set out in that instrument; Rome Statute, article 5(2). Th is was a ‘last-minute addition’ to the 
Rome Statute: Danesh Sarooshi, ‘Th e Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (1999) 48 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 387, 400. A defi nition of the crime was agreed 
at the fi rst Review Conference of the Rome Statute, held in Kampala, Uganda from 31 May 
to 11 June 2010: see Resolution RC/Res.6, adopted at the Review Conference on 11 June 2010 
<www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf> at 23 January 2015. See 
Rome Statute, articles 8 bis, 15 bis and 15 ter.
6 For the purposes of the discussion that follows, these three crimes are referred to in this and 
the following chapter as the ‘core’ international crimes.
7 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 
1991 (ICTY).
8 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Furundzjia, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Trial Chamber, 10 December 1998, 
para 227.
9 Elaina I. Kalivretakis, ‘Are Nuclear Weapons Above the Law? A Look at the International 
Criminal Court and the Prohibited Weapons Category’ (2001) 15 Emory International Law 
Review 683, 684.
10 See, for example, Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (2003), 91–4. See also 
Judgement, Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago 
Josipovic, Dragan Papic and Vladimir Santic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, 14 January 
2000, where the Trial Chamber (at para 545) noted that ‘[b]y requiring that crimes against 
humanity be committed in either internal or international armed confl ict, the [United 
Nations] Security Council, in establishing the [ICTY], may have defi ned the crime in Article 5 
[of the Statute of the ICTY] more narrowly than is necessary under customary international 
law’. It may be pertinent, however, to note that Antonio Cassese was the Presiding Judge in 
that specifi c case.
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acknowledged that the parameters of the core international crimes (that is, 
other than the crime of aggression) represent acts that are a gross aff ront to 
fundamental norms.
Th is chapter examines these three core international crimes, as they currently 
appear in the Rome Statute, with a view to determining whether, individually 
or in toto, they are suffi  cient to address the need for individual criminal 
responsibility under international criminal law relating to the intentional 
destruction of the environment during armed confl ict. In addition, therefore, to 
a detailed analysis of the only provision of the Rome Statute that makes express 
reference to the environment – the war crime defi ned in article 8(2)(b)(iv) – it is 
also necessary to undertake a (briefer) examination of other core international 
crimes to determine whether such acts might also (or instead) fall within their 
scope, even though they are not specifi cally directed towards environmental 
damage.
Following this analysis, it will be possible to form a conclusion as to whether 
article 8(2)(b)(iv), together with, or independently of the other core international 
crimes within the Rome Statute, comprehensively meet what is argued in this 
book to be an impending need.11 If it is concluded that the current regime 
within the Rome Statute does not fulfi l the requirements to address such acts, a 
consideration of alternate ‘solutions’ is necessary. Th is would inevitably involve 
amendment of the Rome Statute.
Th is analysis will serve to test the underlying hypothesis that has motivated 
this book – that there is a need to defi ne a new sui generis crime to cover such 
behaviour, since it is not adequately addressed in the existing Rome Statute 
regime and, as has been demonstrated in previous chapters, neither is it properly 
dealt with under the jus in bello and international environmental law treaties, 
nor under customary international law. Before undertaking this analysis, 
however, it is necessary to briefl y set out the background to the establishment of 
the Court, as well as its general jurisdictional mandate.
4.2. FINALIZATION OF THE ROME STATUTE AND 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ICC
In December 1989, in response to a request by Trinidad and Tobago, the United 
Nations General Assembly asked the International Law Commission (ILC) to 
resume its work on the draft ing of a constitutive instrument for an international 
11 Refer in particular to chapter 1.
4.2. Finalization of the Rome Statute and Establishment of the ICC
Intersentia 181
criminal court,12 with a jurisdiction that would specifi cally include drug 
traffi  cking.13 Th e ILC subsequently completed a draft  statute (ILC Draft 
Statute) and submitted it to the United Nations General Assembly in 1994.14 
Even though the fi nal version of the Rome Statute diff ers quite signifi cantly from 
the ILC Draft  Statute,15 in the words of the chairperson of the ILC Working 
Group that produced the draft , it ‘got the diplomatic ball rolling again’.16
Following receipt of the ILC Draft  Statute, the General Assembly established 
the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court (Ad Hoc Committee), which met twice in 1995 and then reported back 
to the General Assembly. Having considered the Ad Hoc Committee’s report, 
the General Assembly subsequently created the Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court (PrepCom), to prepare a 
consolidated draft  text for submission to a diplomatic conference. Th e PrepCom, 
which began meeting in 1996, completed its work at its fi nal session in March-
April of 1998.
12 Th e ILC had in 1948 already been invited by the United Nations General Assembly to ‘study 
the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial 
of persons charged with genocide and other crimes’: United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 260 (III) B (9  December 1948) UN Doc A/RES/260(III)B on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Study by the International Law Commission 
of the Question of an International Criminal Jurisdiction. However, the political realities 
associated with the Cold War meant that, in 1954, the United Nations General Assembly 
halted work on the draft ing of any statute for such a proposed court: see United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 897 (IX) (4  December 1954) UN Doc A/RES/897(IX) on the 
Draft  Code of Off ences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, and United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 898 (IX) (14  December 1954) UN Doc A/RES/898(IX) on 
the International Criminal Jurisdiction. For a description of the evolution of the system of 
international criminal justice leading up to the establishment of the ICC, see Steven Freeland, 
‘International Criminal Justice and the Death Penalty’, in Jon Yorke (ed), Th e Right to Life and 
the Value of Life: Orientations in Law, Politics and Ethics (2010), 193, 195–210.
13 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 44/39 (4 December 1989) UN Doc A/RES/44/39 
on the International Criminal Responsibility of Individuals and Entities Engaged in Illicit 
Traffi  cking in Narcotic Drugs across National Frontiers and Other Transnational Criminal 
Activities, para 1.
14 Draft  Statute for an International Criminal Court, Report of the International Law 
Commission on Its Forty-sixth session, United Nations General Assembly Offi  cial Records 
49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc A/49/10 (1994) (ILC Draft  Statute).
15 It has been suggested by Gilbert Bitti that the ILC Draft  Statute was ‘a common law orientated’ 
document, and consequently required considerable amendment in order to accommodate 
the concern among civil lawyers that the Court would become an ‘International Criminal 
Common Law Court’: Gilbert Bitti, ‘Two Bones of Contention Between Civil and Common 
Law: Th e Record of the Proceedings and the Treatment of a Concursus Delictorum’, in Horst 
Fischer, Claus Kress and Sascha Rolf Lüder (eds), International and National Prosecution of 
Crimes Under International Law: Current Developments (2001), 273, 273–4 (emphasis added).
16 James Crawford, ‘Th e draft ing of the Rome Statute’, in Philippe Sands (ed), From Nuremberg 
to Th e Hague: Th e Future of International Criminal Justice (2003), 109, 110.
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Th e General Assembly convened the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (1998 
Rome Conference), which was held from 15 June to 17 July 1998, ‘with a view to 
fi nalizing and adopting a convention on the establishment of an international 
criminal court’.17 Th e 1998 Rome Conference was attended by delegations 
from over 160 States, 30 Intergovernmental Organizations and 230 Non-
Governmental Organizations. During the Rome Conference, several complex 
questions remained to be agreed and, at times, the discussions were tortured and 
acrimonious, not the least because many of the States had not participated in the 
Ad Hoc Committee or PrepCom discussions, and were thus confronted with a 
detailed draft  perhaps even for the fi rst time.18 Right up until the fi nal vote, there 
remained a number of contentious issues – particularly in relation to the extent 
of the Court’s proposed jurisdiction, as well as its relationship with the United 
Nations Security Council. In the end, however, the delegates adopted the fi nal 
terms of the Rome Statute, albeit not unanimously.19
As events at the 1998 Rome Conference and subsequently have illustrated, the 
establishment of the Court was as political an event as it was signifi cant in the 
evolution of international criminal justice. Th e negotiating States, as well as the 
other stakeholders at the 1998 Rome Conference, represented a multitude of 
diff ering views as to how the Court should be structured. Th e fi nal terms of the 
Rome Statute were, in many respects, the result of an ‘enduring tension inherent 
in multilateral negotiations between sovereignty and universality’,20 which by 
necessity required a ‘solution’ based upon political compromise, even including 
the question as to what crimes should be included in the Rome Statute,21 in 
order that the (draft ) instrument could be presented as ‘marketable’ to the 
delegates.22
17 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 52/160 (15  December 1997) UN Doc A/
RES/52/160 on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, para 3.
18 Kalivretakis, supra note 9, 697–8.
19 Of those represented at the 1998 Rome Conference, 120 States voted to adopt the Rome 
Statute. Th ere were 21 abstentions and seven States (China, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar, Yemen 
and the United States of America) voted against the resolution.
20 Tim McCormack and Sue Robertson, ‘Jurisdictional Aspects of the Rome Statute for the New 
International Criminal Court’ (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 635, 636.
21 For example, a number of States had argued that the defi nition of war crimes should include a 
provision prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. As the 1998 Rome Conference was drawing 
to a close, these States largely agreed to compromise on this point – with the result that such 
a provision was not included in the Rome Statute – since they were prepared to ‘put the larger 
goal of achieving an international criminal court fi rst’: see Kalivretakis, supra note 9, 702.
22 Sharon A. Williams, ‘Th e Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court – Universal 
Jurisdiction or State Consent – To Make or Break the Package Deal’, in Michael J.N. Schmitt 
(ed), International Law Studies Volume 75: International Law Across the Spectrum of Confl ict 
(2000), 539, 546.
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Of course, compromise may also produce an instrument refl ecting an agreement 
of the ‘lowest common denominator’, with the result that important issues may 
be consciously omitted from the fi nal version, and the language utilized may 
give rise to more than one possible meaning, uncertainties as to interpretation, 
and/or weaknesses that may dilute its eff ectiveness in addressing the object(s) of 
the instrument.
Th e precise scope of those crimes included in the fi nal version of Rome Statute 
thus represented a realpolitik compromise in the circumstances – a careful 
balance between the important goals of the Court on the one hand,23 and a 
politically acceptable series of defi nitions of proscribed acts to be regarded 
as international crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court on the other. In 
such a context, a more expansive approach towards prohibiting intentional 
environmental damage during armed confl ict beyond the scope of what was 
agreed under article 8(2)(b)(iv) was not politically feasible.
Certainly, also, the specifi c proscription of intentional environmental 
destruction was not among the principal concerns of the delegates to the 1998 
Rome Conference. In the end, the conclusion of the Rome Statute, and the 
establishment four years later of the ICC, were considered by the international 
community to be the most important outcome, notwithstanding the 
impossibility of satisfying the concerns of all stakeholders.
If anything, the importance of the principles represented by the aims of the 
Court has grown further since 1998. Th e fi nalization of the Rome Statute 
and its subsequent ratifi cation (thus far) by 123 States (as at January 2015),24 
demonstrates a broader acceptance of the principle underlying the establishment 
of the ICC – the need for more eff ective enforcement of the universal norms 
of international criminal law. Given that the Rome Statute was fi nalized 17 
years ago, and the ICC has been operating for more than a decade, it is argued 
that the imperatives for individual criminal responsibility have expanded 
in the intervening years, and it is now appropriate to (re)consider the issue of 
intentional environmental destruction during armed confl ict in greater detail. 
Th is is the main focus of this and the following chapter.
Th e Court has been given the mandate to play a role when certain international 
crimes have (allegedly) been committed. As a permanent court, it diff ers from 
the ad hoc international criminal Tribunals. Th e ICTY and ICTR were set up 
23 See Rome Statute, preamble.
24 Palestine acceded to the Rome Statute on 2  January 2015. Th e Rome Statute will enter into 
force for Palestine on 1 April 2015: see ICC Website, ‘Palestine’ <www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/
asp/states%20parties/asian%20states/Pages/Palestine.aspx> at 23 January 2015.
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as ‘UN subsidiary organs’25 in response to specifi c events, and were always 
intended to have a limited life-span, as is indicated by the formulation of the 
Completion Strategy for those Tribunals.26
By contrast, the ICC is ‘a permanent institution’,27 established under a treaty 
and, as such, is formally independent of the United Nations, although there is 
clearly an ongoing relationship between the two institutions on several key 
issues.28 Th e Court has the power to exercise its jurisdiction with respect to 
circumstances that may occur in the future – that is, at any time aft er the Rome 
Statute came into force (1  July 2002).29 Unless the Assembly of States Parties 
to the Rome Statute decides to completely alter the nature or focus of the Court, 
the ICC will remain in place for the long-term, and will have the potential to 
play a role in circumstances where ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole’ have been committed.30
In this sense, the Court represents an important mechanism of international 
criminal justice in relation to values and norms that are accepted universally 
among the international community now and into the future. Th ese values 
and norms will continue to evolve further in the years and decades following 
the establishment of the ICC, in order to address relevant concerns regarding 
25 Sarooshi, supra note 5, 389.
26 See inter alia United Nations Security Council Resolution 1503 (28  August 2003) UN 
Doc S/Res/1503 on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1534 (26  March 2004) UN Doc S/Res/1534 on the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1966 (22 December 2010) UN Doc S/Res/1966/2010 on the International 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and 
Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory 
of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations 
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 
1994.
27 Rome Statute, article 1.
28 Th ere is a Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and 
the United Nations (4 October 2004) ICC Doc ICC-ASP/3/Res.1, whose purpose is to ‘defi ne 
(…) the terms on which the United Nations and the Court shall be brought into relationship’ 
(article 1(1)). In addition, there are a number of provisions in the Rome Statute that formalize 
various aspects of the specifi c relationship between the Court and the United Nations 
Security Council: see, for example, Rome Statute, articles 13(b), 16, 53(2)(c), 53(3)(a), 87(5), 
87(7) and 115(b).
29 It should be noted, however, that if a State becomes a State Party to the Rome Statute aft er 
1  July 2002, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed 
aft er the entry into force of the Rome Statute for that State, unless that State has made a 
declaration as a non-State Party under article 12(3) of the Rome Statute: see Rome Statute, 
article 11(2).
30 Rome Statute, preamble para 4.
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actions taken within the context of armed confl ict that may, for example, 
threaten the future of humanity. It is contended in this book that the integrity 
of the environment has become such a concern not just in respect of its own 
sake, but also from a human rights perspective,31 and that it is important to 
adequately address the intentional destruction of the environment during armed 
confl ict from an international criminal law perspective, utilizing the ICC acting 
in accordance with the Rome Statute.
As United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi  Annan, put it following the adoption 
of the Rome Statute at the conclusion of the 1998 Rome Conference, the Court’s 
creation is:32
a gift  of hope to future generations, and a giant step forward in the march towards 
universal human rights and the rule of law
Not only is this important in and of itself; it also reaffi  rms the interrelationship 
noted in chapter 1 between the maintenance of international peace and 
security – one of the principal purposes of the United Nations33 – and respect 
for fundamental human rights. Th e United Nations Security Council has 
acknowledged that:34
peace and security, development and human rights are the pillars of the United 
Nations system and the foundations for collective security and well-being, and … in 
this regard … development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and 
mutually reinforcing
4.3. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT – A BRIEF 
OVERVIEW
Obviously, the Court can legitimately operate only within the limits of its 
jurisdiction. A specifi c crime will only fall within its jurisdiction where express 
provision has been made within the Rome Statute. Th ere is, however, nothing 
that restricts the inclusion in the future of further crimes within the Rome 
31 See, for example, Laura Horn and Steven Freeland, ‘More than Hot Air: Refl ections on the 
Relationship between Climate Change and Human Rights’ (2009) 13 University of Western 
Sydney Law Review 101.
32 Statement by the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi  Annan at the Ceremony Celebrating 
the Adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (18  July 1998) <http://
untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/rome/proceedings/contents.htm> at 29 March 2013.
33 See United Nations Charter, opened for signature 26  June 1945, 1 UNTS 16; 59 Stat. 1031 
(entered into force 24 October 1945) (United Nations Charter), article 1(1).
34 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1674 (28 April 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1674/2006 
on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Confl ict, preamble para 3.
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Statute, as long as the necessary procedural requirements are complied with. 
As noted, the Rome Statute currently provides that the following crimes, when 
committed aft er 1 July 2002,35 fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC:
(a) Th e crime of Genocide – when committed ‘with intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such’;36
(b) Crimes against Humanity – when committed ‘as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge 
of the attack’;37
(c) War Crimes – which usually involves a breach of 1949 Geneva 
Conventions38 and/or the laws and customs of armed confl ict, ‘in particular 
when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale 
commission of such crimes’;39
(d) Th e Crime of Aggression as recently defi ned.40
Th e specifi c requirements of the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes, particularly as they might possibly be applied to intentional 
destruction of the environment during armed confl ict, are discussed in 4.4 below. 
In general terms, and as is the case with serious crimes under the national law of 
most countries, these crimes require the presence of both a ‘physical’ element 
(actus reus) and a ‘mental’ element (mens rea).41 In terms of the mental element, 
the Rome Statute sets out a ‘default’ standard of mens rea, which specifi es that, 
for individual criminal responsibility to apply, the material (physical) elements 
of the crime must be ‘committed with intent and knowledge’, as those terms are 
defi ned in the provision.42 As discussed in chapter 5, this standard is expressed 
to apply ‘[u]nless otherwise provided’, so that specifi c crimes may have mens rea 
requirements that diff er from the article 30 standard.
35 Th is is, as noted, subject to the terms of article 11(2) of the Rome Statute.
36 See Rome Statute, chapeau article 6.
37 Ibid, article 7(1).
38 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into 
force 21 October 1950) (1949 Geneva Convention I), Geneva Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 
opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (1949 
Geneva Convention II), Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950) (1949 
Geneva Convention III), Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War, opened for signature 12  August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 
21 October 1950) (1949 Geneva Convention IV).
39 See Rome Statute, article 8(1).
40 See ibid, article 8 bis.
41 See, for example, William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law (2000), chapters 4 and 5.
42 Rome Statute, article 30(1). Article 30 is discussed in more detail in chapter 5.
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Articles 12 and 13 of the Rome Statute specify the ‘[p]reconditions to the exercise 
of jurisdiction’ and ‘exercise of jurisdiction’ by the Court respectively.43 In 
summary, the Court can exercise its jurisdiction in relation to these crimes in 
the following circumstances:
(a) where an (alleged) crime has been committed on the territory of a State 
Party to the Rome Statute;44
(b) where a national(s) of a State Party to the Rome Statute is alleged to have 
committed a crime;45
(c) where a situation in which a crime(s) ‘appears to have been committed’ has 
been referred to the Prosecutor of the ICC by the United Nations Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter;46 or
(d) where a non-State Party to the Rome Statute lodges a declaration with the 
Registrar of the ICC, accepting the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to 
the ‘crime in question’.47
As also noted, the ICC is also subject to a specifi c ratione temporis, as set out in 
article 11 of the Rome Statute.
Th e jurisdiction of the Court is subject to the principle of ‘complementarity’ 
as established under the Rome Statute. In essence, this means that primary 
responsibility for the prosecution of these crimes lies with States, and that the 
ICC therefore operates as a ‘court of last resort’. Th is in itself demonstrates a 
shift  in emphasis from the culture of impunity that had existed before the 1990s, 
during which time States had been reluctant to try their own nationals for war 
crimes, ‘and even more [so] where crimes against humanity or genocide [were] 
concerned’.48
43 Th ere are specifi c provisions relating to the exercise by the Court of its jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression, which have the eff ect that such jurisdiction will not exist until 1 January 
2017 at the earliest, subject to various requirements: see ibid, article 15 bis and 15 ter.
44 Ibid, article 12(2)(a).
45 Ibid, article 12(2)(b).
46 Ibid, article 13(b).
47 Ibid, article  12(3). For a discussion of the declaration process by non-State Parties under 
article  12(3) of the Rome Statute, see Steven Freeland, ‘How Open Should the Door 
Be? – Declarations by non-States Parties under Article  12(3) of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court’ (2006) 75(2) Nordic Journal of International Law 211; Carsten 
Stahn, ‘Why some Doors may be Closed Already: Second Th oughts on a ‘Case-by-Case’ 
Treatment of Article 12(3) Declarations’ (2006) 75 Nordic Journal of International Law 243.
48 Philippe Sands, ‘Aft er Pinochet: the role of national courts’, in Philippe Sands (ed), From 
Nuremberg to Th e Hague: Th e Future of International Criminal Justice (2003), 68, 72.
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Article  17 of the Rome Statute applies the complementarity principle in terms 
of the ‘admissibility’ of a case. A case is determined by the Court as being 
inadmissible inter alia where:49
(a) [t]he case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction 
over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution;
(b) [t]he case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the 
State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision 
resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute;
(…)
(d) [t]he case is not of suffi  cient gravity to justify further action by the Court.
Th is creates what has been described as a ‘presumption in favour of prosecution 
in domestic courts’,50 given that it accords a priority to national jurisdiction. 
Th is is to be contrasted with the ‘primacy’ principle under which the ad hoc 
Tribunals operate.51
49 Rome Statute, article 17(1). Th e Appeals Chamber of the ICC considered the meaning of the 
words ‘is being investigated’ in article 17(1)(a) of the Rome Statute in Judgment on the appeal 
of the Republic of Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled 
“Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility 
of the Case Pursuant to Article  19(2)(b) of the Statute”, Th e Prosecutor v. William Samoei 
Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09–01/11 OA, Appeals 
Chamber, 30 August 2011, and Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the 
decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled “Decision on the Application by the 
Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article  19(2)
(b) of the Statute”, Th e Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and 
Mohammed Hussein Ali, Case No. ICC-01/09–02/11 OA, Appeals Chamber, 30 August 2011.
50 Sarooshi, supra note 5, 395.
51 See articles 9(1) and 9(2) of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed 
in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, 32 ILM 1159 (entered into force 
25 May 1993) (ICTY Statute). Th e Appeals Chamber of the ICTY confi rmed the legitimacy 
of its primacy in Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 
Prosecutor v Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Appeals Chamber, 2  October 1995, para 
49–64. See also articles  8(1) and 8(2) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan 
Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of 
Neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, 33 ILM 1598 (entered 
into force 8  November 1994) (ICTR Statute), which is in slightly wider terms. It has been 
suggested that the wording in the ICTR Statute, which was draft ed aft er the ICTY Statute, 
refl ected a broader consensus at that time among the United Nations Security Council as to 
the concept of primacy: Bartram S. Brown, ‘Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the 
Jurisdiction of National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals’ (1998) 23 Th e Yale 
Journal of International Law 391, 402.
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Article 17(2) specifi es those circumstances in which the ICC may determine the 
‘unwillingness’ of a State in a particular case. Th is may arise in the following 
situations:52
(a) [t]he proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made 
for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility 
(…);
(b) … an unjustifi ed delay in the proceedings … inconsistent with an intent to bring 
the person concerned to justice;
(c) [t]he proceedings were or are not being conducted independently or impartially, 
and … are being conducted in a manner … inconsistent with an intent to bring 
the person concerned to justice.
In assessing these circumstances, the Court is to have regard to ‘the principles 
of due process recognized by international law’.53 In determining a State’s 
(in)ability in a particular case, the Court has to consider whether:54
due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, 
the State is unable to obtain the accused or … evidence or otherwise [is] unable to 
carry out its proceedings
4.4. APPLICABILITY OF THE ROME STATUTE TO 
THE INTENTIONAL DESTRUCTION OF THE 
ENVIRONMENT DURING WARFARE
Th e remainder of this chapter will examine the extent to which the intentional 
destruction of the environment during armed confl ict is addressed by the 
existing core international crimes defi ned in the Rome Statute. As mentioned, 
article  8(2)(b)(iv) expressly refers to, and ‘criminalizes’ damage to the natural 
environment in certain specifi c circumstances. Th e terms of this provision will 
be discussed in 4.4.3.1.
Before turning to that specifi c provision, however, one should fi rst consider 
whether it may be possible that other provisions of the Rome Statute might also 
be relevant to such acts; specifi cally, whether the crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity and other war crimes (apart from article  8(2)(b)(iv)) also 
address the issue to any signifi cant degree. In this way, one can gain a more 
comprehensive understanding of the applicability of the Rome Statute to acts 
that might constitute a crime against the environment, as well as the signifi cance 
52 Rome Statute, article 17(2).
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid, article 17(3).
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of article  8(2)(b)(iv) itself within the broader schema of crimes within the 
instrument. In undertaking this exercise, however, it is important to bear in 
mind that, as provided in the Rome Statute itself:55
[t]he defi nition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by 
analogy. In case of ambiguity, the defi nition shall be interpreted in favour of the 
person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.
4.4.1. INTENTIONAL DESTRUCTION 
OF THE ENVIRONMENT AS GENOCIDE?
Th e word ‘genocide’ was fi rst coined in 1944 by a Polish-Jewish lawyer, Raphael 
Lemkin. It was derived from a combination of other words – the fi rst part 
derived from the Greek root génos (meaning ‘race or tribe’), and the second part 
from the Latin caedere (or cide) (‘killing’).56 In a book published that year, 
Lemkin restated the idea he fi rst suggested in the 1930s, that acts that amount to 
the crime of ‘barbarity’ constituted a crime against international law.57 In his 
book, Lemkin presented a defi nition of genocide,58 and conceived of the crime 
as one directed against specifi c ‘groups’, involving:59
the criminal intent to destroy or to cripple permanently a human group. Th e acts are 
directed against groups, as such, and individuals are selected for destruction only 
because they belong to these groups.
55 Ibid, article 22(2). Reference should also be made to the rules relating to the interpretation of 
treaties discussed in chapter 2. In May 2008, the ICC Appeals Chamber endorsed its earlier 
fi nding when considering its methodology for the interpretation of the Rome Statute, where it 
had stated:
 ‘Th e rule governing the interpretation of a section of the law is its wording read in context 
and in light of its object and purpose. Th e context of a given legislative provision is defi ned 
by the particular sub-section of the law read as a whole in conjunction with the section of 
an enactment in its entirety. Its objects may be gathered from the chapter of the law in which 
the particular section is included and its purposes from the wider aims of the law as may 
be gathered from its preamble and general tenor of the treaty’: Judgment on the appeal of 
Mr. Germain Katanga against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber 1 entitled “Decision on the 
Defence Request Concerning Languages”, Th e Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-
01/04–01/07 (OA3), Appeals Chamber, 27 May 2008, para 39.
56 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, 
Proposals for Redress (1944), 79. See also Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a 
Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Th e Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir (‘Omar Al Bashir’), Case No. ICC-02/05–01/09, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
4 March 2009, para 114.
57 In 1933, Lemkin proposed at the fi ft h International Conference for the Unifi cation of Criminal 
Law that the destruction of racial, religious or social groups constituted a crime under 
international law. He advocated for the creation of both the crime of barbarism and the crime of 
vandalism: Nina H.B. Jørgensen, Th e Responsibility of States for International Crimes (2000), 32.
58 Lemkin, supra note 56, 79.
59 Raphael Lemkin, ‘Genocide as a Crime Under International Law’ (1947) 44 American Journal 
of International Law 145, 146.
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Lemkin argued that persons who committed genocide should be subject 
to trial in an international court, since ‘a country which makes a policy of 
genocide cannot be trusted to try its own off enders’.60 He lobbied to have the 
issue of genocide as an international crime discussed at the United Nations 
General Assembly and, with the support of the United States this item was 
eventually placed on the agenda of that body. Th e concept was soon taken up 
widely by the international community, which agreed with the assertion that 
genocide was indeed a crime under international law.61 Th ere then followed 
a number of General Assembly Resolutions,62 culminating in the conclusion 
and unanimous adoption by the General Assembly of the 1948 Genocide 
Convention.63 Th is landmark instrument set out an agreed defi nition of 
genocide that has since remained largely unchanged.
Th e 1948 Genocide Convention was the fi rst major treaty dealing with human 
rights issues to be concluded under the auspices of the United Nations. Th e 
International Court of Justice has said of the 1948 Genocide Convention that:64
[t]he origins of the Convention show that it was the intention of the United Nations 
to condemn and punish genocide as “a crime under international law” involving a 
denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, a denial which shocks the 
conscience of mankind and results in great losses to humanity, and which is contrary 
to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations
However, despite the signifi cance of the 1948 Genocide Convention, and the 
recognition of genocide as an international crime, the precise ‘meaning’ of the 
crime, as it had been defi ned, was not judicially considered for many years. Th e 
60 Raphael Lemkin, ‘Genocide: A Modern Crime’ (1945) 4 Free World 39, reproduced in Samuel 
Totten and Paul R. Bartrop (eds), Th e Genocide Studies Reader (2009), 6, 10.
61 Some commentators consider that acts of genocide had in fact been included within the 
concept of ‘crimes against humanity’ as applied in the indictments brought under the Charter 
of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, annexed to the 1945 London Agreement 
for the Establishment of an International Military Tribunal (8  August 1945) 82 UNTS 279 
(Nuremberg Charter): see, for example, Restatement of the Law: Th ird Restatement of U.S. 
Foreign Relations Law, Volume 2 (1987), 165, ss 702, Reporters’ comments, para 3. However, 
it is now accepted that, even though they have some common elements, what distinguishes 
genocide from crimes against humanity is that the crime of genocide is a ‘crime of intent’ in 
which a specifi c ‘group’ is targeted, and not merely specifi c individuals within that group; 
or put another way, ‘the ultimate victim of genocide is the group’: Judgement on Defence 
Motions to Acquit, Prosecutor v Dusko Sikirica, Damir Dosen and Dragan Kolundzjia, Case 
No. IT-95-8-T, Trial Chamber, 3 September 2001, para 89.
62 See, for example, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 96(I) (11 December 1946) UN 
Doc A/RES/96/(I) on the Crime of Genocide.
63 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for 
signature 9  December 1948, 78 UNTS 277 (entered into force 12  January 1951) (Genocide 
Convention).
64 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Advisory Opinion) [1951] ICJ Rep 16, 23.
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lack of political will, coupled with the prevailing geopolitical circumstances in the 
period between the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1990s, meant that 
the prosecution of such a crime at the international level (or indeed at the national 
level), was neither a high priority nor, in many situations, a practical possibility. 
It was not until aft er the establishment of the ad hoc Tribunals dealing with the 
confl icts in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda that an international criminal 
court began to consider the precise meaning of the defi nition in any detail.
Th e crime of genocide as defi ned in the Rome Statute is drawn from the 
defi nition in the 1948 Genocide Convention, which was incorporated as well 
into the ICTY and ICTR Statutes.65 Th e preamble of the 1948 Genocide 
Convention notes that ‘at all periods of history genocide has infl icted great losses 
on humanity’.66 Genocide has been referred to as the ‘crime of crimes’67 and 
is oft en regarded as the most heinous of all violations of human rights.68 Th e 
particular distinguishing characteristic of the crime of genocide is, as noted, 
its focus on ‘groups’, specifi cally the intended destruction of entire human 
groups.69 It therefore incorporates a very specifi c dolus specialis, being the 
intent ‘to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such’.70
From the perspective of any prosecution, this specifi c intent is far more complex 
in terms of proof than a general intent, which might instead be inferred on the 
basis of a ‘reasonable person’ test,71 and/or the default standard of intent set out 
in article 30 of the Rome Statute referred to above. For this reason, genocide is a 
65 Th ere are, however, some diff erences between the ICTY and ICTR Statutes on the one 
hand and the Rome Statute on the other. For example, article 4(3) of the ICTY Statute and 
article 2(3) of the ICTR Statute respectively specify that the following acts are punishable:
 ‘(a) Genocide;
 (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
 (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
 (d) Attempt to commit genocide;
 (e) Complicity in genocide’.
 By contrast, these acts are not included in article  6 of the Rome Statute, but are instead 
incorporated into article  25(3), which deals with individual criminal responsibility and 
applies to each of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. Th e act of ‘directly and 
publicly incit[ing] others to commit genocide’ is, however, specifi cally referred to in 
article 25(3)(e) of the Rome Statute.
66 Genocide Convention, preamble para 2.
67 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber, 
2 September 1998, para 16.
68 Daniela de Vito, Aisha Gill and Damien Short, ‘Rape characterized as genocide’ (2009) 10 
SUR International Journal on Human Rights 29, 37.
69 Ibid, 36.
70 1948 Genocide Convention, article II. See also, for example, Rome Statute, chapeau article 6.
71 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Th e Normative Framework of International Humanitarian Law: 
Overlaps, Gaps, and Ambiguities’, in Michael J.N. Schmitt (ed), International Law Studies 
Volume 75: International Law Across the Spectrum of Confl ict (2000), 1, 9.
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very diffi  cult crime to prove in the absence of a clear ‘paper trail’ – which would 
not normally exist72 – although, as noted, there have since 1998 been several 
successful prosecutions of genocide before the ad hoc Tribunals, and counts of 
genocide have also been alleged against an accused before the ICC.73
As for the ‘physical’ elements, the crime comprises a number of acts of genocide 
relating to four specifi c types of group. Th e concept of genocide based on an 
intention to destroy a ‘political’ group was not included in the fi nal defi nition, 
despite having been part of both Lemkin’s original draft  defi nition, as well as 
the more general description adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
two years prior to the conclusion of the 1948 Genocide Convention.74 Attempts 
to include political and social groups into the Rome Statute defi nition were also 
not accepted at the 1998 Rome Conference, as the majority of States present 
did not want to alter a defi nition that was clearly recognized under customary 
international law.75
Similarly, the defi nition of genocide does not appear to include actions intended 
to destroy (in whole or in part) a group based on their culture. Th us, from a legal 
perspective, there exists no formal concept under international criminal law of 
‘cultural genocide’.76
Th ese observations raise a more general point; that the existing defi nitions of 
a number of the core international crimes in the relevant treaties, including 
that of genocide, are now too narrow and require revision or ‘upgrading’,77 
in order to make them accord more closely with the both contemporary 
values and reality.78 Th is has, for example, been the case, as has been noted, 
with respect to the sexual violence provisions within the defi nition of crimes 
72 See, for example, id, where Cherif Bassiouni suggests that the 1948 Genocide Convention was 
draft ed with the Nazi Germany experience in mind, which left  behind a very detailed paper 
trail, but that this is a ‘situation [that] never has been repeated’.
73 See Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Th e Prosecutor v. Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (‘Omar Al Bashir’), Case No. ICC-02/05–01/09, Pre-Trial Chamber 
I, 12  July 2010. Th is accused was also currently charged with fi ve counts of crimes against 
humanity and two counts of war crimes. However, as noted, the investigation by the ICC 
Prosecutor in the case concerning President Bashir is currently suspended.
74 See United Nations General Assembly Resolution 96(I) (11  December 1946) UN Doc A/
RES/96/(I) on the Crime of Genocide, para 4.
75 See Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law (2005), 191.
76 See, however, id, where the author has suggests that article 6(e) of the Rome Statute (‘Forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group’) ‘defi nes a form of cultural genocide’.
77 Steven Freeland, ‘Towards Universal Justice – Why Countries in the Asia / Pacifi c Region 
should Embrace the International Criminal Court’ (2007) 5 New Zealand Journal of Public 
and International Law 49, 63.
78 See, for example, Jørgensen, supra note 57, 41, where that author, when discussing the notion 
of State responsibility for genocide, argues that ‘[t]he time now seems ripe to bring the [1948] 
Genocide Convention up to date’.
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against humanity,79 and is a topic that is the subject of ongoing debate among 
academic commentators.80 Yet, history has thus far indicated that there is a 
strong reluctance among States to amend the defi nition of the crime of genocide, 
particularly given its ‘crime of crime’ connotations.
Putting this question aside, acts designed to destroy a group (in whole or in part) 
could possibly involve the intentional destruction of the environment during 
armed confl ict, as a way of attempting to render impossible the group’s ability to 
continue to exist. Th e Rome Statute specifi es that ‘[d]eliberately infl icting on the 
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction’ would 
fall within the type of acts that constitute genocide.81 Under this provision, it 
is not necessary for the intended ‘results’ – the actual destruction of the group 
– to occur. A ‘result requirement’ had been proposed by the United States in the 
draft ing process of the Elements of Crimes under the Rome Statute (Elements of 
Crimes),82 but was ultimately not included in the fi nal version.83
Although the footnote to article 6(c) in the Elements of Crimes also envisages 
a broader range of circumstances,84 acts such as the draining of the marshes 
in southern Iraq, or the poisoning of water wells or destruction of forests 
upon which local indigenous groups depend, could arguably fall within this 
description, although it is still necessary to demonstrate that the special intention 
79 Compare article  5(g) of both the ICTY Statute and the ICTR Statute, which each refer to 
‘rape’, with article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute, which covers ‘Rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of 
comparable gravity’.
80 See, for example, Cassese, supra note 10, 118, who points to the confl ict between the 
generally agreed customary law defi nition of the crime of torture and the narrower treaty 
defi nition, which is limited to certain acts ‘infl icted by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public offi  cial or other person acting in an offi  cial capacity’: 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, opened for signature 10  December 1984, 23 ILM 1027 (entered into force 
26 June 1987), article 1(1).
81 Rome Statute, article 6(c).
82 Article 9(1) of the Rome Statute provides for the adoption of the ‘Elements of Crimes’ by a 
two-thirds majority of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute, and specifi es that 
their function is to ‘assist the Court in the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7 and 8’ 
of the Rome Statute. See also Elements of Crimes (9 September 2002) ICC Doc ICC-ASP/1/3 
(part II-B), article 6(c).
83 Wiebke Rückert and Georg Witschel, ‘Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity in the Elements 
of Crimes’, in Horst Fischer, Claus Kress and Sascha Rolf Lüder (eds), International and 
National Prosecution of Crimes Under International Law: Current Developments (2001), 59, 68.
84 Th is footnote provides that:
 ‘[t]he ‘conditions of life’ may include, but is not necessarily restricted to, deliberate 
deprivation of resources indispensable for survival, such as food or medical services, or 
systematic expulsion from homes’.
 See also Judgement, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber, 
2 September 1998, para 506.
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to ‘destroy’ is directed towards the physical destruction (in whole or in part) of 
the relevant group,85 rather than, for example, their ‘way of life’. As noted, 
proving the existence of this dolus specialis is a diffi  cult exercise, and reliance 
on this provision to address the intentional destruction of the environment will 
therefore rarely be applicable.
In addition, it may be that the targeted group that is the subject of the 
environmental destruction does not constitute one of the established groupings 
within the defi nition of genocide. As noted, these groups were ‘chosen’ very 
carefully by the international community when agreeing the defi nition of the 
crime, and various additional groups suggested by Lemkin and others were 
deliberately not included. Th at said, the categorization into (one or more of) the 
four specifi ed groups in the defi nition of the crime of genocide may not be quite 
as clear-cut as might fi rst appear. Indeed, William Schabas has suggested that 
the listed groups ‘resist eff orts at precise defi nition’.86
In Akayesu,87 Trial Chamber I of the ICTR, when considering the appropriate 
classifi cation of the Tutsi, concluded the grouping of ‘ethnic[al]’ came closest, 
but that to use this categorization was ‘troublesome’ for the Trial Chamber, since 
the Tutsi could not meaningfully be distinguished from the Hutu on the basis 
of language and culture.88 In the end the Trial Chamber preferred its own 
interpretation89 of what constituted a group for the purposes of genocide.90 
85 Judgement, Prosecutor v Goran Jelesić, Case No. IT-95-10-I, Trial Chamber, 14  December 
1999, para 78–83. It has been held by the ICTY Appeals Chamber that the ‘in part’ 
requirement refers to a ‘substantial part of that group’: see Judgement, Prosecutor v Radislav 
Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber, 19  April 2004, para 8 and the various 
references made in para 8–13.
86 Schabas, supra note 41, 109.
87 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber, 
2 September 1998.
88 William A. Schabas, ‘Th e Crime of Genocide in the Jurisprudence of the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda’, in Horst Fischer, Claus Kress 
and Sascha Rolf Lüder (eds), International and National Prosecution of Crimes Under 
International Law: Current Developments (2001), 447, 450.
89 Th e Trial Chamber came to the following conclusion (para 516):
 ‘[m]oreover, the Chamber considered whether the groups protected by the Genocide 
Convention, echoed in Article  2 of the [ICTR] Statute, should be limited to only the four 
groups expressly mentioned and whether they should not also include any group which 
is stable and permanent like the said four groups. In other words, the question that arises 
is whether it would be impossible to punish the physical destruction of a group as such 
under the Genocide Convention, if the said group, although stable and membership is by 
birth, does not meet the defi nition of any one of the four groups expressly protected by the 
Genocide Convention. In the opinion of the Chamber, it is particularly important to respect 
the intention of the draft ers of the Genocide Convention, which according to the travaux 
préparatoires, was patently to ensure the protection of any stable and permanent group’ 
(emphasis added).
90 In this regard, the Trial Chamber read the express terms of the defi nition of genocide beyond 
their ordinary meaning. Resort to the travaux préparatoires of a treaty for the purposes of 
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However, this ‘expansive’ view as to what constitutes a relevant ‘group’ for the 
purposes of the crime of genocide has not been followed in the subsequent 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals. Th e specifi ed list of four groups is 
regarded as exhaustive.91
In Jelesić, for example, Trial Chamber I of the ICTY confi rmed that:92
the preparatory work of the [1948 Genocide] Convention demonstrates that a wish 
was expressed to limit the fi eld of application of the Convention to protecting “stable” 
groups objectively defi ned and to which individuals belong regardless of their own 
desires
Having said this, however, the Trial Chamber in Jelesić did recognize the 
diffi  culties associated with specifying precisely the meaning of the various 
groups that had been ‘objectively defi ned’ for the purposes of the crime. In the 
immediately following paragraph of its judgement, it noted that:93
[a]lthough the objective determination of a religious group still remains possible, 
to attempt to defi ne a national, ethnical or racial group today using objective and 
scientifi cally irreproachable criteria would be a perilous exercise whose result would 
not necessarily correspond to the perception of the persons concerned by such 
categorisation
As a consequence, the Chamber preferred to adopt a ‘subjective criterion’ – the 
perception of the person(s) who intends to target that group – to determine the 
existence of a national, ethnical or racial group for the purposes of the defi nition 
of the crime of genocide.
interpretation should only be undertaken to clarify ‘ambiguous or obscure’ terms, or those 
where the result would otherwise be ‘manifestly absurd or unreasonable’: Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331; 8 ILM 679 (entered 
into force 27  January 1980), article  32 (see also chapter 2). Whilst the ICTR Statute is not 
a ‘treaty’ as such, and that therefore the VCLT rules for treaty interpretation do not stricto 
sensu apply to that instrument, the defi nition of the crime of genocide in the ICTR Statute 
is, as noted above, taken from a treaty – the Genocide Convention. Th ere is no reason to read 
the (exhaustive) list of groups specifi ed in the ICTR Statute in any other manner than would 
apply to interpreting them in that treaty.
91 See, for example, Judgement, Prosecutor v Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial 
Chamber, 2 August 2001, para 554, where the ICTY Trial Chamber stated that:
 ‘the Genocide Convention does not protect all types of human groups. Its application is 
confi ned to national, ethnical, racial or religious groups’.
92 Judgement, Prosecutor v Goran Jelesić, Case No. IT-95-10-I, Trial Chamber, 14  December 
1999, para 69 (emphasis added).
93 Ibid, para 70 (emphasis added).
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While this subjective approach has not always been followed,94 and has been 
criticised by some commentators,95 the point to be taken for present purposes 
is that there may be circumstances where the defi nition of genocide might, in 
practice, be somewhat ‘broader’ than what might appear from a strict reading of 
the wording as set out in the relevant instruments. Indeed, in Rutaganda, Trial 
Chamber I of the ICTR (which comprised the same Judges as in Akayesu), when 
discussing the various groups specifi ed in the defi nition, noted that ‘[e]ach of 
these concepts must be assessed in the light of a particular political, social and 
cultural context’.96
Nevertheless, irrespective of the expansive approach taken by the ICTR Trial 
Chamber I in Akayesu and Rutaganda, as well as the uncertainties highlighted 
by the ICTY in Jelesić, it appears highly unlikely that the intentional destruction 
of the environment during armed confl ict would per se fall within the (current) 
defi nition of genocide. To assert otherwise would, in eff ect, impose a ‘double 
intent’ requirement to what is already a very complex crime. Not only would 
it be necessary to show the existence of the current dolus specialis, but an 
additional intent – to target the environment as a victim or use it as a weapon 
– would also be necessary to prove genocide for such acts. Th is would constitute 
a redefi nition of the crime (at least in relation to circumstances involving the 
intentional destruction of the environment) and would mean that, for practical 
purposes, it would be virtually impossible to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
the commission of what is already a very diffi  cult crime to prove.
In any event, given the ‘stigma’ associated with this crime of crimes, it would 
be unlikely that circumstances pointing ‘just’ to the intentional targeting of the 
environment alone would be prosecuted as genocide. Consequently, even if acts 
of this type were such as to (possibly) constitute an act of genocide, it is probable 
that the Prosecutor of the ICC would take a very conservative approach. To date, 
prosecution in the international tribunals for the crime of genocide has generally 
been ‘reserved’ for ‘high profi le’ acts that have resulted in, or have been intended 
to directly cause very considerable harm to a relevant group.
It is suggested, therefore, that it would, under current circumstances, be a 
‘bridge too far’ to expect the Prosecutor to run the risk of being seen (rightly 
94 See, for example, Judgement and Sentence, Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe 
Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, Trial Chamber I, 6  December 1999, where the Trial 
Chamber concluded (at para 57) that:
 ‘a subjective defi nition alone is not enough to determine victim groups, as provided for in the 
Genocide Convention’.
95 See, for example, Schabas, supra note 88, 455–6.
96 Judgement and Sentence, Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, Case No. 
ICTR-96-3, Trial Chamber I, 6 December 1999, para 56.
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or wrongly) to be ‘stretching’ the scope of genocide to incorporate actions that 
do not, on their face, appear to be a genocidal acts. Moreover, the Elements of 
Crimes appear to limit any scope for considering intentional environmental 
destruction as an act of genocide, by stipulating that, for each of the acts that 
might constitute an act of genocide under the Rome Statute, that act inter alia 
must have taken place:97
in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or 
was conduct that could itself eff ect such destruction
Th is is not to say that the range of acts of genocide may not expand in the 
future – the decision in Akayesu that, as well as a crime against humanity, 
rape and sexual violence can constitute an act of genocide in particular 
circumstances,98 demonstrates how even this crime is likely to be interpreted 
more expansively in the future in order to refl ect contemporary values.99 In 
this regard, Cherif Bassiouni has suggested that it is valid to consider the scope 
of the crime of genocide ‘as susceptible of progressive interpretation in the light 
of new techniques that nefarious planners devise to achieve their evil goals’.100 
However, at least in the relatively early stages of the judicial activities of the 
ICC, there is a need for the Prosecutor, and the Court itself, not to be seen to 
be ‘creating’ crimes that are not clearly set out in the Rome Statute, as this fl ies 
in the face of the political concerns that lead to the compromised terms of the 
Rome Statute in 1998.
If, for example, an extension of the relevant groups within the defi nition of 
genocide was eventually to be accepted, it might be possible to apply it more easily 
to circumstances of ‘cultural genocide’ perpetrated through the destruction of 
the natural habitat or resources upon which indigenous or minority populations 
are dependent. However, this does not readily fall within the current framework 
of genocide under the Rome Statute and, as such, the prosecution of such acts 
therefore does not appear either legally sustainable or politically feasible at this 
stage.
97 See Elements of Crimes, articles 6(a)(4), 6(b)(4), 6(c)(5), 6(d)(5) and 6(e)(7).
98 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber, 
2 September 1998, para 731. See also de Vito, Gill and Short, supra note 68.
99 In this regard, the Akayesu decision was described at the time as ‘the most important decision 
rendered thus far in the history of women’s jurisprudence’: Kelly Askin, ‘Women’s Issues 
in International Criminal Law: Recent Developments and the Potential Contribution of 
the ICC’, in Dinah Shelton (ed), International Crimes, Peace, and Human Rights: Th e Role 
of the International Criminal Court (2000), 47, 52. For a description of the circumstances 
leading to the inclusion of charges of rape and sexual violence against Jean-Paul Akayesu, 
see Cherie Booth, ‘Prospects and issues for the International Criminal Court: lessons from 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda’, in Philippe Sands (ed), From Nuremberg to Th e Hague: Th e Future of 
International Criminal Justice (2003), 157, 167–72.
100 Bassiouni, supra note 71, 10.
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4.4.2. INTENTIONAL DESTRUCTION OF THE 
ENVIRONMENT AS A CRIME AGAINST 
HUMANITY?
Th e Rome Statute defi nes a crime against humanity as any of a number of 
specifi ed acts ‘committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack’.101 Th ese 
include:102
[p]ersecution against any identifi able group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender … or other grounds that are universally 
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act 
referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court
and:103
[o]ther inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suff ering, or 
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health
Although ‘crimes against humanity’ was not formally categorized as a separate 
crime until aft er the Second World War, the concept had by that time already 
been recognised. On 28 May 1915, the Governments of France, Great Britain and 
Russia made a declaration regarding the massacres of the Armenian population 
in Turkey, denouncing them as:104
crimes against humanity and civilisation for which all the members of the Turkish 
government will be held responsible together with its agents implicated in the 
massacres
Crimes against humanity were recognized (and codifi ed) in the Nuremberg 
Charter,105 and considered in the Judgment of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 
as well as in Law No. 10 of the Control Council for Germany,106 and the Tokyo 
Military Tribunal Charter.107 Its inclusion within the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg 
101 Rome Statute, chapeau article 7(1).
102 Ibid, article 7(1)(h).
103 Ibid, article 7(1)(k).
104 See Judgement, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber, 
2 September 1998, para 565 and the corresponding footnote.
105 See Nuremberg Charter, article 6(c).
106 See Law No. 10 of the Control Council for Germany, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War 
Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity (20 December 1945) 36 ILR 31, article 
II. Th is law was enacted to establish a legal basis in Germany for the trial of war criminals 
who were not prosecuted by the Nuremberg Military Tribunal: Jørgensen, supra note 57, 20.
107 See Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the trial of the major war criminals in 
the Far East (19 January 1946) TIAS 1589; 4 Bevans 20 (Tokyo Charter), article 5(c).
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and Tokyo Military Tribunals was an important milestone in the formal recognition 
of crimes of international concern that violated fundamental human rights.108
Since the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunal trials, the concept of crimes 
against humanity has continued to undergo a gradual evolution, fi rstly in national 
cases such as Eichmann109 and Barbie,110 and subsequently as it has been defi ned 
in the Statutes of the ad hoc international tribunals111 and, ultimately, in the Rome 
Statute itself. As noted, the defi nition of crimes against humanity in the Rome 
Statute is broader than any previous formulation in several important respects.
Despite this process of evolution and expansion, there is (still) no specifi c reference 
to the environment in the defi nition of crimes against humanity. It is true, however, 
that certain acts that constitute crimes against humanity might also relate to 
circumstances where the environment has been intentionally targeted, in particular 
those specifi ed in articles 7(1)(h) and 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute quoted above.
Article  7(1)(h) identifi es persecution against ‘any identifi able group’ or 
‘collectively’ on a very broad basis (‘any other grounds’) – the characterization 
of the targeted groups for this crime is therefore signifi cantly wider than for the 
108 Flavia Lattanzi, ‘Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda’, in Horst Fischer, Claus Kress 
and Sascha Rolf Lüder (eds), International and National Prosecution of Crimes Under 
International Law: Current Developments (2001), 473, 475.
109 Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v Eichmann (1961) 36 ILR 5. Eichmann was 
prosecuted under Israeli law (1951 Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law) for 
war crimes, crimes against the Jewish people (the defi nition of which was modeled on the 
defi nition of genocide in the 1948 Genocide Convention) and crimes against humanity. He 
was convicted by the District Court of Jerusalem and sentenced to death. His appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Israel was dismissed: Eichmann v Attorney-General of the Government of 
Israel (1962) 36 ILR 277.
110 In 1987, Klaus Barbie, who had been the head of the Gestapo in Lyon from November 1942 
to August 1943 and was known as the ‘Butcher of Lyon’, was convicted by the Rhone Cour 
d’assises of 17 counts of crimes against humanity. His appeal was dismissed by the French 
Court of Cassation: Féderation National des Déportées et Internés Résistants et Patriots and 
Others v. Barbie 100 ILR 330.
111 Article  3 of the ICTR Statute defi nes crimes against humanity as any one of a number of 
enumerated acts ‘… when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against 
any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds’. Article 5 
of the ICTY Statute defi nes crimes against humanity to include the same acts, but ‘… when 
committed in armed confl ict, whether international or internal in character, and directed 
against any civilian population’. However, in practice, the ICTY has adopted the criteria 
mentioned in the chapeau of article  3 of the ICTR Statute: see, for example, Judgement, 
Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, Dragan 
Papic and Vladimir Santic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, 14 January 2000, para 544; 
Judgement, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber, 29  July 
2004, para 96–126. Th is practice has been criticised by some commentators: see, for example, 
Lattanzi, supra note 108, 478–82.
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crime of genocide. ‘Persecution’ is defi ned for the purposes of article 7(1) of the 
Rome Statute as:112
… the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to 
international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectively
Th e deliberate destruction of a habitat113 or of access to clean and safe water or 
food on a signifi cant scale could, in certain circumstances, represent a breach of the 
fundamental human rights of the individuals within a targeted group, as perhaps 
might some other acts of environmental destruction. Th e right to ‘adequate food’ 
is, for example, expressly included in article  11 of the ICESCR,114 one of the 
principal human rights instruments that makes up the so-called ‘International Bill 
of Human Rights’.115 Th e right to water is, in addition, guaranteed in articles 11 
and 12 of the ICESCR.116 Th e duty to provide water is also expressly specifi ed in 
article  24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,117 and article  14 of the 
Convention of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.118
In relation to the right to water, the United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights has stated that:119
112 Rome Statute, article 7(2)(g).
113 As noted in chapter 1, conservation regimes such as those specifi ed in the European Council 
Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna 
and fl ora are not expressly designed, nor appropriate to deal with the intentional destruction 
of the environment during armed confl ict.
114 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 
16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976) (ICESCR).
115 Th e other two instruments that, together with the ICESCR make up the ‘International Bill of 
Human Rights’, are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 217A (III) (10 December 1948) UN Doc A/810 on the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 
23 March 1976) (ICCPR).
116 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Substantive Issues 
arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: General Comment No. 15 (2002) – Th e right to water (arts. 11 and 12 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ (November 2002) UN Doc 
E/C.12/2002/11, para 3. See also Horn and Freeland, supra note 31.
117 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20  November 1989, 1577 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990) (CROC), article 24(2)(c).
118 See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, opened 
for signature 1  March 1980, 19 ILM 33 (entered into force 3  September 1981) (CEDAW), 
article 14(h).
119 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Substantive Issues 
arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: General Comment No. 15 (2002) – Th e right to water (arts. 11 and 12 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ (November 2002) UN Doc 
E/C.12/2002/11, para 1 and 3.
Chapter Four.  Regulation of the Intentional Destruction of the Environment 
during Warfare under the Existing Rome Statute Regime
202 Intersentia
[w]ater is a limited natural resource and a public good fundamental for life and 
health. Th e human right to water is indispensable for leading a life in human dignity. 
It is a prerequisite for the realization of other human rights
(…)
[t]he right [to water] should also be seen in conjunction with the other rights 
enshrined in the International Bill of Human Rights, foremost amongst them the 
right to life and human dignity
Th us, in theory, the terms of article  7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute might extend 
to certain acts that intentionally target the environment during armed confl ict. 
However, of course, it would also be necessary to prove the other elements of 
the crime of crimes against humanity – as set out in the chapeau of article 7 – 
for this provision to be applicable to such acts. Th is is discussed below; however, 
before doing so, one should note the ‘catch all’ provision, article 7(1)(k) of the 
Rome Statute, which is also referred to above. Once again, one could envisage the 
possibility of acts that constitute environmental crimes perhaps falling within 
the terms of this provision.
As noted, the chapeau of article 7 sets out a number of overarching elements of 
the crime of crimes against humanity, which must also be present in order to 
support a conviction. Th is includes a ‘widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population’. Th ere has been considerable jurisprudence in 
relation to the meaning of the concepts of ‘widespread’ and ‘systematic’ in this 
context. Th e Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has confi rmed that:120
‘widespread’ refers to the large-scale nature of the attack and the number of targeted 
persons, while the  phrase ‘systematic’ refers to the organized nature of the acts of 
violence and the improbability of their random occurrence
In similar vein, in 2009, a Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC confi rmed that:121
[a]lthough the terms “widespread” and “systematic” are not specifi cally defi ned in 
the Statute, the Chamber has previously held that this language excludes random 
or isolated acts of violence, and that the term “widespread” refers to the large-scale 
nature of the attack, as well as to the number of victims, while the term “systematic” 
pertains to the organised nature of the acts of violence and to the improbability of 
their random occurrence
120 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber, 29  July 
2004, para 101, referring to Judgement, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and 
Zoran Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Chamber, 12 June 2002, para 
94.
121 Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir, Th e Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (‘Omar Al Bashir’), Case 
No. ICC-02/05–01/09, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 4 March 2009, para 81.
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Th e two expressions are set out in the chapeau in the disjunctive (‘or’) form, 
and are therefore alternate requirements. It is not necessary to demonstrate that 
the relevant attack meets both criteria – one would be suffi  cient to support a 
conviction. Be that as it may, both expressions at least suggest on their face that a 
crime against humanity will generally only occur in the context of a multiplicity 
of actions, an observation that is reinforced by article  7(2)(a) of the Rome 
Statute, which specifi es that an ‘attack directed against any civilian population’ 
means:122
a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in 
[article 7(1) of the Rome Statute] against any civilian population, pursuant to or in 
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack
However, it is still possible for a limited number of acts, or even a single act by an 
accused, to constitute a crime against humanity, assuming that all other elements 
of the crime are satisfi ed, if they are ‘a part of [the] attack … unless those acts 
may be said to be isolated or random’.123 Nevertheless, the overall combined 
eff ect of these elements, coupled with the fact that there is a need to demonstrate 
the existence of a ‘policy to commit such attack’, would seem to make it very 
diffi  cult to bring acts done with the intent to destroy the environment during 
armed confl ict within the terms of crimes against humanity.
Further, and most signifi cantly for the purposes of this discussion, any possible 
connection is made even more tenuous due to the requirement that the attack 
must be directed ‘against any civilian population’. In essence, for a crime against 
humanity to be committed, it is necessary to demonstrate that the civilian 
population is the ‘victim’ or ‘primary object’ of such an attack.124 Indeed, the 
‘status of the victim as a civilian’ is one of the characterizing features of a crime 
against humanity.125 In order to determine whether the attack has been directed 
122 Rome Statute, article 7(2)(a) (emphasis added). It should be noted that, as has been confi rmed 
in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, the reference to a ‘State … policy’ in this 
provision does not mean that the crime of crimes against humanity can be characterized as 
‘an act of criminal sovereignty’ – the concept of individual criminal responsibility for such 
crimes still applies, and the ad hoc tribunals, as well as the ICC, only have jurisdiction over 
‘natural persons’ (ICTY Statute, article 6; ICTR Statute, article 5; Rome Statute, article 25(1)): 
see also Judgement, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Chamber, 
3 March 2000, para 205 and the corresponding footnotes.
123 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber, 29  July 
2004, para 101, referring to Judgement, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and 
Zoran Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Chamber, 12 June 2002, para 
96.
124 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic, Case No. 
IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Chamber, 12 June 2002, para 91.
125 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber, 29  July 
2004, para 107.
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against the civilian population in this way, the ICTY has stated that the following 
factors must be considered:126
the means and method used in the course of the attack, the status of the victims, 
their number, the discriminatory nature of the attack, the nature of the crimes 
committed in its course, the resistance to the assailants at the time and the extent to 
which the attacking force may be said to have complied or attempted to comply with 
the precautionary requirements of the laws of war
Although the intentional destruction of the environment during armed confl ict 
may oft en be intended as a method of harming specifi c populations, it is for 
this reason that the crime of crimes against humanity is not readily applicable 
in circumstances where it is the environment (as opposed to civilians) that is 
deliberately targeted as the victim or the primary object of such acts. Indeed, 
as outlined in chapter 1 and discussed further in the next chapter, although 
the concept of crimes against the environment is not to be regarded as an 
environmental protection measure per se, the principal focus of this book is to 
more eff ectively address actions that specifi cally target the environment. It is the 
intent to destroy the environment during warfare that is the distinguishing feature 
of the crime of crimes against the environment. It is this specifi c victim perspective 
that diff erentiates any notion of a crime against the environment from the other 
core international crimes in the Rome Statute and, as a consequence, such acts will 
generally not fall within crimes against humanity.
For all of these reasons, it is considered that crimes against humanity, as 
defi ned in the Rome Statute, would at most only have indirect relevance to 
such actions, although of course this has not been specifi cally considered by the 
Court. Consequently, the crime of crimes against humanity does not represent 
a satisfactory mechanism for the prosecution before the ICC of intentional 
destruction of the environment during armed confl ict.
4.4.3. INTENTIONAL DESTRUCTION OF THE 
ENVIRONMENT AS A WAR CRIME?
4.4.3.1. Article 8(2)(b)(iv)
As noted, the ‘natural environment’ is expressly referred to in only one provision 
of the Rome Statute, this being a specifi c act within the defi nition of war 
126 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic, Case No. 
IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Chamber, 12  June 2002, para 91: see also Judgement, 
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber, 29 July 2004, para 106.
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crimes.127 Article  8(2)(b)(iv) specifi es that, ‘in particular when committed as 
part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes’,128 
a war crime within the jurisdiction of the Court includes:129
(b) … serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed 
confl ict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the 
following acts:
(…)
(iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will 
cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would 
be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage 
anticipated
As can be seen, the article specifi es three ‘variants of the off ence’130 – relating to 
i) incidental loss of life or injury to civilians; ii) damage to civilian objects; or iii) 
damage to the natural environment. Given the focus of this book, it is only the 
third variant that is the subject of the following discussion.
Before assessing the scope of this aspect of the provision, it is necessary to 
consider its draft ing history. Although, as noted in chapter 1, the notion of the 
‘criminality’ of States for signifi cant environmental damage was, for a period, 
included in the ILC Draft  Articles on State Responsibility,131 and the concept of 
individual criminal responsibility for ‘widespread, long-term and severe damage 
to the natural environment’ was included in the Draft  Code of Crimes against 
127 Of course, other ‘war crimes’ defi ned in article  8 of the Rome Statute may also relate to 
conduct that might indirectly involve damage to the natural environment: Mark A. Drumbl, 
‘Waging War against the World: Th e Need to Move from War Crimes to Environmental 
Crimes’, in Jay E. Austin and Carl E. Bruch (eds), Th e Environmental Consequences of War: 
Legal, Economic, and Scientifi c Perspectives (2000), 620, 622, footnote 8. Th ese are discussed 
in 4.4.3.2.
128 Rome Statute, article 8(1).
129 Ibid, article 8(2)(b)(iv).
130 Gerhard Werle and Florian Jessberger, Principles of International Criminal Law (3rd ed, 2014), 
493.
131 See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on its work of 
the thirty-second session, [1980] 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission Part II, 
32, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.l (Part 2). As noted in chapter 1, draft  article 19 of the 
‘Draft  Articles on State Responsibility for International Wrongful Acts’ had provided that an 
‘international crime’ included:
 ‘[a]n internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State of an international 
obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the international 
community that its breach is recognized as a crime by that community as a whole constitutes 
an international crime’, and included (draft  article  19(3)(d)) ‘a serious breach of an 
international obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding and preservation of the 
human environment, such as those prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the 
seas’.
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the Peace and Security of Mankind,132 such actions did not form part of the 
1994 ILC Draft  Statute.
Instead, it was suggested that such damage would usually fall within the scope 
of other crimes already included in the draft  text, and that, if that were not the 
case in a specifi c situation, it might be that the act does not meet the ‘threshold 
of gravity for an international crime’.133
Th e revised draft  version of the Statute, which subsequently formed the basis for 
the fi nal discussions at the 1998 Rome Conference, contained three additional 
options, other than the version that was ultimately adopted as article 8(2)(b)(iv), 
namely:134
(1) ‘Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment, which is 
not justifi ed by military necessity’;
(2) ‘Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment’;
(3) ‘No paragraph’ – which would have meant that there would be no prohibition 
included in the Rome Statute in relation to widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment.
In the end, a compromise was reached. As discussed in chapter 2, and as yet 
another illustration of the political concerns associated with criminalizing 
acts that damage the environment in the context of armed confl ict, the fi nal 
provision requires a balancing of the damage as against military advantage. In 
practical terms, this means that environmental issues are ‘made secondary’ to 
interests of military importance.135 In so doing, the provision therefore does not 
focus on the issues that arise from the intentional targeting of the environment 
during the course of armed confl ict. It fails to recognize the importance of 
the environment as such, instead falling back on the traditional and outdated 
approach that environmental harm is to be regarded as an unfortunate 
‘bi-product’ of warfare, even in circumstances where the damage is deliberate 
and intentional.
132 [1991] 1 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 234, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1991, 
draft  article 26.
133 Antonio Cassese, Albin Eser, Giorgio Gaja, Philip Kirsch, Alain Pellet and Bert Swart (eds), 
Th e Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (2002), 522–3.
134 See Draft  Statute for the International Criminal Court (14  April 1998) UN Doc A/
CONF.183/2/Add.1, Part 2 ‘War Crimes’, ss B(b), as quoted in Drumbl, supra note 127, 622–3.
135 Drumbl, ibid, 623.
4.4. Applicability of the Rome Statute to the Intentional Destruction 
of the Environment during Warfare
Intersentia 207
Article  8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute has been discussed in general terms in 
earlier chapters, particularly in the context of the similar language used in 
article 55(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I,136 and article I(1) of the ENMOD 
Convention.137 However, in addition to the issues raised above, several points 
bear further elaboration here. First, it is apparent that article 8(2)(b)(iv) demands 
a very high threshold of injury to the environment before an act would fall 
within the scope of the crime. Th e use of the conjunctive (‘and’) between the 
words widespread, long-term and severe, rather than the disjunctive form, has, at 
least from an environmental integrity viewpoint, eff ectively meant a ‘regression’ 
from the standard that had been specifi ed in the ENMOD Convention (where 
the disjunctive form is used).138 Gerhard Werle and Florian Jessberger explain 
this variance as follows:139
[s]ince environmental damage can be expected as a collateral consequence in any 
type of warfare, the requirements were raised in comparison to those in ENMOD.
Moreover, a comparison of article  8(2)(b)(iv) with article  55(1) of the 1977 
Additional Protocol I also indicates how the degree of culpable action necessary 
to amount to a war crime under the Rome Statute appears to have been increased. 
Acts that would contravene article 55(1) would not necessarily constitute a war 
crime under article  8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute, since this latter provision 
includes the need for the damage to be ‘clearly excessive’. Th e diffi  culties relating 
to the requirement of ‘excessive’ damage (let alone clearly excessive) have already 
been canvassed in chapter 3 in relation to the 2000 Committee Report examining 
NATO’s actions during Operation Allied Force,140 although it is generally 
agreed that, under customary international law, the parties to an armed confl ict 
are prohibited from causing ‘excessive damage to the environment during 
military operations’.141
In the case of article 8(2)(b)(iv), not only must the damage be ‘excessive’, but it 
must also be ‘clearly’ so. Irrespective of any uncertainties as to what ‘excessive’ 
means, the inclusion of the descriptor ‘clearly’ suggests an intention to set as 
136 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Confl icts, opened for signature 8  June 1977, 
1125 UNTS 3, 16 ILM 1391 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (1977 Additional Protocol I).
137 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modifi cation Techniques, opened for signature 10 December 1976, 1108 UNTS 151; 16 ILM 
88 (entered into force 5 October 1978) (ENMOD Convention).
138 Drumbl, supra note 127, 624.
139 Werle and Jessberger, supra note 130, 493.
140 Final Report to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 13 June 2000, 39 ILM 1257 (Committee Report).
141 See Werle and Jessberger, supra note 130, 492 and the references in the corresponding 
footnote. See also chapter 3.
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the requisite threshold an even higher level of damage, since there must be a 
diff erence between damage that is excessive and damage that is clearly excessive, 
although how this is to be determined is unclear.
Th ere is also no guidance provided as to the meaning of ‘widespread’, ‘long-term’ 
or ‘severe’ as they appear in article  8(2)(b)(iv). Reference was made in chapter 
2 to the interpretative guidance provided in relation to their meaning in the 
ENMOD Convention. As noted, these three terms are defi ned, for the purposes 
of the ENMOD Convention, as follows:142
(a) ‘widespread’: encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square 
kilometres;
(b) ‘long-lasting’: lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season;
(c) ‘severe’: involving serious or signifi cant disruption or harm to human life, 
natural and economic resources or other assets.
Th e breadth of these interpretations, particularly as all of the variables must be 
satisfi ed (‘and’), already sets the bar at a very high point in terms of what level of 
environmental damage will be necessary before article 8(2)(b)(iv) might apply.143 
Yet, in relation to the use of these words in article 55(1) of the 1977 Additional 
Protocol I, various commentaries have provided even more restrictive 
interpretations. In a 1993 report to the United Nations General Assembly, the 
Secretary-General stated that:144
[t]here are substantial grounds, including from the travaux préparatoires of [the 1977 
Additional] Protocol I, for interpreting ‘long-term’ to refer to decades rather than 
months. On the other hand, it is not easy to know in advance exactly what the scope 
and duration of some environmentally damaging acts will be.
Naturally, it will be important to develop an understanding as to the scope of 
these words as they are used in any specifi c provision of the Rome Statute. Th e 
interpretations off ered for the purposes of ENMOD ‘should not be transferred 
mechanically’ to article  8(2)(b)(iv).145 Moreover, the words will not necessarily 
have the same meaning in diff erent articles of the same instrument – obviously, 
142 1976 CCD Understanding Relating to Article I of ENMOD, 31 United Nations General 
Assembly Offi  cial Records Supp. No. 27 (A/31/27), Annex I.
143 As noted previously, William Fenrick has suggested, for example, that the threshold would 
probably not be reached even by ‘the sort of damage caused by heavy shelling during World 
War I battles on the Western Front’: William J. Fenrick, ‘Article 8: War Crimes – article 8(2)
(b)(iv)’, in Otto Trifft  erer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (1999), 197, 197.
144 United Nations Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of 
the Environment in Times of Armed Confl ict’ (29  July 1993) UN Doc A/48/269, para 34 
(emphasis added).
145 Werle and Jessberger, supra note 130, 493.
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the context in which a particular word appears is relevant to its precise meaning. 
For example, as will be detailed in the following chapter, the meaning of the 
word ‘widespread’ as it appears in the chapeau of article  7(1) (crimes against 
humanity) will not be the same as its meaning in article  8(2)(b(iv). Without a 
specifi c defi nition of such words, or any agreements or discussions that may 
provide such guidance, it would ultimately fall to the Court itself to determine 
their precise meaning, thus leaving the issue unclear at least until that point.
In the absence of an express defi nition (or clarifi cation) within the Rome Statute, 
for the ICC Judges to determine a diff erent (lower) interpretation of these words 
in the context of environmental damage than the thresholds in the ENMOD 
Convention and the 1977 Additional Protocol I, it would be necessary for them to 
base their conclusions, at least partially, on environmental concerns. Th is might 
possibly eventuate, but such an outcome would require both the involvement of 
environmental groups in the proceedings, although it is not entirely clear how this 
would work in practice,146 and a ‘brave’ bench of Judges, given the reality that 
environmental damage invariably occurs in armed confl ict, and the fact that there 
has traditionally been political reluctance to extend the express sanctions against 
environmental damage beyond what is specifi cally provided for in the Rome Statute.
Until such time, there will be a great deal of uncertainty as to precisely what level 
of environmental damage would be required for the provision to be applicable, 
or even relevant. As a consequence, it is suggested that the Prosecutor of the 
Court would be hesitant to initiate a prosecution alleging a violation of this war 
crime, at least in the absence of further clarity on these points, for fear of falling 
short of demonstrating the requisite degree of environmental harm.
In addition, as noted, article  8(2)(b)(iv) requires an assessment of the 
proportionality of the environmental damage seen in the context of the military 
contingencies surrounding such actions. Th e requirement that the anticipated 
military advantage must be taken into account when looking at the damage to the 
environment – which was not the case with respect to either of articles 35(3) or 
55(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I – adds to the uncertainty, subjectivity and 
diffi  culty of applying the provision. Even if the requisite threshold of ‘widespread, 
long-term and severe’ damage is found to have resulted from a particular act – 
and of course this would assume that the scope of this threshold is itself clear in 
practice – a war crime still would not have been committed if this falls within 
what was acceptable in the light of the anticipated military advantage.
146 One possibility might be for the Judges to require that specifi c information relating to the 
relevant environmental concerns be presented, pursuant to article  64(6)(d) of the Rome 
Statute, which empowers a Trial Chamber to ‘[o]rder the production of evidence in addition 
to that already collected prior to the trial or presented during the trial by the parties’.
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Th e Elements of Crimes, when referring to article  8(2)(b)(iv), emphasize 
that the military considerations that are to be weighed in determining the 
proportionality of the act are to be determined on a subjective basis. It provides 
that:147
[t]he expression ‘concrete and direct overall military advantage’ refers to a military 
advantage that is foreseeable by the perpetrator at the relevant time. Such advantage 
may or may not be temporally or geographically related to the object of the attack … 
It refl ects the proportionality requirement inherent in determining the legality of any 
military activity undertaken in the context of an armed confl ict.
Th e military ‘value’ of any particular act(s) is to be determined on the basis of 
‘the broader purpose’ of the particular operation.148 As has also been noted in 
previous chapters, a determination of whether the relevant act is acceptable will 
be dependent upon the knowledge of the alleged perpetrator, based on his/her 
(‘foreseeable’) perceptions at the time. Th e Elements of Crimes confi rm this as 
follows:149
… this knowledge element requires that the perpetrator make the value judgement 
as described therein. An evaluation of that value judgement must be based on the 
requisite information available to the perpetrator at the time.
It is highly likely that the terms of article  8(2)(b)(iv), when read together with 
the guidance provided by the Elements of Crimes, would ‘excuse’ many 
(all?) decisions made by military commanders to intentionally target the 
environment.150 Taking these considerations into account, the terms of 
article 8(2)(b)(iv) are therefore, in the words of Phoebe Okowa, ‘heavily tilted in 
favour of military advantage and against environmental protection’.151
In addition, article 30 of the Rome Statute applies as the mens rea standard for 
article 8(2)(b)(iv).152 Th e dual requirement of both intention and, in particular, 
knowledge further restricts any possible practical application of article  8(2)(b)
(iv). For example, the Committee Report concluded that:153
147 Elements of Crimes, article 8(2)(b)(iv), footnote 36.
148 Knut Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: Sources and Commentary (2004), 173.
149 Elements of Crimes, article 8(2)(b)(iv), footnote 37 (emphasis added).
150 Knut Dörmann, ‘War Crimes in the Elements of Crimes’, in Horst Fischer, Claus Kress 
and Sascha Rolf Lüder (eds), International and National Prosecution of Crimes Under 
International Law: Current Developments (2001), 95, 127.
151 Phoebe Okowa, ‘Environmental Justice in Situations of Armed Confl ict’, in Jonas Ebbesson 
and Phoebe Okawa (eds), Environmental Law and Justice in Context (2009), 231, 248.
152 Werle and Jessberger, supra note 130, 494.
153 Committee Report, para 23 (emphasis added).
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the requisite mens rea [under article 8(2)(b)(iv)] on the part of a commander would be 
actual or constructive knowledge as to the grave environmental eff ects of a military 
attack; a standard which would be diffi  cult to establish for the purposes of prosecution 
and which may provide an insuffi  cient basis to prosecute military commanders 
infl icting environmental harm in the (mistaken) belief that such conduct was 
warranted by military necessity
It must also be noted that article 8(2)(b)(iv) is only applicable ‘in international 
armed confl ict, within the established framework of international law’. Th is 
express limitation by defi nition further restricts its eff ectiveness in dealing with 
the environmental aspects of armed confl ict. Earlier draft s of the instrument 
had included wording similar to article  8(2)(b)(iv) within articles  8(2)(c), and 
8(2)(e), which both deal with war crimes committed in an armed confl ict ‘not 
of an international character’; however, this was omitted during the negotiation 
process and was not included in the fi nal version of the Rome Statute.154
As mentioned below, a number of other provisions in the Rome Statute that 
originally only applied to international armed confl icts have more recently been 
extended to the war crimes provisions applying to non-international armed 
confl icts (see 4.4.3.2). However the scope of article 8(2)(b)(iv) was never part of 
that debate. In any event, the defi nition of a non-international armed confl ict in 
the Rome Statute is itself quite limited.155
Th is is a particularly notable omission given that, as pointed out in earlier 
chapters, an increasing number of armed confl icts in the world are of a 
non-international nature and, in any event, there is no overwhelming logic 
preventing the applicability of such a provision in relation to internal confl icts. 
Th e environmental damage that occurred during the Rwandan and Yugoslav 
confl icts (the latter being regarded as having the characteristics of both an 
international and a non-international armed confl ict),156 indicate the extent 
of environmental destruction that can take place during the course of a ‘civil 
war’. Th is would be the case, for example, in circumstances where an insurgency 
group uses a tropical forest as its ‘base’ and the Government forces, believing 
that such acts are ‘legitimate theaters of operations’, deliberately destroy the 
forest and/or poison water and river systems as part of its attempt to defeat the 
insurgents.157
154 Drumbl, supra note 127, 631.
155 See Rome Statute, article  8(2)(f). See also Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a 
Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Th e Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir (‘Omar Al Bashir’), Case No. ICC-02/05–01/09, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
4 March 2009, para 59.
156 See, for example, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 
Prosecutor v Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, para 73.
157 Drumbl, supra note 127, 631.
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Th ere is also another issue with respect to article 8(2)(b)(iv), albeit in practical 
terms, relatively minor. Under the obliquely sanitized heading ‘Transitional 
Provision,’ article 124 of the Rome Statute enables States to ‘opt out’ of the war 
crimes provisions for seven years.158 Th e inclusion of article  124 was regarded 
as yet another necessary compromise to allow for the acceptance of the Rome 
Statute, given the political sensitivities associated with any restriction on the 
acts of a State’s offi  cial armed forces (war crimes are typically – though not 
exclusively – committed by military personnel). France and Colombia indicated 
early on that they would consider invoking this provision,159 and subsequently 
proceeded to do so.160 Unless and until this provision is amended,161 there 
is nothing – apart from (the admittedly not insubstantial) political pressure – 
to stop a new State Party to the Rome Statute from making such a declaration 
in relation to war crimes, which would, of course, include article  8(2)(b)(iv). 
However, as noted, this is not likely to be a major concern.
In sum, therefore, it seems that there is a real risk that, in reality, resort will 
not be made to the environmental damage variant in article  8(2)(b)(iv). Th is 
provision is but one of a multitude of diff erent war crimes set out in the Rome 
Statute, and the requirements necessary for it to be applied appear virtually 
impossible to satisfy in practical terms. Not only are there very signifi cant legal 
hurdles to overcome in this regard, but this is also a refl ection of the resistance 
towards the issue at the political level, given the general reluctance of States to 
limit the actions of their own military personnel.
It is true in one respect that express reference to environmental damage as a war 
crime is to be regarded as a step forward in the development of international 
criminal law, particularly since there is now a mechanism of international 
justice – the ICC – through which such acts can be prosecuted. At least the issue 
158 Article 124 of the Rome Statute provides that:
 ‘… a State, on becoming a party to this Statute, may declare that, for a period of seven 
years aft er the entry into force of this Statute for the State concerned, it does not accept the 
jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of crimes referred to in article 8 when a 
crime is alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on its territory.’
159 Michael Matheson, Council Unbound: Th e Growth of UN Decision Making on Confl ict and 
Postconfl ict Issues aft er the Cold War (2006), 375.
160 In 2008, France withdrew its declaration. On several occasions Colombian authorities 
had publicly stated their intention to withdraw Colombia’s declaration: Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court, ‘Delivering on the Promise of a Fair, Eff ective and Independent 
Court – Review Conference of the Rome Statute: Article 124’, October 2010 <www.iccnow.
org/?mod=article124> at 24  January 2015. Although, in the end, no such withdrawal was 
initiated by Colombia, the eff ects of the declaration with respect to that country expired on 
1 November 2009.
161 Article 124 was considered at the Review Conference of the Rome Statute (convened under 
article 123(1) of the Rome Statute) held in Kampala from 31 May to 11  June 2010; however 
it was decided at that time not to delete the provision, but rather to review it again fi ve years 
later.
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has been raised and discussed, and there is an acceptance, in relation to the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, that completely unfettered environmental destruction is 
no longer accepted – refer, for example, to the fact that the third possible ‘no 
paragraph’ option quoted above in the draft  version of the Statute was ultimately 
rejected at the 1998 Rome Conference.
However, as indicated by the discussion above, and in the absence of a specifi c 
environmental crime, the issue of intentional environmental destruction 
during armed confl ict still appears at best to be a narrowly defi ned ‘add-on’,162 
with very considerable – perhaps even insurmountable – legal hurdles that, for 
all practical purposes, will serve to curtail any eff ective prosecution. As Mark 
Drumbl has stated, the decision to criminalize widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment as a war crime, as is specifi ed in article 8(2)
(b)(iv) is ‘cause for limited celebration, considerable disappointment, and some 
concern’.163
Indeed, the high damage thresholds and very limited circumstances as to 
when the provision may be relevant, if anything, serve to reinforce traditional 
perceptions that environmental concerns remain very much a minor or 
subsidiary issue when planning and implementing a military action.
4.4.3.2. Other War Crimes within Article 8 of the Rome Statute
For the sake of completeness, it is appropriate to consider whether any other acts 
that might constitute a war crime within the terms of the Rome Statute may be 
helpful in addressing the issue of intentional destruction of the environment, 
even though, unlike article 8(2)(b)(iv), they make no specifi c reference to such 
damage at all. In doing so, it must be noted that the chapeau of each potentially 
relevant paragraph of article 8 suggests that the enumerated war crimes within 
that paragraph are to be regarded as exhaustive, since it has generally been 
accepted that the use of the words ‘namely, any of the following acts’164 implies 
exclusivity.165 As a consequence, it does not appear possible to extend the scope 
of article 8 of the Rome Statute beyond the specifi c war crimes that have been 
expressly stipulated, notwithstanding the fact that article  21(1)(b) of the Rome 
Statute provides that the applicable law of the Court shall include:166
162 Drumbl, supra note 127, 632.
163 Ibid, 630.
164 See Rome Statute, chapeau of articles 8(2)(a), 8(2)(b), 8(2)(c) and 8(2)(e) respectively.
165 Drumbl, supra note 127, 633. For a contrary view, see Carl E. Bruch, ‘All’s Not Fair in (Civil) 
War: Criminal Liability for Environmental Damage in Internal Armed Confl ict’ (2001) 25 
Vermont Law Review 695, 719.
166 Rome Statute, article 21(1)(b). For an apparently contrary view, however, at least in relation to 
the applicability of what are referred to as ‘parent norms’, see Werle, supra note 75, 107.
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[i]n the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and 
rules of international law, including the established principles of the international 
law of armed confl ict
With this caveat in mind, one can list those war crimes provisions that 
criminalize particular acts, the implementation of which could have 
destructive eff ects on the environment. Within the ‘grave breaches’ provisions, 
articles 8(2)(a)(iii) and 8(2)(a)(iv) of the Rome Statute may be relevant in this 
regard.
In addition, within the context of an international armed confl ict, articles 8(2)
(b)(v), 8(2)(b)(xiii), 8(2)(b)(xvi), 8(2)(b)(xvii) and 8(2)(b)(xviii) also appear to 
apply to acts that may impact negatively on the environment. Th e latter two of 
these provisions relate to the use of weapons that might already be prohibited 
by some of the international agreements discussed in chapter 2.167 With respect 
to the prosecution of environmentally destructive acts within the context of a 
non-international armed confl ict, the only possible provisions of relevance are 
articles 8(2)(e)(v), 8(2)(e)(xii), and the more recently included articles 8(2)(e)(xiii) 
and 8(2)(e)(xiv).
However, each/all of these provisions, to the extent they may be relevant, do 
not, either individually or collectively address adequately all of the fundamental 
issues associated with the intentional destruction of the environment during 
warfare.168 Th e structure of article 8 of the Rome Statute thus creates somewhat 
of a dilemma; in the event that the Prosecutor wishes to proceed against an 
accused in relation to such damage, he/she would in all likelihood look at the fi rst 
instance to article 8(2)(b)(iv) as the ‘standard’ for such a war crime. However, as 
discussed above, there are very signifi cant diffi  culties associated with proving 
that the requisite threshold requirements of that provision could in reality ever 
be met.
167 See, for example, Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous and Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, opened for signature 
17 June 1925, 26 Martens (3rd) 643 (entered into force 8 February 1928); Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction, opened for signature 10 April 1972, 1015 UNTS 
163 (entered into force 26 March 1975); Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or 
to Have Indiscriminate Eff ects, opened for signature 10 April 1981, 1342 UNTS 137 (entered 
into force 2 December 1983); Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Th eir Destruction, opened for signature 
13 January 1993, 32 ILM 800 (entered into force 29 April 1997).
168 For a discussion of the limited scope to which these provisions might possibly be applied in 
relation to intentional environmental destruction during armed confl ict, see Aaron Ezekiel, 
‘Th e Application of International Criminal Law to Resource Exploitation: Ituri, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo’ (2007) 47 Natural Resources Journal 225, 237–9.
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On the other hand, a ‘fall back’ position of resorting to other war crimes, 
assuming that they may be applicable, and that all of the relevant elements of 
those crimes have been met, would in most circumstances not cover all of the 
elements of such damage and, in any event, would not address the specifi c 
‘intent’ aspect of a crime against the environment – the deliberate targeting of 
the environment as a victim, and/or its use as a weapon, during armed confl ict.
4.5. CONCLUSION
One of the principal goals behind the establishment of the ICC has been the 
deterrence and punishment of the most serious international crimes, which also 
‘threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world’.169 Given the rapid 
development of technology and the sometimes bewildering shift  in geopolitical 
alliances, such threats are themselves ‘fl uid’ in nature and will almost certainly 
vary (expand) in the future.
Th e intentional destruction of the environment during the course of armed 
confl ict now falls plainly within this description, particularly given the 
catastrophic environmental damage that may result. However, the limitations 
of, and uncertainties with the defi nitions of the existing crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court signifi cantly restrict any attempt to utilize them in such 
a way so as to comprehensively apply to such acts.
It might be suggested by some that the inclusion of article  8(2)(b)(iv) of the 
Rome Statute, which makes express reference to the natural environment, may 
be suffi  cient in this regard. Indeed, the fact that there currently exists a specifi c 
war crime dealing with the issue might reinforce to most military personnel and 
others engaged in armed confl ict that they cannot act with complete disregard of 
the environmental impact of their actions. In this regard, it could even be argued 
that, on a cursory reading, this provision provides some protection against such 
acts, and that therefore the ‘need’ to impose an enforcement mechanism has 
somehow been satisfi ed.
Yet, this has been shown to be both simplistic and inaccurate. Th e intentional 
destruction of the environment during armed confl ict represents behaviour that 
is no longer acceptable, as it represents a blatant disregard for the environment 
and for the (potential) consequences of such acts, including on human 
populations but also more broadly. In certain circumstances, such acts can 
therefore also ‘shock the conscience of humanity’ and give rise to outrage and 
calls for appropriate criminal accountability. Article  8(2)(b)(iv) is insuffi  cient 
169 Rome Statute, preamble para 3.
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and inadequate to address the problem, due to the uncertainties of the provision 
and the inordinately high threshold level of damage that it requires, and even 
then only aft er taking account of the military contingencies. For the reasons 
outlined above, the elements of the crime appear to be almost unattainable as far 
as proof of violation is concerned.
Moreover, as discussed in this chapter, none of the core international crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC are in terms that would adequately regulate 
such acts. In relation to these crimes, it will no doubt be important, particularly 
in the relatively early days of the Court’s judicial activities, that the Court and 
the Prosecutor of the ICC avoid claims (whether or not they are justifi ed) that 
they are perhaps ‘overreaching’ the boundaries of their respective powers, 
particularly given the highly political nature of the Court’s mandate. It would 
almost certainly be unrealistic to expect that the Court would seek to exercise a 
role unless and until any act can quite readily be ‘pigeon-holed’ into the crimes 
within the Court’s jurisdiction.
Yet, it is argued that acts done with the intent to cause signifi cant environmental 
destruction during armed confl ict should be prosecuted at the international level 
in particular circumstances, and certainly in broader terms than appear possible 
within the existing structure of the Rome Statute. Th is fl ows from two important 
considerations – fi rst, the need to properly formalize the criminalization of such 
acts through a mechanism (a clearly defi ned crime) that appropriately addresses 
their heinous nature; and secondly, that this mechanism should be included 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC, given the functions mandated to that 
institution by the broader international community, and the level of seriousness 
of the actions it addresses.
As regards the latter point, it is appropriate that these prosecutions should be 
undertaken by an international mechanism of criminal justice that has been 
established according to diplomatic, legal and political processes. Th e need to 
ensure the integrity of such prosecutions means that they must be carried out 
by a body that has been created with the general acceptance of States. As the 
fi rst and only permanent international criminal court, the ICC represents the 
appropriate judicial ‘forum’ through which to prosecute such acts.
Hence, we are now at a crossroads – there is an imperative to address the 
intentional targeting of the environment during armed confl ict, and an 
appropriate judicial institution exists for that to be done. Yet, article  8(b)(2)
(iv), and indeed the Rome Statute as a whole, is simply not performing the role 
that it should with respect to such acts and, frankly, is incapable of doing so as 
presently constituted. Th e current legal framework fails to provide suffi  cient 
protection against such acts and thus fails humanity on this issue.
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Th e following chapter therefore elaborates on the elements that are required 
for more eff ective regulation of the intentional destruction of the environment 
during armed confl ict. It off ers a legally consistent, practical and politically 
acceptable codifi cation of the form of international criminal accountability 
that should apply and which remedies the lacunae within existing international 
(criminal, as well as humanitarian and environmental) law that have been 
highlighted in this book.
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CHAPTER FIVE
INCORPORATING CRIMES 
AGAINST THE ENVIRONMENT 
INTO THE ROME STATUTE
5.1. THE NEED FOR A SUI GENERIS CRIME OF 
CRIMES AGAINST THE ENVIRONMENT
5.1.1. REVISITING THE IMPERATIVE TO MORE 
EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS THE INTENTIONAL 
DESTRUCTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
DURING WARFARE UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW
In 1997, the International Court of Justice, when dealing with a dispute that 
involved issues relating to the environment and the concept of sustainable 
development, made the following observation:1
Th roughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and other reasons, constantly 
interfered with nature. In the past, this was oft en done without consideration of 
the eff ects upon the environment. Owing to new scientifi c insights and to a growing 
awareness of the risks for mankind – for present and future generations – of pursuit of 
such interventions at an unconsidered and unabated pace, new norms and standards 
have been developed, set forth in a great number of instruments during the last 
two decades. Such new norms have to be taken into consideration, and such new 
standards given proper weight, not only when States contemplate new activities but 
also when continuing with activities begun in the past.
In other words, in the Court’s view, when it comes to environmental concerns, 
it has been necessary from time to time to recognize ‘new norms and standards’ 
to react to, and counter, the threats posed by the increasingly destructive 
eff ects of various activities undertaken by humans. Th ere is an ‘expanding 
need’ for the development of appropriate universal norms by the international 
1 Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 140 
(emphasis added).
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community,2 in order to address issues of global concern, including the state 
of the environment. As a consequence, acts that may represent signifi cant threats 
to the environment must be eff ectively regulated through appropriate legal 
mechanisms.
Not only is this important given that our values and perspectives with respect to 
the environment have altered and been reshaped over time, but also because of 
our increasing ‘ability’ to cause (and to understand the eff ects of) catastrophic 
and potentially permanent environmental damage.
In the case of environmental treaty norms, their development and codifi cation 
has been a relatively recent phenomenon. As noted in chapter 2, it was only in 
1972 that the fi rst signifi cant statement of fundamental international principles 
relating to the protection of the environment was elaborated in a multilateral 
instrument.3 Th e development of environmental norms is as much an ongoing 
process today as it has been over the previous four decades.4
Yet, as discussed in earlier chapters, the development of Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements (MEAs), and more particularly the jus in bello treaty 
and customary principles, has not paid signifi cant attention to the impact upon 
the environment of acts undertaken during warfare. While the humanitarian 
consequences of armed confl ict have been increasingly addressed in the relevant 
jus in bello instruments, the international community has been far more resistant 
to the notion of eff ectively regulating the environmental consequences,5 with 
the result that the interaction between the conduct of armed confl ict and the 
natural environment is largely under-explored.
Th e same could be said about the relationship between international criminal 
law, which increasingly appears to be the global community’s chosen mode 
2 Jonathan I. Charney, ‘Universal International Law’ (1993) 87 American Journal of 
International Law 529, 529.
3 See Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (16 June 1972) 
UN Doc A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1972 Stockholm Declaration).
4 For example, the International Environmental Agreements (IEA) Database Project 
maintained by the University of Oregon has calculated that, in the period from January 2000 
to January 2015, there were 321 multilateral IEAs and modifi cations concluded (comprising 
97 New Agreements, 176 Amending Agreements and 48 Protocols), as well as 100 bilateral 
agreements and modifi cations (91 New Agreements, 3 Amending Agreements and 6 
Protocols): University of Oregon, ‘International Environmental Agreements (IEA) Database 
Project’ <http://iea.uoregon.edu/page.php?query=summary&type=MEA> at 25  January 
2015.
5 Mark A. Drumbl, ‘Waging War against the World: Th e Need to Move from War Crimes 
to Environmental Crimes’, in Jay E. Austin and Carl E. Bruch (eds), Th e Environmental 
Consequences of War: Legal, Economic, and Scientifi c Perspectives (2000), 620, 620.
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of enforcing some of its most cherished norms,6 and concerns for the 
environment during armed confl ict. Addressing atrocities perpetrated against 
humans in the conduct of warfare has totally overshadowed any environmental 
concerns. In some senses, this primary anthropocentric focus is perfectly 
understandable as international criminal law has been increasingly utilized as 
a legal tool for the regulation of conduct during warfare. However, this has also 
meant that, thus far, relatively little eff ective focus has been directed towards the 
real threats to the environment that arise in the context of armed confl ict (and 
beyond).
To the extent that these environmental concerns have been dealt with within 
either the jus in bello or the principles of international criminal law – either 
directly or (more typically) indirectly – other factors have still tended to 
dominate the discussions, in particular those relating to military necessity and 
military advantage, and/or the traditional reluctance of States to ‘unduly’ restrict 
the conduct of their forces on the battlefi eld by referring to the environmental 
consequences that may result therefrom. Such institutionalized reluctance stems 
from the fact that warfare almost invariably results in environmental damage, 
thus generating a concern among States that any action taken during armed 
confl ict may potentially attract some form of sanction, unless certain ‘legal 
safeguards’ – typically in the form of minimum thresholds of culpability – are 
put into place.
Th us, any possible regulation of armed confl ict that might otherwise have been 
driven primarily by environmental concerns has historically been perceived 
as unnecessarily hindering the conduct of military operations, with the 
consequence that those thresholds necessary for the application of any criminal 
accountability that have been codifi ed are deliberately set at extremely high 
levels and, consequently, are of little practical or ‘deterrence’ value.
As a result, the relevant jus in bello principles, and the more recently developed 
standards codifi ed within international criminal law instruments, do not 
adequately address the intentional targeting of the environment during warfare, 
as has been demonstrated in earlier chapters, and have probably never done 
so. Th is reality stands in stark contrast to the growing movement in other 
areas towards the universal recognition of environmental rights7 and, more 
fundamentally, the overarching importance of the environment.
6 Frédéric Mégret, ‘Th e Problem of an International Criminal Law of the Environment’ (2011) 
36:2 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 195, 201.
7 Peggy Rodgers Kalas, ‘International Environmental Dispute Resolution and the Need for 
Access by Non-State Entities’ (2001) 12 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law 
and Policy 191, 243.
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With the (possible) exception of article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute (but see 
further below), the international crimes that have been included within the 
jurisdictional mandate of the international criminal tribunals have therefore 
not focused in any specifi c way on addressing the intentional destruction 
of the environment during armed confl ict. Th e threats posed to the natural 
environment have largely not had a role to play in the codifi cation of unacceptable 
behaviour warranting individual criminal responsibility under international law.
In this context, it is no surprise that the concept of an international 
environmental ‘crime’ has not been seriously considered by States within an 
international criminal law context. Rather, to the degree that environmental 
issues have arisen, they have, as noted earlier, typically only been treated as ‘at 
most … an add-on in narrowly circumscribed areas’.8
Th is notion that environmental issues are only of supplementary concern 
has restricted the application of principles relating to the concern for the 
environment in international criminal law and, as was discussed with regard 
to article  8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute, limits the eff ectiveness of regulating 
such damage within the context of armed confl ict. In other words, the previous 
analysis suggests that, if anything, the possibility of criminal accountability for 
intentional destruction of the environment has decreased due to the terms of 
article 8(2)(b)(iv), given the near impossibility of ever proving that the requisite 
threshold of damage required under that provision, to be balanced against 
various military considerations, has been perpetrated.
In chapter 1, a proposition was put forward for assessment; that there is 
an imperative to eff ectively prosecute the intentional destruction of the 
environment during warfare under international criminal law. It is submitted 
that this case has been demonstrated in this book. Th e analysis of the jus in bello 
treaty instruments and customary principles, the international environmental 
law treaty instruments, and the jurisdictional mandates of the international 
criminal justice mechanisms clearly point to the fact that the current 
international regulatory framework is not designed to meet this imperative. 
Th e jus in bello in particular and, to a far lesser extent, the international 
environmental law principles, do touch on certain aspects of this issue, but in 
neither a comprehensive, consistent or focused manner. In terms of international 
criminal law, the Rome Statute also does refer to environmental damage, but, as 
discussed, in terms that are, for practical purposes, largely ineff ective.
8 Drumbl, supra note 5, 632. Th is is also illustrated by the fact that damage to the environment 
is currently addressed in the Rome Statute within the provision (article 8(2)(b)(iv)) that also 
relates to incidental loss or damage to civilians or civilian objects.
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Simply put, to proscribe certain behaviour (the intentional destruction of the 
environment during armed confl ict) in terms, and with conditions, that imply 
that any relevant sanctions will not be enforced because the crime can in 
practical terms never be proven, may at a minimum render any possible criminal 
accountability as an irrelevant consideration. Ironically, therefore, just as the 
need for eff ective regulation continues to increase, the institutional response has 
had a regressive eff ect.
Th us, if one of the important aims of criminalizing certain behaviour within 
the Rome Statute is to deter such actions from being perpetrated – so as ‘to 
contribute to the prevention of such crimes’9 – then article 8(2)(b)(iv) does not 
function as it should. In crude terms, it simply does not ‘work’ to any eff ective 
degree and fails to encourage those involved in armed confl ict to consider 
the environmental consequences of their actions in a signifi cant way. Th is is 
a situation that must be redressed. As discussed below, it is (and has been for 
some time) generally agreed that the intentional destruction of the environment 
during armed confl ict on a signifi cant scale exhibits ‘elements’ that characterize 
it as an international crime, and thus represents an appropriate subject matter 
for international criminal law.
Th is must also, as noted, be seen in the light of the continued development of 
weapons technology, with its ever-increasing destructive capabilities. A number 
of studies indicate that, as this technology continues to develop, the amount 
of (and potential for) environmental damage caused during armed confl ict 
has also escalated.10 As noted in chapter 1, already in 1976, the International 
Law Commission (ILC), in its commentary on the then draft  article  19 of 
the Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, had 
observed that:11
[t]he astounding progress of modern science, although it has produced and 
continues to produce marvellous achievements of great benefi t to mankind, 
nevertheless imparts a capacity to infl ict kinds of damage which would be fearfully 
destructive not only of man’s potential for economic and social development but 
also of his health and of the very possibility of survival for the present and future 
generations.
9 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17  July 1998, 2187 
UNTS 3; 37 ILM 999 (entered into force 1 July 2002) (Rome Statute), preamble para 5.
10 See, for example, Eric Talbot Jensen, ‘Th e International Law of Environmental Warfare: 
Active and Passive Damage During Armed Confl ict’ (2005) 38 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 145, 184–5 and the corresponding footnote.
11 Commentary by the International Law Commission on Article  19 ‘Articles on State 
Responsibility for International Wrongfully Acts’ [1976] 2 Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission Part II, 96, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1976/Add.l (Part 2), 108.
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In this regard, the International Committee of the Red Cross has concluded 
that:12
[i]n the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means 
or method of warfare, States are under an obligation to determine whether its 
employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by applicable rules 
of international law, including those providing protection to the environment in times 
of armed confl ict
Moreover, the fact that environmental destruction is an inevitable occurrence in 
virtually all armed confl ict cannot (or at least can no longer) justify its exclusion 
from otherwise attracting international criminal responsibility in appropriate 
circumstances. In this regard, parallels can be drawn from other developments 
in the evolution of international criminal law, a notable example being the fact 
that an act of rape (or other acts of sexual violence) can, as noted, now constitute 
a war crime, a crime against humanity and even an act of genocide.13 In 1998, 
the then judge of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),14 
Navi Pillay (until recently, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights),15 when interviewed about the landmark Akayesu decision,16 was 
quoted as saying:17
[f]rom time immemorial rape has been regarded as spoils of war … now it will be 
considered a war crime. We want to send out a strong signal that rape is no longer a 
trophy of war.
12 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions 
on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Confl ict’ (1995), article IV(18) 
(emphasis added) <www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JN38#a2> at 25  January 
2015. In support of this statement, the Guidelines refer to article 36 of Protocol I Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Confl icts, opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, 16 ILM 1391 
(entered into force 7 December 1978).
13 See, for example, Rome Statute, articles 7(1)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi).
14 International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and 
Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory 
of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations 
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 
1994 (ICTR).
15 Navanethem ‘Navi’ Pillay was a Judge of the ICTR from 1995–2003, a Judge of the 
International Criminal Court from 1 March 2003–31 August 2008, and United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights from 1 September 2008–31 August 2014.
16 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber, 
2 September 1998.
17 Bill Berkeley, ‘Judgment Day’ Th e Washington Post, 11 October 1998, at W10, quoted in Mark 
Ellis, ‘Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime’ (2006–2007) 38 Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law 225, 236.
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In other words, even though rape had always been associated with warfare, it was 
considered necessary and appropriate at some point in time (albeit much later 
than was justifi ed) to deem the perpetration of such acts as suffi  ciently serious 
so as to constitute an international crime. Similarly, the time has now come to 
codify in appropriate terms that the intentional destruction of the environment 
during armed confl ict constitutes such a crime (subject to minimum damage 
thresholds); and not only so, but that the elaboration of that crime, and the 
scope for criminal accountability for such acts, must bear due correlation to the 
prevailing standards of what constitutes (un)acceptable behaviour in the eyes of 
the international community.
In its oral submissions before the International Court of Justice during hearings 
related to that Court’s Advisory Opinion regarding the legality of nuclear 
weapons, when referring to the ‘Martens clause’,18 Australia made the following 
point:19
neither the concept of “humanity”, nor the “dictates of public conscience” are 
static. Conduct which might have been considered acceptable by the international 
community earlier … might be condemned as inhumane by the international 
community today
In similar vein, in his Dissenting Opinion in the same case, Judge Shahabuddeen 
noted that the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience – 
both of which are specifi ed in the Martens clause – should be ascertained:20
in the light of changing conditions, inclusive of changes in the means and methods 
of warfare and the outlook and tolerance levels of the international community. Th e 
principles would remain constant, but their practical eff ect would vary from time to 
time: they could justify a method of warfare in one age and prohibit it in another
Th ese sentiments – which were expressed by the Judge when considering the 
(potential) use of massively destructive weapons during warfare – apply equally 
to the context of acts targeting the environment on a signifi cant scale during 
armed confl ict. Th e ‘tolerance threshold’ of the international community 
18 See, for example, the preamble of the Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War, opened for signature 18  October 1907, 3 Martens (3rd) 461 (entered into 
force 26 January 1910) (Hague Convention IV). For a discussion of the Martens clause, see 
chapter 2.
19 Verbatim Record, Public Sitting held on Monday 30  October 1995 in the case in Legality 
of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Confl ict (Request for Advisory Opinion 
Submitted by the World Health Organization) and in Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons (Request for Advisory Opinion Submitted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations), Statement of Australia, Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, para 10.
20 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
(Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 375, at 406 (emphasis added).
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towards environmental damage suff ered in warfare is now lower than what 
might previously have been the case. Acts committed during armed confl ict that 
exceed acceptable levels in this regard should now render those responsible as 
criminally accountable, and enforcement mechanisms must be structured so as 
to make this possible in a practical sense. As Bassiouni has opined:21
Th e object of the normative proscription of international criminal law is to specify 
conduct identifi ed as harmful to a given world social interest whose protection is 
deemed to require the imposition of criminal sanctions on violators and which 
sanctions are enforced by the member states of the world community through 
international collective, cooperative or national action.
States did not for a long time establish a specifi c tool to allow for international 
criminal responsibility for intentional environmental destruction during armed 
confl ict. However, given the increasing appreciation of the importance of the 
natural environment and the consequences of environmental destruction, past 
inaction is not a valid reason to prevent the elaboration and development of the 
rules of international criminal law in more recent times,22 particularly where 
those rules are warranted. Indeed, this has been expressly recognized by the 
inclusion of article  8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute – however, for the reasons 
already discussed, this provision does not codify the criminalization of such 
acts in a way that properly addresses the realities of environmental destruction; 
nor does it conform with the increasing need for appropriate standards and 
enforcement mechanisms to project the signifi cance of environmental concerns 
during the conduct of armed confl ict.
5.1.2. A SUI GENERIS CRIME – CRIMES AGAINST THE 
ENVIRONMENT
5.1.2.1. Why a Stand-Alone Crime?
In order to achieve these goals and following on from the analysis in previous 
chapters, a more rigorous criminalization of the intentional destruction of the 
environment during armed confl ict is required. Th e Rome Statute is the most 
appropriate instrument in which this should be included and through which it 
should be enforced. Th is is both due to the fact that the ICC is the best equipped 
of any of the existing mechanisms of international criminal justice to deal with 
21 M. Cherif Bassiouni, as quoted in Mark Allan Gray, ‘Th e International Crime of Ecocide’ 
(1996) 26 California Western International Law Journal 215, 270.
22 Tullio Scovazzi, ‘State Responsibility for Environmental Harm’ (2001) 12 Yearbook of 
International Environmental Law 43, 67.
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this crime, and also, as noted in chapter 1, that the Rome Statute itself plays ‘a 
powerful trendsetting role’23 in articulating and shaping the actions of States.
As demonstrated in chapter 4, this cannot, however, be achieved simply by trying 
to ‘pigeon-hole’ such environmental concerns into, or add them onto, the already 
existing core international crimes in the Rome Statute, not the least because 
those crimes largely do not have a focus directed towards the environment. To 
attempt to do so might, in certain circumstances, also unduly compromise the 
nullum crimen sine lege principle in relation to those crimes.
In addition, at a more general level, it would not be appropriate to manipulate 
or dilute the focus of the core international crimes away from the egregious 
violations of human rights with which they already deal. Such an approach may, 
in fact, compromise the terms of those crimes, and even then may (still) fail 
to more eff ectively address the issue of intentional environmental destruction 
during armed confl ict.
One solution that was initially considered by this author was to (simply) amend 
the existing war crime provision, or perhaps to include a new war crime. Aft er 
careful thought, however, it was concluded that such an approach would not 
be appropriate. First, amending article 8(2)(b)(iv) itself to alter the prohibitions 
relating to environmental damage would be complicated, particularly because 
the provision also deals with the other ‘variants’ of the crime – incidental 
loss of life or injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. Th ose aspects 
of the provision are not the subject of this discussion and, therefore, the only 
amendment to article  8(2)(b)(iv) that is proposed is the deletion of the third 
variant dealing with damage to the natural environment (see Appendix I 
5.3.2.2.2).
Moreover, adding a ‘new’ war crime within article  8 of the Rome Statute to 
address the intentional destruction of the environment does not adequately 
meet the imperatives in terms of environmental concerns during hostilities. 
Whilst, on the one hand, that approach might be more amenable to States than 
the approach suggested in this chapter, it would not suffi  ciently demonstrate 
the importance of instituting international justice mechanisms that address 
acts that target the environment per se. Apart from issues relating to the type 
23 Mark A. Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy (2012), 121. See 
also African Union, ‘Draft  Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights’ AU Doc Exp/Min/IV/Rev.7, which was concluded 
at a meeting of Government Experts and Ministers of Justice/Attorneys General of the 
African Union States on 15 May 2012, draft  article 28D(b)(iv) of which is identical in its terms 
to article  8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute: see <http://africlaw.fi les.wordpress.com/2012/05/
au-fi nal-court-protocol-as-adopted-by-the-ministers-17may. pdf> at 18 February 2014.
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of armed confl ict to which it would apply, and the sensitivity of States in respect 
of war crimes, categorizing such acts simply as a war crime and within the 
other restrictions that apply to war crimes, as well as the underlying military 
considerations, would not adequately stigmatize such acts – in simple terms, 
apart from the legal hurdles, it would send ‘the wrong message’ regarding the 
importance of the environment, even during hostilities.
What is required is an appropriate ‘tool’ that regulates such acts reaching a 
(specifi ed) level of gravity by way of its codifi cation as a crime in its own right. 
Th is therefore calls for an alternate approach; an amendment to the Rome Statute 
that would see the inclusion of a separate sui generis crime within the Rome 
Statute – ‘crimes against the environment’ – with a principal and direct focus 
on acts done with intent to signifi cantly destroy the environment during armed 
confl ict. Having said this, it is important to bear in mind that the Rome Statute is 
not an ‘environmental’ treaty, but rather an elaboration of fundamental aspects 
of international criminal law. Th is does not, however, rule out the inclusion 
of such a crime; rather what it emphasizes is that such acts have now reached 
a level of gravity and seriousness such that they will, in certain circumstances, 
constitute an international crime.
Th e inclusion, within the jurisdiction of a mechanism of international justice 
created by the international community, of a specifi c crime directed towards 
this type of act therefore represents an appropriate elaboration of law that, as 
Kittichaisaree notes, should be undertaken ‘in light of the latest developments in 
law, morality, and the sense of criminal justice at the [relevant] time.’24
5.1.2.2. Why ‘During Armed Confl ict’?
In this context, this chapter seeks to set out a relatively modest proposal to more 
adequately address such acts – modest in the sense that it focusses solely on acts 
done with intent to cause signifi cant environmental destruction during armed 
confl ict. History has demonstrated that such attacks on the environment have 
oft en occurred in armed confl ict. It is, however, recognized that this is not the 
only context in which they take place, since they might also be perpetrated in 
circumstances where there is not necessarily a clear nexus to an armed confl ict, 
or even perhaps in the course of ‘peaceful activities’.25
24 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law (2001), 3.
25 See, for example, Ludwik A. Teclaff , ‘Beyond Restoration – the Case of Ecocide’ (1994) 34 
Natural Resources Journal 933, who (at 934) contended that the term ‘ecocide’ could be 
applied to peaceful activities that destroy the environment on a massive scale. See also 
Mansour Jabbari-Gharabagh, ‘Type of State Responsibility for Environmental Matters in 
International Law’ (1999) 33 Revue Juridique Th emis 59, 86. For a contrary view, see Malcolm 
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In a sense, the potential range of circumstances in which a deliberate targeting of 
the environment might take place presents a fundamental choice to those seeking 
to ‘defi ne’ such a crime. As someone with sympathies for the need to prevent 
such attacks in all contexts, this author could have chosen to put forward a broad, 
all-embracing proposal for a crime – covering actions that are perpetrated either 
in the context of armed confl ict or occasioned during times of peace. In the end, 
however, the author has chosen not to take this path – despite its attractions – 
and has limited it to armed confl icts, for the reasons set out below.
First, as discussed in the following sections, the intentional targeting of the 
environment is addressed in this book not from an environmental protection 
perspective, but rather from a (international) criminal law viewpoint, giving rise to 
the need to elaborate appropriate and eff ective tools of criminal accountability for 
acts that represent unacceptable (criminal) behaviour, as opposed to environmental 
law sanctions. In other words, the proposed amendment to the Rome Statute set 
out in this chapter addresses acts that constitute an international crime, for which 
regulation is necessary and appropriate under international criminal law. In 
essence, it is the intention to target the environment that indicates the gravity of 
such acts, and this is to be seen within the context of international criminal law.
Whilst the inclusion of this crime within the mandate of the ICC will have a much 
greater deterrence value than the current status quo, and thus serve to (potentially) 
reduce the risk of signifi cant environmental damage, it is therefore fi rst and 
foremost to be considered under the ambit of international criminal law. Measures 
designed more generally to specifi cally protect the environment might take other 
forms, since not every act that has adverse consequences for the environment 
should be considered as falling within the scope of an international crime.
Secondly, it is important to recognize the boundaries under which the ICC 
operates. In general, the underlying contexts of the crimes that fall within the 
mandate of the Court revolve around armed confl icts. Although it may be possible 
– technically – for some of the crimes to be perpetrated in ‘peace-time’, since there 
is no (or no longer in the case of the latter) direct linkage or nexus required to an 
armed confl ict in the case of the crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity, 
the reality is that even these crimes will typically take place during some form of 
armed confl ict, even if this is not a defi nitional element of the crime.
To introduce into the Rome Statute a crime that would cover acts that clearly 
take place outside the scope of any confl ict – for example, the deliberate dumping 
of nuclear waste into the ocean by a merchant vessel – would, it is submitted, 
‘stretch’ the reach of the Court to situations beyond which it was principally 
N. Shaw, ‘Genocide and International Law’, in Yoram Dinstein (ed), International Law at a 
Time of Perplexity (1989), 797, 810.
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designed to address, notwithstanding the seriousness of such an action. Th is 
would potentially dilute the important role of the Court in dealing with crimes 
that take place (generally) within the context of confl ict, and may also involve it 
in situations that are outside of its principal focus. Consequently, this would also 
give rise to political opposition, which might seriously hamper any acceptance of 
the need to codify this crime.
Th irdly, to the extent that the international community has thus far chosen 
to specifi cally address the deliberate destruction of the environment under 
international criminal law, it has done so as a war crime (article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the 
Rome Statute). Notwithstanding that this provision is fl awed and ineff ective, the 
fact remains that the concept of addressing environmental destruction has (only) 
been accepted in circumstances that have a clear nexus to an (international) 
armed confl ict.26 In this sense, it is already the case that environmental issues 
are relevant in the context of armed confl ict for the purposes of the ICC, with the 
only issue (albeit a signifi cant one, and a principal focus of this book) being how 
to eff ectively proscribe such acts. As noted, however, limiting any prohibition of 
intentional environmental destruction during warfare only to the classifi cation 
of war crimes does not achieve all that is required. On the other hand, for the 
reasons outlined, a link between the crime and armed confl ict is still considered 
to be necessary and appropriate, if the Rome Statute is to be the conduit by which 
such acts are to be prohibited.
Th us, criminalizing such acts as are perpetrated in an armed confl ict context is 
an accepted approach under international criminal law, and the ICC is already 
regarded as an appropriate mechanism of international criminal justice to 
deal with them. In essence, to comply with already accepted enforceability 
mechanisms in respect of such acts is consistent with existing practice whilst 
not imposing systematic boundaries limiting the scope of any defi nition of 
crimes against the environment. It is acknowledged, however, that to require this 
‘relationship’ with an armed confl ict will necessarily exclude other examples of 
deliberate environmental destruction that do not indicate such a link.
Finally, from a political realist viewpoint, a broad all-embracing proposal 
would, it is submitted, have no chance of ever seeing the light of day, not only 
because its scope would be too wide-reaching to be politically acceptable, but also 
because it would most likely require the establishment of a new, specifi c judicial 
infrastructure – an international environmental (criminal) court27 – to measure 
26 See the opening words of article 8(2)(b) of the Rome Statute, which make direct reference to 
an (international) ‘armed confl ict’. Th is was raised in chapter 4 and will be discussed further 
in this chapter.
27 Th ere have, over the past two decades, been a number of calls for the establishment of an 
international environmental court: see, for example, details of the 1992 draft  convention 
for the Establishment of an International Court for the Environment proposed under the 
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compliance with the appropriate standards and also to regulate enforcement. Such 
a development does not appear likely, particularly in the light of the sensitivity 
of the international community towards increasing the number of international 
(criminal) tribunals,28 given their very signifi cant operational costs.29
For all of these reasons, this author has chosen to defi ne crimes against the 
environment in terms that emphasize the need to better protect the environment 
per se and, by codifying it as a stand-alone crime, elevate its importance quite 
unambiguously in the context of armed confl ict, so that it is no longer to be 
treated as a minor and incidental matter, clouded by overarching military 
considerations that are traditionally applied in the sphere of war crimes. Instead, 
it sends a strong and clear message that the destruction of the environment can 
no longer be treated simply as a ‘spoil of war’.
At the same time, the terms of the crime as proposed below are not only workable 
in a functioning criminal law sense, but are consistent with current practice, 
far more eff ective than the existing legal regime in terms of addressing the 
fundamental environmental concerns, and politically more ‘achievable’ in the 
short-medium term. Th is is both because its scope is in line with the increasing 
acceptance by the international community of the principles of international 
criminal law as a tool for addressing the most egregious of acts, particularly 
(although, as noted above, not exclusively),30 during armed confl ict,31 and also 
auspices of the National Academy of Lincei in Rome, discussed in Kalas, supra note 7, 232–
40. For another example of a proposed treaty for such a court, see Kenneth F. McCallion, 
‘International Environmental Justice: Rights and Remedies’ (2003) 26 Hastings International 
and Comparative Law Review 427, 438–443. More recently, see Alliance des Démocrates et des 
Libéraux pour l’Europe, ‘Charter of Brussels for the creation of European and International 
Criminal Court of the Environment and Health’, 30 January 2014, article 3.
28 See, for example, the Completion Strategy for the International Tribunal for the Prosecution 
of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed 
in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY) and of the ICTR, discussed in 
chapter 4.
29 See, for example, Steven D. Roper and Lilian A. Barria, Designing Criminal Tribunals – 
Sovereignty and International Concerns in the Protection of Human Rights (2006), who 
calculated (at page 61) that, already by the end of 2005, the ICTY and ICTR had ‘received over 
$4.5 billion through Chapter VII fi nancing’.
30 In this regard, the crime of crimes against humanity is no longer formally linked to the 
existence of an armed confl ict: compare, for example, the chapeau of the defi nition of crimes 
against humanity in article 5 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution 
of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed 
in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, 32 ILM 1159 (entered into force 25 May 
1993) (ICTY Statute) (‘… when committed in armed confl ict, whether international or 
internal in character’) with article 7(1) of the Rome Statute, where no such nexus is specifi ed. 
See chapter 4 for more details.
31 As mentioned in chapter 1, it is also noteworthy to observe that, at its 65th session in 
2013, the International Law Commission decided to include the topic of ‘Protection of the 
Environment in relation to Armed Confl icts’ in its programme of work, on the basis of the 
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because an existing and operative enforcement mechanism – the ICC – has 
already been accepted as an appropriate institution to deal with such acts, and 
has (or is developing) much of the necessary expertise.
Moreover, designating an existing permanent (as opposed to ad hoc) mechanism 
of international criminal justice with this jurisdiction would allow for future 
accountability for acts perpetrated in as yet un-conducted armed confl icts, 
thus adding considerably to the deterrence eff ect of the provisions, assuming of 
course, that the terms of the crime are practical and workable.
All of these considerations address many issues that may otherwise have 
given rise to a general reluctance on the part of States to codify an additional 
international crime on the basis of the lack of existing enforcement 
machinery.32 Th ey also counter arguments as to any ‘novelty’ of the legal 
approach taken in this book to address the intentional destruction of the 
environment during armed confl ict.
Although some may advocate that a far broader crime is required, it is submitted 
that the most appropriate approach to take is to codify the crime on the basis 
that it might realistically be accepted and acceptable within a relatively short 
time period. As Frédéric Mégret has noted:33
[i]nternational criminalization ought not to attempt too much at the risk of failing to 
accomplish what can realistically be achieved.
Th is does not represent a lack of ambition; nor, it is submitted, is it an exercise 
in undue cynicism. Rather, it is an acceptance of the realpolitik, as well as 
recognition of the advantages of developing the regime of institutionalized 
international criminal law along the lines of existing accepted practice, thus 
refl ecting a more seamless evolution of legal principles. Th ere are no doubt many 
worthy and ‘justifi able’ calls for change and the extension of accountability 
mechanisms in a wide range of fi elds, including with respect to the Rome Statute 
itself.34 However, some of these are unlikely to have any practical relevance for, 
or impact on, the ongoing development of international law, due to the inherent 
recommendations contained in a working group report: see International Law Commission, 
‘Protection of the environment in relation to armed confl icts’ (5  June 2013) <www.un.org/
law/ilc/index.html> at 21 January 2015.
32 Gray, supra note 21, 271.
33 Mégret, supra note 6, 211.
34 See, for example, Kamari Maxine Clarke, ‘Treat Greed in Africa as a War Crime’, Th e New 
York Times (New York), 29  January 2013 <www.nytimes.com/2013/01/30/opinion/treat-
greed-in-africa-as-a-war-crime.html?emc=eta1> at 25 January 2015.
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conservatism of States when it comes to submitting themselves to international 
legal regulation and enforcement.
A tangible consequence of this conservatism, at least since the 1990s, has been 
the creation of international criminal tribunals with mandates that, to a large 
degree, were intended to prosecute only those crimes that were ‘doubtless part 
of customary international law.’35 However, this limitation only to customary 
international law, as discussed in the previous chapter, may not always be the 
case.36 Seen in this context, it is argued that the inclusion of the sui generis 
international crime of crimes against the environment is a necessary and 
appropriate step at this point, even though existing customary law may not 
(yet) support every aspect of the defi nition set out in 5.3. As discussed in 5.2, 
a requirement that every one of its elements represents customary international 
law does not appear to be a necessary criterion for the legal characterization of 
an act as an international crime.
In any event, the suggestion that the targeting of the environment during 
armed confl ict may attract international criminal prosecution has, as noted, 
already been accepted.37 International criminal law already deals with acts 
directed against victims and addresses prohibitions on certain weapons. Th us, 
the inclusion of a crime that encompasses situations where the environment is 
targeted as a victim or utilized as a weapon is not at odds with existing accepted 
practice with respect to codifying acts that give rise to international criminal 
responsibility.
As mentioned, given the status of the ICC as a permanent international criminal 
court, that institution is the appropriate judicial body to have jurisdiction 
over this crime. Th is is so even though the Court undoubtedly faces some 
35 United Nations Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 
of Security Council Resolution 808’ (3 May 1993) UN Doc S/25704, para 33–5. As noted in 
chapter 1, this can be contrasted to arguments raised before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal 
to the eff ect that the crimes prosecuted in that tribunal off ended the nullum crimen sine lege 
principle. In respect of the ICTY, one commentator suggests that it also adopted a ‘relaxed 
attitude’ to the nullum crimen principle quite early on in its judicial operation, an approach 
that he considered was ‘certainly consistent’ with that also taken by the European Court of 
Human Rights: see, William Schabas, ‘Commentary on Judgement, Prosecutor v Furundžija’, 
in André Klip and Göran Sluiter (eds), Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal 
Tribunals, Volume III, Th e International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 1997–
1999 (2001), 753, 757. See also Steven Freeland, ‘Judicial Decision-Making in International 
Criminal Courts: ‘Eff ective’ Justice?’ (2014) 3(1) Griffi  th Journal of Law and Human Dignity 
(forthcoming).
36 See, for example, Kenneth S. Gallant, ‘Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and Jurisdiction to Prescribe 
in International Criminal Courts’ (2003) 48 Villanova Law Review 764, 783.
37 See also Byung-Sun Cho, ‘Emergence of an International Environmental Criminal Law?’ 
(2001) 19 UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 11, 26.
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considerable challenges, and there remain imperfections in this still-evolving 
system of international justice.38 Yet, it has continued to develop expertise in 
the prosecution of serious international crimes, notwithstanding diffi  culties 
along the way.39 Incorporating a crime of crimes against the environment into 
mandate of the ICC will, it is submitted, further emphasize the criminal aspects 
associated with such acts, and also allow for a relatively seamless adoption of the 
crime into an existing and functioning mechanism of international criminal 
justice.
For all of these reasons, therefore, this book argues for the introduction of a 
separate and independent international crime of crimes against the environment, 
as defi ned in section 5.3, to be included in the Rome Statute, and thus within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC.
5.2. CRIMES AGAINST THE ENVIRONMENT – 
AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME?
As noted, the Rome Statute is intended to address ‘the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole.’40 Th e core crimes within 
the Rome Statute are regarded as international crimes, given their degree of 
‘seriousness’, the level of which is refl ected in the nature of the act(s) in question, 
the extent of its (their) eff ects, the motives of the perpetrator, or a combination 
of these factors.41 In addition, the ILC has suggested that ‘[t]he more important 
the subject-matter [of an off ence], the more serious the transgression’.42 At 
issue here is whether acts that would constitute a crime against the environment 
meet the criteria as to constitute an international crime.
38 For a discussion of some of the challenges facing the ICC, see Steven Freeland, ‘International 
Criminal Governance: Will the International Criminal Court be an ‘Eff ective’ Mechanism for 
Justice?’, in Michael Head, Scott Mann and Simon Kozlina (eds), Transnational Governance: 
Emerging Models of Global Legal Regulation (2012), 213.
39 See, for example, the very pointed criticism of the Prosecution by the Trial Chamber of the 
ICC in Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article  76 of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Th omas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04–01/06–2901, Trial Chamber I, 10 July 2012, at inter alia 
para 60, 75, 89, 91 and 97.
40 Rome Statute, preamble para 4 (emphasis added).
41 See International Law Commission, ‘Draft  Code of Off ences Against the Peace and Security 
of Mankind’ [1987] 2:2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 7, UN Doc A/CN.4/
SER.A/1987/Add.1 (Part 2), 13, para 66, where the ILC concluded that ‘it is this seriousness 
which constitutes the essential element of a crime against the peace and security of mankind’. 
Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad goes even further, believing that the notion of international 
crimes ‘is not necessarily limited to the most serious harms, but rather the most outrageous 
actions’: Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, ‘Th e Rome Statute & Captain Planet: What lies 
between ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ and the ‘Natural Environment’’ (2009) XIX Fordham 
Environmental Law Review 265, 268.
42 Nina H.B. Jørgensen, Th e Responsibility of States for International Crimes (2000), 107.
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At the very least, the intentional targeting of the environment during armed 
confl ict may, in certain circumstances, meet (and exceed) the relevant threshold 
level of seriousness, principally in terms of its potential eff ects; and particularly 
because the intent of the perpetrator is to cause such damage. In this respect, 
it should also be recalled that a Special Rapporteur of the ILC dealing with the 
Draft  Code of Off ences against the Peace and Security of Mankind had stated 
already in 1985 that:43
… all international crimes are characterized by the breach of an international 
obligation that is essential for safeguarding the fundamental interests of mankind. But 
some interests should be placed at the top of the hierarchical list. Th ese are international 
peace and security, the right of self-determination of peoples, the safeguarding of 
the human being and the preservation of the human environment. Th ose are the four 
cardinal points round which the most essential concerns revolve, and these concerns 
constitute the summit of the pyramid on account of their primordial importance.
In general terms, it follows from this that such crimes attain the ‘status’ of an 
international crime because they are regarded as an aff ront to us all. In this sense, 
international criminal law since the 1990s has generally taken an anthropocentric 
approach to accountability. It is the perspective of the international community as 
to the abhorrent or heinous nature of the relevant act(s) directed towards humans 
that determines whether an international criminal response is warranted.44
Whilst this will remain the predominant motivation for the codifi cation of crimes 
in the constituent documents of the international criminal tribunals, there are 
signs that there are also other factors at play – as indicated, for example, by the 
incorporation into the Rome Statute in 2010 of the defi nition of the crime of 
‘aggression’, which is a more State-centered crime, and thus not so much a response 
to human rights concerns but rather to a breakdown in inter-State relationships.
As a consequence, there is no inherent impediment, based on any assertion that 
not all ‘[a]ttacks on the environment … categorically “shock the conscience of 
mankind”’, to prevent the conclusion that crimes against the environment 
constitutes an international crime for which specifi c provision should be made 
within the Rome Statute in a manner that gives rise to eff ective enforcement.45 
43 Th ird Report on the Draft  Code of Off ences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, by 
Mr. Doudou Th iam, Special Rapporteur, International Law Commission, 8 April 1985, UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/387 and Corr.1 and Corr.2, para 61 (emphasis added).
44 Mégret, supra note 6, 208; Wattad, supra note 41, 268.
45 Id Mégret. See also M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed), A Draft  International Criminal Code and Draft  
Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal (1987), who (at page 30) rates environmental 
crimes as 5 out of 10 – with 10 being the ‘highest degree of prevalence’ and 0 meaning 
‘non-existence’ – under the element headed ‘“Shocking” to the Conscience of Humanity’ 
(discussed below).
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What is important in this respect is to provide a mechanism to determine the 
appropriate level of gravity, refl ected principally in the intent to cause a certain 
threshold of damage, to constitute such a crime. In any event, it is clear that the 
perception of the international community as to what constitutes a serious crime 
of international concern may change over time and, as noted, this also applies 
to the intentional destruction of the natural environment, given our changing 
attitudes towards the state of the environment and acknowledgement of the need 
to better protect it during armed confl ict.
Other criteria have also been suggested as indicative characteristics of what 
might constitute an international crime. Particular acts are, for example, 
categorized as international crimes because they are regarded as of such 
importance to the international community as to warrant accountability in 
the form of individual criminal responsibility.46 As noted in chapter 1, in the 
context of the general international law principles of State responsibility, the ILC 
had earlier suggested that:47
[a]n internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State of an 
international obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the 
international community that its breach is recognized as a crime by the community as 
a whole constitutes an international crime.
Th is defi nition incorporated both an objective (the type of obligation specifi ed) 
and a subjective factor (the recognition by the international community). To 
provide further clarity as to what might constitute such a crime, the draft  article 
then went on to indicate that one example might be:48
a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the 
safeguarding and preservation of the human environment …
Th e draft  article thus indicated that damage to the human environment on a 
signifi cant scale was suffi  ciently serious as to be recognized as an international 
crime. It is true that draft  article 19 was not directed towards the ‘criminalization’ 
of such acts, but was rather focused on the responsibility of States. However, 
applying the nomenclature of an ‘international crime’, even (or perhaps more so) 
within the concept of State responsibility under the general principles of public 
46 Dinah Shelton, ‘Centennial Essay: In Honor of the 100th Anniversary of the AIJL and 
the ASIL: Normative Hierarchy in International Law’ (2006) 100 American Journal of 
International Law 291, 318.
47 See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on its work of the 
thirty-second session, [1980] 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission Part II, 32, UN 
Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.l (Part 2), draft  article 19(2) (emphasis added).
48 Ibid, draft  article 19(3)(d).
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international law, was indicative of what has become a trend towards regarding 
such acts from a criminal law perspective.
In 1987, Cherif Bassiouni suggested that an international crime exhibits one or 
more of the following characteristics:49
(a) An ‘International Element’, in that it:
(i) threatens the peace and security of mankind, either directly or 
indirectly;
(ii) is conduct that is ‘shocking to the conscience of the world community’ 
and is thus contrary to its ‘shared values’;
(b) A ‘Transnational Element’, in that it:
(iii) is ‘transnational’ in nature, aff ecting public safety and economic 
interests in more than one State, involves citizens of more than one 
State, and transcends national borders; or
(c) A ‘Necessity of International Cooperation Element’, in that it:
(iv) requires international cooperation for its prevention, suppression and 
control.
Bassiouni then goes on to assess crimes involving damage to the environment 
against these elements, and concludes that they display characteristics of all of 
them apart from factor (a)(i) above.50
In this author’s view, the intentional destruction of the environment during 
warfare does, in fact, meet all of the elements outlined by Bassiouni, including 
the link to a threat to international peace and security, which is now regarded 
as a ‘fi rmly established element of a theory of international criminal law’.51 As 
discussed in chapter 1, there is a strong body of thought that also subscribes to 
this view. It is noteworthy that the ILC, in providing examples of what might 
constitute an international crime in its then draft  article  19, ‘equated’52 a 
breach threatening the human environment (as quoted above) with:53
(a) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the 
maintenance of international peace and security…
(b) (…)
49 Bassiouni, supra note 45, 36–40.
50 Ibid, 39.
51 Florian Jessberger, Report to Chairman of Degree Committee regarding dissertation 
submitted by Steven Robert Freeland to the University of Maastricht, 23  July 2014, 7 (copy 
with author).
52 Jabbari-Gharabagh, supra note 25, 88.
53 See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on its work of the 
thirty-second session, [1980] 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission Part II, 32, UN 
Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.l (Part 2), draft  articles 19(3)(a), 19(3)(c) (emphasis in original).
Chapter Five. Incorporating Crimes against the Environment into the Rome Statute
238 Intersentia
(c) a serious breach on a widespread scale of an international obligation of essential 
importance for safeguarding the human being, such as those prohibiting slavery, 
genocide and apartheid
If anything, this further reinforces the view that crimes against the environment 
display the characteristics that are normally associated with the select group 
of international crimes, and thus is suitable for inclusion as a sui generis crime 
within the terms of the Rome Statute.
Th e importance of the natural environment – and thus the ‘seriousness’ of any 
signifi cant damage caused to it – also stems from the fact that it covers a wide 
range of concepts, each of which is vital for the existence of not only humankind, 
but also the other co-existing and interdependent elements of the environment. 
Within the context of determining the degree to which damage to the 
environment should be criminalized, the ILC regarded it as encompassing:54
the environment of the human race and where the human race develops, as well 
as areas the preservation of which is of fundamental importance in protecting the 
environment. Th ese words therefore cover the seas, the atmosphere, climate, forests 
and other plant cover, fauna, fl ora and other biological elements.
In 1994, at its 15th International Congress on Penal Law, the International 
Association of Penal Law adopted a resolution relating to the concept of crimes 
against the environment. Th e discussions did not diff erentiate between such 
crimes occurring during armed confl ict and those committed in times of peace 
– and thus were broader than the codifi ed crime proposed in this book, which 
is just limited to acts during armed confl ict. Even so, the resolution, which 
largely dealt with prosecution under national law, contained the following 
paragraph:55
Core crimes against the environment aff ecting more than one jurisdiction or 
aff ecting the global commons outside any national jurisdiction should be recognized 
as international crimes under multilateral conventions
In sum, therefore, it is generally agreed that, in appropriate circumstances, acts 
done with intent to destroy the environment during armed confl ict ‘qualify’ as 
an international crime. Th is appears to have been widely accepted by academic 
scholars already in the 1990s (most of the examples referred to above were 
54 International Law Commission, ‘Draft  Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind’ [1991] 2:2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 107, UN Doc A/CN.4/
SER.A/1991/Add.1 (Part 2).
55 See International Association of Penal Law, Resolutions of the XVth International Congress 
on Penal Law (1995) 66 1:2 International Review of Penal Law 52, 52–3 (emphasis added).
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from that period). It is submitted that, if anything, there is an even stronger 
case for asserting this now, given the increased signifi cance attributed by the 
international community to issues associated with the environment.56 Of 
course, this will depend on a range of factors and will therefore not apply to 
all such damage – the extent of (potential) damage will be one, among several, 
relevant circumstances to take into account, along with the intent of the alleged 
perpetrator.
Th e following section therefore sets out a proposed defi nition of the crime of 
crimes against the environment, draft ed on the basis as discussed in 5.1 (that is, 
limited to armed confl icts) and as a sui generis crime within the Rome Statute.
5.3. CRIMES AGAINST THE ENVIRONMENT – 
A DEFINITION FOR THE ROME STATUTE
As noted, this section sets out a defi nition of the crime in a form that would 
be consistent with its inclusion as a separate crime within the Rome Statute. It 
also discusses the most important aspects of the defi nition. In addition to the 
terms of the crime, the applicable updated Elements of Crime are also included. 
Other necessary associated changes in the Rome Statute as a consequence of the 
inclusion of this new provision are set out in Appendix I.
Section 5.4 will then briefl y outline the process for amending the Rome Statute 
to include these provisions, although this is not particularly controversial and 
will only be dealt with in relatively brief terms.
5.3.1. THE APPLICABLE APPROACH TO DEFINING 
CRIMES AGAINST THE ENVIRONMENT
An obvious starting point for this exercise is to establish what the proposed 
new provision would seek to ‘accomplish’57 and, equally important, what it 
would not. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that, as noted, the Rome 
Statute is an instrument directed towards the prevention of international crimes 
and enforcement by way of international criminal responsibility. It is not an 
environmental protection treaty, as demonstrated by the fact that the scope of 
56 See, for example, ‘End Ecocide’, (2013), which claims that ‘[o]ver the course of 2012 making 
Ecocide a crime has developed into a global movement’ <http://eradicatingecocide.
cmail5.com/t/ViewEmail/r/9F38DE90606F959E/9E223A7C45EC01860CC2E775D3CF5869> 
at 25 January 2015.
57 Peter J. Richards and Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Mars Meets Mother Nature: Protecting the 
Environment During Armed Confl ict’ (1999) 28 Stetson Law Review 1047, 1089.
Chapter Five. Incorporating Crimes against the Environment into the Rome Statute
240 Intersentia
the penalties that the Court may impose are i) relatively limited;58 ii) do not 
easily lend themselves to an order for restitution, remediation or the ‘clean up’ of 
any environmental harm;59 and iii) are clearly not specifi cally directed towards 
the ‘curing’ of environmental damage.60
Given this understanding of what the Rome Statute is and is not, debates about what 
constitutes the most appropriate requirements for ‘crimes’ under environmental 
treaties (and regional and national law)61 might not always be directly relevant. 
Rather, the approach taken in this book, as emphasized previously, is from an 
international criminal law perspective vis-à-vis those who intend to damage the 
environment during armed confl ict.62 Th at said, as noted, the inclusion of the 
crime of crimes against the environment into the Rome Statute will have the eff ect 
of better protecting the interests of the environment during armed confl ict.
As will be seen, for the crime of crimes against the environment, it is not 
necessary that the actual harm, in the sense of what is intended by the perpetrator, 
is ‘achieved’. Th is is also the case with respect to other crimes under the Rome 
Statute. For example, for a crime of genocide to have been perpetrated, it is (only) 
necessary that one of the listed acts be committed, that it is directed towards a 
specifi c group, and that it is committed with the requisite intention (to destroy).63 
Th ere is no requirement as to the actual destruction of all or part of the group.64 
As the Trial Chamber of the ICTR stated in the landmark Akayesu judgment:65
58 Apart from imprisonment (Rome Statute, article 77(1)), the Court may order the payment of 
fi nes (article  77(2)(a)) or ‘[a] forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived directly or 
indirectly from [the] crime’ (article 77(2)(b)).
59 Mark A. Drumbl, ‘Waging War against the World: Th e Need to Move from War Crimes to 
Environmental Crimes’ (1998) 22 Fordham International Law Journal 122, 150.
60 Although article  75 of the Rome Statute provides for the possibility of the Court making an 
order for the award of reparations to ‘victims’, it is clear from the terms of that provision that this 
is intended to apply to ‘human’ victims, and not where the natural environment is the victim.
61 For a comprehensive discussion of possible structures for criminalization under environmental 
instruments, see Michael G. Faure and Marjolein Visser, ‘How to Punish Environmental 
Pollution? Some Refl ections on Various Models of Criminalization of Environmental Harm’ 
(1995) 3 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 316.
62 As discussed below, due to the particular circumstances of the crime, the mens rea element of 
crimes against the environment is not just limited to a direct dolus directus intention, but also 
includes dolus eventualis and wilful blindness.
63 See, for example, Judgement and Sentence, Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe 
Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, Trial Chamber I, 6 December 1999, para 48.
64 Cassese’s International Criminal Law (3rd ed, 2013) (revised by A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, L. Baig, 
M. Fan, C. Gosnell and A. Whiting), 45. See also Kittichaisaree, supra note 24, 71. Note, 
however, the possible inconsistency on this point raised by Gerhard Werle when considering 
the Elements of Crime for genocide: Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law 
(2005), 204–5.
65 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber, 
2 September 1998, para 497. In a 1996 report on the Draft  Code of Off ences against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind, the International Law Commission stated that ‘it is not necessary to 
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[c]ontrary to popular belief, the crime of genocide does not imply the actual 
extermination of [a] group in its entirety, but is understood as such once any one 
of the acts mentioned in Article  2(2)(a) through 2(2)(e) [of the ICTR Statute] is 
committed with the specifi c intent to destroy “in whole or in part” a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group.
Th is is logical and appropriate – logical in the sense that one would otherwise 
have to wait until the actual destruction of a group before charging an alleged 
perpetrator, and appropriate in that the deterrence eff ect of the crime would 
be signifi cantly diluted by such a requirement. Indeed, it would lead to the 
unacceptable consequence that if, for example, a perpetrator had killed many 
people with the requisite intention, but it could not be shown that he had actually 
destroyed a (part of a) group, then he could not be charged with the crime of 
genocide.66 It is also appropriate because it emphasizes that the heinous nature 
of the crime arises by virtue of the intent to achieve such a result.
Although there are signifi cant diff erences with respect to the two crimes, the 
crime of crimes against the environment is also defi ned as a crime of intent,67 
accompanied by specifi c acts. Like genocide, therefore, it is not necessary 
that the actual intended harm – ‘widespread, long-term or severe damage to 
the natural environment’ (as defi ned in article  8 ter(2) – see 5.3.2.1) – occurs 
before the crime is committed. Of course, any actual harm may be relevant 
as a material fact for other purposes, and may assist in a determination as to 
whether the alleged perpetrator did, in fact, intend to cause the threshold level of 
environmental damage.
It follows, therefore, that the general structural approach taken in this book to 
defi ning crimes against the environment is not completely ‘new’, or ‘radical’, 
or contrary to existing accepted practice. It is not intended here to completely 
overturn the existing approach to criminalizing those acts that meet a level of 
gravity such that they constitute an international crime. Rather, it is submitted 
that the proposed sui generis crime of crimes against the environment represents 
a logical, eff ective and consistent evolution of the codifi cation of acts that both 
achieve the fi nal result of the destruction of a group in order for the crime of genocide to have 
been committed. It is enough to have committed any one of the acts listed in the article with 
the clear intention of bringing about the total or partial destruction of the group as such’: 
Code of Off ences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the International Law 
Commission on Its Forty-eighth session, United Nations General Assembly Offi  cial Records 
51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, 9 UN Doc A/51/10 (1996), 126.
66 As discussed below, there has never been a prosecution initiated before the international 
criminal courts and tribunals for attempted genocide.
67 As noted, the ‘intent’ requirement for crimes against the environment incorporates a diff erent 
(and lower) mens rea standard than the dolus specialis (special intent) requirement for the 
crime of genocide. Th e point here is the fact that, for both crimes, it is not necessary that the 
actual intended harm occurs.
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‘deeply shock the conscience of humanity’68 and ‘threaten the peace, security 
and well-being of the world’.69
Th at said, there is one signifi cant diff erence. Th e focus of the crime of crimes 
against the environment relates to a threshold level of intended damage to the 
environment, and thus does diff er from the other core international crimes in 
that it does not necessarily require or involve an anthropocentric element – for 
example, a concrete endangerment to human life or health – or a human rights 
element. However, once again these will be amongst those factors that may be 
relevant, in the particular circumstances, to determine the degree of seriousness 
of any such damage that does actually eventuate.
For all the reasons noted above, therefore, it would not be appropriate that the 
crime were to apply to all deliberate environmental damage, and certainly not to 
de minimis damage. In addition, given the nature of the international criminal 
enforcement mechanism that is to be utilized (the ICC), the crime does not 
specifi cally deal with acts constituting a ‘mere’ violation of the many MEAs that 
exist although, of course, those will oft en also have signifi cant environmental 
consequences. As noted in chapter 2, the applicable sanctions under those 
instruments will, however, oft en be in the form of an obligation to make 
compensation, rather than any criminal responsibility.70
Nor is the international crime of crimes against the environment necessarily 
intended to apply to a breach of domestic legislation that regulates the 
environment in various jurisdictions, even where violations of this type may be 
classifi ed as ordinary (non-international) environmental crimes, and may attract 
criminal sanctions under the relevant domestic law.71 Having said this, acts 
68 Rome Statute, preamble para 2.
69 Ibid, para 3.
70 Th ere are, of course, other international instruments that are also relevant to conduct that 
might constitute this type of crime. For example, the Hague Convention for the Protection 
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Confl ict, opened for signature 14 May 1954, 249 
UNTS 240 (entered into force 7 August 1956) imposes obligations on States to refrain from 
any act of hostility directed against cultural property and to abstain from using this property 
for military purposes. Th is instrument does not, however, provide for international criminal 
responsibility for acts constituting a breach, although article 28 requires States Parties to ‘take 
all necessary steps’ to prosecute those who breach the treaty. See also the Second Protocol to 
the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Confl ict, opened for signature 26 March 1999, 38 ILM 769 (entered into force 9 March 2004), 
article 15. For more detail, see chapter 2.
71 For a discussion on the position with regard to, for example, environmental crimes under 
the national law of the United States, see Rachel Glickman, Rose Standifer, Lory Stone and 
Jeremiah Sullivan, ‘Environmental Crimes’ (2003) 40 American Criminal Law Review 413.
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that do constitute crimes against the environment cannot be justifi ed on the 
basis of any national law.72
Instead, the proposed defi nition in 5.3.2.1 specifi es a minimum threshold level 
of intentional damage for the crime (potentially) to be applicable. Th is is also in 
keeping with the understanding of what constitutes an international crime, since 
the defi nition should be restricted only to actions of such a magnitude as to be 
regarded as an aff ront to humanity. It is also appropriate to include a minimum 
threshold of damage as a constitutive element of the crime for the simple 
reason that most acts conducted during armed confl ict will have some adverse 
environmental consequences. It is only where such acts are done with intent to 
cause some (defi ned) signifi cant degree of damage that the crime might apply. 
Th e inclusion of a minimum threshold is also necessary given that the specifi ed 
mens rea standard has been defi ned in relatively expansive terms and is lower 
than the ‘default’ standard set out in article 30 of the Rome Statute.
Moreover, as noted, the crime does not relate to activities occurring in peace 
time, but rather is applicable only in circumstances where there is a nexus to 
armed confl ict.
Taking account of these various considerations, the approach to defi ning the 
crime begins with an acceptance that its terms cannot be overly broad. Nor can 
they be vague, ambiguous and uncertain.73 Reference has been made in earlier 
chapters to the international criminal law principle of legality, which establishes 
an important basis for the codifi cation of any crime. Th is principle is itself oft en 
also associated with the lex certa principle, which requires that the preconditions 
for criminal responsibility be expressed clearly and in suffi  cient detail, so that a 
person is in a position to be able to determine whether or not certain acts would 
be give rise to sanction under criminal law.74
72 See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 
UNTS 331; 8 ILM 679 (entered into force 27  January 1980) (VCLT), article  27. Th is also 
extends to other non-treaty international obligations: see International Law Commission, 
Draft  Articles on Responsibility of States for International Wrongfully Acts contained in 
Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on its work of the fi ft y-
third session, [2001] 2:2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1, UN Doc A/CN.4/
SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), article 32 and the commentary thereto.
73 Cherif Bassiouni described as ‘overtly broad and ambiguous’ the suggested crime of ‘wilful 
and severe damage to the environment’ as it appeared in the 1991 version of the Draft  Code 
of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind prepared by the International Law 
Commission: M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law 
(2nd ed, 1999), 190.
74 Faure and Visser, supra note 61, 322. Th ose authors also refer (at footnote 24) to the XVth 
International Congress of Penal Law, which resolved that:
 ‘Consistent with the principle of legality, there should be certainty in the defi nition of crimes 
against the environment’.
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What is therefore required in the draft ing of any crime, and perhaps even more 
so for a crime that will be codifi ed in the statute of an international criminal 
tribunal for the fi rst time – is the requisite degree of ‘prescriptive specifi city’.75 
Th e elements of the crime should be expressed as clearly as possible so as to 
satisfy these requirements.
Th is does not mean, however, that the defi nition should necessarily be too 
precise. If, for example, the terms of the crime are strictly encased within 
an exhaustive list of acts, then it may well be that an act that exhibits the 
characteristics of what would properly constitute an international crime might 
fall outside the scope of international criminal responsibility. Th is would also 
limit any deterrence eff ect that would otherwise be generated by the introduction 
of the crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.76
Of course, no amount of careful draft ing will capture every possible 
scenario. Hence, for example, we have seen the necessary evolution of various 
international crimes to include acts that, in earlier codifi cations, would not 
have been included (perhaps largely because they were not contemplated by the 
draft ers in the fi rst place).77 Th is demonstrates that, as refl ected in chapter 1, 
international criminal law is typically ‘reactive’ – responding to acts that shock 
the conscience of the world rather than pre-empting them, as much as the latter 
would be the ideal approach.
It is therefore suggested that the terms of the crime of crimes against the 
environment to be included in the Rome Statute, whilst demonstrating suffi  cient 
clarity and detail to satisfy the lex certa principle, should also allow for some 
‘fl exibility’ as to a determination as to whether a particular act(s) warrants 
individual criminal responsibility in the particular circumstances.
Th is is also important in view of the continuing development of weapons 
technology giving rise to possible environmental damage in ways that we 
might not as yet be able to properly contemplate or comprehend, but which 
may be relevant in the future. Th is fl exibility will, as is evident in the terms of 
the defi nition set out below, be inherent in the determination of the level of the 
(potential) damage to the environment, and also from the broad conception 
of what constitutes the ‘natural environment’ and ‘damage to the natural 
environment’ for the purposes of the crime.
75 Richards and Schmitt, supra note 57, 1090.
76 See, generally, Jakob von Holderstein Holtermann, ‘A “Slice of Cheese” – a Deterrence-Based 
Argument for the International Criminal Court’ (2010) 11 Human Rights Review 289.
77 See, for example, the instances referred to in chapter 4 relating to the inclusion of acts of 
sexual violence in later codifi cations of the crime of war crimes.
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5.3.2. DEFINITION OF CRIMES AGAINST 
THE ENVIRONMENT
Taking into account the various considerations discussed above, it is proposed 
that a new article 8 ter be included in the text of the Rome Statute. As noted, the 
inclusion of this provision will also require some associated amendments to the 
Rome Statute (specifi ed in Appendix I) and to the Elements of Crimes (5.3.2.3).
However, the most signifi cant change is the proposed inclusion of article 8 ter in 
the terms as set out below.
5.3.2.1. Proposed article 8 ter of the Rome Statute
‘Article 8 ter
Crimes against the environment
1. For the purposes of this Statute, “crimes against the environment” means 
employing, within the context of and associated with an armed confl ict, a 
method or means of warfare with intent to cause widespread, long-term or 
severe damage to the natural environment.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1:
(a) a person has “intent” to cause widespread, long-term or severe damage 
to the natural environment where:
(i) that person means to cause such damage; or
(ii) that person is aware of the substantial likelihood that such damage 
will occur in the ordinary course of events; or
(iii) that person consciously disregards information that clearly 
indicates a substantial likelihood that such damage will occur in 
the ordinary course of events;
(b) “widespread” means an area on the scale of at least one hundred square 
kilometres;
(c) “long-term” means lasting at least for a period of one or more seasons;
(d) “severe” means serious disruption, degradation or harm;
(e) “natural environment” includes those ecological, biological and resource 
systems necessary to sustain the continued existence of all forms of 
human, animal, or plant life;
(f) “damage to the natural environment” includes but is not limited to 
circumstances that constitute a concrete endangerment to human life or 
health, and may include any of the following:
(i) destruction or degradation of the marine environment, marine 
wildlife, or marine habitats;
(ii) destruction or degradation of terrestrial fauna and fl ora, or their 
habitats;
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(iii) pollution of the atmosphere;
(iv) destructive climate modifi cation;
(v) any other form of environmental destruction, degradation or harm 
of comparable gravity.’
5.3.2.1.1. Discussion
Having set out the defi nition of the crime, the following discussion outlines the 
rationale underpinning the various elements specifi ed.
5.3.2.1.1.1. Paragraph 1 (article 8 ter(1))
(i) An armed confl ict
As discussed in previous chapters, a distinction at law has historically been 
made between an ‘international’ armed confl ict and an ‘armed confl ict not of 
an international character’. Th e ICTY was called upon to consider and clarify 
this distinction in Tadic,78 the fi rst case before the ICTY. Th is distinction is also 
maintained in the Rome Statute.79
Th e fact that there are considered to be two types of armed confl ict under 
international law has given rise to signifi cantly diff ering regulatory regimes 
within the jus in bello. As discussed in chapter 2, when the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions80 were ‘upgraded’ by the conclusion of the two 1977 Additional 
Protocols,81 what was striking was the enormous disparity in the range of rules 
specifi ed in each of those instruments. Whereas the 1977 Additional Protocol I, 
78 See Opinion and Judgment, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber, 
7  May 1997; Judgement, Prosecutor v Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Appeals Chamber, 
15 July 1999.
79 For example, compare the respective chapeau of articles  8(2)(b) and 8(2)(c) of the Rome 
Statute.
80 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, opened for signature 12  August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into force 
21 October 1950); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 
75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War, opened for signature 12  August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 
21 October 1950); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950).
81 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Confl icts, opened for signature 8  June 1977, 
1125 UNTS 3, 16 ILM 1391 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (1977 Additional Protocol 
I); Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Confl icts, opened for signature 8  June 
1977, 1125 UNTS 609, 16 ILM 1442 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (1977 Additional 
Protocol II).
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which relates to international armed confl icts, consists of over 100 articles, some 
of them quite detailed and ‘radical’ (at least for the time), the 1977 Additional 
Protocol II, which was the fi rst international instrument to deal solely with 
non-international armed confl icts, was far more modest (28 articles, of which 
only 18 were substantive in content). While, of course, the absolute number of 
provisions is not necessarily indicative of the content of a treaty, it is clear from 
a comparison of both documents that there are many issues that were simply not 
addressed in relation to internal armed confl icts.
Th is regulatory gap is also refl ected in the existing war crime in the Rome 
Statute dealing with damage to the environment. As noted, the acts specifi ed in 
article 8(2)(b)(iv) are prohibited only within the context of an international armed 
confl ict.82 Th is is unacceptable for a number of reasons, even more so given 
that armed confl icts are (either primarily or partially) increasingly ‘internal’ in 
character as, with some obvious exceptions,83 the nature of warfare has largely 
moved away from the traditional ‘State versus State’ confl ict. Notwithstanding 
the general reluctance among States to agree to more rigorous binding legal 
standards regulating what have traditionally been regarded as internal matters, 
Antonio Cassese has noted ‘the current trend to abolish the distinction’, with the 
ultimate result of having ‘one corpus of law applicable to all confl icts’.84
While such sentiments may perhaps be a little optimistic, at least in the relatively 
short term, there is no convincing reason – apart from this traditional political 
State-centered conservatism – to maintain this distinction when it comes to 
serious crimes that ‘deeply shock the conscience of humanity’.85 By contrast, 
there are compelling reasons to avoid this distinction with respect to such 
crimes. It is already not a relevant consideration with respect to the crimes of 
genocide and crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute. Whilst, as 
indicated above, the distinction is maintained in respect of war crimes, this 
largely refl ects the bifurcated approach adopted when the 1977 Additional 
Protocols were negotiated and agreed.
Disproportionate damage to civilians or civilian objects is, under customary 
international law, ‘also a crime in non-international armed confl ict’.86 In 
82 See Rome Statute, chapeau article 8(2)(b).
83 For example, the armed confl ict between the Russian Federation and Georgia that took 
place in 2008, although even that confl ict also involved the separatist ‘governments’ of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia. See, generally, Case Concerning Application of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian 
Federation) (Preliminary Objections, Judgment) [2011] ICJ Rep 70, para 23–114.
84 Cassese et al, supra note 64, 82.
85 Rome Statute, preamble para 2.
86 Gerhard Werle and Florian Jessberger, Principles of International Criminal Law (3rd ed, 2014), 
494.
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this respect, therefore, article  8(2)(b)(iv) ‘lags behind customary international 
law’.87 Th e distinction is also neither necessary nor appropriate in the case of 
crimes against the environment. As noted in previous chapters, acts that might 
fall within the scope of this crime are just as likely to occur within an internal 
armed confl ict as during an international one.88 A required nexus only to 
an international armed confl ict therefore means that such intentional damage 
would likely escape criminal accountability.
Moreover, certain forms of serious environmental damage or destruction (for 
example, the poisoning of waterways), even if perpetrated within an internal 
confl ict, may well signifi cantly impact upon the environment of countries 
outside of those specifi c borders, since environmental damage (and its eff ects) 
will not necessarily be confi ned to the area where the relevant method or means 
of warfare is initially employed.
Hence, for all of these reasons, whilst article  8 ter does require a nexus to an 
armed confl ict, it does not distinguish between the types of armed confl ict. In 
other words, the crime is applicable in either an international armed confl ict, or 
an armed confl ict not of an international character, or both.89
(ii) Method or means of warfare
Article  8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute can only apply in circumstances where 
inter alia: (i) there is an international armed confl ict; and (ii) an ‘attack’ has 
been intentionally ‘launched’ in the knowledge that such attack will give rise 
to certain consequences. As discussed above, the crime of crimes against the 
environment applies in both international armed confl icts and armed confl icts 
not of an international character. In addition, it stems not from an ‘attack’, but 
rather from employing a particular ‘method or means of warfare’.
Th e concept of an attack is diff erent from that of an armed confl ict,90 and 
has been interpreted by the international criminal courts and tribunals in 
terms of both war crimes and crimes against humanity. In Kordić and Čerkez, 
the ICTY Appeals Chamber applied the defi nition of attack as specifi ed in the 
1977 Additional Protocol 1 – ‘acts of violence against the adversary, whether 
87 Id.
88 See Tara Weinstein, ‘Prosecuting Attacks that Destroy the Environment: Environmental 
Crimes or Humanitarian Atrocities?’ (2005) 17 Georgetown International Environmental Law 
Review 697, 722.
89 See further 5.3.2.3.2.1.
90 See, for example, Judgement, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran 
Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Chamber, 12 June 2002, para 86.
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in off ence or in defence’ – in determining whether an unlawful attack against 
civilians occurred.91
Th e same defi nition was used by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC in Katanga 
and Chui in the context of the war crime set out in article 8(2)(b)(i) of the Rome 
Statute.92 It is therefore likely that this defi nition would also apply to an attack 
within the terms of article  8(2)(b)(iv), including with respect to the issue of 
damage to the natural environment.93 Th is emphasizes the fact that article 8(2)
(b)(iv) is principally concerned with acts that involve violence directed against 
humans rather than, as is the case with crimes against the environment as 
defi ned in 5.3.2.1, focusing on the intentional damage to the environment per se.
Th us, even though an ‘attack’ has been interpreted more broadly for the purposes 
of assessing whether a ‘widespread or systematic attack directed against 
any civilian population’ has been perpetrated within the context of a crime 
against humanity,94 it is still appropriate that the crime of crimes against the 
environment instead relates to the employment of a method or means of warfare. 
Th e International Committee of the Red Cross has indicated the expansive scope 
of those concepts as follows:95
International law limits the methods and means used to wage war. Th ese restrictions 
apply to the type of weapons used, the way they are used and the general conduct of 
all those engaged in the armed confl ict.
91 See also the other ICTY decisions referenced at footnote 622 in Werle and Jessberger, supra 
note 86, 477.
92 Decision on the Confi rmation of Charges, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga  and  Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04–01/07, 30 September 2008, para 266.
93 In the absence of any indication to the contrary, the word ‘attack’ would be interpreted in 
the same way for all the variants of the off ence under article  8(2)(b)(iv). In other words, it 
would not be interpreted in one way for the fi rst two variants but somehow mean something 
diff erent when it comes to the third variant under the same provision – that is, relating to 
damage to the natural environment.
94 In Judgement and Sentence, Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Trial 
Chamber III, 15 May 2003, the Trial Chamber of the ICTR stated (at para 327) that:
 ‘[a]n “attack” is generally defi ned as an unlawful act, event, or series of events of the kind 
listed in Article 3(a) through (i) of the Statute. An “attack” does not necessarily require the 
use of armed force, it could also involve other forms of inhumane mistreatment of the civilian 
population.’
 Similarly, in Judgement, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Chamber 
II, 31  July 2003, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY, quoting from Judgement, Prosecutor v. 
Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A, 
Appeals Chamber, 12 June 2002, para 86, noted (at para 623) that:
 ‘[a]n attack can “precede, outlast, or continue during the armed confl ict, but it need not be 
part of it”, and “is not limited to the use of armed force; it encompasses any mistreatment of 
the civilian population.”.’
95 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Methods and Means of Warfare’ <www.icrc.org/
eng/war-and-law/conduct-hostilities/methods-means-warfare/index.jsp> at 28 January 2015.
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It is intended that the scope of crimes against the environment applies to any 
way in which the environment is targeted as an act of warfare – either by way of 
a ‘method’ (through employing a particular action) or a ‘means’ (for example, 
through employing a particular type of weapon), or both. It is not restricted to 
acts directed against humans – its application arises when the act is directed 
against the environment. Th e reference to methods and means of warfare does, 
however, limit the scope of the crime to acts (and certain ‘inactions’ – see below) 
that constitute a part of the conduct of the armed confl ict. In other words, 
it does not extend to actions that are not a part of that conduct – for example, 
where natural resources are exploited for fi nancial gain, or to actions that might 
contribute to climate change and/or global warming – even though, as noted in 
chapter 1, these may ultimately fuel (future) armed confl icts.
Th at said, the crime does extend to the (perhaps rarer) circumstance of deliberate 
inaction or an ‘omission to act’ (see (iii) below). Th is would, for example, include 
a failure either to limit the eff ects of a particular act that was part of the conduct 
of an armed confl ict, or to take steps to stop such damage from occurring and/
or escalating, even where it was not initially intended. Such inaction would, most 
likely, not constitute an ‘attack’, and would thus fall outside of the scope of the 
existing legal regime.
As a result, the crime of crimes against the environment may apply even where 
there has not necessarily been an act of violence as such by the perpetrator, 
contrary to the requirement of ‘[i]ntentionally launching an attack’ in article 8(2)
(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute.
(iii) Intent (also incorporating article 8 ter(2)(a))
As has been argued, the existing legal regime for addressing the intentional 
destruction of the environment during armed confl ict is inadequate and must 
be strengthened. Th e rationale for including a sui generis crime of crimes against 
the environment in the Rome Statute is therefore to codify an appropriate 
accountability mechanism to deal with this issue. Th e defi nition of this crime 
must exhibit the appropriate level of specifi city, clearly setting out both the acts 
(and/or omissions) that form the basis of the crime (actus reus), as well as any 
mental element related to its commission (mens rea). As discussed above, the 
actus reus of the crime consists of the employment, within the context of and 
associated with an armed confl ict, of a method or means of warfare.
Turning to the mens rea, as noted, the crime of crimes against the environment 
is a crime of intent. Th e Rome Statute envisages that the diff erent crimes might 
have specifi c mens rea thresholds appropriate to each crime, and that these can 
(and do) vary as between the crimes. Th ere is therefore no express limitation 
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as to the intent requirements that may be specifi ed for crimes against the 
environment; rather they should encompass those circumstances that indicate 
an unacceptable level of disregard for the environment in the conduct of armed 
confl ict. Accordingly, in order to comprehensively address the ‘intentional’ 
destruction of the environment during warfare, it is necessary to include a range 
of mens rea standards within the defi nition of crimes against the environment. 
Th ese are refl ected in article  8 ter(2)(a) and diff er from the mental element 
standard specifi ed in article 30 of the Rome Statute.
Before discussing the specifi c mental elements that apply to the crime of crimes 
against the environment, it is necessary to raise two important points. First, it is 
acknowledged that the mens rea threshold requirements proposed for this crime 
are, in certain respects, lower than the standards required for a number of the 
other core international crimes, even some that may address acts committed 
against humans. At fi rst glance, therefore, some might criticize this disparity on 
the basis that article 8 ter may be seen as providing a greater degree of protection 
to the environment than other provisions in the Rome Statute do for civilians 
and civilian objects.
It is submitted that this argument misses the point about what is sought to be 
achieved by the terms of article  8 ter. It has been emphasized throughout this 
book that the intention is to provide an eff ective and workable mechanism to 
impose international criminal responsibility for acts directed against the 
environment that are unacceptable and, according to all relevant criteria, that 
constitute an international crime. It would be, in this author’s view, illogical and 
counter-productive to limit the scope of this crime below what is necessary to 
achieve this purpose for the sole reason that other crimes have lower standards.
On the other hand, this observation does highlight a very important point. 
Th ere is no doubt that the elements of some of the other core crimes should be 
reconsidered in light of experience and changing values. Reference was made 
(albeit briefl y) in chapter 4, for example, as to the need to ‘upgrade’ the terms 
of the crime of genocide. Th is may well also apply to other core crimes. Th e 
shortcomings of article 8(2)(b)(iv) that have been highlighted in chapter 4 will 
still apply to civilians and civilian objects aft er the amendments proposed in this 
book. Naturally, this point raises complex questions that are beyond the scope of 
this book – which is focused on the intentional destruction of the environment – 
but are deserving of very careful consideration.
However, to unacceptably compromise the terms of the crime of crimes against the 
environment due to the shortcomings of other crimes does not represent a proper 
and appropriate approach to the fundamental question as to how to eff ectively 
address intentional destruction of the environment during armed confl ict.
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Secondly, the terms of article  8 ter as defi ned in 5.3.2.1  may be interpreted as 
imposing ‘absolute’ liability for the use of certain means of warfare, including, 
for example, nuclear weapons. It has been noted in chapter 2 that there are 
already in place restrictions with respect to certain weapons; however, there 
is currently no express comprehensive prohibition against the use of nuclear 
weapons. Of course, one also should bear in mind the (majority) opinion of 
the International Court of Justice in the Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion.
Nonetheless, once again the terms of article 8 ter must be viewed for what they 
seek to achieve. If they do, indeed, have the eff ect of limiting or even prohibiting 
the use of such weapons, it is submitted that is a necessary consequence of 
the problem that the inclusion of this sui generis crime seeks to eff ectively 
address.96
Having dealt with these preliminary issues, the various intent requirements in 
article 8 ter are described below, starting with a discussion of the relevance and 
eff ect of article 30 of the Rome Statute.
a) Article 30 of the Rome Statute
As noted, within the framework of the Rome Statute, article 30 sets out a what has 
been termed a ‘default rule’97 standard regarding the mental element for crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court. Th is codifying of a general defi nition of 
the mental element for individual criminal responsibility was unprecedented in 
international criminal law. Notwithstanding that there has been doubt expressed 
as to whether and, if so, to what extent it refl ects customary international law,98 
article 30 is the starting point in terms of the intent standard for crimes under 
the Rome Statute.
Whilst, at fi rst sight, the inclusion of this provision may appear to ‘harmonise’ 
the mens rea requirements for international crimes, and thus ‘put an end to the 
long lasting debate regarding the mens rea enigma’ that has emerged through 
96 In draft ing the terms of article 8 ter, this author had considered the inclusion of an additional 
paragraph (article 8 ter(3)) to address this issue. Th is draft  paragraph is included in Appendix 
II, together with a discussion of its terms. However, it is emphasized here that, aft er due 
consideration, this author has concluded that pargaraph 3 does not form part of the proposal 
for a sui generis crime of crimes against the environment to be included as article 8 ter in the 
Rome Statute.
97 Gerhard Werle and Florian Jessberger, “Unless Otherwise Provided’: Article  30 of the ICC 
Statute and the Mental Elements of Crimes under International Criminal Law’ (2005) 3 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 35, 35.
98 Cassese et al, supra note 64, 39.
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the jurisprudence of the various tribunals,99 this has, in fact, not been the 
case. Th is standard applies subject to any express rules for a specifi c crime,100 
as is indicated by the fi rst three words of the article – ‘[u]nless otherwise 
provided’. In other words, the default rule standard operates only to the extent 
that specifi c express rules relating to the requisite mental element are not 
applicable. Th ese rules for a particular crime may be found in other provisions 
of the Rome Statute, in the Elements of Crimes or, it has been suggested, in 
customary international law.101 It is important therefore to determine the 
scope of article  30, the terms of any express rules relating to crimes against 
the environment, and the extent to which the article 30 standard consequently 
applies.
Article 30(1) specifi es that, for a person to be criminally responsible and liable 
for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, the material 
elements (actus reus) must be committed ‘with intent and knowledge’. Th e 
provision then defi nes what is meant by each of those concepts.102
With regard to the relevant ‘conduct’ in relation to the crime of crimes against 
the environment – employing a method or means of warfare – article 30(2)(a) 
continues to apply. Th e crime can only apply where a person ‘means to engage 
in [that] conduct’. Th is is refl ected in the proposed Elements of Crimes set out in 
5.3.2.3.2.
As regards the relevant ‘consequence’, the situation is diff erent. As discussed, 
the crime of crimes against the environment as defi ned in article  8 ter is 
characterized by a person’s intent to target the environment during armed 
confl ict so as to cause a specifi ed level of damage. Th e damage represents the 
consequence of the conduct. In the absence of article 8 ter(2)(a), the existence (or 
not) of the requisite intent in relation to that consequence would be determined 
by the terms of article 30(2)(b) of the Rome Statute – that is, that a person ‘means 
to cause that consequence’ or, at least, in committing the act ‘must be aware that 
it will occur in the ordinary course of events’.103
Antonio Cassese has suggested that article 30(2)(b) does not therefore purport to 
encompass the full continuum104 of possible mens rea categories, which would 
99 Mohamed Elewa Badar, Th e Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law: Th e Case for 
a Unifi ed Approach (2013), 382.
100 Werle, supra note 64, 104.
101 See Werle and Jessberger, supra note 97. See also Werle, ibid, 106–9.
102 Rome Statute, articles 30(2) and (3) respectively.
103 Ibid, article 30(2)(b) (emphasis added).
104 Amalie Frese, ‘Th e Least Bad Option: A Pluralistic Th eory of Discrimination’, unpublished 
thesis, University of Copenhagen, 29 June 2012, 66 (copy with author).
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include at least ‘intent, recklessness [and] negligence’,105 although there have 
been mixed signals in the jurisprudence of the ICC as to whether the provision 
might in fact encompass recklessness.106 Either way, it is clear that crimes against 
the environment includes mens rea elements that do diff er from the article  30 
standard.
b) Dolus Directus (article 8 ter(2)(a)(i))
It is not disputed that the standard set by article 30(2)(b) does cover direct intent 
to cause the requisite level of damage to the environment (dolus directus). Of 
course, the existence of this mens rea standard represents a clear case in which 
the crime of crimes against the environment is intended to apply. Given that the 
terms of article  8 ter encompass a diff erent (broader) mens rea standard than 
article 30 in other respects (see below), the terms of the fi rst part of article 30(2)
(b) (‘that person means to cause …’) are reproduced in and encompassed by 
article  8  ter(2)(a)(i), so as to avoid any doubt that this standard applies to the 
crime.107
Th is intent standard will also capture a situation where, for example, a person 
intends to cause the requisite level of environmental damage, but employs a 
method or means of warfare that (unbeknown to him) is incapable of reaching 
the prescribed threshold. Th is is to be compared with article 8(2)(b)(iv), which 
applies only when the alleged perpetrator has actual or constructive knowledge 
that actions will cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
environment.
c) Dolus Eventualis (article 8 ter(2)(a)(ii))
In many cases, of course, it may be diffi  cult to prove that there exists a direct 
intent to cause the prescribed level of environmental damage. However, there will 
be other circumstances that fall outside of the dolus directus standard of intent, 
yet still indicate a complete disregard by a person for any adverse environmental 
consequences arising from acts undertaken during armed confl ict. For these to 
be excluded from culpability, as they are under the existing legal regime specifi ed 
105 Cassese et al, supra note 64, 39.
106 See the contrasting views of two diff erent Pre-Trial Chambers, in Decision on the 
Confi rmation of Charges, Prosecutor v. Th omas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04–01/06, 
Pre-Trial Chamber 1, 29  January 2007, and Decision Pursuant to Article  61(7)(a) and (b) 
of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05–01/08, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 
15 June 2009. See also Werle and Jessberger, supra note 86, 180–2.
107 It is not necessary to incorporate into article 8 ter(2)(a)(i) the second part of article 30(2)(b) 
(‘is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events’), since that mental element is 
subsumed by and covered by the broader standard specifi ed in article 8 ter(2)(a)(ii).
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in article 8(2)(b)(iv), signifi cantly dilutes the scope of any crime relating to the 
infl iction of damage to the environment. As noted, it is therefore necessary to 
augment the mental element for the crime to additionally allow for a ‘lower’108 
standard than a dolus directus level, so as to also encompass the following 
circumstances;
(i) where that person, being aware of the substantial likelihood of such 
damage, decides to proceed with employing a method or means of warfare 
notwithstanding the risk (article 8 ter(2)(a)(ii));
(ii) where that person engages in ‘wilful blindness’ so as to avoid being made 
aware of the substantial likelihood of such damage (article 8 ter(2)(a)(iii)).
As a result, the wording of article  8 ter(2)(a), whilst incorporating the direct 
intent standard also specifi ed article 30(2)(b), diff ers in two important respects 
from the remainder of that provision. First, article 8 ter(2)(a)(ii) incorporates a 
situation where a person is aware of the substantial likelihood of such damage, 
rather than that it ‘will occur’. In other words, although the crime focuses on 
the fact that it is the intent to target the environment that refl ects the heinous 
nature of this act, at the same time, it also includes circumstances involving 
dolus eventualis (which has also been referred to by the ICTY as ‘advertent 
recklessness),109 which is not otherwise contemplated by article 30(2).110
To ensure, therefore, that this aspect of the mental element is not excluded,111 
it is necessary to expressly provide for its incorporation within the meaning 
of ‘intent’ in article  8 ter. Its inclusion as article  8 ter(2)(a)(ii) also renders 
moot any uncertainty as to whether this standard of mental element is already 
encompassed by article 30.
108 Werle, supra note 64, 109.
109 See, for example, Judgement, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Appeals Chamber, 
15  July 1999, para 220; Judgement, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, 
Appeals Chamber, 22  March 2006, para 99. Th e two expressions – recklessness and dolus 
eventualis – have been treated as more or less equivalent concepts by some authors; see, for 
example, Cassese et al, supra note 64, 41. Other commentators do point to diff erences, albeit 
that these are largely relatively minor in practice; Werle, supra note 64, 113 and the references 
in footnote 131. With a slightly contrary view, however, Kai Ambos suggests that recklessness 
is ‘not encompassed’ by article 30 of the Rome Statute, but that the question as to whether it 
does incorporate dolus eventualis ‘is more complex’: see generally, Kai Ambos, Treatise on 
International Criminal Law: Volume 1: Foundations and General Part (2013), chapter VII.
110 See, for example, Judgment pursuant to Article  74 of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Th omas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04–01/06, Trial Chamber I, 14 March 2012, para 1011, where 
Trial Chamber I of the ICC has concluded that:
 ‘[t]he plain language of the Statute, and most particularly the use of the words “will occur” in 
Article 30(2)(b) as opposed to “may occur”, excludes the concept of dolus eventualis’.
 See also ibid Werle, 113–4.
111 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2008), 137.
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Dolus eventualis is, of course, diff erent from dolus directus. Th at said, it is not 
an unknown concept in relation to international crimes and other relevant 
treaty instruments, or within the jurisprudence of the various mechanisms of 
international criminal justice. Indeed, recklessness represents a suffi  cient requisite 
mens rea element in a variety of diff erent situations. For example, specifi c 
prohibited acts under the jus in bello require that certain conduct is committed 
‘wilfully’.112 In its commentary to these provisions, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC), when discussing the word ‘wilfully’, states that:113
the accused must have acted consciously and with intent, i.e., with his mind on 
the act and its consequences … (“criminal intent” or “malice aforethought”); this 
encompasses the concepts of “wrongful intent” or “recklessness”, viz., the attitude of 
an agent who, without being certain of a particular result, accepts the possibility of it 
happening
Similarly, the requirement of ‘wilfulness’ is found with respect to a number 
of war crimes within the Rome Statute (although not in article  8(2)(b)(iv)), 
either expressly,114 or impliedly through the underlying provisions of the 
1977 Additional Protocol I,115 which are regarded as ‘embody[ing] customary 
international law’.116 As a consequence, for those crimes ‘reckless conduct is 
usually suffi  cient’.117
Th e jurisprudence of the various international criminal courts have confi rmed 
that recklessness can represent a suffi  cient mental element with respect to a 
number of specifi c crimes, even if it is not expressly referred to in the defi nition 
of the crime.118 In Kupreskic et al, for example, the ICTY Trial Chamber, citing 
the ICTR Trial Chamber in Akayesu,119 concluded that the mens rea of the 
crime of murder as a crime against humanity was either an ‘intent to kill’ or 
112 See, for example, 1977 Additional Protocol I, articles 85(3) and 85(4).
113 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 
8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949’, para 3474 <www.icrc.org/applic/
ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?viewComments=LookUpCOMART&documentId=78C0DA9A7B4
59ACEC12563CD0042F649&action=openDocument> at 31  January 2015 (emphasis added). 
See also Cassese et al, supra note 64, 40–1.
114 See, for example, Rome Statute, articles 8(2)(a)(i), 8(2)(a)(iii), 8(2)(a)(vi).
115 See, for example, ibid, article 8(2)(a)(ii).
116 Werle, supra note 64, 310.
117 Ibid, 110. Th at author also concludes that the use of the descriptor ‘wanton’ in relation to 
conduct proscribed in other war crimes also means that recklessness is suffi  cient in those 
cases; see, for example, Rome Statute, article 8(2)(a)(iv).
118 Note, however, that this view is not universally supported; see, for example, the confl icting 
approaches taken by diff erent ICTY Trial Chambers in relation to grave breaches of Common 
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions in the various decisions noted in Werle, supra note 
64, 298, footnote 211.
119 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber, 
2 September 1998, para 589.
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an ‘intent to infl ict serious injury in reckless disregard of human life’.120 In the 
same decision, the ICTY Trial Chamber also found that the burning of property 
with ‘recklessness towards the lives of its inhabitants’ may constitute the crime 
of persecution as a crime against humanity, if committed on discriminatory 
grounds.121 In addition, notions of recklessness have been incorporated into the 
mens rea elements of crimes committed within the context of the third category 
of a Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE).122
In Stakic, the ICTY Trial Chamber, referring both to civil law (German) and 
common law (United States) domestic legal principles, found that ‘that both 
a dolus directus and a dolus eventualis are suffi  cient to establish the crime of 
murder under Article 3’ of the ICTY Statute (‘Violations of the laws or customs 
of war’).123 Th e Chamber went on to provide the following ‘technical defi nition’ 
of dolus eventualis in the context of that crime:124
if the actor engages in life-endangering behaviour, his killing becomes intentional if 
he “reconciles himself” or “makes peace” with the likelihood of death.
Th is assessment of the requisite mens rea element for life-endangering behaviour 
leading to death is also appropriate in relation to the decision by a person to 
120 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago 
Josipovic, Dragan Papic and Vladimir Santic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, 14 January 
2000, para 561 (emphasis added). See also Judgement, Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko 
Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber, 16  November 
1998, para 439.
121 Ibid, Kupreskic et al, para 631 (emphasis added).
122 See, for example, Judgement, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Appeals Chamber, 
15 July 1999, para 228, where the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that, with respect to the third 
category of Joint Criminal Enterprise, one mens rea element with respect to crimes that were 
not part of a ‘common criminal purpose’ was that the accused ‘willingly took [the] risk’ that 
a crime would be committed. See also Judgement, Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljević, Case No. 
IT-98-32-A, Appeals Chamber, 25 February 2004, para 101; Judgement, Prosecutor v. Miroslav 
Kvočka, Mlado Radić, Zoran Žigić and Dragoljub Prcac, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appeals 
Chamber, 28 February 2005, para 83.
123 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Chamber II, 31 July 2003, 
para 587.
124 Id. Th is defi nition has been expressly approved or referred to in subsequent decisions; see, for 
example, Decision on Motions for Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98 bis of the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, Prosecutor v. Enver Hadzihasanoinc and Amir Kubura, Case No. IT-01-
47-T, Trial Chamber, 27  September 2004, para 37; and also by the ICC in Decision on the 
Confi rmation of Charges, Prosecutor v. Th omas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04–01/06, 
Pre-Trial Chamber 1, 29  January 2007, para 352, footnote 434. In addition, the concept of 
dolus eventualis is also referred to in international criminal law jurisprudence in various 
other contexts; see, for example, Judgement, Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-
36-A, Appeals Chamber, 3 April 2007, para 365; Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) 
of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05–01/08, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 
15 June 2009, para 363.
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employ a method or means of warfare in circumstances where that person is 
aware of the substantial likelihood that it will cause signifi cant damage to the 
environment in the ordinary course of events, but nonetheless ‘reconcil[es] 
himself… with it or consent[s] to it.’125 Conduct of this nature demonstrates a 
clear disregard for the likely (environmental) consequences of one’s acts, even 
though they may be very serious.
Th e wording in article  8 ter(2)(a)(ii) thus allows for criminal responsibility 
even apart from circumstances of ‘near inevitability or virtual certainty’ of the 
damage occurring, as is represented by the article 30 standard (‘will occur’),126 
so as to also incorporate a ‘substantial likelihood’ of damage. Although it 
may represent a lower mens rea standard than a direct intent to damage the 
environment, it is equally necessary to include this dolus eventualis mental 
element within the crime of crimes against the environment in order to cover 
such circumstances. On the other hand, the terms of the crime do not extend 
to a mere possibility that the damage ‘may’ occur. Th is distinction follows 
jurisprudence of the ICTY. In Strugar, for example, the Trial Chamber, citing the 
Appeals Chamber in Blaskic,127 noted that:128
it has been confi rmed by the Appeals Chamber that the awareness of a mere 
possibility that a crime will occur is not suffi  cient in the context of ordering under 
Article 7(1) of the Statute. Th e knowledge of a higher degree of risk is required.
Th e Strugar Trial Chamber, when considering the crime of murder, then went on 
to conclude that:129
knowledge by the accused that his act or omission might possibly cause death is not 
suffi  cient to establish the necessary mens rea. Th e necessary mental state exists when 
the accused knows that it is probable that his act or omission will cause death.
Similarly, in Delić, the ICTY Trial Chamber, confi rmed that the mens rea for 
murder inter alia includes ‘indirect intent’, which comprises ‘knowledge that 
125 Id, Lubanga.
126 Decision Pursuant to Article  61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the 
Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case 
No. ICC-01/05–01/08, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 15 June 2009, para 363.
127 See Judgement, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber, 29 July 
2004, where (at para 42), the Appeals Chamber concluded that:
 ‘a person who orders an act or omission with the awareness of the substantial likelihood 
that a crime will be committed in the execution of that order, has the requisite mens rea for 
establishing liability under Article 7(1) pursuant to ordering.’
128 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Pavel Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Trial Chamber II, 31  January 
2005, para 235.
129 Ibid, para 236.
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the death of a victim was a “probable” or “likely” consequence of such act or 
omission.’130
Th e mental element standard specifi ed in article 8 ter(2)(a)(ii) is consistent with 
this line of reasoning and, in any event, accords with the underlying rationale 
of the crime, which focuses on those persons whose behaviour is indicative of 
a disregard of the environmental consequences of their actions. In this regard, 
the circumstances must demonstrate an awareness of the substantial likelihood 
of the damage occurring in the ordinary course of events. Th e substantial 
likelihood criterion allows for the input of relevant, independent and objective 
scientifi c data to assist in a determination as to whether international criminal 
responsibility for acts that may lead to damage to the environment should apply 
in a particular circumstance.131
At the same time, it provides an appropriate balance to the lower damage 
threshold in article  8  ter as compared to article  8(2)(b)(iv) – through the use 
of the disjunctive (‘or’) in article  8  ter(1) rather than conjunctive (‘and’) (see 
below). In this regard, this awareness standard is stricter than the prohibition 
of environmental damage that is found in the 1977 Additional Protocol I, which 
provides that:132
[i]t is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or 
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment.
Moreover, this departure from the ‘default’ standard specifi ed in article  30 is 
entirely consistent with the schema for mens rea established under the Rome 
Statute, which clearly indicates that, for a number of crimes, the ‘requirements of 
the mental element are lowered in comparison to the standard of Article 30’.133 
Important also is the fact that this dolus eventualis mens rea element represents 
‘one of the genuine and independent pillars of criminal responsibility’134 that 
130 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Rasim Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-T, Trial Chamber I, 15 September 
2008, para 48.
131 Robert McLaughlin, ‘Improving Compliance: Making Non-State International Actors 
Responsible for Environmental Crimes’ (2000) 11 Colorado Journal of International 
Environmental Law and Policy 377, 394.
132 1977 Additional Protocol I, article 35(3) (emphasis added). Th e same threshold is also used 
in the 1977 Additional Protocol I, article 55(1). See also Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise 
Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law (Volume I: Rules, 2005) 
(ICRC Study) Rule 45, which is discussed in chapter 3.
133 Werle and Jessberger, supra note 86, 187.
134 Mohamed Elewa Badar, ‘Th e Mens Rea Enigma in the Jurisprudence of the International 
Criminal Court’, in Larissa van den Herik and Carsten Stahn (eds), Th e Diversifi cation and 
Fragmentation of International Criminal Law (2012), 503, 504.
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might legitimately be utilised in appropriate circumstances as a basis to support 
the existence of an international crime.135
d) Wilful blindness (article 8 ter(2)(a)(iii))
Th e second way in which 8 ter(2)(a) diff ers from article 30(2)(b) is refl ected in 
article 8 ter(2)(a)(iii). Th is specifi c notion of mens rea is designed to capture the 
‘stick your head in the sand approach’,136 where a person consciously disregards 
information as to the likely consequences of an action (or inaction, which 
would still constitute a ‘method’ of warfare). Th is is a similar approach (albeit 
in a diff erent context) to that pertaining to non-military superior responsibility 
pursuant to article 28(b)(i) of the Rome Statute – which specifi es that individual 
criminal responsibility may arise inter alia where ‘the superior … consciously 
disregarded information which clearly indicated’ that subordinates under his 
eff ective authority or control were committing or about to commit crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court.
It is also important to also include this mental element standard within the 
crime of crimes against the environment. In a sense, it is a necessary extension 
of the dolus eventualis standard that arises under article  8 ter(2)(a)(ii). Given 
that, as argued above, it is appropriate to proscribe behaviour in circumstances 
where a person was aware of the substantial likelihood of the environmental 
consequences of certain action then, in the absence of 8 ter(2)(a)(iii), criminal 
culpability could still be circumvented if a person deliberately chooses not to 
make himself aware of that substantial likelihood, by engaging in what has been 
described as ‘wilful blindness’.
How this standard sits with respect to dolus eventualis is the subject of some 
academic debate. Th ere are those who believe that it ‘stands between knowledge 
and recklessness’,137 while others equate it with recklessness.138
Irrespective of its ‘place’ in the spectrum of mens rea standards, it already 
represents an aspect of the mental element of some international crimes.139 One 
of the more frequent applications of this standard is with respect to command/
135 Werle, supra note 64, 114.
136 William G. Eckhardt, ‘Command Criminal Responsibility: A Plea for a Workable Standard’ 
(1982) 97 Military Law Review 1, 14.
137 Ambos, supra note 109, 227 (emphasis added).
138 See id, footnote 441.
139 See, for example, R. v. Finta [1994] 1 SCR 701, where the Supreme Court of Canada concluded 
that:
 ‘[t]he mental element required to be proven to constitute a crime against humanity is that the 
accused was aware of or wilfully blind to facts or circumstances which would bring his or her 
acts within crimes against humanity’.
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superior responsibility under international criminal law.140 In the Celebici case, 
a Trial Chamber of the ICTY, when considering the mens rea standard under the 
ICTY Statute for superior responsibility that includes ‘had reason to know’,141 
confi rmed:142
the principle that a superior is not permitted to remain wilfully blind to the acts of his 
subordinates. Th ere can be no doubt that a superior who simply ignores information 
within his actual possession compelling the conclusion that criminal off ences are 
being committed, or are about to be committed, by his subordinates commits a most 
serious dereliction of duty for which he may be held criminally responsible under the 
doctrine of superior responsibility.
Wilful blindness, sometimes referred to as ‘deliberate ignorance’,143 has in 
certain circumstances been held to result in ‘equal culpability’ to that arising 
from actual knowledge, even without its express inclusion in the elements 
of a crime.144 However, some regard such a conclusion with a degree of 
introspection, as noted by William Schabas when he quotes Glanville Williams 
as follows:145
Th e rule that wilful blindness is equivalent to knowledge is essential, and is found 
throughout the criminal law. It is, at the same time, an unstable rule, because judges 
are apt to forget its very limited scope. A court can properly fi nd wilful blindness only 
where it can almost be said that the defendant actually knew. He suspected the fact; 
he realised its probability; but he refrained from obtaining the fi nal confi rmation 
because he wanted in the event to be able to deny knowledge. Th is, and this alone, is 
wilful blindness.
What is clear, therefore, is that to ensure that the concept of wilful blindness is 
included as one mental element in the crime of crimes against the environment, 
it is necessary to make express reference to this standard in article 8 ter(2)(a)(iii), 
since it otherwise falls outside of the article 30(2))b) default standard. Secondly, 
 Th ese observations were expressly noted by the ICTY Trial Chamber in Opinion and 
Judgment, Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber, 7 May 1997, para 657.
140 See, generally, Greg R. Vetter, ‘Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the 
International Criminal Court (ICC)’ (2000) 25 Yale Law Journal 89, 123–4.
141 ICTY Statute, article 7(3). Th is can be compared with the ‘knew … or should have known’ 
standard for military command responsibility specifi ed in Rome Statute, article  28(a)(i). 
Note the comments of an ICTY Trial Chamber on this distinction in Judgement, Prosecutor 
v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial 
Chamber, 16 November 1998, para 393.
142 Ibid, Delalic et al, para 387.
143 Judgement on Appeal by Anto Nobilo against Finding of Contempt, Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, 
Case No. IT-95-14/1-AR77, Appeals Chamber, 30 May 2001, para 43.
144 Id.
145 William A. Schabas, ‘Mens Rea and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia’ (2003) 37:4 New England Law Review 1015, 1029–30, footnote 61.
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the extent to which such deliberate ignorance would suffi  ce as a mens rea 
element for a crime must be clearly expressed. Th e wording used – ‘consciously 
disregarded information that clearly indicated’ – is, as noted, identical to that 
used in article 28(b)(i) of the Rome Statute in respect of non-military superior 
responsibility, and appears to take into consideration the caveat off ered by 
Glanville Williams. It assumes that the person who suspects the substantial 
likelihood of a particular consequence makes a deliberate eff ort to ignore the 
information that would confi rm that likelihood. Once again, the inclusion of 
this mental element does not confl ict with the scope for an expanded regime for 
mens rea as contemplated by the opening words of article 30 of the Rome Statute.
e) Knowledge
Article  30(1) of the Rome Statute specifi es that criminal responsibility and 
liability for punishment will only arise if the ‘material elements [of the crime] 
are committed with intent and knowledge’. Knowledge is defi ned as ‘awareness 
that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of 
events’.146 A requirement in similarly unequivocal terms constitutes an element 
of article  8(2)(b)(iv) (‘in the knowledge that such attack will cause …’).147 As 
referred to in chapter 4, in the view of the 2000 Committee Report examining 
NATO’s actions during Operation Allied Force, this requirement of actual 
or constructive knowledge of the consequences of certain acts (in that case an 
‘attack’) represented a mens rea standard that ‘would be diffi  cult to establish for 
the purposes of prosecution’.148
Antonio Cassese has noted that, in civil law countries, knowledge ‘is not 
regarded as an autonomous category of mens rea, being absorbed either by intent 
or recklessness’ but that, on the other hand, it is quite common in countries like 
the United States.149 Under the terms of article  30(3) of the Rome Statute, the 
requirement of knowledge relates to the circumstances and the consequences.150
In relation to the circumstances, the defi nition of crimes against the 
environment requires that a method or means of warfare is employed ‘within the 
context of and associated with an armed confl ict’. It is therefore necessary that 
the alleged perpetrator has knowledge – is aware – of the factual circumstances 
that established the existence of an armed confl ict. Th is requirement is refl ected 
146 Rome Statute, article 30(3).
147 Ibid, article 8(2)(b)(iv) (emphasis added).
148 Final Report to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 13 June 2000, 39 ILM 1257, para 23.
149 Cassese et al, supra note 64, 49.
150 See also Werle and Jessberger, supra note 86, 178–9.
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in the Elements of Crimes set out in 5.3.2.3.2. In this sense, the standard set by 
article 30(3) remains applicable.
However, it follows from the departure from the article 30 standard in relation to 
the awareness of the consequences of employing a method or means of warfare, 
as discussed above in the context of the ‘intent’ requirement, that the second leg 
of the knowledge standard of article  30(3) does not apply. As noted, articles  8 
ter(2)(a)(ii) and (iii) are not limited to situations where there is an awareness of 
a virtual certainty that a consequence will fl ow; rather it also includes a lower 
threshold so as to apply where there is an awareness of a substantial likelihood 
that a consequence will occur. Th e inclusion of this threshold within the 
defi nition of ‘intent’ for the purposes of article  8 ter(1) is not contradictory, 
but rather expansive, thus making the crime more (rather than less) eff ective 
in addressing the underlying imperatives that necessitate its inclusion as a sui 
generis crime in the Rome Statute.
(iv) Other issues arising from the defi nition of intent
Th e expansive defi nition of ‘intent’ in article 8 ter(2)(a) gives rise to a number of 
other issues that are briefl y discussed below.
a) Non-applicability of a negligence standard
Th e mental element of crimes against the environment does not extend to 
‘advertent (culpable)’ or ‘inadvertent’ negligence,151 which are diff erent from, 
and not encompassed by either dolus directus, dolus eventualis,152 or wilful 
blindness. It is considered by some commentators that ‘mere’ negligence would 
not be suffi  cient for individual criminal liability to arise153 and, by extension 
therefore, to justify an act as an international crime within the Rome Statute.154 
However, diff ering views have emerged on this point. Other commentators 
believe that gross or culpable negligence may operate as a standard of liability 
under international criminal law in certain circumstances.155 Th e Trial 
Chamber of the ICTR has concluded that acts or omissions amounting to the 
crime of extermination as a crime against humanity ‘may be done with intention, 
recklessness or gross negligence.’156
151 Cassese et al, supra note 64, 42.
152 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Chamber II, 31 July 2003, 
para. 587. See also Werle, supra note 64, 113.
153 Cassese et al, supra note 64, 53.
154 See Gray, supra note 21, 265 and the corresponding footnote.
155 See, for example, Cassese et al, supra note 64, 53–5.
156 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, 
Trial Chamber II, 21 May 1999, para 146 (emphasis added).
Chapter Five. Incorporating Crimes against the Environment into the Rome Statute
264 Intersentia
On the other hand, the ICTY Trial Chamber, when confi rming that the mens rea 
for murder includes both direct and indirect intent, concluded that ‘[n]egligence 
and gross negligence do not form part of indirect intent’.157 In addition, the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber, when considering the mental elements necessary to 
substantiate a fi nding of command responsibility and citing the ICTR Appeals 
Chamber in Bagilishema,158 noted that:159
the ICTR Appeals Chamber has on a previous occasion rejected criminal negligence 
as a basis of liability in the context of command responsibility, and that it stated that 
“it would be both unnecessary and unfair to hold an accused responsible under a 
head of responsibility which has not clearly been defi ned in international criminal 
law.” It expressed that “[r]eferences to ‘negligence’ in the context of superior 
responsibility are likely to lead to confusion of thought …” Th e Appeals Chamber 
expressly endorses this view.
Overall, in most cases at least, when the mechanisms of international criminal 
justice have applied a mens rea standard that is lower than the default standard 
set out in article 30 of the Rome Statute, they have not extended it to negligence 
or gross negligence,160 although, as noted, there are some exceptions to this.161 
In any event, it is submitted that a negligence mens rea standard would in 
general not encapsulate the type of heinous behaviour that warrants sanction 
under the crime of crimes against the environment. Moreover, to attempt to 
apply a regime incorporating negligence is, in most cases, fraught with diffi  culty. 
It introduces elements of fault, which may be diffi  cult to prove in the context of 
armed confl ict, and requires a standard of care that may vary depending upon 
how military regulations might be interpreted.162
b) Command / Superior responsibility
As discussed, the wording of article 8 ter draws from a number of elements that 
are found within the notion of command/superior responsibility as elaborated 
under article 28 of the Rome Statute. It has already been noted that the threshold 
in article  8 ter(2)(a)(iii) mirrors the wording of article  28(b)(i) (‘consciously 
disregard[ing] information which clearly indicated …’). Th e knowledge element 
157 See Judgement, Prosecutor v. Rasim Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-T, Trial Chamber I, 
15 September 2008, para 48 and the various decisions referred to in footnote 88.
158 Judgement (Reasons), Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-A, Appeals 
Chamber, 3 July 2002, para 34–5.
159 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber, 29  July 
2004, para 63.
160 Werle, supra note 64, 116.
161 See Werle and Jessberger, supra note 86, 187. Th ose authors (at page 188) also provide 
examples of provisions within the Elements of Crimes which, in their view, ‘may be found to 
expand liability under Article 30 … into the realm of negligent liability’.
162 Jabbari-Gharabagh, supra note 25, 104.
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in article 8 ter does, however, diff er from that relating to a military commander 
(‘knew or … should have known’), since it incorporates an element of substantial 
likelihood rather than certainty, unlike article 28(a)(i), for the reasons outlined 
above.
Nonetheless, as well as potentially giving rise to individual criminal responsibility 
pursuant to article  25 of the Rome Statute – for example, by ordering the 
employment of a method or means of warfare – article 8 ter still allows for the 
possibility that a commander/superior may be criminally responsible by virtue 
of article 28. Th is may arise in circumstances where a person under his eff ective 
command or control (in the case of a military commander), or a subordinate 
under his eff ective authority or control (in the case of a non-military superior), 
was committing or was about to commit a crime against the environment 
as defi ned in article 8 ter(1). In the end, the applicable mode(s) of liability will 
depend on the circumstances,163 to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Th e 
point to note here is that the inclusion of article 8 ter into the Rome Statute does 
not constrict the application of well-accepted principles relating to the criminal 
responsibility of commanders/superiors in appropriate situations.
c) Attempt
Th e Rome Statute contains a general provision relating to ‘attempt’ that applies 
to crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court (article  25(3)(f)). In practical 
terms, the concept of attempt would rarely be relevant to crimes against the 
environment. As noted, the crime is constituted when a method or means of 
warfare is employed during armed confl ict by a person with the requisite intent 
(as defi ned in article  8 ter(2)(a)). For the reasons discussed below, it is worth 
reiterating that crimes against the environment is a crime of intent rather than 
result.
As noted, this is also the case with the crime of genocide – although, of course, 
unlike crimes against the environment, the mens rea requirement for genocide 
163 In this regard, however, note should be taken of the Appeals Chamber’s fi nding in Judgement, 
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber, 29 July 2004, where (at 
para 91) the Chamber stated that:
 ‘Th e Appeals Chamber considers that the provisions of Article  7(1) and Article  7(3) of the 
Statute connote distinct categories of criminal responsibility. However, the Appeals Chamber 
considers that, in relation to a particular count, it is not appropriate to convict under 
both Article  7(1) and Article  7(3) of the Statute. Where both Article  7(1) and Article  7(3) 
responsibility are alleged under the same count, and where the legal requirements pertaining 
to both of these heads of responsibility are met, a Trial Chamber should enter a conviction on 
the basis of Article 7(1) only, and consider the accused’s superior position as an aggravating 
factor in sentencing’.
 See also Judgement, Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad 
Landzo ‘Celebici Case’), Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Chamber, 20 February 2001, para 745.
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involves a dolus specialis. Th ere has never been a prosecution for ‘attempted 
genocide’ within the ad hoc tribunals, even though both the ICTY and ICTR 
Statutes do include ‘attempt to commit genocide’ as a ‘punishable act’.164 
Th is raises some interesting dilemmas, with Jens David Ohlin of the view that 
‘attempts ought to be punished because perpetrators of attempts share the same 
culpability as perpetrators of completed off ences’, although this is not a view that 
is universally shared.165
In any event, with respect to crimes against the environment, there may be 
circumstances where signifi cant preparatory steps are undertaken by a person 
prior to employing a method or means of warfare (with the requisite intent) but, for 
reasons independent of that person’s intentions, the relevant conduct is then not 
carried out. In these circumstances, there may perhaps be an argument to suggest 
that the person has ‘attempted’ to commit the crime, although it is probably less 
likely that the Prosecutor would decide to move forward in such a case.
As to the general circumstances contemplated in the second sentence of 
article 25(3)(f), these are factual issues that may be relevant as to a determination 
of the ‘gravity’ of the crime. For example, if a person employs a method or means 
of warfare with the requisite intent, the crime has prima facie been committed. 
However, should that person then have a ‘change of mind’ and take steps to 
remediate the situation and mitigate the actual consequences of his conduct, 
that will be a matter that the Prosecutor166 and/or Court167 would likely take 
into account when determining the gravity of the crime/case, or the appropriate 
sentence upon conviction.168
d) Territorial ‘reach’ of article 8 ter
It is important to note the territorial ‘reach’ of article  8 ter. As with all other 
crimes set out in the Rome Statute, the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of 
164 ICTY Statute, article 4(3)(d); ICTR Statute, article 2(3)(d). As noted in Judgement, Prosecutor 
v Radislav Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Chamber, 2 August 2001 (para 640), article 4(3) 
of the ICTY Statute:
 ‘is taken verbatim from Article III of the Genocide Convention. Article 4(3) provides for a 
broad range of heads of criminal responsibility, including heads which are not included in 
Article 7(1) [of the ICTY Statute] such as “conspiracy to commit genocide” and “attempt to 
commit genocide”.’
 See also Judgement, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber, 
2 September 1998, para 473.
165 Jens David Ohlin, ‘Attempt, Conspiracy and Incitement to Commit Genocide’ (2009) Cornell 
Law Faculty Publications, paper 24, 182 <http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1023&context=facpub> at 28 January 2015.
166 See Rome Statute, articles 53(1)(c) (regarding the initiation of an investigation) and 53(2)(c) 
(regarding factors that point to a suffi  cient basis for a prosecution).
167 Ibid, article 17(1)(d) (regarding admissibility of a case).
168 Ibid, article 78(1).
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crimes against the environment will be determined in accordance with, and 
limited by, the ‘Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction’ set out in article 12. 
Obviously, if the accused is a national of a State Party to the Rome Statute, the 
Court may exercise its jurisdiction (article 12(2)(b)). It is also clear that acts by 
a national of a non-State Party may fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, 
where:
(i) the conduct in question – employing the method or means of warfare – 
occurs on the territory of a State Party (article 12(2)(a));
(ii) that non-State Party makes a so-called ‘self-declaration’ (article 12(3)) with 
respect to the crime;169 or
(iii) a situation in which crimes against the environment appears to have 
been committed is referred to the Prosecutor of the Court by the United 
Nations Security Council acting under its Chapter VII powers (article 13(b) 
‘Exercise of jurisdiction’).170
Th us, the specifi c scope of the crime does not purport to ‘extend’ the jurisdiction 
of the Court beyond the limits already imposed by the terms of the Rome 
Statute. Th at said, like other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, crimes 
against the environment as defi ned in article 8 ter can in certain circumstances 
operate ‘extraterritorially’, in the sense that acts undertaken outside the express 
territorial coverage of the Rome Statute may be intended to have serious 
environmental consequences in locations that are within the Court’s territorial 
jurisdiction. For example, a commander or superior having the requisite mens 
rea may be located in a diff erent place (country) from the specifi c area in which 
the relevant conduct occurs (assuming that he is responsible for employing 
a method or means of warfare there). Th e crime would prima facie still be 
applicable provided that the general jurisdictional limits of the Court allow for 
this.
Th is extraterritoriality aspect of the crime is not in itself unusual in terms of the 
crimes currently within the Rome Statute171 – although more generally, this 
169 See Steven Freeland, ‘How Open Should the Door Be? Declarations by non-States Parties 
under Article  12(3) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (2006) 75(2) 
Nordic Journal of International Law 211.
170 See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593 (31  March 2005) UN Doc S/
RES/1593/2005 on the Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan (referral of the situation 
in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the ICC); United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970 
(26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970/2011 on Peace and Security in Africa (referral of the 
situation in Libya to the Prosecutor of the ICC).
171 For example, individual criminal responsibility for a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court extends to a person who ‘orders, solicits or induces the commission of the crime’, 
notwithstanding the fact that that person might not be located at the specifi c place (or even 
country) in which the crime takes place. See, generally, Rome Statute, article 25(3).
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is an issue regarding which the Statute could ideally have been more specifi c 
from the outset. However, the particular point to be made is that the inclusion 
of crimes against the environment within the Rome Statute does not operate to 
unduly broaden the jurisdictional reach of the Court – apart, of course, from 
codifying an additional crime – given that the crime is ‘committed’ by the 
employment of a method or means of warfare with the requisite intent, not 
by the actual result, even though that may be elsewhere (see (v) below). In this 
respect, therefore, the terms of the crime accord with accepted principles already 
encapsulated in the Rome Statute.
Th at said, none of the mens rea elements of the crime are limited territorially. 
Th e dolus directus / dolus eventualis / wilful blindness requirements specifi ed in 
article 8 ter(2)(a) are all with reference to damage ‘to the natural environment’. 
Even where, for example, an (non-State Party national) accused ‘only’ intends 
to cause such damage within the territory of that non-State Party (for example 
by massively polluting a river), or to an area beyond the territorial jurisdiction 
of any State (for example the high seas), the crime might still be applicable in 
circumstances where the conduct occurs in the territory of a State Party.
(v) ‘Or’ not ‘and’
As noted in chapter 4, article  8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute can only apply 
where there has been ‘widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment’ (emphasis added). Th is conjunctive requirement, that all three 
qualifi cations of damage be proven, sets the minimum threshold of damage at 
an extremely high level. On the other hand, the disjunctive ‘or’ is used in the 
defi nition of crimes against the environment in article 8 ter. It is suffi  cient that 
the intended damage meet any one of these thresholds. Obviously this removes 
the need to prove all three elements of damage, thus lowering the evidentiary 
burden of proof that may be required. Th is is consistent with the goal of not 
setting the minimum damage threshold at a level that would be impossibly 
diffi  cult to ‘achieve’ (and prove), thus allowing for the crime to be of practical 
relevance and to apply to behaviour with respect to signifi cant environmental 
damage that would otherwise escape culpability under the current legal regime.
(vi) Other features of paragraph 1
a) No requirement of proof of actual intended harm
As noted in 5.3.1, the terms of article 8 ter have been draft ed such that there is no 
requirement that the actual intended harm – in this case, ‘widespread, long-term 
or severe damage to the natural environment’ – must eventuate before the crime 
can be considered as having been committed. What is required is that a method 
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or means of warfare is employed, and that this is done with the requisite intent 
regarding such damage as defi ned in article  8 ter(2)(a). Th e crime of crimes 
against the environment is therefore not just applicable on an ex post facto 
basis – that is, only aft er the signifi cant environmental damage has occurred.172 
Article 8 ter has been draft ed such that it may apply even if the intended level of 
harm is not actually ever reached.
Th ere are a number of reasons why this is both logical and appropriate. It avoids 
the need to wait until the actual damage has been shown to have occurred 
– which may take a considerable period of time, given the defi nition of the 
relevant threshold levels, and may in any event be diffi  cult to prove, despite 
the (necessarily general) guidance provided by the defi nition of each of these 
thresholds in article 8 ter(2)(b)-(d).
It also avoids unacceptable results, perhaps best illustrated by reference to the 
example of the deliberate igniting of the oil wells in Kuwait by the retreating 
Iraqi forces. As noted in chapter 1, at the time, these acts were widely condemned 
by Governments and civil society alike and were viewed with absolute shock and 
dismay. Yet, imagine if, for whatever reason, and despite the (possible) intent of 
the perpetrators, it could not be proven over the following weeks and months 
that such an act had actually met any of the threshold levels of damage, not for 
want of trying, but perhaps due to a stroke of good fortune – say, a change in 
wind direction or weather conditions.
In such a case, the crime would not be applicable at all if it were to be structured 
as a crime of ‘result’, in the sense that a constituent element was that the actual 
intended harm had occurred, although it might fall within the purview of 
‘attempt’ (see above). It would also not sit comfortably with increasingly clear 
expectations regarding culpability for such acts. In the case of the Kuwaiti oil 
wells, for example, the heinousness of the acts, committed with the intent to 
cause a specifi c type of harm, were not regarded as any less so simply because, 
in the end and aft er a period of time, it was ultimately concluded by scientists 
that the environmental consequences were not quite as dire as had originally 
been feared.173 Th ere was undoubted relief following this conclusion, but no less 
condemnation of the acts that had been perpetrated.
To suggest otherwise would serve to defeat the underlying rationale of the crime 
– to proscribe actions done with an intent to target the environment during 
172 Drumbl, supra note 59, 150–1.
173 See, generally, Jessica E. Seacor, ‘Environmental Terrorism: Lessons from the Oil Fires 
of Kuwait’ (1994) 10 American University Journal of International Law and Policy 481, and 
specifi cally the references listed at footnote 7.
Chapter Five. Incorporating Crimes against the Environment into the Rome Statute
270 Intersentia
armed confl ict. It is this intent, coupled with a specifi ed conduct (employing 
a method or means of warfare), that gives rise to international criminal 
culpability.
Moreover, given the numerous variables that will be relevant in determining the 
actual environmental consequences of certain acts, it is unworkable to include 
an additional requirement that widespread, long-term or severe damage must 
actually occur before the crime is applicable. Th at may leave matters lingering, 
potentially for a lengthy period, and would signifi cantly dilute any deterrence 
value that the inclusion of the crime might otherwise have.
By structuring the crime as one of intent and incorporating an expansive mental 
element with regard to the consequences of a method or means of warfare, 
the terms of article 8 ter will more likely put military and political leaders and 
decision makers clearly on notice that the environmental consequences of acts 
taken during armed confl ict are important considerations. Th eir acts, based on 
the situation at the time of perpetration, will be judged in this regard, rather than 
having to wait until a particular end result may (or may not) be shown to have 
actually occurred. Th is is the approach also typically taken with respect to the 
jus in bello principles as they are applied to the actions of combatants – to judge 
the legality (or otherwise) of their acts at the time, and in the circumstances and 
context at that time.174
In addition, even though it is not an environmental protection provision but 
rather is focussed on criminal law, it is anticipated that, on the basis proposed 
in this book, article 8 ter can function in a far more eff ective manner than the 
existing war crime (article 8(2)(b)(iv)) in protecting the environment by reducing 
the risk of signifi cant environmental destruction during armed confl ict before it 
actually occurs.
Th at said, the reality will probably be that, in most circumstances, a prosecution 
for crimes against the environment might not be initiated unless and until some 
environmental damage is caused, albeit not necessarily to the threshold level of 
‘widespread, long-term or severe’. Th is is because the existence of some adverse 
environmental consequences may make it easier to demonstrate the intent (as 
defi ned) of the alleged perpetrator (to cause the threshold level of environmental 
damage). In Milosevic, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY, when discussing a 
174 See, for example, the Rendulic case (Trial of William List and Others (Th e Hostages Trial) 
(Judgment), United States Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, (1949) VIII Law Reports of Trials of 
War Criminals, Case No. 47, 69), referred to in chapter 3. See also the Elements of Crimes in 
relation to article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute, in particular footnote 37.
5.3. Crimes against the Environment – A Defi nition for the Rome Statute
Intersentia 271
similar point with respect to the inference of the requisite intent in relation to an 
allegation of genocide, stated that:175
[s]ince the acts in Article 4(2) of the Statute are only required to be committed with 
an intent to destroy the protected group, it is clear that the actual destruction of the 
group need not take place. However, the extent of the actual destruction, if it does 
take place, will more oft en than not be a factor from which the inference may be 
drawn that the underlying acts were committed with the specifi c intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a specifi c group as such
Similarly, in most circumstances, the greater the actual environmental damage, 
the more apparent it might be that the alleged perpetrator possesses the requisite 
intent. In this regard, any actual damage, rather than being a material element of 
the crime, is rather a material fact that will, no doubt, be useful (but not legally 
necessary) for the Court to determine whether this intent is present, since one 
might anticipate that, in most cases, intent would be inferred from the relevant 
factual circumstances.176 In addition, should there be actual damage, this would 
also be a pertinent factor when determining the level of seriousness or gravity 
of the act, both for the purposes of applying article  8 ter and, as noted, for 
determining the appropriate punishment in the case of a conviction.
In the end, it is the role of the Prosecutor of the ICC, aft er having ‘evaluated 
the information made available’ to him/her, to decide whether an investigation 
– potentially leading to a prosecution – should be initiated, based on specifi c 
criteria.177 Th e ‘gravity of the crime’ is a relevant consideration in this 
regard,178 which might suggest that it is more likely that, with respect to crimes 
against the environment, an investigation would be initiated only aft er some 
(signifi cant) environmental damage has occurred. Th e structure of article 8 ter 
does not prevent the Prosecutor from so waiting, but likewise it does not restrict 
him/her from acting beforehand.
Either way, the provision allows for a degree of fl exibility, which is important 
given the scientifi c uncertainties that may be associated with assessing the 
environmental impact of certain acts. Th e important point here is that the actual 
intended harm – that is, proven ‘widespread, long-term or severe damage to 
the natural environment’ – is not a pre-requisite for the crime to be applicable, 
175 Decision on Motion for Judgement of Acquittal, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Case No. 
IT-02-54-T, Trial Chamber, 16 June 2004, para 125. See also Susanne Malmstrom, ‘Genocide 
Case Law at the ICTY’, in Roberto Bellelli (ed), International Criminal Justice: Law and 
Practice from the Rome Statute to its Review (2010), 267, 279.
176 Cassese, supra note 111, 141.
177 See Rome Statute, article 53.
178 Ibid, article 53(1)(c).
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as long as the mens rea and actus reus elements specifi ed in article 8 ter(1) are 
satisfi ed.
b) No consideration of military necessity / military advantage
As discussed in previous chapters, it has been common, when determining 
whether criminal responsibility arises for certain acts undertaken within the 
context of an armed confl ict, that they are explicitly ‘measured’ against the 
(anticipated) military advantage or benefi t to be gained by such acts. Article 8(2)
(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute applies this qualifi cation in respect of any widespread, 
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment. Indeed, as noted, 
that provision goes further by requiring that such damage be ‘clearly excessive 
in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated’ 
(emphasis added).179
Th is express reference to the military advantage/benefi t criterion represents a 
major obstacle to providing for eff ective criminal accountability for acts targeting 
the environment during armed confl ict. Given the inherently destructive nature 
of warfare, it would be relatively easy for an alleged perpetrator to claim that 
such acts bring with them a distinct military advantage particularly, as is 
contemplated by article 8(2)(b)(iv), in a broad (‘overall’) context.
As a consequence, article  8 ter has been draft ed without reference to any 
military considerations that may be associated with the intentional targeting 
of the natural environment. Th is also stems from the underlying rationale 
of the crime – to address acts that show a complete disregard for the natural 
environment. On this issue, the International Committee of the Red Cross has 
concluded that:180
a deliberate attack on the environment, not required by military necessity, would also 
amount to a war crime because it would in eff ect be an attack on a civilian object.
Indeed, article 8(2)(b)(ii) of the Rome Statute specifi es that, within the context of 
an international armed confl ict, a war crime may be constituted by:181
179 Th e words ‘clearly’ and ‘overall’ were included at the suggestion of the United States, which 
managed to convince delegates at the 1998 Rome Conference that this was necessary in order 
to further limit potential liability for ‘collateral damage’: Bartram S. Brown, ‘U.S. Objections 
to the Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Brief Response’ (1999) 31 International 
Law and Politics 855, 866–7.
180 See International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Customary IHL: Rule 156. Defi nition of War 
Crimes’ <www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter44_rule156> at 27  January 
2015.
181 Rome Statute, article 8(2)(b)(ii).
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[i]ntentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not 
military objectives
However, this provision is not an appropriate ‘complement’ to article  8(2)(b)
(iv) in relation to acts done with intent to cause environmental damage. It 
incorporates a number of the same weaknesses found in article  8(2)(b)(iv) – a 
restriction only to international armed confl icts and the requirement of an 
attack. It also makes no specifi c reference to the natural environment. Given the 
presence of a provision that specifi cally deals with damage to the environment 
(article  8(2)(b)(iv)), it is unlikely that, in practice, a prosecution would be 
initiated under the more general provision (article  8(2)(b)(ii)) for such acts. 
Indeed, even if such a prosecution was initiated, it would be highly likely that 
an alleged perpetrator would raise as a defence the ‘cloak’ of military advantage, 
thus potentially bringing the much more restrictive terms of article  8(2)(b)(iv) 
into play.
It should be noted, however, that, as with the other crimes specifi ed in 
the Rome Statute, the general ‘defences’ (‘Grounds for excluding criminal 
responsibility’) set out in article 31 may apply with respect to crimes against 
the environment in the specifi c circumstances specifi ed in that provision. 
However, the point to be made here is that the absence of a direct reference 
to military advantage/benefi t within article  8 ter itself limits the possibility 
that this additional legislative ‘justifi cation’ might be available to an alleged 
perpetrator.
c) No relationship with article 124 ‘Transitional Provision’
For the reasons discussed earlier, the criminalization of the intentional 
destruction of the environment during armed confl ict has been draft ed as a 
separate and sui generis crime, rather than as a war crime such as article  8(2)
(b)(iv). One consequence of this is that the potential does not exist for a new 
State Party to the Rome Statute to ‘opt out’ of accepting the jurisdiction of the 
Court (for a period of up to seven years) with respect to crimes against the 
environment.182 Whilst, as noted in chapter 4, an article 124 declaration has been 
made only on very few occasions, the fact that it is not possible at all for crimes 
against the environment removes one layer of (potential) uncertainty, and also 
serves to highlight the importance that must be attached to environmental 
concerns during the conduct of armed confl ict.
182 See Rome Statute, article 124. As noted in chapter 4, article 124 was considered at the Review 
Conference of the Rome Statute held in Kampala from 31 May to 11 June 2010; however it was 
decided at that time not to delete the provision, but rather to review it again fi ve years later.
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5.3.2.1.1.2. Paragraph 2 (article 8 ter(2))
(i) Intent (see 5.3.2.1.1.1 (iii))
(ii) Widespread, long-term or severe
No clarifi cation is provided in article 8(2)(b)(iv) as to what is envisaged by each of 
the terms, ‘widespread’, ‘long-term’ and ‘severe’ as they appear in that provision. 
In the absence of guidance, this may lead to a signifi cant degree of uncertainty 
and, on top of all of the other problems with that provision (see chapter 4), makes 
it even harder to determine whether the requisite threshold of environmental 
damage has been reached, given the broad range of technical factors that might 
be relevant in relation to the state of the environment. Th is uncertainty will make 
it even less likely that a prosecution would ever be initiated under article 8(2)(b)
(iv), since it would be not be at all clear to the Prosecutor what relevant level of 
environmental damage is at issue.
Nor is there any other assistance in this regard to be gained as to the meaning of 
‘widespread’ and ‘severe’ as they appear within the defi nition of crimes against 
humanity in the Rome Statute183 (‘long-term’ only appears in article 8(2)(b)(iv)). 
Even in the absence of a defi nition, their meaning in the context of one crime 
cannot be assumed to be the same as when used to set the parameters of another 
crime – they operate in completely diff erent contexts. For example, the ICTY has 
held that, in the context of crimes against humanity, the word widespread (‘a 
widespread or systematic attack’)184 refers to ‘the large scale nature of the attack 
and the number of targeted persons’,185 an interpretation that, as discussed 
in chapter 4, is not necessarily consistent with the context of ‘widespread … 
[environmental] damage’ in article 8(2)(b)(iv).
Th erefore, in draft ing the terms of the crime of crimes against the environment, 
and in order to provide a level of clarity as to the application and scope of this 
183 See article  7(1) (‘widespread or systematic attack…’), and articles  7(1)(e) (‘[i]mprisonment 
or severe deprivation of liberty…), 7(2)(e) (‘… the intentional infl iction of severe pain or 
suff ering…’) and 7(2)(g) (‘the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights …).
184 Although, in contrast to both article  3 of the ICTR Statute and article  7(1) of the Rome 
Statute, the ICTY Statute does not make specifi c reference to this requirement when setting 
out the elements of crimes against humanity for the purposes of that instrument (see ICTY 
Statute, article  5), the jurisprudence of the ICTY has consistently confi rmed that such an 
attack is a constitutive element in the crime: see, for example, Judgement, Prosecutor v Duško 
Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, para 248; Judgement, Prosecutor v. 
Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A, 
Appeals Chamber, 12 June 2002, para 85.
185 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber, 29  July 
2004, para 101.
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crime, particularly in light of the fact that the minimum threshold of damage, 
as discussed above, has been lowered by the use of ‘or’ rather than ‘and’, it is 
important to specify as clearly as is appropriate in the circumstances what is 
envisaged by each of the terms, ‘widespread’, ‘long-term’ and ‘severe’.
Paragraphs 2(b)-(d) of article 8 ter therefore set out parameters for each of those 
qualifi cations. Th ese defi nitions expressly apply only with respect to article  8 
ter(1). Th ey are broadly based on the defi nitions in the Understanding186 
relating to the ENMOD Convention discussed in chapter 2,187 but have been 
varied in order to provide some greater specifi city,188 and also to ensure that, 
as noted above, the crime applies in relation to the intent to cause a specifi c (and 
signifi cant) degree of environmental damage.
Paragraph 2(d) has been draft ed in relatively general terms so as to, on the 
one hand, emphasize that the crime only applies in circumstances where 
the intended damage is ‘serious’189 (and thus not in the case of minor or 
inconsequential environmental damage), but which still allows the Court some 
scope for analysing and characterizing the intended harm,190 and thus to apply 
article  8 ter in circumstances that may be warranted in a particular case. In 
other words, it allows for the crime to apply without a specifi c restriction apart 
from the degree of intended damage (compared with the temporal or geographic 
requirements as per paragraphs 2(b) and (c)).
Th is more general defi nition of ‘severe’ in article  8(2)(d) ter is appropriate for 
a number of reasons. First, it may well be that certain instances of signifi cant 
environmental destruction ‘cannot necessarily be measured in time or space’.191 
Moreover, the harmful eff ects of such intended damage may not necessarily be 
felt or manifest themselves for a considerable period of time aft er the relevant 
method or means of warfare has been employed (for example, the eff ects of 
booby traps or land mines).192 In addition, it is impossible to foresee all of the 
circumstances in which the environment might be intentionally targeted during 
186 Understanding Relating to Article I of ENMOD, 31 United Nations General Assembly Offi  cial 
Records Supp. No. 27 (A/31/27), Annex I.
187 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modifi cation Techniques, opened for signature 10 December 1976, 1108 UNTS 151; 16 ILM 
88 (entered into force 5 October 1978).
188 Note that article  1 of ENMOD specifi es the term ‘long-lasting’ rather than ‘long-term’; 
however, the latter term has subsequently been used in both the 1977 Additional Protocol I 
and article 8(2)(b)(iv), and has been included in article 8 ter.
189 Th is term is also used in the Rome Statute as a descriptor of the relevant threshold of damage 
(to humans) for particular acts that may constitute an act of genocide (article 6(b)), a crime 
against humanity (article 7(1)(k)), and a war crime (articles 8(2)(a)(iii) and 8(2)(b)(vii)).
190 McLaughlin, supra note 131, 398.
191 Weinstein, supra note 88, 722.
192 Jabbari-Gharabagh, supra note 25, 100.
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armed confl ict. Th e guiding principal for the Court in considering whether 
paragraph 2(d) is applicable will therefore be the extent (gravity) of the intended 
environmental damage.
(iii) Natural environment
It is not necessarily a simple task to clearly defi ne the environment, which in 
some senses is an ‘intangible concept’.193 As noted, there is no widely accepted 
defi nition that will fi t into every circumstance. Rather, the defi nition in any 
particular treaty regime will be contextual, based very much on the scope and 
object of that particular instrument. Nonetheless, again to provide clarity, it 
is important to defi ne, within the terms of article  8 ter, the intended ‘victim’ 
of the crime of crimes against the environment – the natural environment. 
In this regard, as foreshadowed in chapter 1, an expansive defi nition has been 
included in article 8 ter(2)(e), due largely to the fact that it is important not to 
be excessively restrictive, given the (unknown) destructive capabilities of current 
and future weapons technology.
In addition, the environment itself is a broad and complex notion and, only as we 
continue to gather further scientifi c knowledge about the interdependence of the 
various natural elements that occur around us, will we become more cognizant 
of the increasingly destructive eff ects that signifi cant damage to one (perhaps 
even on the face of it seemingly minor) element will have on other aspects of 
‘ecological, biological and resource systems necessary to sustain the continued 
existence of all forms of human, animal or plant life’.194
Of course, it would be unrealistic to expect that combatants in an armed 
confl ict would be aware of all of the nuances of environmental and ecological 
interdependency, and in any event, environmental damage will almost always 
follow any acts taken during armed confl ict. Hence, the crime has not been 
draft ed as a ‘strict liability’ crime but rather, as discussed, one based on an intent 
to target the environment so as to cause a certain threshold of damage.
(iv) Damage to the natural environment
Th e essence of the crime of crimes against the environment stems from the fact 
that it is the environment itself that is targeted. As noted, unlike, in particular, 
the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, which are each 
193 Major Walter G. Sharp, Sr., ‘Th e Eff ective Deterrence of Environmental Damage During 
Armed Confl ict: A Case Analysis of the Persian Gulf War’ (1992) 137 Military Law Review 1, 
32.
194 Jensen, supra note 10, 183.
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primarily directed towards acts that have ‘human’ eff ects, crimes against the 
environment focusses upon methods and means of warfare that are employed 
to have particular consequences on the natural environment. Th ose three core 
international crimes under the Rome Statute have an anthropocentric focus, as 
opposed to an ‘ecological’ focus for crimes against the environment.195
Th e concept of crimes against the environment was given very little attention in 
the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Rome Statute.196 Whilst earlier 
(pre-Rome Statute) suggestions for the proscription of acts that damage the 
environment did propose a direct relationship with aspects of human health,197 
it is argued that such an approach is not appropriate, given the underlying basis 
for the inclusion of this crime as a sui generis crime within the Rome Statute. 
In eff ect, what diff erentiates crimes against the environment from the core 
international crimes in the Rome Statute is that it emphasizes the heinous nature 
of acts that intentionally target the environment per se.
As a consequence, article 8 ter(2)(f) makes it clear that the relevant ‘damage’ to 
the natural environment need not (‘includes but is not limited to’) necessarily 
constitute a ‘concrete endangerment to human life or health’.198 To limit the 
threshold element in that way may have the eff ect, for example, of excluding 
from the scope of the crime such things as the deliberate burning of the Kuwaiti 
oil wells by Iraqi forces, even though that action was met with universal 
condemnation as a ‘crime’ at the time. Of course, should the damage in a 
particular case also constitute such an endangerment, this may be a relevant 
factor that the Court might take into account in determining the gravity of the 
acts of an alleged perpetrator. However, an actual threat to human life or health 
is not a necessary precondition to the commission of the crime.
Although the Rome Statute itself does not have as its primary goal the greater 
protection of the environment, it is anticipated that article 8 ter may have that 
195 Faure and Visser, supra note 61, 344.
196 Joe Sills, Jerome C. Glenn, Elizabeth Florescu and Th eodore J. Gordon, ‘Environmental 
Crimes in Military Actions and the International Criminal Court (ICC) – United Nations 
Perspectives’, April 2001, Executive Summary, para 3 <http://millennium-project.org/
millennium/es-icc.html> at 27 January 2015.
197 See, for example, Draft  Code of Off ences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report 
of the International Law Commission on Its Forty-eighth session, United Nations General 
Assembly Offi  cial Records 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, 9 UN Doc A/51/10 (1996), which (at page 
54) included as a war crime (article 20(g)) the following (emphasis added):
 ‘[i]n the case of armed confl ict, using methods or means of warfare not justifi ed by military 
necessity with the intent to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment and thereby gravely prejudice the health or survival of the population and such 
damage occurs’.
198 Th is criterion is oft en used to defi ne the scope of various models of criminal environmental 
sanction under national law: see, generally, Faure and Visser, supra note 61, 341–63.
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consequence by criminalizing acts that target the environment during armed 
confl ict. In order to best achieve this, it should not be limited only to damage 
that eff ects human beings or their activities, but rather should focus on the 
natural environment.199
So as to avoid suggestions that, without an anthropocentric ‘accent’, a defi nition 
of crimes against the environment would be too ‘vague’ and possibly violate the 
lex certa principle,200 examples of the types of environmental damage that may 
fall within its scope are set out in articles  8 ter(2)(f)(i)-(v).201 Th is is a similar 
approach to that taken with the defi nition of each of the other crimes in the 
Rome Statute. However, it is important that the process of listing examples of 
the relevant acts associated with the crime should not produce a defi nition that 
is restricted only to a small number of very specifi c types of environmental 
damage, or unduly limits the purposes for which they must be undertaken, with 
the eff ect that culpable actions that should be covered would still fall outside the 
scope of the crime. In this respect, whilst the legality principle requires clarity, it 
does not demand total infl exibility in the defi nition of a crime.202
199 See also Susan F. Mandiberg and Michael G. Faure, ‘A Graduated Punishment Approach to 
Environmental Crimes: Beyond Vindication of Administrative Authority in the United States 
and Europe’ (2008) Lewis and Clark Law School Legal Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2008–
21, 4.
200 Faure and Visser, supra note 61, 358–63.
201 See Ensign Florencio J. Yuzon, ‘Deliberate Environmental Modifi cation Th rough the Use of 
Chemical and Biological Weapons: “Greening” the Environmental Laws of Armed Confl ict 
to Establish an Environmentally Protective Regime’ (1996) 11 American University Journal of 
International Law and Policy 793, 843 and the corresponding footnote.
202 See, for example, Rome Statute, article  7(1), which lists various acts that may constitute 
a crime against humanity in particular circumstances. Article  7(1)(k) refers to ‘[o]ther 
inhumane acts of a similar character …’ without providing any additional guidance or 
explanation as to the meaning of ‘inhumane’ in this context, thus allowing for the Court 
to exercise a degree of fl exibility in its application: see, for example, Judgement, Prosecutor 
v. Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, Dragan Papic and 
Vladimir Santic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, 14 January 2000, par. 562–66, and the 
quote at footnote 825. Reference can also be made to the Dutch case of Frans van Anraat, who 
was convicted on several counts in relation to the supply of chemicals to the Saddam Hussein 
regime in Iraq used to make mustard gas and nerve gas that was subsequently utilized in the 
Al-Anfal campaign referred to in chapter 1. In its decision dismissing the original conviction 
for complicity in genocide, the Dutch Court of Appeal concluded that:
 ‘… especially regarding the question which degree of intention is required for a conviction on 
account of complicity in genocide, international criminal law is still in a stage of development 
and does not seem to have crystallized out completely’: Re Frans van Anraat, LJN: BA4676, 
Court of Appeal in Th e Hague, 2200050906 – 2, 9 May 2007.
 Th e case subsequently went to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which quoted 
from Kononov v. Latvia No. 36376/04, 17  May 2010, where that Court (at para 185–7) had 
stated that:
 ‘[a]s regards foreseeability in particular … however clearly draft ed a legal provision may 
be in any system of law including criminal law, there is an inevitable element of judicial 
interpretation. Th ere will always be a need for elucidation of doubtful points and for 
adaptation to changing circumstances.’
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As a result, the list is not exhaustive (‘may include’) and, in addition, a more 
general example in paragraph 2(f)(v) has been incorporated, so as to give the 
Court some fl exibility to apply article 8 ter in circumstances that, for example, 
may not necessarily be specifi cally contemplated at this present time. Th is 
follows the structure of other crimes in the Rome Statute203 and, in the case of 
crimes against the environment, is particularly important, given the continuous 
development of destructive weapons technology.
5.3.2.2. Associated Amendments to the Rome Statute
As noted above, the inclusion of a separate crime of crimes against the 
environment in the Rome Statute will necessitate some associated amendments 
in that instrument. Th ese are set out in Appendix I.
5.3.2.3. Associated Amendments to the Elements of Crimes
Th e Elements of Crimes constitutes part of the fi rst ‘layer’ of the applicable 
law to be applied by the Court, along with the Rome Statute and the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence.204 It is used to assist the Court in the interpretation 
of the various crimes set out in articles  6, 7 and 8, and its terms (and any 
amendments to them) are to be consistent with the Rome Statute.205 As a 
consequence, the inclusion in the Rome Statute of article 8 ter also necessitates 
associated amendments to the Elements of Crimes. Th ese are set out below (see 
also Appendix I).
5.3.2.3.1. Amendment to the Explanatory Note
Th e fi rst sentence of the explanatory note to the Elements of Crimes should be 
amended to read as follows (amendments in bold):
 In van Anraat, the ECtHR went on to note that:
 ‘[t]he scope of the notion of foreseeability depends to a considerable degree on the content of 
the text in issue, the fi eld it is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom 
it is addressed. A law may still satisfy the requirement of foreseeability even if the person 
concerned has to take appropriate legal advice to assess, to a degree that is reasonable in the 
circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail [and that] it is a logical 
consequence of the principle that laws must be of general application that the wording of 
statutes is not always precise. One of the standard techniques of regulation by rules is to use 
general categorisations as opposed to exhaustive lists’: van Anraat v. Th e Netherlands No. 
65389/09, 6 July 2010, para 81 and 83.
203 See Rome Statute, article  7(1)(k), as well as article  7(1)(g), which encompasses (emphasis 
added):
 ‘Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any 
other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity’.
204 Ibid, article 21(1)(a).
205 Ibid, articles 9(1) and 9(3).
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‘Th e structure of the elements of the crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and crimes against the environment follows the 
structure of the corresponding provisions of articles  6, 7, 8 and 8 ter of the 
Rome Statute.’
5.3.2.3.1.1. Discussion
Whilst the explanatory note is not a formal part of the Elements of Crimes, it 
should be amended in order to maintain the consistency of the document with 
the Rome Statute. Th is was not done following the inclusion of article 8 bis, which 
clarifi ed the terms of the crime of aggression, most likely because the provision 
in the Elements of Crimes relating to aggression does not systematically deal 
with every paragraph of article  8  bis. An amendment to the explanatory note 
in relation to article 8 ter is probably warranted – although not necessarily vital 
– if only to clarify the structure of the respective provision in the Elements of 
Crimes.
5.3.2.3.2. Proposed Elements of Crimes for Crimes against the Environment
‘Article 8 ter
Crimes against the environment
Elements
1. Th e perpetrator meant to employ a method or means of warfare.
2. Th e method or means of warfare was employed;
(a) with intent to cause widespread, long-term or severe damage to the 
natural environment; or
(b) with an awareness that, in the ordinary course of events, there is a 
substantial likelihood that it will cause widespread, long-term or severe 
damage to the natural environment; or
(c) aft er consciously disregarding information that clearly indicates that, 
in the ordinary course of events, there is a substantial likelihood that 
it will cause widespread, long-term or severe damage to the natural 
environment.
3. Th e method or means of warfare was employed in the context of and was 
associated with either an international armed confl ict, or an armed confl ict 
not of an international character, or both.
4. Th e perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the 
existence of an armed confl ict.’
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5.3.2.3.2.1. Discussion
Th e proposed elements of crimes against the environment systematically set 
out the components of the crime that need to be proven. Th ese are structured 
in the order specifi ed in the General Introduction to the Elements of Crimes.206 
Th ey confi rm the requisite conduct (paragraph 1), the relevant mental element 
(paragraph 2), and the contextual circumstances (paragraphs 3 and 4), the latter 
of which follow from the limitation, discussed in earlier sections of this chapter, 
that the crime is only applicable when the conduct takes place within the course 
of an armed confl ict.
As noted above, however, for the purposes of this crime, no distinction is to be 
drawn between an international armed confl ict and an armed confl ict not of an 
international character.207 In other words, the crime applies to conduct in any 
type of armed confl ict. Th e words ‘or both’ are included in paragraph 3 since, 
as noted, there may be confl icts that display the characteristics of both forms of 
armed confl ict.208
Th e connection with an armed confl ict specifi ed in both article  8 ter and the 
provision in the Elements of Crimes set out above – ‘in the context of and was 
associated with’ – mirrors the wording used in the provisions of the Elements of 
Crimes relating to war crimes. Th is is also the case with the terms of paragraph 
4 of the proposed Elements of Crimes set out above, which has been included 
to emphasize that this crime applies only to acts undertaken in an armed 
confl ict. Th is also further highlights that the focus of the crime is directed 
towards criminalizing the targeting of the environment as part of the conduct 
of warfare.
206 See General Introduction to the Elements of Crimes, para 7.
207 Because the crime of crimes against the environment is limited to specifi c actions ‘within the 
context of and associated with an armed confl ict’, the qualifi cations as to what constitutes an 
armed confl ict not of an international character for the purposes of article 8(2)(f) of the Rome 
Statute in relation to certain war crimes will apply mutatis mutandis to article 8 ter and the 
respective Elements of Crimes set out in 5.3.2.3.2.
208 See, for example, Judgement, Prosecutor v Duško Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Appeals Chamber, 
15 July 1999, where the ICTY Appeals Chamber (at para 84) stated:
 ‘It is indisputable that an armed confl ict is international if it takes place between two or more 
States. In addition, in case of an internal armed confl ict breaking out on the territory of a 
State, it may become international (or, depending upon the circumstances, be international in 
character alongside an internal armed confl ict) if (i) another State intervenes in that confl ict 
through its troops, or alternatively if (ii) some of the participants in the internal armed 
confl ict act on behalf of that other State’ (emphasis added).
 See also Decision on the Confi rmation of Charges, Th e Prosecutor v. Th omas Lubanga Dyilo, 
Case No. ICC-01/04–01/06, Pre-Trial Chamber 1, 29  January 2007, where (at para 209) the 
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber used similar wording in relation to the situation in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo.
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5.4. COMPARISON WITH ARTICLE 8(2)(b)(iv) – 
‘RIGHTING THE WRONGS’
Th e discussion in chapter 4 analysed the various elements of article 8(2)(b)(iv) 
of the Rome Statute – the only ‘eco-centric’209 provision in that instrument 
expressly referring to the environment and to environmental damage – and 
why its terms are insuffi  cient and inappropriate to deal with the intentional 
targeting of the environment during an armed confl ict, thus rendering it largely 
‘impotent’.210 It is suggested that the terms of article  8 ter properly address 
and rectify each of those concerns so as to provide the basis for a more eff ective 
mechanism to deal with such acts. Th e primary diff erences between article 8(2)
(b)(iv) and article 8 ter have been referred to in detail in the discussion above, but 
are briefl y summarized again in the following table:
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) Article 8 ter
‘intentionally launching an attack’ ‘employing … a method or means of warfare’
‘knowledge that such attack will cause … 
damage’
‘intent to cause … damage’, which 
incorporates dolus directus, dolus eventualis, 
or wilful blindness
‘international armed confl ict’ ‘an armed confl ict’ (of any type)
‘widespread, long-term and severe damage’ ‘widespread, long-term or severe damage’ 
no defi nition/clarifi cation of relevant terms defi nition/clarifi cation of ‘widespread’, ‘long-
term’, ‘severe’, ‘natural environment’, ‘damage 
to the natural environment’
‘clearly excessive’ damage no such requirement
relative to ‘concrete and direct overall military 
advantage anticipated’
no such requirement
subject to article 124 Rome Statute 
‘Transitional Provision’
not subject to article 124 Rome Statute
In the end, the variances between these two provisions are not just a matter 
of semantics, but are tangible and would make a real diff erence in terms of 
regulating conduct during armed confl ict. Th ere is a real possibility that 
notorious historical examples of intentional environmental destruction during 
an armed confl ict, such as the igniting of the Kuwaiti oil wells, the draining of 
the al-Hawizeh and al-Hammar marshes in Iraq, or the extensive use of Agent 
Orange during the Vietnam War, might not have fallen foul of the terms of 
article 8(2)(b)(iv), had it been operable at the relevant time.
209 Ryan Gilman, ‘Expanding Environmental Justice aft er War: Th e Need for Universal 
Jurisdiction over Environmental War Crimes’ (2011) Colorado Journal of International 
Environmental Law & Policy 447, 450.
210 Ibid, 456.
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By contrast, if such acts were to be taken following the inclusion of article 8 ter 
in the Rome Statute, an eff ective and appropriate mechanism would then be 
available to the Court so as to properly address such clear-cut examples of the 
intentional targeting of the natural environment. It is submitted that this would 
also ‘contribute to the prevention of ’ such acts in the future.211
In the end, therefore, the two provisions – the existing article  8(2)(b)(iv) and 
the proposed article 8 ter – represent very diff erent, perhaps even diametrically 
opposed, approaches towards addressing the need to establish appropriate 
mechanisms of justice to deal with persons who target the environment during 
armed confl ict. Th e standards they set are completely diff erent, as are most of 
the relevant factors that constitute the elements of the respective crimes, even 
though they deal with a similar subject matter. Obviously, therefore, it is neither 
practicable nor logical to, on the one hand, include the crime of crimes against 
the environment, whilst at the same time retaining the relevant parts of the 
existing (fl awed) provision. To do so may signifi cantly compromise any attempt 
to prosecute an accused under article 8 ter. As a consequence, it is necessary to 
also amend article 8(2)(b)(iv) so as to delete the reference to ‘widespread, long-
term and severe damage to the natural environment’. Th is is dealt with by the 
amendment to the Rome Statute set out in 5.3.2.2.2 (see Appendix I).
5.5. PROCEDURE FOR AMENDING THE ROME 
STATUTE AND THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES
Th e Rome Statute sets out a relatively clear procedure that would allow for 
amendment of the instrument so as to include the separate crime of crimes 
against the environment, as well as for the necessary associated changes. Th ere 
is therefore no procedural impediment that would prevent this from (eventually) 
becoming a reality.
Any proposal to amend the Rome Statute is to come from a State Party. 
Article  121 permits any State Party to propose an amendment to the Rome 
Statute ‘[a]ft er the expiry of seven years from the entry into force of this 
Statute’;212 that is, at any time aft er 1 July 2009. Th ere is no restriction as to the 
type of amendment that may be proposed, and thus the inclusion of a sui generis 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court is possible, subject to compliance with 
the relevant procedures set out in the remainder of article 121.
A proposal to amend the Rome Statute would be dealt with either by the 
Assembly of States Parties (ASP) directly or, if the ASP considers that ‘the issue 
211 Refer to Rome Statute, preamble para 5.
212 Ibid, article 121(1).
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involved so warrants’, by a Review Conference convened for that purpose.213 
Th e issue of crimes against the environment was not raised at the fi rst Review 
Conference in Kampala in May-June 2010, but the Rome Statute allows for the 
convening of a Review Conference(s) in the future, to consider matters including 
‘the list of crimes contained in article 5’.214
Article 121(3) of the Rome Statute prescribes the voting procedure for the adoption 
of an amendment to the treaty – either by consensus or, if that is not possible, by 
at least a two-thirds majority of States Parties. As noted, the inclusion of the crime 
of crimes against the environment would involve the substantial (and substantive) 
amendment of articles 5 and 8 of the Rome Statute. As a consequence, in the event 
that the relevant amendments were adopted, they would enter into force:215
… for those States Parties which have accepted the amendment one year aft er the 
deposit of their instruments of ratifi cation or acceptance. In respect of a State Party 
which has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction 
regarding a crime covered by the amendment when committed by that State Party’s 
nationals or on its territory.
Obviously, this leaves open the possibility that a State Party will not accept 
the application of the crime of crimes against the environment to actions 
perpetrated by its nationals or on its territory. Th is may somewhat limit the 
immediate impact of the inclusion of the crime, but it is to be hoped that, over 
time, an increasing number of State Parties would accept the amendment, so 
that its application would become universal, at least in respect of those States 
that have ratifi ed the Rome Statute.
Th e amendment of the Element of Crimes is even more straightforward. Th e 
Rome Statute provides that an amendment may be proposed by:216
(a) Any State Party;
(b) Th e judges acting by an absolute majority;
(c) Th e Prosecutor.
Once an amendment has been proposed by any of these, it requires a two-
thirds majority of the members of the ASP for adoption217 and, as noted, is to be 
consistent with the terms of the Rome Statute.218
213 Ibid, article 121(2).
214 Ibid, articles 123(1) and 123(2).
215 Ibid, article 121(5).
216 Ibid, article 9(2).
217 Ibid, article 9(2).
218 Ibid, article 9(3).
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5.6. FINAL REFLECTIONS – A ‘WORK IN PROGRESS’
Over the ages there have been many types of victims of armed confl ict but, where 
the environment has been specifi cally targeted, those responsible have largely 
gone unpunished.219 Whatever the reasons for this in the past, the analysis of 
the key questions raised in chapter 1 has demonstrated that the current position 
under both treaty and customary international law is not suffi  cient or appropriate 
to properly deal with such acts. Moreover, while it is clear that the mechanisms 
of justice under international criminal law, in particular the ICC, should play 
an integral function in this regard, the existing regime under the Rome Statute 
is also fl awed given the virtual impossibility of a successful prosecution. Th e 
conclusion is, therefore, that it is necessary to amend the Rome Statute in order 
to more appropriately deal with ‘crimes against the environment’, and this 
should be done by including a separate crime within that instrument.
Th e inclusion of a sui generis crime of crimes against the environment in the Rome 
Statute, and thus within the jurisdiction of the ICC will, however, not be an easy 
task. In the end, what is required is a signifi cant degree of political will and courage, 
strong assertiveness by civil society, and an understanding by relevant stakeholders 
that the threats posed by the ever-increasing destructive capability of modern 
weapons technology should override military considerations in circumstances 
where the natural environment is intentionally targeted during armed confl ict.
Yet, a sense of realism is necessary if any eff ective progress is to be made. It is a sad 
truism that warfare is inherently destructive by nature. Th e conduct of virtually all 
armed confl ict will render damage to the environment in some way. Th us, to argue 
for an all-embracing defi nition for this crime would, at this stage at least, fall on 
deaf ears, and would run the risk of being unrealistic. To categorically protect the 
environment in all circumstances during armed confl ict (let alone in peace time 
as well) is simply not possible, and presents a ‘particularly vexing dilemma’220 – 
the only way to achieve that goal would be the idealistic but unattainable (at least 
for the foreseeable future) ‘solution’ of prohibiting all armed confl ict. Given the 
realities, such an aim, no matter how laudable, is simply a bridge too far.
Rather, this book, whilst arguing for the need for such a crime, off ers, as a proposal 
intended to allow for far more eff ective regulation of the conduct of armed 
confl ict, a defi nition that applies to acts done with intent (in an expansive sense) to 
target the environment during armed confl ict. Other, broader defi nitions of what 
constitutes a crime against the environment may perhaps follow in succeeding 
219 Weinstein, supra note 88, 721.
220 Sharp, supra note 193, 65.
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discussions, with this author mindful that the defi nition off ered in this book is, for 
the reasons set out in this chapter, deliberately limited in certain ways.
In this author’s view at least, it is far better at this stage to put forward a specifi c 
crime that, on the one hand, is consistent with the general practice and legal 
approach already largely accepted by States and as refl ected in the wording and 
structure of the Rome Statute, and which may be politically ‘acceptable’ in the 
circumstances, but which still addresses in a meaningful and workable way, 
heinous acts directed against the natural environment. Of course, this represents 
a compromise – similar to the circumstances that shaped the fi nal version of the 
Rome Statute – and will perhaps not please those advocates who argue for an even 
greater range of accountability mechanisms directed towards (deliberate) acts that 
damage the environment. It may well be, of course, that other mechanisms may 
eventually be developed through other fora to deal with additional circumstances 
of deliberate environmental damage. Th e proposal in this book, however, 
represents the most appropriate and extensive ‘crime’ that is consistent with the 
aims of the Court, as refl ected in the scope of the Rome Statute.
Indeed, to argue for something that is even broader than the express terms 
proposed in this book would ‘dilute’ the important focus of the Rome Statute 
and the work of the Court, not to mention the legal diffi  culties and political and 
diplomatic barriers that would likely follow from such an attempt. In reality, 
these would stall any such proposal from the outset. It is not the intention of 
this author to argue for something that does not have a realistic chance of being 
taken up and adapted at some stage. To argue too broadly too early may even 
harm the chances of having any suggestion on this issue ever being accepted.
So, in summary therefore, the central proposal of this book represents a ‘work 
in progress’ towards even greater protection of the environment, albeit one 
that, it is submitted, goes a considerable way towards achieving a much greater 
eff ectiveness in the regulation of acts that are intended to cause signifi cant 
environmental damage during armed confl ict. Th is proposal is in line with 
the standards required by contemporary international society and by the 
development of legal doctrine. It certainly does not, and does not purport to 
off er an all-encompassing ‘solution’ to every challenge posed by the intentional 
destruction of the natural environment in any circumstance.
Perhaps put more bluntly, to do nothing now is unacceptable and reckless in the 
extreme, but to attempt to do ‘everything’ at once will cast such a proposal into a 
vortex of political oblivion, thus achieving nothing at all.
Th e position therefore is, and should remain fl uid, in response to technological 
and military developments, and changes in the way humanity prioritizes its 
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natural surroundings. Th e proposed defi nition of the crime of crimes against 
the environment has attempted to take account of this need, whilst also both 
adhering to the requirements of clarity and paying due respect to the lex certa 
principle. It refl ects the signifi cance of the environment to our very future. It is 
submitted that this is a step that should and must be taken, and can be done 
without any signifi cant or overwhelming legal or moral impediments. Th e 
imperative demands that such a step is taken now.
Th is book has been written against a background where, undoubtedly, our 
individual and collective consciousness continues to undergo a process 
of ‘greening’. We are seeing a strong momentum towards the evolution of 
an ‘environmental culture’,221 which also extends to renewed calls for the 
prohibition of many more aspects of environmental destruction.222 Th ere has 
been a gradual but perceptible ‘hardening’ of global attitudes with respect to 
those who intentionally (or even otherwise) damage the natural environment.223 
We have come much more to recognize the importance of respecting the 
environment, and this becomes increasingly more signifi cant even in the face of 
traditional sovereignty and military considerations.
Th e proposal put forward in this book represents a logical step forward along 
this evolutionary path.
Th ere is therefore some sense of optimism ahead, despite the legal and political 
challenges that are still to be faced. In the words of Ellen Goodman, writing 
almost a quarter of a century ago, shortly aft er one of the more notorious 
‘crimes against the environment’ seen in modern times – the igniting of the oil 
wells in Kuwait by Saddam Hussein’s military forces – it is to be hoped that, 
eventually:224
… even in the devastating business of killing each other, there may be enough sanity 
for a consensus, enough sense of preservation to at least have a rule on the book and 
in our minds against waging war on the very environment we must share when the 
war is over.
221 Anthony Leibler, ‘Deliberate Wartime Environmental Damage: New Challenges for 
International Law’ (1992) 23 California Western International Law Journal 67, 136.
222 See, for example, ‘Ecocide: Th e Missing 5th Crime Against Peace – End Ecocide in Europe’ 
(undated) <http://eradicatingecocide.cmail1.com/t/ViewEmail/r/7EDF8501F7FB82C7/9E223
A7C45EC01860CC2E75D3CF5869> at 6 February 2013.
223 Gray, supra note 21, 268.
224 Ellen Goodman, ‘A crime against humanity and nature’, Th e Chicago Tribune, 3  February 
1991 <http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1991–02–03/features/9101100755_1_civil-war-sea-
turtles-enemy territory> at 27 January 2015.
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APPENDIX I
5.3.2.2. Associated Amendments to the Rome Statute
Th e inclusion in the Rome Statute of article  8 ter will require the following associated 
amendments to the Rome Statute. Th ese amendments are largely self-explanatory 
and, apart from the proposed new article  15 quater, which deals with the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the Court over crimes against the environment, do not warrant additional 
discussion.
5.3.2.2.1. Amendment to article 5(1)
Article 5(1) of the Rome Statute should be amended to read as follows (amendment in 
bold):
‘Th e jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community as a whole. Th e Court has jurisdiction in accordance with 
this Statute with respect to the following crimes:
(a) Th e crime of genocide;
(b) Crimes against humanity;
(c) War crimes;
(d) Th e crime of aggression;
(e) Crimes against the environment.’
5.3.2.2.2. Amendment to article 8(2)(b)(iv) and the Associated Elements of 
Crimes
For the reasons discussed in chapters 4 and 5, following the inclusion of the separate 
crime of crimes against the environment as article 8 ter, article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome 
Statute, as well as the associated Elements of Crimes, should be amended so as to delete 
any reference to damage to the natural environment. Th e amended article  8(2)(b)(iv) 
would therefore read:1
 ‘(iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects which would 
1 Of course, as noted, the inherent fl aws in the provision will still apply in this amended version 
of article 8(2)(b)(iv) with respect to the other variants of that crime. It is hoped that others 
will continue to argue for further reconsideration of this provision in the future; however, 
this issue is beyond the scope of this book.
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be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage 
anticipated;’
Th e associated Elements of Crimes for article  8(2)(b)(iv) would also be amended 
accordingly.
5.3.2.2.3. Amendment to article 9(1)
Article 9(1) of the Rome Statute should be amended to read as follows (amendment in 
bold):
 ‘Elements of Crimes shall assist the Court in the interpretation and application of 
articles 6, 7, 8, 8 bis and 8 ter. Th ey shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the 
members of the Assembly of States Parties.’
5.3.2.2.4. Inclusion of article 15 quater
A new article 15 quater should be included in the Rome Statute as follows:
‘Article 15 quater
Exercise of jurisdiction over crimes against the environment
1. Subject to paragraph 2, the Court may exercise jurisdiction over crimes against the 
environment in accordance with article 13.
2. Th e Court may exercise jurisdiction only with respect to crimes against the 
environment committed not earlier than one year aft er the ratifi cation or acceptance of 
the amendments to articles 5, 8 and 9 that relate to that crime by [thirty] States Parties.
3. Th is article is without prejudice to the provisions relating to the exercise of 
jurisdiction with respect to other crimes referred to in article 5.’
5.3.2.2.4.1. Discussion
Th is new article proposes that the Court can exercise its jurisdiction with respect to 
crimes against the environment in the same ways that it can for the crimes of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes. Th ese are diff erentiated from the unique 
jurisdictional limitations applicable to the crime of aggression, as agreed at the First 
Review Conference in Kampala in May-June 2010, which are specifi ed in articles 15 bis 
and 15 ter of the Rome Statute and which stem largely from the ‘political’ and State-
centered nature of that particular crime. Th ere is no reason to apply those restrictions to 
crimes against the environment; rather the exercise of jurisdiction should be consistent 
with the core international crimes.
Th e only restriction that has been specifi cally included in article 15 quater is set out in 
paragraph 2. Th is specifi es a minimum number of ratifi cations / acceptances by States 
Parties to the various relevant amendments to the Rome Statute before the Court can 
exercise jurisdiction with respect to crimes against the environment. Th is follows the 
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‘formula’ agreed by States Parties aft er they concluded an amendment to the Rome 
Statute that clarifi ed the terms of the crime of aggression,2 although the words ‘not 
earlier than’ have been included to make the provision even clearer.
Whilst this author would prefer that the jurisdiction of the Court over crimes against the 
environment was activated immediately following the adoption of all of the amendments 
to the Rome Statute proposed in this book, in accordance with already accepted practice 
it may be more appropriate to follow this minimum acceptance formula as a pre-
condition. Th e minimum number (30) specifi ed in square brackets is the same as that 
agreed with respect to the crime of aggression.3 However, this need not necessarily be 
the case with respect to crimes against the environment, and the actual number specifi ed 
will ultimately be the subject of further discussion and agreement.
Whatever the fi nally agreed number of required ratifi cations / acceptances, the inclusion 
of article  15 quater(2) will allow a State Party to consider its own position in relation 
to that of other States Parties, and also provide a period of transition for all relevant 
stakeholders before the Court is seized with jurisdiction in respect of the crime.
It should also be noted that additional limitations as to the applicability of articles 5(e) 
and 8 ter to a specifi c State – either a State Party or non-State Party – will arise by virtue 
of the terms of article 121(5) of the Rome Statute, which are referred to in 5.4.
5.3.2.2.5. Amendment to article 20(3)
Th e chapeau of article 20(3) should be amended to read as follows (amendment in bold):
‘No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under 
article 6, 7, 8, 8 bis or 8 ter shall be tried by the Court with respect to the same conduct 
unless the proceedings in the other court’.
2 See Rome Statute, article  15 bis(2). Note, however, the additional temporal limitation with 
respect to the crime of aggression specifi ed in article  15 bis(3). A similar limitation is 
considered neither necessary nor appropriate in relation to crimes against the environment, 
and has therefore not been included in the amendments that are proposed in this book.
3 Ibid, article 15 bis(2).
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5.3.3. PARAGRAPH 3 – NOT INCLUDED IN FINAL 
VERSION OF ARTICLE 8 TER
As noted in the discussion relating to the mental element applicable under article  8 
ter, this provision might be interpreted in certain circumstances as applying ‘absolute’ 
criminal liability with respect to the use of nuclear weapons during the course of 
armed confl ict. Th is author has considered this issue carefully, also taking into account 
the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Legality of the Th reat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion.4 Th is author had initially contemplated the 
inclusion of an additional paragraph (3) in article 8 ter as set out below, but ultimately 
decided that this was not appropriate.
Th e terms of this rejected paragraph are set out below together with a discussion as to 
its eff ect. However, it is stressed that this paragraph is not included in the fi nal version 
of article 8 ter proposed in this book, and is only included here to indicate that this issue 
was not ignored in the draft ing of the fi nal version of article 8 ter.
Paragraph 3 – not included in fi nal version of article 8 ter
 ‘(3) A person shall not be criminally responsible under this article where that 
person has deliberately employed a method or means of warfare as a result of an 
extreme circumstance of lawful self-defence on the part of the State of nationality 
of that person, in which the very survival of that State is at stake.’
5.3.3.1. Discussion
As noted, in 1996, the International Court of Justice rendered a landmark advisory 
opinion, in response to a request transmitted to it under a resolution of the United 
Nations General Assembly,5 which had asked the Court, pursuant to article 96(1) of the 
Charter of the United Nations, to ‘urgently’ render its advisory opinion on the following 
question:6
4 Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226.
5 See United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/75K (15  December 1994) UN Doc A/
RES/49/75 on Request for an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice on the 
Legality of the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.
6 Ibid, preamble para 11.
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 Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under 
international law?
Having concluded inter alia (by 11 votes to three) that there did not exist, either under 
treaty law or customary international law, ‘any comprehensive and universal prohibition 
of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such’, the Court went on to hold (by seven 
votes to seven, with the President’s casting vote determining the ‘majority’) that:7
 [i]t follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in 
armed confl ict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law;
 However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of 
fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude defi nitively whether the threat or use 
of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-
defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake
As noted, there were seven judges who disagreed with this fi nding, as refl ected by a range 
of separate and dissenting opinions by individual judges as part of the Court record. Th e 
conclusions reached by the Court on this point have been the subject of considerable 
comment and criticism.8 Nevertheless, in the years since that Advisory Opinion was 
rendered, no such ‘comprehensive and universal prohibition’ has since been agreed, or 
codifi ed in a legally binding multilateral instrument.
In these circumstances, and noting the very signifi cant environmental consequences 
that would arise from the use of a nuclear weapon, this author considered whether it 
would be appropriate to include in article 8 ter a caveat that, in eff ect, would render a 
person not criminally accountable for such damage if it was caused in the same extreme 
circumstances enunciated in the majority judgment in the Legality of the Th reat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion.9
Given that the ICC ‘shall only have jurisdiction over natural persons’,10 paragraph 
3 would need to be reworded so as to focus on the situation of the ‘State of nationality 
7 [1996] ICJ Rep 226, at para 105 (emphasis added).
8 See, for example, Timothy J. Heverin, ‘Case Comment: Legality of the Th reat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons: Environmental and Humanitarian Limits on Self-Defense’ (1997) 72 Notre 
Dame Law Review 1277; Michael J. Matheson, ‘Th e Opinion of the International Court of 
Justice on the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’ (1997) 91 American Journal of International 
Law 417; Christyne J. Vachon, ‘Sovereignty Versus Globalization: Th e International Court 
of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on the Th reat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’ (1998) 26 Denver 
Journal of International Law and Policy 691; Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Philippe 
Sands (eds), International Law, Th e International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons 
(1999); Erik V. Koppe, Th e Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Protection of the Environment 
During International Armed Confl ict (2006).
9 See also Adam Roberts, ‘Environmental Issues in International Armed Confl ict: Th e 
Experience of the 1991 Gulf War’, in Richard J. Grunawalt, John E. King and Ronald S. 
McClain (eds), Protection of the Environment during Armed Confl ict (1996), 222, 268.
10 Rome Statute, article 25(1).
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of [a] person’ who has employed a method or means of warfare in such a way as might 
otherwise fall within the terms of article 8(1) ter.
It is noted however, that the inclusion of this paragraph would place the Court in the 
position where it may be required to determine whether acts were undertaken as part of 
the ‘lawful self-defence’ of a State. Th is is not a matter that would normally be required of 
a court tasked with determining individual criminal responsibility.
In the end, this author, having considered the possibility of addressing this issue in the 
express terms of article 8 ter, decided instead not to include any exception, in the interests 
of proposing a provision that achieves the goal of eff ectively addressing the intentional 
destruction of the environment during armed confl ict. Paragraph 3 should therefore not 
be considered as part of the proposal for a new sui generis crime of crimes against the 
environment, and has only been included in this Appendix II to indicate that this issue 
was carefully considered by this author in formulating the fi nal terms of article 8 ter set 
out in 5.3.2.1.
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